Providing Location Security in Vehicular Networks

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Gongjun Yan's PhD defense slides. Presented on April 16, 2010 in the Department of Computer Science at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, VA.

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Providing Location Security in Vehicular Networks

  1. 1. Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Providing Location Security in Vehicular Networks Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Gongjun Yan Location Confidentiality Co-advisors: Dr. Stephan Olariu Summary Dr. Michele C. Weigle Computer Science Department Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529 April 26, 2010 1 / 53
  2. 2. Table of Contents Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks 1 Introduction Introduction 2 Related Work Related Work Location Integrity 3 Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary 4 Location Confidentiality 5 Summary 2 / 53
  3. 3. Introduction: Modern Vehicles Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Digital ID and Introduction Wireless Transceiver Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Radar Summary GPS Receiver 3 / 53
  4. 4. Introduction: Modern Vehicles Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Roadside Related Work Infrastructure Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Other Vehicles Summary GPS Transceiver Radar 4 / 53
  5. 5. Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) Providing Location Security in Vehicular Create a Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET). Adhoc Networks Supported by gov, industry, and academic. Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary 1 1 http://www.comnets.rwth-aachen.de/ 5 / 53
  6. 6. Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) Providing Location Security in Vehicular Create a Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET). Adhoc Networks Supported by gov, industry, and academic. Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary 1 1 http://www.comnets.rwth-aachen.de/ 5 / 53
  7. 7. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  8. 8. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  9. 9. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  10. 10. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  11. 11. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  12. 12. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  13. 13. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  14. 14. Vehicular Adhoc Network Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) applications: Introduction Safety: Related Work Collision warning, road sign alarms, merge assistance Location Left turn assistance, pedestrians crossing alert, etc. Integrity Comfort (infotainment) to passengers: Location Confidentiality Intelligent navigation Summary Multimedia, internet connectivity Automatic payment of parking, toll collection, etc. 6 / 53
  15. 15. Applications: TrafficView Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary [Nadeem et al.(2004)] 7 / 53
  16. 16. Location Attack: Intersection Providing Location The line of sight is blocked and you trust only the location Security in Vehicular over VANET. No traffic lights. Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Traffic Direction Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Traffic Direction 8 / 53
  17. 17. Location Attack: Highway Providing Location The line of sight is blocked and you trust only the location Security in Vehicular over VANET. Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Traffic Direction Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Traffic Direction 9 / 53
  18. 18. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  19. 19. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  20. 20. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  21. 21. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  22. 22. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  23. 23. Research Question Providing Location Security in Vehicular Most, if not all, applications rely on locations. Adhoc Networks Research question: How to improve location security? Introduction What do we protect? Related Work Location Right time, right ID, right location Integrity Synchronized time can be obtain from GPS Location Confidentiality What is ID? Summary A unique digital identity Anonymous to drivers/passengers’ identity What is location? location ≡ <latitude, longitude, altitude> Obtained from: transceivers, radar, GPS 10 / 53
  24. 24. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  25. 25. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  26. 26. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  27. 27. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  28. 28. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  29. 29. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  30. 30. Location Security Providing Location Assume: <time, ID, Location> can be attacked. Security in Vehicular What is threat model? Adhoc Networks Dropping Availability Eavesdropping Confidentiality Introduction Related Work Modifying Integrity + Confidentiality Location Replaying Integrity Integrity Location Sybil Attack Integrity Confidentiality Summary Sybil Attack T 11 / 53
  31. 31. Our Solution: Ensure Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) Providing Location Security in Integrity Vehicular Adhoc Unreliable Global Integrity Plaintext Networks routing message Propagation Aggregation Local Integrity Introduction Related Work Location Reliable Routing Location Encrypt/Decrypt Integrity Select Maintain Security Access Control Location Confidentiality Link Model (CIA) Summary Availability Confidentiality 12 / 53
  32. 32. Related Work Providing Location Security in Location integrity: Vehicular Adhoc Digital signatures [Armknecht et al.(2007), Choi et Networks al.(2006)], etc. Introduction Resource: Related Work Radio signal [Suen & Yasinsac(2005), Xiao et Location al.(2006)], etc. Integrity Computational resources [Douceur(2002)], etc. Location Confidentiality Identification [Piro et al.(2006)], etc. Summary Location confidentiality: PKI [Choi et al.(2006), Hubaux et al.(2004), Raya et al.(2006)], etc. Location-based encryption [Denning & MacDoran(1996)], etc. 13 / 53
  33. 33. Related Work Providing Location Security in Location integrity: Vehicular Adhoc Digital signatures [Armknecht et al.(2007), Choi et Networks al.(2006)], etc. Introduction Resource: Related Work Radio signal [Suen & Yasinsac(2005), Xiao et Location al.(2006)], etc. Integrity Computational resources [Douceur(2002)], etc. Location Confidentiality Identification [Piro et al.(2006)], etc. Summary Location confidentiality: PKI [Choi et al.(2006), Hubaux et al.(2004), Raya et al.(2006)], etc. Location-based encryption [Denning & MacDoran(1996)], etc. 13 / 53
  34. 34. Related Work Providing Location Security in Location integrity: Vehicular Adhoc Digital signatures [Armknecht et al.(2007), Choi et Networks al.(2006)], etc. Introduction Resource: Related Work Radio signal [Suen & Yasinsac(2005), Xiao et Location al.(2006)], etc. Integrity Computational resources [Douceur(2002)], etc. Location Confidentiality Identification [Piro et al.(2006)], etc. Summary Location confidentiality: PKI [Choi et al.(2006), Hubaux et al.(2004), Raya et al.(2006)], etc. Location-based encryption [Denning & MacDoran(1996)], etc. 13 / 53
  35. 35. Related Work Providing Location Security in Location integrity: Vehicular Adhoc Digital signatures [Armknecht et al.(2007), Choi et Networks al.(2006)], etc. Introduction Resource: Related Work Radio signal [Suen & Yasinsac(2005), Xiao et Location al.(2006)], etc. Integrity Computational resources [Douceur(2002)], etc. Location Confidentiality Identification [Piro et al.(2006)], etc. Summary Location confidentiality: PKI [Choi et al.(2006), Hubaux et al.(2004), Raya et al.(2006)], etc. Location-based encryption [Denning & MacDoran(1996)], etc. 13 / 53
  36. 36. Contributions Providing Location Security in The main contribution of this dissertation is: Vehicular Adhoc To enhance location security in VANETs Networks Specifically, Introduction 1 Enabling location integrity Related Work 2 Ensuring location confidentiality Location Integrity 3 Including integrity and availability in location security Location 4 Enabling location availability Confidentiality Summary 5 Reducing control overhead 6 Reducing response time 7 New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer 8 New Geolock can compute key dynamically 9 New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors 14 / 53
  37. 37. Location Integrity: Overview Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks The main task: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Location Three sub-solutions: Integrity Location 1 Active integrity: strong assumption (radar, GPS, Confidentiality transceiver) Summary 2 Passive integrity: weaker assumption (GPS, transceiver) 3 General integrity: real world environment 15 / 53
  38. 38. Location Integrity: Overview Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks The main task: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Location Three sub-solutions: Integrity Location 1 Active integrity: strong assumption (radar, GPS, Confidentiality transceiver) Summary 2 Passive integrity: weaker assumption (GPS, transceiver) 3 General integrity: real world environment 15 / 53
  39. 39. Active Integrity: “Seeing is believing" Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary 16 / 53
  40. 40. GPS Location Providing Y Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks ∆y Introduction ∆x Related Work B Location (Xgps, Ygps) Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary X 0 Figure: GPS location. (xgps , ygps ) is a measurement value of the GPS coordinates. For GPS: let measurement error ∆α = ∆x = ∆y , write (x − xgps )2 + (y − ygps )2 ≤ (∆α)2 (1) 17 / 53
  41. 41. Radar Detection Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary For Radar detection: (x − γ × cos (θ − ∆θ ))2 + (y − γ × sin (θ − ∆θ ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2 (2) (x − γ × cos (θ + ∆θ ))2 + (y − γ × sin (θ + ∆θ ))2 ≤ (∆γ)2 (3) θ : the detected angle; γ: the detected radius. For the region FCGHDE: γ − ∆γ ≤ x 2 + y 2 ≤ γ + ∆γ x (4) θ − ∆θ ≤ arctan y ≤ θ + ∆θ 18 / 53
  42. 42. Validating GPS Location Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Validating GPS location means resolutions of: (1) { (2) (3) (4) } The accuracy of this solution is 99.1%. 19 / 53
  43. 43. Validating GPS Location Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Validating GPS location means resolutions of: (1) { (2) (3) (4) } The accuracy of this solution is 99.1%. 19 / 53
  44. 44. Passive Integrity: Statistically remove and refine Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Possible data sources: Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range On-coming vehicles: All neighbors in opposite direction 20 / 53
  45. 45. Passive Integrity: Statistically remove and refine Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Possible data sources: Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range On-coming vehicles: All neighbors in opposite direction 20 / 53
  46. 46. Passive Integrity: Data Input Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks 120 120 100 100 Introduction Position (m) Position (m) 80 80 Related Work 60 60 Location Integrity 40 40 Location 20 Confidentiality 20 Summary 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 N N Figure: Bob’s location collected by Alice (raw vs. filtered) 21 / 53
  47. 47. M-Distance Providing Location Security in Vehicular Mahalanobis distance (M-Distance) introduced by P. C. Adhoc Networks Mahalanobis [Mahalanobis(1936)] Vectors x and y with the covariance matrix V , Introduction M-Distance: Related Work Location Integrity d(x, y ) = (x − y )T V −1 (x − y ). Location Confidentiality Let x: the sample mean vector; Summary V : the sample covariance matrix, 1 n V = ∑ (xi − x)(xi − x)T . n − 1 i=1 (5) 22 / 53
  48. 48. M-Distance Providing Location Security in Vehicular Mahalanobis distance (M-Distance) introduced by P. C. Adhoc Networks Mahalanobis [Mahalanobis(1936)] Vectors x and y with the covariance matrix V , Introduction M-Distance: Related Work Location Integrity d(x, y ) = (x − y )T V −1 (x − y ). Location Confidentiality Let x: the sample mean vector; Summary V : the sample covariance matrix, 1 n V = ∑ (xi − x)(xi − x)T . n − 1 i=1 (5) 22 / 53
  49. 49. M-Distance Providing Location Security in Vehicular Mahalanobis distance (M-Distance) introduced by P. C. Adhoc Networks Mahalanobis [Mahalanobis(1936)] Vectors x and y with the covariance matrix V , Introduction M-Distance: Related Work Location Integrity d(x, y ) = (x − y )T V −1 (x − y ). Location Confidentiality Let x: the sample mean vector; Summary V : the sample covariance matrix, 1 n V = ∑ (xi − x)(xi − x)T . n − 1 i=1 (5) 22 / 53
  50. 50. Intuitive Explanation Providing Location An intuitive explanation: the distance of a test point from the Security in Vehicular center of mass divided by the width of the ellipse/ellipsoid Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Figure: Two-dimensional space. Summary Figure: Three-dimensional space. 23 / 53
  51. 51. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Outliers can change the value of mean and covariance. Introduction We replace the mean x by the median x ∗ and obtain Related Work the robust covariance S. Location Integrity ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )T i=1 S = , (6) Location Confidentiality ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ ) i=1 Summary where X = XV −1 X T , K (u) = exp(−hu), By [Caussinus & Ruiz(1990)], h = 0.1, 24 / 53
  52. 52. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Outliers can change the value of mean and covariance. Introduction We replace the mean x by the median x ∗ and obtain Related Work the robust covariance S. Location Integrity ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )T i=1 S = , (6) Location Confidentiality ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ ) i=1 Summary where X = XV −1 X T , K (u) = exp(−hu), By [Caussinus & Ruiz(1990)], h = 0.1, 24 / 53
  53. 53. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Outliers can change the value of mean and covariance. Introduction We replace the mean x by the median x ∗ and obtain Related Work the robust covariance S. Location Integrity ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )(xi − x ∗ )T i=1 S = , (6) Location Confidentiality ∑n K ( xi − x ∗ ) i=1 Summary where X = XV −1 X T , K (u) = exp(−hu), By [Caussinus & Ruiz(1990)], h = 0.1, 24 / 53
  54. 54. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  55. 55. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  56. 56. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  57. 57. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  58. 58. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  59. 59. Passive Integrity Providing Location Security in The new M-distance Dir : Vehicular Adhoc Networks Dir = {(xi − x ∗ )S −1 (xi − x ∗ )T } (7) Introduction Exclude the deviation caused by the outliers Related Work For multivariate normally distributed data, the values of Location Integrity Dir are approximately chi-square distributed (χ2 ) 2 Location [Filzmoser(2004)] Confidentiality The observations can be abandoned by using the Summary chi-squared distribution (e.g., the 97.5% quantile). The sample mean: ∑N=1 xk ∗ x∗ = k (8) N The accuracy of this solution is 96.2%. 25 / 53
  60. 60. General Integrity: Real World Solution Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Data source: Radar: Radar of observer Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range On-coming vehicles: All neighbors in on-coming direction 26 / 53
  61. 61. General Integrity: Real World Solution Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Data source: Radar: Radar of observer Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range On-coming vehicles: All neighbors in on-coming direction 26 / 53
  62. 62. General Integrity: Real World Solution Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Data source: Radar: Radar of observer Neighbors: All vehicles in the transmission range On-coming vehicles: All neighbors in on-coming direction 26 / 53
  63. 63. General Integrity: Data Input Providing Location Security in Before filtering 90 Neighbors Vehicular Oncoming Adhoc 120 60 Radar Networks Introduction 150 30 Related Work Location N Integrity Location 180 0 Confidentiality 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Location (m) Summary 210 330 240 300 270 27 / 53
  64. 64. General Integrity: Location Measurement Providing Location Neighbors Security in After filtering 90 Oncoming Vehicular 120 60 Radar Adhoc Networks Introduction 150 30 Related Work Location N Integrity Location 180 0 Confidentiality 0 10 20 30 40 Location (m) Summary 210 330 240 300 270 28 / 53
  65. 65. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  66. 66. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  67. 67. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  68. 68. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  69. 69. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  70. 70. General Integrity Providing Location Let: Security in Vehicular X: radar detection Adhoc Networks Y: on-coming vehicle detection Z: neighbor detection Introduction The final estimation of location: Related Work Location ∗ ∗ ∗ Integrity P = w1 ∗ X + w2 ∗ Y + w3 ∗ Z Location Confidentiality where the weights of Summary w1 : radar detection w2 : on-coming vehicle detection w3 : neighbor detection w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 The accuracy of this solution is 94.7% (w1 = 0.4, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.2). 29 / 53
  71. 71. Simulation Methods Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks For simulation, we find the location attackers out of all vehicles. Introduction Related Work Q-Q plot (Quantile-Quantile Plots) [Thode(2002)] Location A commonly used tool in statistics to show the outliers. Integrity Is a kind of graphical method for comparing two Location probability distributions Confidentiality Plots the two distributions’ quantiles against each other. Summary A Q-Q plot is applied to show the Mahalanobis distance vs. normal quantile. 30 / 53
  72. 72. Simulation Methods Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks For simulation, we find the location attackers out of all vehicles. Introduction Related Work Q-Q plot (Quantile-Quantile Plots) [Thode(2002)] Location A commonly used tool in statistics to show the outliers. Integrity Is a kind of graphical method for comparing two Location probability distributions Confidentiality Plots the two distributions’ quantiles against each other. Summary A Q-Q plot is applied to show the Mahalanobis distance vs. normal quantile. 30 / 53
  73. 73. Simulation Methods Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks For simulation, we find the location attackers out of all vehicles. Introduction Related Work Q-Q plot (Quantile-Quantile Plots) [Thode(2002)] Location A commonly used tool in statistics to show the outliers. Integrity Is a kind of graphical method for comparing two Location probability distributions Confidentiality Plots the two distributions’ quantiles against each other. Summary A Q-Q plot is applied to show the Mahalanobis distance vs. normal quantile. 30 / 53
  74. 74. Simulation Settings Providing Location Security in Vehicular Table: Parameters and Values Adhoc Networks Parameters Values Initial traffic density 30 vehicles/Km/lane Introduction The length of the road L 3 Km Related Work Average speed 60 km/h Location The number of lanes 4/direction Integrity The mean error µ 1m Location Confidentiality The deviation of error σ 1m Summary Error ε 3m The sample size n 1000 # of neighbor outliers mn 8 # of opposite outliers mo 2 The weight for radar w1 0.5 The weight for opposite w2 0.3 The weight for neighbors w3 0.2 31 / 53
  75. 75. Neighboring Report Filtering Providing QQ Plot of Reported Location versus standard normal Location 4 Security in Quantiles of Input Sample (Reported Location) Vehicular Adhoc 3.5 Networks 3 Introduction 2.5 Related Work 2 Location Integrity 1.5 Location 1 Confidentiality Summary 0.5 0 -0.5 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Standard Normal Quantiles Figure: Q-Q plot of the Mahalanobis distance for neighboring samples. 32 / 53
  76. 76. All Measurements Estimation Providing Location 15 Security in Vehicular Adhoc 10 Networks 5 Introduction Related Work 0 Y Location Integrity -5 Location Confidentiality Summary -10 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 X Figure: The x-y coordinates of location observation and the location estimation. 33 / 53
  77. 77. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  78. 78. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  79. 79. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  80. 80. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  81. 81. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  82. 82. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  83. 83. Location Integrity: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Introduction Validate the tuple <time, ID, location> Related Work Start with a homogenous model and strong Location assumptions Integrity Improve to a real world solution Location Confidentiality Contributions: Summary Novel idea: active location security Real world solution 34 / 53
  84. 84. Location Confidentiality: Overview Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Denning’s GeoEncryption: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): public key & private key Geolock table 35 / 53
  85. 85. Location Confidentiality: Overview Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Denning’s GeoEncryption: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): public key & private key Geolock table 35 / 53
  86. 86. Location Confidentiality: Overview Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Denning’s GeoEncryption: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): public key & private key Geolock table 35 / 53
  87. 87. Denning’s GeoLock Table 2 Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Geolock table is preinstalled on all the nodes. 2 [Denning & MacDoran(1996)] 36 / 53
  88. 88. Denning’s GeoEncryption 3 Providing Location Recipient Location Generate Recipient Location Generate Plaintext Security in Signature Signature Random Key Random Key Vehicular Adhoc Encrypt Encrypt Location Signature → Location Signature → Key_S Networks ⊕ Geolock Mapping Geolock Mapping ⊕ Geolock Key_E Encrypt Encrypt Introduction GeoEncryption Related Work GeoEncrypted Key Ciphertext Location AntiSpoof Enhanced AntiSpoof Enhanced Key_D Integrity GPS, WiFi or Loran GPS, WiFi or Loran Decrypt Decrypt Receiver Receiver Location Confidentiality Location Signature → Location Signature → ⊕ ⊕ Decrypt Decrypt Geolock Mapping Geolock Mapping Key_S Summary Plaintext GeoDecryption Drawbacks? Both sender and receiver have PKI Pre-deployed mapping tables 3 [Denning & MacDoran(1996)] 37 / 53
  89. 89. Confidentiality: Our Method Providing Location Security in Random Numbers Vehicular Adhoc Key_S Key_C Networks Alice Key_S' Encryption Decryption GeoLock GeoLock Introduction Decryption Key_C Key_E Encryption Related Work Location Wireless Channel E{Key} E{Req} E{Rep} E{Key'} Integrity Location Key_D Decryption Encryption Confidentiality Key_S Encryption Key_C Summary Bob GeoLock Decryption GeoLock Key_S' Key_C Random Number To crack this scheme, attackers must have both location and private key. 38 / 53
  90. 90. New GeoLock Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks V X0 Y0 T Introduction Related Work P P P P Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Mux Summary Hash Key 39 / 53
  91. 91. An Example: New GeoLock Providing Location Security in GPS Coordinates Vehicular Adhoc in Networks Coordinates in Region E 04200 N 91500 Introduction Size Related Work E 042.00 N 915.00 Location Integrity E 042 N 915 Location Confidentiality Mux 042915 Summary Hash SHA(042915) output GeoLock d97e0e02efdb13de05d90abf1a99e8feac134f63 Figure: An example of GeoLock. 40 / 53
  92. 92. Simulation Scenario Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Integrity Location Confidentiality Summary Figure: Decryption region snapshot (Decryption region is not proportionally drawn) Comparing our extension with a geoencryption extension: Al-Fuqaha [Al-Fuqaha & Al-Ibrahim(2007)]. Al-Fuqaha added decryption region prediction algorithm to geoencryption in mobile networks. 41 / 53
  93. 93. Simulation Settings Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Table: The selected environment configuration Name Value Introduction Transmission range 300m Related Work Simulation map Urban Location Integrity Map area 3.2*3.2 Km2 Location Decryption area 100*100 m2 Confidentiality Traffic density 1500 vehicles/hour Summary Average speed 28 m/s Acceleration range [0,2] m/s2 Initial acceleration 0 m/s2 Initial speed 25 m/s Mobility model IDM [Treiber et al.(2000)] 42 / 53
  94. 94. GeoEncryption Decryption Ratio Providing Location As expected, our algorithm can tolerate larger location Security in errors. No. of successful decryption Vehicular Adhoc DecryptionRatio = Networks No. of received ciphertext 1 Introduction Yan Al-Fuqaha 0.9 Related Work Location Integrity 0.8 Decryption ratio Location Confidentiality 0.7 Summary 0.6 0.5 0 2 4 6 8 10 Location error (%) 43 / 53
  95. 95. GeoEncryption Decryption Ratio Vs. Overhead Providing Location As expected, our algorithm Security in Vehicular Has smaller decryption error. Adhoc Networks Has fewer control message. Control overhead (Yan) 1 Introduction Decryption Error (Yan) Control overhead (AlFuqaha) Related Work Decryption error (AlFuqaha) Location 0.8 Integrity Location Confidentiality 0.6 Ratio Summary 0.4 0.2 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Update pause (s) 44 / 53
  96. 96. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  97. 97. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  98. 98. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  99. 99. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  100. 100. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  101. 101. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  102. 102. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  103. 103. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  104. 104. Location Confidentiality: Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular Adhoc Networks Main points: Encrypt/decrypt location information Introduction Location is part of the key: GeoLock Related Work Key exchange is secured by GeoLock + private key Location Integrity Contributions: Location Confidentiality New Geoencryption can operate with only one PKI peer Summary New Geolock can compute key dynamically. New Geolock can tolerate larger location errors. New Geoencryption has lower control overhead. 45 / 53
  105. 105. Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular “Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci) Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Focused on studying location information security Integrity CIA model Location Confidentiality Location availability: A mobility and probability model in Summary VANET communication Location integrity: The active, passive and general models Location confidentiality: The location-based encryption and decryption 46 / 53
  106. 106. Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular “Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci) Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Focused on studying location information security Integrity CIA model Location Confidentiality Location availability: A mobility and probability model in Summary VANET communication Location integrity: The active, passive and general models Location confidentiality: The location-based encryption and decryption 46 / 53
  107. 107. Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular “Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci) Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Focused on studying location information security Integrity CIA model Location Confidentiality Location availability: A mobility and probability model in Summary VANET communication Location integrity: The active, passive and general models Location confidentiality: The location-based encryption and decryption 46 / 53
  108. 108. Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular “Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci) Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Focused on studying location information security Integrity CIA model Location Confidentiality Location availability: A mobility and probability model in Summary VANET communication Location integrity: The active, passive and general models Location confidentiality: The location-based encryption and decryption 46 / 53
  109. 109. Summary Providing Location Security in Vehicular “Art is never finished, only abandoned."(Leonardo da Vinci) Adhoc Networks Introduction Related Work Location Focused on studying location information security Integrity CIA model Location Confidentiality Location availability: A mobility and probability model in Summary VANET communication Location integrity: The active, passive and general models Location confidentiality: The location-based encryption and decryption 46 / 53
  110. 110. Putting The Work In Perspective Providing Location Security in What remains to be done: Vehicular Adhoc Cross layer issues Networks Extensive simulation Introduction Integrate to other research, e.g. privacy Related Work Optimization of the algorithm Location Integrity Real traffic data import Location Confidentiality Test bed implementation Summary Prototype design Applying the research in real applications Theory analysis of the transportation issues Disaster evacuation Data storage in VANET 47 / 53
  111. 111. VANET Applications Providing VANET Applications Location 1. Dangerous road features 1. Curve speed warning, 2 low bridge warning, Security in 3. traffic lights violation warning Vehicular I. Active safety 2. Abnormal conditions 1. Vehicle-based road condition warning, 2. Adhoc infrastructure-based road condition warning, 3. Networks visibility enhancer, 4. work zone warning. 3. Danger of collision 1. Blind spot warning, 2. lane change warning, 3. intersection collision warning, 4. forward/rear Introduction collision warning, 5. emergency electronic brake lights, 6. rail collision warning, 7. warning about Related Work pedestrians crossing 4. Incident occurred 1. Post-crash warning, 2. incident recovery (in- Location surance), 3. SOS service, 4. evacuate people Integrity 1.Support for authorities 1. Electronic license plate, 2. electronic drivers II. Public service license, 3. vehicle safety inspection, 4. stolen Location vehicles tracking, 5. Emergency vehicle warning, Confidentiality 1. Enhanced Driving 1. Highway merge assistant, 2. left turn as- III. Improved driving Summary sistant, 3. cooperative adaptive cruise control, 4. cooperative glare reduction, 5. in-vehicle sig- nage, 6. adaptive drivetrain management 2. Traffic Efficiency 1. Notification of crash, 2. intelligent traffic flow control, 3. enhanced route guidance and naviga- tion, 4. map download/update, 5. parking spot locator service 1. Mobile Services 1. Internet service provisioning, 2. instant mes- saging, 3. point-of-interest notification IV. Entertainment 2. E-Commerce 1. Fleet management, 2. rental car processing, 3. area access control, 4. cargo tracking; 5. toll collection, 6. parking/gas payment 1. E. Schoch, at el, "Communication Patterns in VANETs," IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol.46 48 / 53
  112. 112. Selected Publication Lists Providing Location Journal Security in Vehicular 1. G Yan, S. Olariu, "An Efficient Geographic Location-based Adhoc Networks Security Mechanism for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks", IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation System, 2010. Accepted with minor revision (Impact factor: 2.844). Introduction 2. G Yan, S. Olariu, S. Salleh, "A Probabilistic Routing Protocol in Related Work VANET," International Journal of Mobile Computing and Location Integrity Multimedia Communication, IGI-Global, 2010. Location 3. G. Yan, S. Olariu, M. C. Weigle, "Providing Location Security in Confidentiality Vehicular Ad hoc Networks ", IEEE Wireless Communication Summary Magazine Special Issue On-The-Road Communications, 16(6), pp. 48-53, 2009. (Impact factor: 2.0). 4. G. Yan, S. Olariu, M. C. Weigle, "Providing VANET Security through Active Position Detection", Computer Communications - Elsevier, Special Issue on Mobility Protocols for ITS/VANET, 31(12):2883-2897, 2008. (Impact factor: 0.884) 49 / 53
  113. 113. Refereed Conference Publication Lists Providing Refereed Conference Location 5. G. Yan, S. Olariu, D. B. Rawat, "Provisioning Vehicular Ad hoc Networks with Quality of Security in Service", in Proceedings of The International Workshop on Wireless Sensor, Actuator and Vehicular Robot Networks (WiSARN). Montreal, Canada, June 17, 2010. Adhoc 6. G. Yan, S. Olariu and S. Salleh, "A Probabilistic Routing Protocol in VANET", in Networks Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Advances in Mobile Computing and Multimedia (MoMM2009), 14-16 December 2009, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 7. G. Yan, M. C. Weigle and S. Olariu, "A Novel Parking Service Using Wireless Networks," In Proceedings of the International 2009 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations, Introduction Logistics and Informatics (SOLI 2009), July 22 - 24, 2009, Chicago, IL, USA, The Best Related Student Paper Award. Work 8. G. Yan, S. Olariu, "An Efficient Geographic Location-based Security Mechanism for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks," In Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Location Trust, Security and Privacy for Pervasive Applications (TSP). Macau, October 12-14, 2009. Integrity 9. G. Yan, X. Chen, S. Olariu, "Providing VANET Position Integrity Through Filtering," In Proceedings of the 12th International IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems Location (ITSC2009). St. Louis, MO, USA. Accepted, October 3-7, 2009. Confiden- 10. G. Yan, Y. Wang, M. C. Weigle, S. Olariu and K. Ibrahim, "WEHealth: A Secure and tiality Privacy Preserving eHealth Using NOTICE," In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE). Dearborn, 2008. Summary 11. G. Yan, S. Olariu, M. C. Weigle and M. Abuelela, "SmartParking: A Secure and Intelligent Parking System Using NOTICE," In Proceedings of the International IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC). Beijing, October 2008, pp. 569-574. 50 / 53
  114. 114. Selected Book Chapters Providing Location Security in Book Chapters Vehicular 12. G. Yan, K. Ibrahim and M. C. Weigle, "Vehicular Network Adhoc Networks Simulators," In Vehicular Networks: From Theory to Practice, S. Olariu and M. C. Weigle, Eds. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2009. 13. G. Yan, S. El-Tawab, and D. B. Rawat, "Reliable Routing Introduction Protocols in VANETs," In Advances in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Related Networks: Developments and Challenges, Mohamed Watfa, Ed. Work IGI Global, 2009. Location 14. G. Yan, S. Olariu, D. B. Rawat, W. Yang, "E-Parking: A Integrity Electronic Parking Service Using Wireless Networks". in Location E-Business Issues Challenges and Opportunities for SMEs: Confiden- Driving Competitiveness, M. Manuela Cruz-Cunha and João tiality Eduardo Varajão, Eds, IGI Global, 2010. Summary 51 / 53

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