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Under Secretary of the Navy's presentation at the MCPON's 2012 Leadership Mess Symposium.

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  • Active 3/4 Star Flag Officer Symposium
  • Mcpon

    1. 1. Department of the NavyThe Emerging Strategic Environment and the U.S. Navy: Where do we Stand? Hon. Robert O. Work MCPON Leadership Mess Symposium 26 Sep 2012
    2. 2. Sometimes, it’s good to take a break… Declining OCO Sequestration Declining toplineDoN 6-month CR
    3. 3. Part I: Understanding where we areI take …a ‘GPS approach’ to strategy…. The firstthing you have to understand about the historicalmoment is where we are.” Ralph Peters, 2007 3
    4. 4. Prior National Security Policy Eras• Continental Era (July 4, 1776-December 29, 1890; 1374 months) – Primary national security challenge: deter, defeat, or frustrate any intervention of foreign powers in either the newly formed United States or, later, the entire western hemisphere; screen our steady expansion to the limits of our continental borders; secure the continent from internal threats; and preserve the Union – No entangling alliances; expeditionary posture…out-of-hemisphere engagement through naval forces only – Dominant service: Army (if not always in budget, in stature) – 181 months at war (48 months with each other); ratio of number of months at war to number of months at peace: 1:6.59 4
    5. 5. Prior National Security Policy Eras (II)• Oceanic Era (December 30, 1890-March 12, 1947; 674 months) – Primary national security challenge: Solidify position as a hemispheric hegemon and secure the maritime approaches to the hemisphere; use a secure hemispheric base to project joint power beyond the North American continent for the first time – We fought with allies and foreign partners overseas, but on our own terms; we continued to avoid foreign alliances – Expeditionary posture, but with first external bases—all on US sovereign/ controlled territory – Dominant service: Navy (in terms of world naval rankings) – 108 months at war; war-to-peace ratio: 1:5.24 5
    6. 6. Prior National Security Policy Eras (III)• Transoceanic (Eurasian) Era, aka, the Cold War (March 13, 1947-May 12, 1989; 506 months) – Primary national security challenge: Lead a global coalition to contain/deter a hostile ideological continental peer located across the oceans – Many entangling alliances; garrison posture, with large numbers of external US bases on foreign soil around forward defensive perimeter – Nuclear Warfighting Phase (1947-1960): Dominant service: Air Force (in strategy, budget) – Flexible Response Phase (1961-1988): no dominant service; PPBS and the “1/3-1/3-1/3” rule o 1/3 rule later solidified with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols – 138 months at war; war-to-peace ratio: 1:2.67 6
    7. 7. With the end of the Cold War, we entered a fourth national security policy era• Global Era (May 13, 1989-present; 271 months…and counting) – With the Cold War won, we began to slowly return to our more traditional expeditionary global posture, with most US combat power resident in the continental US or on US-controlled external bases – Even as we reduced or disassembled our overseas garrisons, however, leaders from both parties were determined to remain engaged forward in order to maintain global stability and peace, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and enlarge the community of democratic nations – In support of these key national security aims, the 1993 BUR called for a force structure capable of fighting and winning two regional wars in overlapping timeframes o Perhaps more importantly, however, the BUR established the principle that the U.S. military would be an important national instrument for actively “shaping” the international environment in peacetime 7
    8. 8. Global Era (con’t)• Global Era (May 13, 1989-present; 280 months…and counting) – The BUR strategy, updated in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010, ultimately led to notions of preventive war, armed nation building, and rebuilding failed states as an sanctuary denial strategy – It also led to an unprecedented level of military activity that has continued to this day – On Aug 31, 2012, we will have seen 138 months at war; war-to-peace ratio: 1:1.03 (and assuming we cease combat ops in Afghanistan in Dec, 2014: 1:0.85) o Most active period of military activity in our country’s history o Next most active period: between the start of the Transoceanic Era (March 12, 1947) and end of the Vietnam War (January 27, 1973), a 310-month long period which saw 137 months at war, for a war-to-peace ratio of 1:1.25 8
    9. 9. Given the amount of military activity, the Global Era has seen unprecedented defense spending levels (Dollars in Billions) Iraq/Afghan 800 701.6 700 Korea 688.0 633.4 622.9 Reagan Buildup 600 Vietnam 551.8 533.6 530.9 500 400 371.5 369.7 300 200 187.9 100 0 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 14 16 17Fiscal Year Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars Projections (red bars) assume OMB guidance plus OCO placeholder of $70B in FY14, trending to $20B in FY17 2
    10. 10. With this as backdrop, last year the President announced a 10-year plan to renew our economy• This announcement signaled the start of the fifth broad defense “build- down” since the end of World War II – And an accompanying “strategic review” to inform the required budget decisions• DoD received successive savings targets: – Initially: $400 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over 12 years ($33Bn/yr) o At this point, each MILDEP was told to prepare an Alt POM that cut $49Bn over FYDP – Then: $400 billion in cuts over 10 years ($40Bn/yr) – Then: $464 billion in cuts over 10 years ($46.4Bn/yr) – Finally: $489 billion in cuts over 10 years ($48.9Bn/yr) o Front-loaded, with $263 billion in cuts in first FYDP ($52.6Bn/yr) o Forced OSD to sweep the entire Alt POMs of all three MILDEPs, and to delay making “buy-backs” until after the completion of the strategic review 10
    11. 11. However, it would be a big mistake to think of this as a simple budget drill• As President Obama said: – “[We have] failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. Our prosperity provides a foundation to our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy.” – “…I’d encourage all of us to remember what President Eisenhower once said — that “each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.” After a decade of war, and as we rebuild the source of our strength — at home and abroad — it’s time to restore that balance.” 11
    12. 12. Bottom line: getting our economic house in order is now a strategic imperative• “Today, our foreign and economic relations remain indivisible. Only now, our great challenge is not deterring any single military foe, but advancing our global leadership at a time when power is more often measured and exercised in economic terms….[E]verywhere I travel, I see countries gaining influence less because of the size of their armies than because of the growth of their economies…A strong economy has been a quiet pillar of American power in the world. It gives us the leverage we need to exert influence and advance our interests. It gives other countries confidence in our leadership and a greater stake in partnering with us.” 12
    13. 13. Simply put, we are seeking a different, more sustainable path for continued US global leadership (Dollars in Billions) Iraq/Afghan 800 Korea 701.6 700 688.0 633.4 Post- OIF/OEF 622.9 Reagan Buildup FY10 - 17: -24% Vietnam 600 Post-Korea Post-Vietnam 551.8 Post- Cold War 533.6 530.9 FY52 - 56: -40% FY68 - 76: -30% FY86 - 98: -33% 500 400 371.5 369.7 300 Cold War: “Forever War” 200 187.9 506 months, 271 months, 138 months at 130 months at 100 war war 1 month at war for (and still 0 every 2.67 counting)Fiscal Year 50 52 54 56 58 months at peace 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 W:P ratio falls to 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 14 16 17 1:1.08 Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars Projections (red bars) assume OMB guidance plus OCO placeholder of $70B in FY14, trending to $20B in FY17 2
    14. 14. Military power will not be any less important in the coming decade…but its role is changing in National Grand Strategy“The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced. But when we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or act without partners, then our military is overstretched, Americans bear a greater burden, and our leadership around the world is too narrowly identified with military force.” 14
    15. 15. Part II: Priorities for 21st Century Defense“This country is at a strategic turning point after adecade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a JointForce for the future that will be smaller and leaner,but will be agile, flexible, ready, andtechnologically advanced. It will have cutting edgecapabilities, exploiting our technological, joint, andnetworked advantage…It will remain the worlds finestmilitary. President Barack Obama, 2012 15
    16. 16. We are assuming our more normal Global Expeditionary Posture Alaska 3Alaska rd Wing UK 4th Airborne (2 Sqdns) and Germany 48th Fighter Wing Germany 2nd Stryker 354th and (1 Sqdn) (3 Tactical Sqdns) 1st Stryker 52nd Cavalry Wing Fighter Fighter Wing Brigades (1 Tactical Sqdn) Regiment Italy Japan 173rd Airborne Korea 35th Fighter Wing Brigade 8th (2 Sqdns) and (2 Tactical Sqdns) Italy 31st Fighter Wing 51st (2 Sqdns) (2 Tactical Sqdns) Fighter Wings South Korea Okinawa 8th Army 18th Wing (2 Tactical Sqdns) Guam 36th Wing Hawaii Hawaii (No Tactical Sqdns) 25th15th Wing Infantry(1 Tactical Sqdn) Division U.S. Air Force Laydown U.S. Army Laydown 16
    17. 17. “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent—if possible with a smaller nuclear force.• Sustain freedom of access throughout the global commons.• Sustain US global freedom of action even in the face of increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area-denial threats.• Rebalance the focus of U.S. military forces toward the Asia-Pacific region.• Rely on non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability to reduce the demand for significant troop commitments to nation-building or stability operations. 17
    18. 18. “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”(II)• Develop a long-term strategic partnership with India, to support its role as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the Indian Ocean.• Maintain U.S. and allied military presence in—and support of— partner nations in and around the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but with less emphasis on large numbers of boots on the ground.• Reduce our land-based posture in Europe while increasing forward- stationed naval forces there• Pursue innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives in Africa and Latin America. Hard to imagine a more maritime friendly strategy, or one 18 that calls for more expeditionary excellence
    19. 19. Part III: Implications for the Navy“To enable economic growth and commerce, America,working in conjunction with allies and partners aroundthe world, will seek to protect freedom of accessthroughout the global commons—those areas beyondnational jurisdiction that constitute the vitalconnective tissues of the international system. Globalsecurity and prosperity are increasingly dependent onthe free flow of goods shipped by air and sea.” Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 19
    20. 20. The Navy is particularly well-aligned with the emerging strategic environment“If a service does not possess a well-defined strategicconcept, the public and the political leaders will beconfused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to thenecessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to theclaims made by the service upon the resources of thesociety.” Samuel P. Huntington, 1954 20
    21. 21. Departments/services well aligned to the strategy will inevitably do well in resource allocation fights• Three key elements of any service: ₋ Strategic concept: a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security. ₋ Organizational structure: how the service groups the resources allocated by society…most effectively to implement the strategic concept. Thus the nature of the organization is likewise dependent upon the nature of the strategic concept. ₋ Resources: fiscal, technological, institutional, and human capital 21
    22. 22. Department of the Navy’s strategic concept• As part of a combined National Fleet, the Navy-Marine Corps Team is an expeditionary force for an expeditionary age—built and ready for war, and operated forward to preserve the peace ⁻ The Navy-Marine Corps Team is the world’s preeminent expeditionary organization – Core competencies: o High readiness o Distributed, networked operations o Disaggregated, networked operations o Low-cost, innovative, unobtrusive presence o Partnership building – Key guarantor of access to maritime global commons – Key guarantor of access to combat theaters, even in face of anti- access/area denial threats – Ideally matched for challenges in PACOM and CENTCOM 22
    23. 23. The “National Fleet” is the sum total of US maritime capabilities and capacities• Navy Battle Force• US Marine Corps• US Coast Guard• Navy and Marine Corps air• Maritime Patrol and Recon Force• NECC• Navy-Marine SOF/Cyber• Special Mission Fleet• Prepo Fleet/Surge Sealift• Ready Reserve Force 23• Industrial base partners
    24. 24. Navy’s organizational construct: “Total Force Battle Network”• Used to be known as FORCEnet: the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force.• Sensor grid(s) ₋ Tied into National/Joint Grid ₋ Navy Multi-band Terminal• C5I grid(s) ₋ CANES ₋ Jointly Interoperable ₋ TENTH FLT; MARFORCYBER• Effects grid(s) ₋ Joint Network-enabled Weapons (JNEW) 24
    25. 25. TFBN: Key design principles• Optimize the network, not the platform: Modular missile batteries (VLS) ₋ “All platforms sensors; all sensors netted” Modular platforms ₋ Sensors and payloads take precedence over platforms (“trucks”)• Design for rapid capabilities insertion – Open architecture combat systems – Modular, open architecture missile batteries UAVs – Flexible payload space• Build energy-efficient platforms with: Helos ₋ Smaller crews (automation) ₋ Air and surface interfaces PBs USVs• Field multiple manned and unmanned “second- RHIBs stage” (off-board) systems ₋ Helos + UAVs UUVs ₋ USVs + RHIBs + Boats ₋ UUVs 25• Develop network-enabled weapons
    26. 26. TFBN Battle Force emphasizes self-deployable, multi- role/mission platforms with reconfigurable payload bays and open combat systems Medium Large X- XX- Large Multi-mission Large Small Multi-role/multi-missionMulti-role 26
    27. 27. A globally distributed, fully netted force 27
    28. 28. People: our true secret weapon High School Diploma Grads, % AFQT Category I – IIIA (Score of 50+), % Unprecedented quality , unequalled talent 28Source: CNRC, MCRC, OSD(P&R)
    29. 29. The Navy-Marine Corps Team: An Expeditionary Force for an Expeditionary Age Norway MCPP-N Kodiak WHEC Poland Seattle Aegis WHEC Ashore Alameda Norfolk NSC Norfolk CFFC Romania Japan WHEC MDZ-Lant MARFORLANT Aegis Ashore CVN Amphibs Japan Naples DDG MCM MDZ-Pac CLNC Rota 6th Fleet 7th Fleet So. CA CG LCS San Diego Charleston MEF II DDG Okinawa 3rd Fleet WHEC WHEC Naples Bahrain III MEF I MEF Guam 4th Fleet 5th Fleet LCSHawaii Hawaii MCM MEB SSN PACFLT DDG WHEC PC MPSRON ASMARFORPAC CG WPB Diego Garcia Singapore MPSRON AS LCS Australia MAGTF BAMS Orbit P-8 MOB & FOB P-8 & BAMS CSL USMC Forward-Stationed&Operating Bases (MOB & FOB) P-8 Main and Cutters & AccessOrbits Locations (CSL) USCG ForwardMAGTFs & Defense Zones Laydown USN Fleet MARFOR Pre-Positioning USN / USCG Maritime Laydown MajorBAMSForward-Stationed P-8 & BAMS Contingency Support Port UAS Agreements
    30. 30. Given all that happening, it is easy to think the wheels are starting to come off…Declining budgets… Chief’s Mess …Reduced manning… …Shrinking O&M… Navy6-month CRLooming sequestration 30
    31. 31. But, by and large, US navy is very well positioned for the emerging strategic environment• As part of a combined National Fleet, the Navy-Marine Corps Team is an expeditionary force for an expeditionary age—built and ready for war, and operated forward to preserve the peace ⁻ The Navy-Marine Corps Team is the world’s preeminent expeditionary organization 31
    32. 32. Discussion and QuestionsUnder MCPON 32
    33. 33. This posed a stiff challenge to the DON, since the base budget build-up was not nearly as substantial as the headlines suggested FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 Total Funding $111 $112 $110 $116 $121 $141 $138 $149 $161 $162 $173 $172 $179 $179 $173 Baseline Funding $111 $112 $110 $115 $121 $129 $132 $135 $138 $137 $148 $153 $161 $161 $158 $159 $159 $160 $162 54% increase in total 200 40% increase in baseline 180 45% increase in baseline 19 19 15 25 19(Constant Year FY11) 160 Billions of Dollars 22 26 140 12 15 0 6 1 72 69 66 67 68 69 70 120 63 67 46 51 51 54 55 100 44 38 40 37 43 80 40 42 43 44 46 47 48 46 47 47 60 38 41 38 39 39 33 34 34 33 40 20 40 39 38 38 39 43 42 44 44 43 43 44 45 45 46 45 45 44 44 0 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 MilPers O&M Investment OCO 33
    34. 34. Indeed, the build-up was just large enough to help mask some serious structural budget problems which forced many “hard choices”• For example, the cost to maintain an AVF rose by about 20-28% since FY98 – Cost per Sailor FY98: $70,822 – Cost per Sailor FY10: $83,656 (+ 18%) – Cost per Marine FY98: $56,727 – Cost per Marine FY10: $68,753 (+ 21%)• Only reason Departmental manpower costs rose only about 10% was because we reduced active duty end strength: – DoN active duty end-strength FY98: 555K – DoN active duty end-strength FY10: 531K (-24K) o Navy end strength dropped by over 40K 34
    35. 35. We also had to shift money to maintain (aging) equipment• Overall, the DON share of topline devoted to O&M rose by about 40%• Maintenance funding per ship FY98: $13.5M Maintenance funding per ship FY10: $22.3M (+ 65%)• Maintenance funding per a/c FY98: $226K Maintenance funding per a/c FY10: $383K (+ 73%)• Partly reflected the fact that we decommissioned ships and aircraft and slowed procurement, causing equipment to age – Avg age per ship increased from 17.91 to 21.70 yr – Avg age per a/c increased from 15.76 to 18.74 yr 35
    36. 36. Very high fleet optempo also contributed to higher O&M costs (and was wearing out the force faster than expected)• Ship operations FY98: $2.67B Ship operations FY10: $4.64B (+ 74%) 40-45% of fleet deployed! (compared to about 25% in the Cold War)• Air operations FY98: $2.95B Air operations FY10: $5.04B (+ 71%)• Marine Corps operations FY98: $2.17B Marine Corps operations FY10: $5.14B (+ 137%) 36