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In this scientific talk I shall address a marginal topic in Luhmann’s work: that of emotions. Several authors have criticised not only the secondary role emotions play in Luhmann’s theory, but also his out of date (and flawed) description of emotions, since they are undifferentiated visceral activations of the organic system and processed latter by the psychic system (and latter by the social system), or they are collapsed in the symbiotic mechanisms that coordinate the relation between human bodies and social systems. My aim here is to review some elements established in the scientific literature of emotions, so we can go beyond the vague and narrow description of emotions present in Luhmann’s account, although I shall be faithful to his broader theoretical commitments. My proposal is that emotions can be understood as an instance of structural coupling among organic, psychic and social systems. Specifically, I maintain that emotions represent a threshold domain in which the normative expectations of social systems are bundled together with states of consciousness, in the form of beliefs that affirm individuals are entitled to have the right emotion in some interaction system, and the consequent bodily processes. To advance my proposal, I will focus on some of emotions and their relation to moral and legal norms. I will also tackle one of the most important body substrata of emotions: the human face.