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Williams 2010 W Globaliz Vs Darul Islam As Pubd

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Effects of tension between globalization from the West and values of Islam in Southeast Asia.

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Williams 2010 W Globaliz Vs Darul Islam As Pubd

  1. 1. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’][p 27] Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao =+=+=+= Mark Stephen Williams *1IntroductionAS HISTORY RECORDS THE HUMAN DILEMMA OF VARIOUS PEOPLES strivingto adapt to the material and physical environment around them, these differencescontribute to nuance changes in these human cultures and to the social forces constitutingthe framework by which each society abides. The world situation of despair anddestruction resulting from the aftermath of World War II fostered an environment forrealizing the Anglophile dream echoed by Woodrow Wilson 25 years earlier – ‘to makethe world safe for democracy.’ The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 led to thecreation of those institutions that would engineer and guide the post-World War capitalistWest, and those colonies gaining independence, into a coordinated world politicaleconomy1 to ensure member development and protect its interests against otherhegemonies vying against it – namely, the Soviet bloc. While this engineering was touted as being culturally and socially neutral (due, asit was thought, to the invisible-hand characteristic of laissez-faire capitalism), variousallies of the West (with different social and religious structures) were finding itchallenging to fit into the mold of what is now known as the Western globalizationparadigm. This challenge has become more acute due to the fall of the Iron Curtain in theearly 1990s – since this has [p 28] allowed the so-called sleeping-giant of Islam to wakefrom its slumber, especially from under the tyranny of Soviet communism in Asia. Whilemuch has been written, and continues to be broadcast over various media, regarding theresurgence of Muslim hegemony in the Middle East and Central Asia, this essay willfocus on the response and reaction of Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao to*1 [p 141] Mark Stephen Williams is an ethnohistorian, cultural anthropologist, and Islamicist by training.He completed two A.B. degrees at the University of California in San Diego (UCSD) in History andPolitical Science. In 1989, Mr. Williams completed the Certificate Program in Islamic Studies at theWilliam Carey International University in Pasadena, California. Serving with a mission organization in thedecade of the 1990s, Mr. Williams pursued the M.A. degree in Intercultural Studies at Biola Universitynear Los Angeles, California, finishing in 2002. Returning to service in the southern Philippines as amissionary anthropologist and ethnohistorian, Mr. Williams is now conmpleting the Ph.D. in DevelopmentStudies at the Ateneo de Davao University. In addition to other duties and dissertation research, he servesas Adjunct Professor of Islamics at Koinonia Theological Seminary, also located in Davao City. 1
  2. 2. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]the phenomenon of Western globalization in their midst. First, it is prudent to understandsome historical aspects of the development of the region, especially as the insularperiphery found itself becoming part of the world of Islam several hundreds of years ago.The Realm of Malay Islam in Southeast AsiaWhen speaking of this region, the reference is directly to “the Malay race of SoutheastAsia [which] includes primarily the people of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines”(McAmis 2002, 3). Since Indonesia is well-known to tourists for the resort area of Baliand the Hindu influences there, it is sometimes forgotten that this vast archipelago ishome to the largest singular Muslim population in the world, nearly 200 million inIndonesia alone2 – more than in Arabia, or India, or any one Central Asian country.Despite occasional spitefulness about Southeast Asian Islam being less pure than that ofits Middle East progenitors, Malay Muslims have always been confident in their positionin the greater Islamic ummah (community-of-faith) within the realm of dar-ul Islam(world-of-peace). Using Mindanao as representative of the Malay Muslim positiontoday, “the concept of Dar-ul Islam (household of Islam) demands that state authoritymanifests and reflects Islamic principles and ideals. [The] secular nature of the[Philippine] Republic does not echo the Muslim experience. That is why most Muslimsthink that to be truly Muslim is to have an Islamic state” (Alejo, et al, n.d., 122; italics inoriginal). This defines dar-ul Islam well from the Southeast Asian Muslim viewpoint. For hundreds of years since their Islamization, the Malay Muslim sultanates ofinsular Southeast Asia were formidable and extensive in their regional trade relations(Laarhoven 1989, 25-27, 46ff). Especially during the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, sultanates flanking the South China Sea were active in creating an internationaltrade network known as the ‘Sulu Zone.’ Three water-borne routes led into the heart of the Sulu zone. The Chinese began with the Sulu Sea, an extension southward from their trade entrepots in the Philippines, but they also navigated across the South [p 29] China Sea through the Palawan passage, while the Bugis mariners sailed north through the Celebes Sea into the zone. In this context, if one ignores traditional political boundaries and views these seas as unifying rather than divisive agents – ‘great connectors’ – strategically extending across the region’s key shipping routes, a strong case could be made for regarding the zone as one of the final, albeit critically important, extremities of the world capitalist economy in eastern Asia. (Warren 2000, 4) The history of this area is indeed replete with contact of many Asian peoples byEuropeans – the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch and the English – because ofextensive stores of spices and other desirable organic products. Seeking to corner themarket in this regard, the Europeans sought to make exclusive trade arrangements – or tocolonize the desired island areas – with greater military technology at their disposal. 2
  3. 3. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’] What do Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, and Indonesia have in common? First, they were all subject to foreign colonial subjugation except Thailand. Colonialism disrupted traditional political, economic, social and ethno-religious patterns, particularly the predominant role of Islam. (Palmier 2005, 1-2) This was not, then, an economic rivalry along the lines of a Marxist dialectic; bothhegemonic forces involved in this area espoused capitalist economies and means ofproduction. The difference, which from the outset seemed strictly religious in nature,involved two opposing cultural outlooks: Islam – the acculturated worldview andpolitical economy of choice; and, Western (European) colonialism – the aggressive,imperialism of non-Muslims, the kafir (infidels); those who hailed from dar-ul Harb(world-of-war).The Machinery of Western Globalization in East and Southeast AsiaHow did the West come to dominate this Eastern regional trading network? There is nodenying that European colonialists were imperialistic in their entanglements in both LatinAmerica and Asia. The Dutch were probably the most beneficent of these Europeancolonizers in Southeast Asia. Theirs was much more of a business relationship(especially with Ternate near Moluccas), vis-à-vis the vehicle of the Dutch East IndiaCompany, or VOC as it is known in the literature (Laarhoven 1989, 4-22; cf. Ty n.d., 5).Other Europeans and the Americans (in lieu of interests in integrating Mindanao with therest of the Philippines) [p 30] were less beneficent, and left legacies of typical colonialabuse, racism (Ty n.d., 4) and tyranny. Fast-forward now nearly fifty years after the Spanish-American War in the mid-twentieth century. With the apparent success of rebuilding war-torn nations in Europeunder the Marshall Plan and through the World Bank after World War II, the U.S.-ledeffort of instituting the policies and frameworks of the Bretton Woods institutions in EastAsian countries was into full-scale implementation by the beginning of the 1950s (cf.Todaro 2000). Encouraged by the success of this program in post-War Europe, theBretton Woods engineers convinced certain developing countries of Southeast Asia tosubscribe to the ideal that laissez-faire capitalism and free-market mechanisms wouldspur on the best growth in these recovering economies. This is because export successes…provided the primary impetus for arguments by…the World Bank and the IMF…that…economic growth is best served by allowing market forces, free enterprise, and open economies to prevail…. Unfortunately, the reality of the East Asian cases does not support this view…. In…Singapore…[for example], the production and composition of exports was not left to the market but resulted as much from carefully planned intervention by the government. (Todaro 2000, 503) Today, the result is a polarization between the guardians of the Westernglobalization machinery and those nations which were supposed to benefit – and improve 3
  4. 4. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]– through the use of those institutions. Attention has focused more on “…the question ofsocial cohesion and domestic governance in East Asian societies…” (Fukasaku & Duval2005, 4) than on evaluating the mechanisms under which these countries are subjected.The arrogant confidence of the West in regards to its globalization approach, then, hascreated a veritable crisis of leadership in certain East Asian recipient nations:“[G]lobalization has posed serious challenges to governance in East Asian countries.Crises in development have greatly eroded the legitimacy of the existing politicaleconomic model, while East Asian governments’ failure to overcome the crisis hasbrought about political instability” (Chung 2002, 20). While losing face in the challenge of operating and surviving under thismachinery leads to much social and cultural consternation, especially among Muslimpopulations, the fact that the West is imposing its imperial will over these SoutheastAsian societies is a stronger cause for alarm: [p 31] Globalization has transformed the environment in which the actors live and compete [by implementing]…the challenge of adapting to global standards. In order to participate in the global economy and the world community, nations and firms are required to act in accordance with globally accepted rules and norms. Certainly, pressures from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and powerful states like the United States play a major role. (Chung 2002, 22-23) Even before the full effects of the Asian financial crisis were felt at the end of thetwentieth century, Western globalization was exerting pressure on the whole Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In veritable patron-client fashion, there was theannouncement of the creation of “ASEAN + 3” (Ohno 2002, 8n4) – those three othernations being Japan, China and South Korea. This occurred because the states andgovernance statutes of those three nations is perceived to be more stable – stability asmeasured by the Western globalization paradigm.Same Hegemony, Different PersonaMany commentators on the state of Islam, since the end of World War II and the formalcolonial period, make a comment similar to McAmis concerning the “…challenge ofresurgent Islam…” (2002, iii). What has not been voiced directly but only implied in theliterature is the diametrically opposite resurgence of Western imperial colonialism in theguise of Western globalization. The empirical – indeed, imperial – nature ofglobalization was mentioned a few years ago: “Globalization refers to a bundle ofprocesses that continue to change the world we live in and the way we live in it. Thereare historical antecedents to some of the processes described by globalization,…whenthere appeared to be a limited number of transnational totalizing discourses shaped by theempires that sustained them” (Bouma 2004, ix). Similar to the superior military power of the European colonialists of old is thepressure of the superior economic power now being exerted by the Bretton Woodsinstitutions in enforcing a veritable imperial will of the globalization paradigm: 4
  5. 5. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’] Preferring the term ‘imperialism’ implies a focusing on patterns of economic, political and cultural power…. [O]ne of the constituents of the new imperialism is the process of accumulation by dispossession through a combination of coercion and consent enforced by the international [p 32] financial system and organized state power…. The cultural imperialism thesis thus relates not merely to the spread of Western values through the media, but more significantly to a fundamental reorganization of local cultures that is linked to economic liberalization, neo-liberalism, and imperialist formations of global capital. (Harindranath 2006, 144) In classic Chinese or European theatre, the actor would put on one or moredifferent masks (persona, in Latin) in order to characterize a different part played in eachsuccessive Act. Likewise, the Western hegemony ‘actor’ has worn the mask ofcolonialism before World War II and, now, wears the mask of globalization in thiscurrent generation. The persona are different, but the Western hegemonic paradigm isthe same.Not Just the Economy – It’s About the ‘Territory’Market economics has always entailed the aspect of geography: organic products aregrown in specific geographic locations; markets and storehouses take up geographicspace; cargoes are transported geographically over land or over sea. Whereas this isseemingly automatic in market capitalism (perhaps another virtue of the invisible-handcharacteristic) and virtually undetectable, geography takes a much more prominent placein the whole ethos of Islam, not just in economic activities. The cardinal Muslim concept of dar-ul Islam is treated as mere ideology by 3some, but its central tenets clearly reveal it as a concrete concept of occupying territory –territory that belongs to, and is of, Allah, the one true God. In principle, when a certainarea, or ‘territory,’ is completely inhabited by Muslims, then it is considered dar-ulIslam, which is translated more literally as “abode of Islam” (Gowing 1979, 202) or“territory of Islam” (Che Man 1990, 44). More than just a philosophical platitude, then,striving to keep or expand dar-ul Islam involves willingness on the part of faithfulMuslims to occupy land and peoples in the name of Allah so that the hegemony of Islamwill prevail. Islamic resurgence will increase the dar-al-Islam (household of Islam) and decrease the opposition in the dar-al-harb (household of war). The requires jihad (struggle for the faith) and da’wa (mission to the world). The ultimate goal of resurgence is to bring the whole world under the controlling influence of Islam. (McAmis 2002, 73)[p 33] From older to newer Western empires, the thrust has always been to champion theempire and lessen the allegiance to the locality where the citizens lived. For example,Palestine and Spain in the time of the Roman Empire were under Pax Romana; and, 5
  6. 6. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]South American lands and peoples, and the Philippines, were under the Spanish Empire –a veritable Pax Hispanica. This totalizing discourse has not changed purpose under theWestern globalization paradigm either; instead, it has just changed its name:“supraterritoriality” (Scholte 2000, 16). This term means that there will be anoverarching entity over existing territory which will be considered more important, as inthe case of Pax Romana. A different term that is also used in the literature, whichindicates the same situation, is deterritorialization. The emphasis in the second term ismore on the overarching entity and less on the territory over which it reigns supreme. Deterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of the modern world, since it brings laboring populations into the lower class sectors and spaces of relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated and intensified senses of criticism or attachment to politics in the home-state. Deterritorialization, whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians or Ukranians, is now at the core of a variety of global fundamentalisms, including Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism. (Appadurai 2000, 106) Appadurai’s analysis is critical for understanding McAmis’ comment that jihadwill be used, and is, by Muslims in defense of dar-ul Islam. The fact that Westernglobalization can be perceived as yet another hegemonic threat to the realm of dar-ulIslam, as colonialism was in centuries past, provides the backdrop to some of theresponse and reaction to globalization from these three Malay Muslim regions.Reaction and Response to Western Globalization from the Malay Muslim RealmMalaysia Given the history of the Islamic presence and sultanate structure of government inwhat is now known as the nation of Malaysia, the following assessment of the “impact ofglobalization” (in the aftermath of the late-1990s Asian financial crisis) is not surprising:[p 34] [It is true that] Malaysia tapped heavily into the economic drivers of globalization in order to develop the country. At the same time, it does not mean that Malaysia embraced globalization without reservations, as the government did not utilize strictly ‘market-friendly’ policies in certain sectors while protecting others, sometimes temporarily, for the sake of national interest. (Siew-Yean 2004, 63) Despite Western globalization’s dictum in regards to subscribing to liberal-democratic ideals in political economy, the admission here is most revealing due to thetension that we have witnessed already of dar-ul Islam versus Western ideals forglobalization. In keeping with the more authoritarian, Islamic framework of politicaleconomy practiced in the Malay Muslim world (in juxtaposition to Western 6
  7. 7. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]globalization), it again comes as no surprise that politics is as authoritarian as economicsin Malaysia. On one so-called Asian side, the power of the state relying on military power and an ethnic group is more important than the exercise of rights by political groups. We see this in Malaysia, where the Malay Muslim ethnic and religious majority is predominant…. These authoritarian regimes argue that the specific situation in Asia politically, culturally and traditionally required a monolithic power in order to achieve economic development alongside political stability…. (Soubert 2004, 171) In the West’s desire to have hegemonic control over all member-nationsparticipating in this experiment in globalization, Malaysia’s experience with Westernglobalizing ‘development’ would make those espousing liberal democracy flinch indisbelief. Development in Malaysia is called “command capitalism” [as opposed to laissez- faire capitalism]. Among its characteristics are these: (a) development follows the path of capitalism and is implemented from the top almost by force, with most decisions made by a few leaders and implementations undertaken by the same circle of close associates, and without much participation from the bottom; and (b) several laws and regulations in stark violation of basic human rights are perpetuated presumably in order to create an atmosphere of stability…. (Osman 2004, 133) In light of this assessment, it is a wonder that the Bretton Woods institutions havenot stepped in to reprimand this member that is seemingly not [p 35] obeying the rules.Interesting is the admission that Malaysia’s challenge “to sustain the development” willcome through “…regional cooperation, especially at the ASEAN [BIMP EAGA]4 level,[which] will enhance Malaysia’s capabilities to meet this challenge” (Siew-Yean 2004,78). The region’s legacy bodes against the liberal-democracy ideal of Westernglobalization, which is not surprising at all.Indonesia Perhaps due to the world-renown of Bali, most people are initially surprised tofind out that Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world by population.Historically, the Islamic influences came alongside of the Hindu but, eventually, theMuslim forces circumvented and displaced those vestiges (in all but Bali today). Arabs started arriving in Indonesia as far back as the 4th century…. In the 14th century the Mohammedans [i.e., Muslims] consolidated their hold on Gujerat in India and began to expand their trade considerably in Indonesia. This was the beginning of the archipelagos Islamic period. 7
  8. 8. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’] Islam caught on in far northern Sumatra first, then spread to Java…. In 1478, a coalition of Muslim princes attacked what was left of the Hindu Majapahit Empire, and Islam was here to stay. (Dalton 1991) One of the evident ways that Indonesian Islam expresses itself in digression to thestated Western liberal-democratic ideal is in the understanding of the socio-politicalconcept of rasa – [For post-colonial Indonesia in the mid-1960s],…Suhartos attempt to project a dignified role as the leader of the state also involved an almost ritualised dominance in political life for himself and his family. At times his rule was viewed as being similar to that of a Javanese king…. This may seem to be an exaggeration, but viewing the public supplication of members of the government and family at the knees of head-of-state Suharto reminds us that such rituals also enforce hierarchy and send a powerful signal of political dominance to the public. (Ferguson 2002, 4) Similar to Malaysia, then, Indonesia has accepted certain tenets of Westernglobalization on her own terms. In reporting on the “unrealized potential” of“globalization” in “the Indonesian economy,” Rice & Sulaiman (2004) [p 36] applaud the“openness” of the Indonesian government in allowing the Bretton Woods institutionswork to alleviate problems caused by the 1997 Asian economic crisis. They are baffled,however, at the apparent lack of willingness on the part of the Suharto government (in thelate-1990s) to welcome the complete Western globalization paradigm as the panacea tomany problems. Rice & Sulaiman (2004, 80, 81) mention internal factors preventingsuch wholesale adoption, seemingly without understanding the implied reasoning therein: Globalization has both caused difficulties and created opportunities for the Indonesian people…. The crisis in 1997 ‘forced’ Indonesia to request assistance from the International Monetary Fund…. Although IMF influences on the Indonesian government have favoured foreign direct investment and international trade, domestic factors have adversely affected the investment climate and stymied foreign direct investment…. Later, their comment that “…export to the global market is being realized, butmuch more could be done” (2004, 89) indicates a misunderstanding for reticence on thepart of Indonesia. Once it is realized that Indonesia sees herself as part of dar-ul Islam inSoutheast Asia, the confusion fades away. Because Indonesia was forced to ask for helpfrom the machinery of Western globalization, she has virtually ‘lost face,’ causing thetension between globalization and dar-ul Islam to mount there.Mindanao (Philippines) Recalling the discussion above about the Western persona, perhaps no otherinsular nation in Southeast Asia has experienced the full assault of Western colonial 8
  9. 9. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]power as the Philippines. Historical accounts are replete with the capitulation of Luzonand the Visayas to the colonial demands of the Spaniards through to the end of thenineteenth century; only Mindanao Muslims withstood the imperial onslaught of Spain(though that too seemed imminent in the late-nineteenth century5). With the coming ofthe Americans in the first-half of the twentieth century, promises were made to theMuslim bangsamoro peoples of Mindanao (i.e., the Bates Treaty) but were leftunfulfilled in order to further designs for all regions of the Philippine archipelago –especially Mindanao – to come in line with ‘national integration’ policies emanating fromManila. While historical records differ on both sides – from the Luzon / VisayanKristyano view of untrustworthy Moros, to the bangsamoro view of being [p 37]disenfranchised from their own homeland – there is no dispute that neglect occurred. Thequestion is, rather, did it happen by commission or omission? The Moroland is rich of natural resources and mines, aside from the fertility of its soil, yet quite behind in economic development because of being neglected by the Manila government. Since annexation of the Moroland by the Philippines, a vast amount of Pesos is being generated by the crusade Philippine government out of the Moro wealth on the account of the Moros themselves. (Zahir 1998) In this climate of tentative trust between Muslims and non-Muslims in thePhilippines comes an all too familiar solution from the camp of Western globalization:give them a ‘Marshall Plan’ to bring peace and development to the war-torn areas ofMindanao. [T]he US government appears receptive to long-term assistance toward peaceful and progressive Mindanao, which it could use as a model for future programs for “strife-torn Islamic societies”…. [This new] Marshall Plan could be applied to the whole of Mindanao region, but Ople said it would be focused on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao…. [E]uropean countries and Japan have played an important role in Mindanao’s development. We envision their continued participation in an over-all plan to rebuild the region,” [Foreign Minister] Ople said. (Vargas & Corpuz 2003) While many others have reported on this already, this encapsulates the ongoingtension that exists between those stakeholders representing bangsamoro interests – theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Development Agency(BDA), etc. – and those wanting to bring Mindanao into line with the rest of thePhilippines regarding integration and subscribing to the globalization dogma of Westerndevelopment through the assistance of the Bretton Woods institutions.ConclusionIn anthropological fashion, then, it would be easy to resort to a structural dichotomistexplanation (a la Levi-Strauss) to account for the apparent polarization between Western 9
  10. 10. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]globalization and dar-ul Islam. Even a statement from a recent Brookings Institutionpublication admits that “Islam’s quite rapid diffusion from Arabia across Asia to what isnow Indonesia was a clear instance [p 38] of globalization…” (Keohane & Nye 2000, 2)– and this furthers the idea that this tension is simple and reductionistic. Indeed, this notion of simplicity translates to downplaying the idea thatimpositions and cultural-imperialism are inherent to the nature of the Westernglobalization paradigm. Citing the phenomenon of American pop culture as radiating“soft power” but not possessing the quality of hegemony due to “hybridization,” anotheressay from that Brookings publication makes this pronouncement: The United States, perhaps the most intensively hybridized state on the planet, has not been remaking the world in its image during this period, but it has consolidated and maintained a preponderant position as the single greatest generator of culture intended for worldwide consumption. (Rosendorf 2000, 126). But this is where the Brookings Institution downplays the reality of Westernglobalization’s “preponderant position.” Another think-tank in the United States, theRAND Corporation, is more forthcoming in revealing some reasons for the apparenthegemonic thrust in Muslim Malay territory, on the part of this Western paradigm: Southeast Asia derives its geopolitical importance from the region’s location at the crossroads between the concentration of industrial, technological, and military power in Northeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the oil resources of the Middle East, and Australia and the Southwest Pacific. A high proportion of the trade of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, including much of their oil imports, transits the straits and sea-lanes of communication in Southeast Asia. From a military perspective, these sea-lanes are critical to the movement of U.S. forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. (Rabasa & Chalk 2001, 1). Whereas American pop culture emphasizes the (so-called) benign effects ofglobalization’s soft-power, truer motivations for the polarizing hard-power of Westernglobalization now become clear. Phrasing a question in the same way as RobertChambers (who asked ‘Whose Reality Counts?’ in his 1997 publication), anxiousMuslims are asking ‘whose culture counts?’ This is because of a corollary query: ‘Whyshould we Muslims believe that Western globalization will offer a “worldwide culture” towhich we can subscribe?’ [p 39] Instead, in their view, it is Muslims, living under theideal of dar-ul Islam, who will truly generate the godly culture intended for the wholeworld by those serving Allah. Inherent in these types of questions, therefore, is fuel for such issues mountingbetween Western globalization and Islam. Similarly, it is these questions that sparkdiscussion and reaction to Western hegemony from the Malay Muslim world of insularSoutheast Asia – a reaction that will not seem to dissipate anytime soon. 10
  11. 11. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]Endnotes1 “As the emerging countries gravitated towards the UN system [formally ratified in 1948], theleading governments increasingly relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and theInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) [also known as the World Bank]to push their agenda. [These are] the Bretton Woods institutions…. The IMF was conceived byJohn Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the two pillars of the Bretton Woods meeting, asthe guardian of global liquidity, a function that it was supposed to fulfil by monitoring membercountries’ maintenance of stable exchange rates…. [T]he IBRD was, as its name implied, set upto assist in the reconstruction of the war-torn economies, particularly those of Western Europe…”(Bello 2006, 36).2 “The fact is that there is a common feeling of solidarity among the Muslims of the Malay worldwhere, after all, Islam is the predominant religion. Muslim Filipinos have a strong sense of thissolidarity, and though numerically a minority in the Philippines they do not in any way sufferfrom a minority mentality. They are geographically concentrated in a homeland that iscontiguous across shallow seas with the predominantly Muslim nations of Malaysia andIndonesia. They thus readily identify with the Muslim majority of the Southeast Asian islandrealm…” (McAmis 2002, 5n3).3 Gowing sometimes referred to the concept in ideological terms (1979, 101 & 102). Onedisillusioned Filipino Muslim author has written: “[T]he theory of dar-ul-Islam which demandsthe unity of all Muslim believers under one government and in one territory is denied in practice.Dar-ul-Islam has not prevented the dissolution of Pakistan nor cemented the fractious MiddleEastern Islamic powers. The theory may continue to exist in theological and philosophicaltreatises, perhaps even in political propaganda, as happens sometimes. But in the real world thereare many social forces that cannot be controlled by ideologies be they religious or utopian”(Casiño 1976, 136; italics in original).4 “[The Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP EAGA)will]…give Mindanaoans and Palawenos the opportunity to renew [p 40] cultural and ethnic tieswith their East ASEAN neighbors and build upon historical trade ties that date back to the 17thcentury. (Cultural affinity is seen as a strong binding force for BIMP EAGA, an element that isabsent in the other growth areas of Asia.)” (MEDCo 2004).5 “The Spanish tactic of establishing forts to sever the local channels of communication,beginning with Zamboanga in the sixteenth century, reached its full spread [before the end of thenineteenth century]” (Ileto 2007, 109).References CitedAlejo, Fr. Albert E., SJ, et al. n.d. Mapping of Indigenous Governance Practices in Mindanao (Project Research Team Report). Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University.Appadurai, Arjun. 2000. Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. In Readings in Contemporary Political Sociology. ed. Kate Nash. 100-114. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.Bello, Walden. 2006. Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (Philippine Edition). Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 11
  12. 12. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]Bouma, Gary D. 2004. Preface. In Globalization in the Asian Region: Impacts and Consequences. eds. Gloria Davies and Chris Nyland. ix-xii. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.Casiño, Eric. 1976. The Jama Mapun: a changing Samal society in the southern Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.Chambers, Robert. 1997. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. London: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd.Che Man, W.K. 1990. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.Dalton, Bill. 1991. Indonesia Handbook. Jakarta: Moon Handbooks Indonesia, http://www.wiedenhoff.nu/indones/part1.htm (accessed: August 18, 2005).Fukasaku, Kiichiro and Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval. 2005. Policy Coherence of OECD Countries Matters: Evidence from East Asia. Policy Insights 4(January):1-7, http://www.oecd.org/dev/insights (accessed: February 25, 2007).Ferguson, R. James. 2002. The Rasa of Leadership in Contemporary Asia: The Nexus of Politics, Culture and Social Performance. Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies 5(1):1-29, http://www.international- relations.com/wbcm5-1/WBRasa.htm (accessed: October 12, 2005).Gowing, Peter G. 1979. Muslim Filipinos – Heritage and Horizon. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.Harindranath, Ramaswami. 2006. Perspectives of Global Cultures. New York: Open University Press.[p 41]Ileto, Reynaldo C. 2007. Magindanao 1860-1888: The Career of Datu Utto of Buayan. Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc.Chung, Jin-young. 2002. Globalization and East Asia: Challenges to Governance and Its Developmental Future. East Asian Review 14(4):19-41.Laarhoven, Ruurdje. 1989. Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2000. Introduction. In Governance in a Globalizing World. eds. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue. 1-41. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCo). 2004. Significance, Vision, Goal and Objectives. Mindanao Economic Development Council. http://www.medco.gov.ph/medcoweb/bimpsign.asp.McAmis, Robert D. 2002. Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.Ohno, Kenichi. 2002. The East Asian Experience of Economic Development and Cooperation. Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), http://www.grips.ac.jp (accessed: February 27, 2007).Osman, Sanusi. 2004. Economic Development and the Creation of National Culture and Identity in Malaysia. In Development Anthropology: Beyond Economics. ed. Yasushi Kikuchi. 120-137. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. 12
  13. 13. Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism, and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]Palmier, Leslie. 2005. Islam the Protector. American Diplomacy April 29, http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive=68&num=18000&printer=1 (accessed: August 18, 2005).Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1344/index.html (accessed: September 13, 2007).Rice, Robert C. and Idris F. Sulaiman. 2004. (Case Study 1) Globalization and the Indonesian Economy: Unrealized Potential. In Globalization in the Asian Region: Impacts and Consequences. eds. Gloria Davies and Chris Nyland. 80- 91. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.Rosendorf, Neal M. 2000. Social and Cultural Globalization: Concepts, History, and America’s Role. In Governance in a Globalizing World. eds. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and John D. Donahue. 109-134. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.Scholte, Jan A. 2000. Globalization: A Critical Introduction. London: Macmillan.Siew-Yean, Tham. 2004. The Impact of Globalization on Malaysia. In Globalization in the Asian Region: Impacts and Consequences. eds. Gloria Davies and Chris Nyland. 63-79. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.[p 42]Soubert, Son. 2004. “The Anthropological Role in the Reconstruction and Development of Cambodia,” in Kikuchi, Yasushi (ed.), Development Anthropology: Beyond Economics. pp. 164-173. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers.Todaro, Michael P. 2000. Economic Development (Eleventh Edition). Singapore: Pearson Education Asia Pte, Ltd.Ty, Rey. n.d. Colonialism and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. http://www.seasite.niu.edu/crossroads/ty/COLONIALISM_%20IN_SE%20ASIA. htm.Vargas, Anthony and Jowie Corpuz. 2003. Marshall Plan for Mindanao development in the works. Manila Times March 28, http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/mar/28/metro/20030328met1.html (accessed: January 13, 2005).Warren, James F. 2000. The Global Economy and the Sulu Zone: Connections, Commodities and Culture. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.Zahir, Sheikh Abu. 1998. The Moro Jihad: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines. Nidaul Islam 23(April-May), http://www.islam.org.au/articles/23/ph1.htm (accessed: January 27, 2005). 13

Effects of tension between globalization from the West and values of Islam in Southeast Asia.

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