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Tuition Rising:    Why College Costs          so Much          Ronald Ehrenberg          Cornell University          For a...
Cost Pressures on Tuition                                        living and learning environment to attract students,     ...
1997, it was $2,700. Private institutions have had to             mounts, and unilateral reduction of costs in a number of...
“ the shared system of  across activities (e.g., teaching, research, etc.). The  center covers central costs and allocates...
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Tuition rising - why college costs so much (by ronald ehrenberg of cornell university)


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Tuition rising - why college costs so much (by ronald ehrenberg of cornell university)

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Tuition rising - why college costs so much (by ronald ehrenberg of cornell university)

  1. 1. Tuition Rising: Why College Costs so Much Ronald Ehrenberg Cornell University For at least a century, tuition at selective private colleges and universities has risen annually by two to three percent more than the rate of inflation. It wasn’t until the 1980s, though, that tuition growth began to regularly outstrip growth in median family income. During the 1990s, endowments grew enormously as a result of the booming stock market, leading many observers to wonder why tuition needed to be raised at all. Ronald Ehrenberg, Irving M. Ives Professor at Cornell University and director of the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, discusses a number of forces that put upward pressure on tuition, and recommends several steps institutions can consider to help hold down their costs.
  2. 2. Cost Pressures on Tuition living and learning environment to attract students, they are likely to agree.Over 30 years ago, William Bowen, now president ofthe Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, attributed tuition At public institutions, trustees often do not have controlrising faster than the rate of inflation primarily to the over tuition levels and state appropriations—the politicalnature of the educational process, which did not permit process often makes such decisions. Administrators at theacademia to share in the productivity gains that caused public institutions often can make hard decisions to bal-earnings growth in the rest of society. Today, several ance budgets because they can always blame the cuts onadditional forces continue to put upward pressure on state government. In contrast, administrators at privatetuition. institutions often find that all blame for cutbacks is“Winner-Take-All” SocietyThe objective of selective academic institu- “ t op institutions havetions is to be the best they can in every aspectof their activities. They aggressively seek out chosen to maintain and increaseall possible resources and put them to usefunding things they think will make thembetter. To look better than their competitors, quality largely by spending more,the institutions wind up in an arms race ofspending to improve facilities, faculty, stu-dents, research, and instructional technology. not by increasing efficiency,Meanwhile, students and their familiesincreasingly want to buy the best: the fraction reducing costs,of our nation’s top students, as measured bytest scores, who choose to enroll in selectiveprivate institutions has increased substantially or reallocating funds ”over time. Research suggests they are wise todo so, because the economic return to attending a selec- assigned to them. Rather than risk the goodwill of thetive private institution is large, and increasing. faculty, whose support they need to effectively govern,With long lines of high quality applicants flocking to they are more likely to agree to raise tuition than taketheir doors, top institutions have chosen to maintain and other actions to provide budget relief.increase quality largely by spending more, not by increas-ing efficiency, reducing costs, or reallocating funds. Federal Government Policies The federal government has contributed to the cost pres-Shared Governance sure on selective private institutions in at least three ways.The shared system of governance between trustees, First, the Justice Department’s breakup of the collectiveadministrators, and faculty almost guarantees that selec- agreement of several elite institutions to target theirtive private institutions will be slow to react to cost pres- financial aid to students with the greatest need has led tosures. Trustees are often successful business people who the increased use of merit aid and more expensive finan-know how to cut costs and meet budget constraints. But cial aid packages. Second, the value of the maximumif the president tells them that they need to spend Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG) has notmoney to maintain the strength of the university in a kept pace with inflation. Viewed in 1997 constant dol-particular field, or that they need funds to enhance the lars, in 1975, the maximum BEOG grant was $4,000; in 29
  3. 3. 1997, it was $2,700. Private institutions have had to mounts, and unilateral reduction of costs in a number of make up the difference in the form of institutional finan- areas is untenable. cial aid, putting more pressure on tuition. Finally, the cost of doing research has skyrocketed in recent years as Appointment and Evaluation of Deans the government has put pressure on private research uni- While the president or provost typically makes appoint- versities to reduce their indirect costs rates, and, at the ments, searches for deans are often conducted by com- same time, raised its expectations for matching funds in mittees comprised primarily of faculty from the relevant grant applications. college. Once in office, if a dean is successful at fund rais- ing and external relations, and maintains faculty support, External Actors it is difficult for a provost or president to penalize or While valuable to selective institutions in a number of remove the dean for failing to cooperate in university- ways, alumni also tend to discourage institutions from wide initiatives. Thus, central administrators have limit- cutting almost anything by threatening to withhold ed power to influence the actions of deans, whose inter- contributions. Academic institutions also face cost ests most often lie with their own colleges rather than the pressures from local governments. Obtaining required broader institution. permits for construction or to develop properties often requires complex negotiations, frequently lead- How Universities Organize Themselves ing to increased financial payments to local govern- How institutions are organized for budgetary purposes ments to compensate them for the institution’s tax- can have a significant impact on their ability to control exempt status. Environmentalists and historical costs. Universities use four broad types of resource alloca- preservationists, too, can slow down projects and tion methodologies, as follows: increase costs much more so than for a for-profit firm: unlike the university, the business firm has the option • Central Control. Nearly all revenue flows directly to to pack up and move. the central administration, which covers costs and then allocates some portion of the remaining revenues back to the individual colleges. Published Rankings of Institutions • Tubs. Each college keeps the revenue it generates, It has been shown that when an institution’s ranking in U.S. including tuition, and is responsible for all costs that News & World Report improves, the number of applicants it incurs. Funds are remitted to central administra- increases and the percentage of applicants accepted decreas- tion only to cover allocated shares of central costs. es, while yield and freshmen test scores increase, and the • Tubs with a Franchise Fee. Each college is a tub, but amount of financial aid that must be offered to enroll the remits more than its share of central costs; this “fran- class decreases. As a result, institutions have every incentive chise fee” is allocated back to the colleges at the discre- to improve their ranking. To the extent that the rankings are tion of the central administration. partially based on how much an institution spends educat- • Activity Driven. Each college remits to the center ing each student, pressure to increase such spending a share of its total expenditures; the share differs“ how institutions are organized for budgetary purposes can have a significant impact on their ability to control costs ” 30
  4. 4. “ the shared system of across activities (e.g., teaching, research, etc.). The center covers central costs and allocates excess funds back to the colleges without explicitly hav- governance between ing calculated central costs for each unit.The results of a survey of research and doctorate institu- trustees, administrators,tions that I conducted in 1999 indicate that central con-trol is by far the most prevalent form of organization,with 63 percent of the privates and 92 percent of the and faculty almostpublics arranged as such. Less than 10 percent of the pri-vates were organized as tubs, and this form was mostprevalent in private research I institutions. In practice, guarantees that selectivehowever, at nearly half of the institutions under centralcontrol, year-to-year percentage changes in the allocation private institutions willof revenues to colleges did not vary much across colleges.De facto, it appears that the colleges are being treated astubs at these institutions. be slow to react to costThe tub model reduces central administration’s controlover resources and the actions of deans. It is not the pressures ”best form to use to improve efficiency and controlcosts, as what is in the best interests of the individualunit is not necessarily in the best interests of the uni-versity. To provide incentives for colleges to raise rev- Further, colleges and universities must assume the mind-enues and hold down costs, as well as contribute to the set of growing by substitution, not by expansion. Andoverall efficiency of the university, variants of the tubs finally, institutions must increase cooperation with theirwith a franchise fee model or the activity driven mod- competitors. Consortia to share academic and adminis-els are the preferred alternatives. trative resources both within campus and across institu- tions promise significant savings in a number of areas.Conclusion Clearly, tuition increases need not—and, indeed, given the changes sweeping throughout higher education, can-Selective private colleges and universities can take several not—march on inexorably for another century.actions to moderate their tuition increases. The resourceallocation method an institution uses can have consider-able effect on its ability to control costs. In the same vein, Ronald Ehrenberg is the Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrialdeans should be held responsible for the well being of the and Labor Relations and Economics at Cornell University, direc-institution as a whole, not just for their individual col- tor of the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute, and co-lege. Trustees and alumni, too, need to be educated to director of Cornells Institute for Labor Market Policies. He alsolook beyond their special interests. In private institutions, served for three years as Cornells vice president for academictrustees can play a crucial role in backing efforts on the programs, planning, and budgeting. Ehrenberg has authored orpart of presidents and provosts to control costs. co-authored over 100 papers and books. 31