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bankruptcy testing analysis

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bankruptcy testing analysis

  1. 1. BANKRUPTCY TESTING ANAL- YSIS Presentedby Group 4:  Nguyen Thi Thu Ha  Pham Quang Huy  Quan Thi Hanh Mai  BachHong Nhung National Economics Unviersity - Ha Noi August 2011
  2. 2. 2 TABLE OF CONTENT CHAPTER 1: Introduction ............................................................................ 3 A. Background........................................................................................ 4 B. Objectives........................................................................................... 4 C. Literature Review.............................................................................. CHAPTER 2: Methodology............................................................................ A. Moody................................................................................................. B. S&P..................................................................................................... C. Varizi’s Model ................................................................................... D. Altman Z-score .................................................................................. CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS............................................................................... A. Qualitative Analysis .......................................................................... B. Moody Analysis ................................................................................. C. S&P Analysis ..................................................................................... D. Z-factor Analysis ............................................................................... E. Varizi’s Model Analysis.................................................................... CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION .......................................................................
  3. 3. 3 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND Nowadays, the risk associated with engaging in international relationships have increased sub- stantially, and become difficult to analyze and predict for decision makers in the economic, financial and political sectors. The field of risk assessment and risk management is becoming increasingly more important in every facet of business. Financial risk management is a process to deal with the uncertainties resulting from financial markets. It involves assessing the financial risks facing an or- ganization and developing management strategies consistent with internal priorities and policies. Addressing financial risks proactively may provide banks with a competitive advantage. The ability to ability to estimate the likelihood of a financial loss is highly desirable. However, standard theories of probability often fail in the analysis of financial market because risks usually do not exist in isola- tion, and the interaction of several exposures may have to be considered in developing an under- standing of how financial risk arises. These interactions are difficult to forecast, since they ultimately depend on human behavior. Besides, the process of financial risk management is an ongoing one; strategies need to be refined when the market and requirements change. Refinements may reflect changing expectations about market rates, changes to the business environment, or changing interna- tional political conditions. In this paper, we will identify the key issues for the bankruptcy. Three subjective banks selected for this study are Maritime bank, Nam A Bank and Trust Bank. The data were collected in the time period of three years, from 2008 to 2010. http://www.msb.com.vn http://www.nab.com.vn http://trustbank.com.vn
  4. 4. 4 B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH Our study focuses on two main purposes. The first one is to identify the major signals of financial distress which lead to the bankruptcy of Vietnamese banks. When measuring the riskiness and providing bankruptcy alarm for these banks, we will provide both qualitative risks analysis (identi- fied based on the market, government policies, all factors that do not involve numbers) and quantita- tive risks analysis (found using numbers from financial statements). Four different methodologies are used to analyze the performance of the banks, which are Moody’s financial ratios, Standards and Poor’ financial ratios, Z-score model and Vaziri’s model. The second purpose of this study is to determine which of these four models is the most efficient, which model gives more alarming signals for the bankruptcy of the banks so that banks can use that model as strategy to limit the effect of risk. C. LITERATURE REVIEW Banking stability and systematic crises (Andrew Crockett) Research on risk measurement and systemic risk-related issues, the focus of the conference, has progressed substantially since 1995, when the first in this series of conferences was held. At the first conference, centre stage was taken by the value-at-risk (VaR) methodology, which was then gaining ground in academia and at leading financial institutions. Some papers explored how risk could be quantitatively measured and what the meaning of such measures would be. Shortly thereafter, in 1997, the Asian crisis erupted, triggered by and itself triggering events that were beyond the bounds envisioned by standard VaR methodology. As a result, discussions at the second conference in 1998 very much focused on the implications of the Asian crisis for risk measurement methodologies as well as market microstructure theory’s lessons for market dynamics in times of stress. In his opening remarks, Andrew Crockett explained the rationale for the focus of this third con- ference and its emphasis on questions relating to the nature and sources of market liquidity, recent advances in risk measurement methods, sources of banking crises and contagion effects across re- gions and markets. As for the first two conferences in the series, the goal was to foster the exchange between the policy and research communities. To this end, the co-organisers brought together a broad mix of attendees: academics, public sector officials and industry professionals as well as cen-
  5. 5. 5 tral bank staff. Overall, the conference generated a set of interesting discussions which sought to both assess and further the current state of knowledge on issues related to risk measurement and sys- temic risk and to identify areas of policy interest and for future research. These discussions focused on three broad topics, which are summarized below under three headings. Diamond and Dybvig, in their seminal paper, present a theory of banking based on liquidity risk sharing, with banks emerging as providers of the required liquidity insurance. They show how, under asymmetric information, bank runs can emerge in such a fractional reserve banking system. Howev- er, while allowing for the possibility of bank runs, the Diamond/Dybvig (DD) model is not able to explain the causes of banking crises: bank runs, in their world, are essentially self-fulfilling prophe- cies or “sunspot” events. Extensions of the DD model, as surveyed by Allen and Gale’s contribution to this proceedings volume, have therefore introduced uncertainty about asset returns to proxy for the impact of the business cycle on the valuation of bank assets. In these models with aggregate shocks to asset re- turns, financial crises are driven by fundamentals. Shocks to asset returns, by reducing the value of bank assets, raise the possibility of banks being unable to service their commitments. Depositors, an- ticipating such difficulty, will tend to withdraw their funds early, possibly precipitating a crisis. Despite its widespread use in theoretically analyzing financial instability, the DD model and its various extensions do not provide a completely plausible description of actual patterns of banking crises. Runs by depositors are rare. Therefore, banking crises have more typically started when the interbank supply of credit was sharply cut or withdrawn. In addition, a purely bank-centric approach to systemic risk may no longer be appropriate, given that financial markets tend to play a significant role as propagation channels for disturbances involving the banking system and the real economy. This is why Yutaka Yamaguchi, in his luncheon address, set out the need for any comprehensive analysis of systemic risk to go beyond the narrow confines of the banking system, to cover the inter- relations between the banking system, financial markets and the real economy. Indeed, one of the recurring themes of the conference was that much of the literature on banking crises and contagion, the topics of the first two conference sessions, remained overly focused on a set of specific assump- tions and modelling conventions. As a result, while being more tractable, these models have provid- ed only limited analytical assistance to the policy community. In the latest version of their 1998 model, the main focus of the first presentation at the joint re- search conference, Allen and Gale introduce a market for long-term assets into the analysis, enabling
  6. 6. 6 banks to liquidate these assets. Contrary to the original DD model, liquidation costs are therefore en- dogenous. As a result, asset markets provide a transmission mechanism that serves to channel the effect from the liquidation of assets by some banks to other banks in the economy. If a sufficient number of banks are forced to liquidate their assets and the demand for liquidity rises above a certain level, asset prices will move sharply. This may, in turn, force other banks into insolvency and exac- erbate the original crisis. As a result, the model, compared with earlier theories, provides a more real- istic explanation of how and why financial crises may develop. It also highlights the importance of asset market liquidity for the evolution and, eventually, the avoidance of financial crises. Carletti et al, in their presentation, tackled another major shortcoming of many analyses based on the traditional Diamond/Dybvig approach: the failure to recognize the role of interbank credit. In their model, banks compete in the loan market, while the interbank market serves as an insurance mechanism against deposit withdrawals due to liquidity shocks. This setup enables the authors to in- vestigate the influence of bank mergers on reserve holdings and the interbank market and, ultimately, aggregate liquidity risk. Mergers affect bank balance sheets via increased concentration and poten- tially enhanced cost efficiency, while also altering the structure of liquidity shocks. The model high- lights the importance of functioning interbank markets for financial stability and sheds some light on potential trade-offs between antitrust and supervisory policies. In the discussion, some conference participants commented on the practical relevance of the model. In particular, it was noted that now- adays central banks were usually ready to provide liquidity elastically to accommodate temporary fluctuations in liquidity. Given this willingness, it was argued, bank liquidity crises would be of lim- ited importance. However, it was felt that the paper generated important insights into how mergers might affect liquidity in the money market and, by extension, how this would influence the execution of monetary policy operations. The final presentation of the first conference session, which is summarized in Giannetti’s contri- bution to this volume, shifted the focus to the emerging markets. Specifically, she argued that under- developed financial markets, characterized by a lack of transparency, and easy access to foreign capi- tal can help to explain overlending and crisis phenomena in emerging financial markets. According to Giannetti, overlending due to investor moral hazard, that is the existence of explicit or implicit guarantees, is merely a special case of a broader crisis model. In her model, based on incomplete in- vestor information on the average quality of investment opportunities and the existence of soft budg- et constraints due to capital inflows, bank-financed investors will rationally not require a risk premi- um until losses become substantial, even without guarantees on deposits. Based on this insight, the
  7. 7. 7 paper suggests that well developed capital markets, by increasing the number of creditors, can elimi- nate excessive reliance on bank-firm relationships and soft budget constraints, which will reduce the probability of financial crises. This, in turn, lends support to the often advocated “sequencing” policy prescription, demanding that countries should have appropriate financial structures in place before removing capital controls and passively accommodating foreign investors.
  8. 8. 8 CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY To analyze and discover the problems under each researched banks, it is suggested to use four critical methodologies, including: Moody’s Financial Ratios, Standards & Poor’s Financial Ratios, Vaziri’s Financial Ratios and Z-Score Model. Those methods will be displayed and explained in the following section. A. MOODY Coverage Interest Ratios  EBIT/Interest Expense  EBITDA/ Interest Expense Leverage Ratios  Total Liability/Total Asset  Equity/Total Liability  Short Term Debt/Equity Book Value Liquidity Ratios  Current Asset/Current Liability  Intangible Asset/Total Asset  Cash/Net Sale  Working Capital/Total Asset, Cash/ Total Asset Profitability Ratio  ROA B. STANDARDS & POOR (S&P) Coverage ratios  EBIT/ Interest Expense  EBITDA/Interest Expense  Net Operating Income/Total Debt Leverage Ratio  Total Debt/EBIT  Total Debt/EBITDA
  9. 9. 9  Total Debt/Capitalization Profitability Ratios  ROE  Net Operating Income/Sale C. VARIZI’S MODEL Coverage Ratios  Current Ratio  Quick Ratio  Cash Velocity  Time Interest Earn Leverage ratios  Total Liability/Total Asset  Equity/Total Liability  Short Term Debt/Equity Book Value Profitability Ratios  ROE  ROA  Net Income/Total Asset  Retained Earnings/ Total As- set  Net Income/ Sale Efficiency Ratios  Asset Turnover  Fixed Asset Turnover  Inventory Turnover  Inventory to Net Working Capital D. ALTMAN Z-SCORE MODEL In 1968, one statistical model was developed by Edward Altman, assisting to forecast bankruptcy probability for the business. In reality, this method has been proved to predict quite well about fu- ture’s destiny for the banks within 2 years. It is the easy to calculate method that has formula to use: (1) For private firm: Z’- Model: Z = 0.71 X1 + 0.847 X2 + 3.107 X3 + 0.420 X4 * + 0.998 X5 Zones of Discrimination:
  10. 10. 10 1.23 2.9 “Distress” zone “Grey” zone “Safe” zone (2) For Non-Manufacturer Industrials and emerging market credit Z’’- Model: Z = 6.56 X1 + 3.26 X2 + 6.72 X3 + 1.05 X4 * Zones of Discrimination: 1.1 2.6 “Distress” zone “Grey” zone “Safe” zone Where: X1 Working capital / Total assets It is used as a measure if liquidity standardized by the size of the firm. X2 Retained earnings / Total assets Young firm tends to have lower RE/TE than the older firm. It is be- cause that retained earning that firm decided to retain for in- vestment. Young firm tends to hold more capital to invest more for new projects. X3 Earnings before in- terest and taxes / Total assets The ratio measures the productivity of the assets or the earning po- wer. X4 Market value equity / Book value of total liabilities This ratio measures the extent to which total assets can decline in value before total liabilities exceed book value of equity. In other words, this indicates the asset cushion of the firm. X4 * Book value equity / Book value of total liabilities This differs from X4 in that it uses the book value rather than the market value of equity. This ratio is appropriate for a firm that is not publicly traded, and hence the Z-model with this variable definition is called the Z’-model or the private firm model. X5 Sales/ Total assets This asset turnover ratio is intended to capture the sales generating ability of the assets. Altman found this to be industry sensitive and least discriminating between the bankrupt
  11. 11. 11 CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS In this section, the very first step we want to discuss about the big picture of Vietnam economy in general during the period from 2008 to 2010 in order to penetrate the banks’ situation in those years. Getting back to history, we only peak and describe some typical events in those years to illustrate for readers some ideas about Vietnam circumstance at that time. [2008] – The hash time to challenge the economics as a whole The year 2008 has marked as the most extensive global economic downturn in many years, high- lighted by the bankruptcy of a series of big names in international banking system. Facing with the tough time, Vietnam Government and also the banking systems reacted immediately to the market with the aim to stabilize the macroeconomic and society. First of foremost, there were many changes in monetary policies with many adjustments in basic interest rate, reserve requirement rate and exchange rate bid-ask spread. Significantly, it was the first time form 1st Dec, 2005, the basic interest rate was adjusted from 8.25% up to 8.75% and 12% on 19th May. Additionally, SBV (State bank of Vietnam) officially capped the interest rate no more than 150% the basic rate based on the civil law of Vi- etnam. As the chart is showing, we can see that with the tightening monetary policies all some es- Macroeconomics Factors Pink: Refinance rate; Blue: Base rate;Red: Discount rate Figure: Illustration of some crucial interest rates in 2008 (Source: vneconomy)
  12. 12. 12 sential rates also decreased at the same time. Consequently, it created the more liquidity risk for commercial banks, and the mobilization rate was the most fluctuated widely in 20 years development of Vietnam. During this time, credit growth was the lowest in the year, kept increasing -1% per month indeed. Simultaneously, the exchange rate VND/USD was varied seriously and adjusted by SBV which we have never seen in Vietnam history. In the early months, the market had the phenomenon of accumulation of foreign currency, and the exchange rate was down to the "bottom" about VND15,300 per USD. But in May, the "fever" of foreign currency scarcity placed stress on both the formal market and the free market. Many businesses have bought with the price of VND 18,000 per USD, thus the financing costs were pushed higher, affecting profitability. Additionally, since 2008, SBV has approved registrations of establishment of new joint stock banks Lien Viet Bank, Tien Phong Bank, Bao Viet Bank, and so on. Also in 2008, SBV issued the permission for the first 100% foreign capital to set up in Vietnam such as HSBC, ANZ and Standard Chartered. It opened a new era for the operation of foreign banks in Vietnam and the enhancement the comprehensive competition amongst domestic and foreign banks. At this time, the domestic banking systems faced many difficulties as followed:  Bad debts tend to be increased: in 2007, the bad debts ratio was in the range of 2% to 3%, but in 2008, many large banks announced the bad debts ratio is about 5% to 6%.  Most banks did not meet its targeted profit: in the beginning of the year, many banks’ profits were affected due to liquidity risk. This was the first time in more than five consecutive years that many banks had to adjust their business goals and targeted profits which were set at the be- ginning of the fiscal year.  Many lending activities were limited: with tightening monetary policies and liquidity problems forced many banks to suspend this activity. Besides, the strong and rapid decline of the stock market and real estate led to credit risk for commercial banks. In short, in 2008 the monetary tightening and loosening gradually policies created the frequency of policy adjustment that unprecedented in history. There were 8 times to alter the base rate, re- finance rate, rediscount rate, 5 times to adapt reserve requirement, 3 times to loosen exchange rate and 2 times to modify the average increase rate of the interbank. [2009] – Recovery after economics crisis 2008 Compared to 2008, monetary policy and operation of commercial banks in 2009 had been rela- tively stable. At this time, the interest rate was stable and not fluctuated much. Specially, in Feb, 2009, Government began to implement the stimulus package included supporting interest rate played
  13. 13. 13 the vital role to secure the financial system. This strategy created favorable conditions for banks to reach their target customers and credit growth because of low interest rate. Furthermore, the credit growth was over navigation. The stimulus package to prevent the eco- nomic downturn led to the credit growth. However, it was still a problem that SBV had to pay more attention to determine the time to increase the base rate in order to prevent inflation in 2010. As a result, the profits of banks were improved step by step. [2010] – Market kept fluctuating On 30th Mar, 2010, the Government has requested to terminate of operation of gold trading floors due to the difficulty to manage the gold. Unfortunately, Vietnam at that time was lowered credit continuously three times in one year by three most prestige credit-ranking organizations in the world. - Significantly, on July 2010, Fitch credited Vietnam down from BB- to B+ because of low ex- change reserve and weak banking systems. - In September, Fitch downgraded credit of Vietcombank and ACB to D/E from D due to high level growth in loans and low quality loans. - In December, Moody lowered confidence for Vietnam’s bonds to B1 from Ba3 by risks related to balance of payment (BOP) crisis, the pressure on the currency devaluation and high inflation. - At the end of December S&P announced a level of credibility down the national debt of Vietnam.  The lower credit ratings will be affected to the mobilization of international bonds by enterprises in Vietnam in the near future; and the discount was spent to borrow a loan will raise. USD raised in the highest lev- el about VND 21,500/USD on Nov, 2010. Vietnam had 2 times to lower the domestic currency. On 4th Nov, 2010, Financial Supervisory Commission an- nounced that the State Govern- ment agreed to pump up foreign currency in the industry for pro- duction of essential goods and not pumped into export and the Gov- ernment would not adjust the rate (Source: cafef)
  14. 14. 14 until the end of the year. Gold rose highest to 38.5 million VND increased 43.6% over the closing price in 2009. The Government announced that Vietnam had surplus import 71 tons of gold. Many changes in regulation’s credit institution were set up: - Adjusted Law of Banking and adjusted Law on Credit institutions are approved and start to be in effect since 1/1/2011: mother bank is not allowed to provide credit for its own bank in the system. - On 5th Oct, 2010, circular 13 about increasing the CAR (capital adequacy ratio) ratio in banks from 8% to 9% was enforced.  Maritime bank [MSB] In 2008, facing with the economic downturn, Maritime bank and Vietnam banking system have experienced the real challenges in this tough environment. MSB still performed very well in meeting the challenges and also created opportunities to deliver impressive business results and build MSB’s images as one of the leading commercial banks in Vietnam. From the table above, we can see that the result in 2008 gives us the positive signal compared to the previous year. All total assets, capitalization mobilization, outstanding loans, and profit before Banking system insight
  15. 15. 15 tax were increased over 100% plan and NPL (non-performing loan) reduced to 1.59% (from 2.08% in 2007). Even during the crisis but somehow everything was in the control of MSB. In 2009, MSB had outstand- ing loans of VND 23,800 billion, which equal to 213% of the level at the end of 2008 and 109% of target agreed by BOD. This growth can be attributed to the introduction of new personal credit products to meet borrow- ing needs of many types of con- sumers, which helped drive the large increase in retail customers overall. Besides, NPL made up 0.62% of the total loans outstanding-well below the 3% allowed by our shareholders. This is the re- sult of MSB’s decision to focus on credit risk and bring its processes up to international standards. This effort included strengthening credit inspection and monitoring. In 2010, we quote here the basic measure performance of MSB as follow: As we look at the table above, we can see that the total assets and the deposits both increased double with three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010. Especially, the ROE of MSB raised so seri-
  16. 16. 16 ous, that means that the leverage MSB used is so large, and MSB was ranked in the leading in the industry to generate great profit from the stockholder’s equity. On the other hand, the NPL of MSB also leveled up underlying 2010. It raised about 1.25% com- pared to 2009 and 0.38% with 2008. That created some signals for MSB to pay more attention on controlling the bad debts.  Nam A bank In 2008, business operation of Nam A bank evolved with many obstacles due to the complexity of domestic and international economics, especially fi- nancial crisis 2008. Moreover, with tightening monetary policies to control inflation and stabilize macro economy of Government, all of them had great impact on the business of Nam A bank. Even in the harsh time, Nam A bank has achieved some key result as followed: - Nam A bank had strongly developed in the business of foreign exchange: to successfully develop gold business on accounts, to equip and facilitate and modernize IT in order to promote foreign exchange activities in 2009. - The proportion of the outstanding debt of corporate loans had increased 4.28% higher than 2007. The development of corporate customers had facilitated enterprises to increasingly access to the banking services. - Overdue debts and bad debts were 2.56% which was less than the plan at the beginning of year (1.8%) but it’s acceptable when compared to the banking industry (3.5% in 2008). Even Nam A bank had to face with high rate of mobilization in the banking system; it still ensured the suffi- cient financing resources for its operations. In 2009, in the context of financial crisis and global recession, the domestic economy has to cope with a lot of difficulties. Some targets experienced slow growth or dramatic decrease compared to 2008: - The hug competition in many aspects amongst banks, especially in interest rates. This caused the decline in profit from credit activities. - To ensure the growth in the long run, Nam A bank had to reserve a substantial financial resource to build the Corebanking sytem, restructure the organization model, build up the network, pro- mote its brand name and strengthen the provision of banking products and services.
  17. 17. 17 - Non-profitable assets of the bank have been developed but the result cannot come immediately in 2009. In 2010, we have the result as the table here: (Source: Annual report 2010 of Nam A bank) Via the table, we can see that 2010 is the successful for Nam A bank when almost ratios are met the target, except for bad debt ratio. It raised 0.47% compared with 2009. Hence, it makes BOD have to pay more attention on this issue.
  18. 18. 18 B. MOODY ANALYSIS MARITIME BANK NAM A BANK TRUST BANK Coverage Interest Ratios Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 EBIT/ Interest Expense 1.2490 1.3638 1.2400 1.0187 1.1499 1.2282 1.2397 1.2095 1.2909 EBITDA/ Interest Expense 1.2573 1.3720 1.2453 Leverage ratios Total liabilities/Total assets 0.9426 0.9444 0.9451 0.7812 0.8778 0.8501 0.8052 0.8173 0.8353 Equity/Total liabilities 0.0609 0.0589 0.0580 0.2801 0.1392 0.1763 0.2419 0.2236 0.1972 Short-term debts/Equity 15.5326 15.3633 15.0197 3.5350 5.9958 4.5940 4.0578 3.9482 4.6197 Liquidity Ratios Current Asset/ Current Lia- bility 1.1098 1.1591 1.0072 1.1533 1.1521 1.0311 1.1807 1.2937 1.1976 Intangible Asset/ Total Asset 0.0043 0.0022 0.0014 0.0635 0.0352 0.0301 0.0360 0.0468 0.0561 Working Capital/ Total As- set 0.0979 0.1360 0.0059 0.1186 0.1114 0.0214 0.1428 0.2119 0.1503 Cash/ Total Asset 0.0076 0.0072 0.0946 0.0533 0.0166 0.0244 0.0140 0.0097 0.0066 Profitability ratios ROA 6.72% 5.90% 6.80% 11.80% 5.19% 6.86% 4.99% 5.02% 6.78% It is the system of rating securities that was originated by John Moody in 1909. Moody’s financial ratios’ purpose is to provide investors with a simple system of gradation by which relative creditworthiness of securities may be noted.
  19. 19. 19 In Moody’s Financial Ratios, it is divided into 5 kinds of ratios including: Coverage Interest Ratios, Leverage Ratios, Liquidity Ratios, Prof- itability Ratio and some other ratios. Each type assists to describe one characteristic or distress’s potential to the business firm. In this part, after applying Moody method into our research, there are some problems can be seen from our 3 researched banks: Maritime bank, Nam A bank and Trust bank. First of all, it is about interest coverage ratio. The lower the ratio, the more the company is burdened by debt expense. When an interest coverage ratio was 1.5 or lower, its ability to meet interest expenses may be questionable. An interest coverage ratio below 1 indicates the bank was not generating sufficient revenues to satisfy interest expenses. As a result, in all 3 banks, due to the fact that those ratios were just above 1 and stand from 1.2 to 1.4, lower than 1.5, it suggested that they all found difficult to pay its debt expense. Thus, this is one of the first and critical problems for banks in Vietnam. In leverage ratios part, there are also several different ratio, including (3) (4) (5) ratios. Those ratios assist to calculate how much debt it has on its balance sheet. Generally, the more debt a company has, the riskier it is because there is very little left for stock holders in the case compa- ny go to bankrupt and has to pay all of its debt first rather than for equity. From the table, we could see that banks used too much debt to finance its activities. It was about 80% to 90% of total asset is due from asset. On the other hand, equity was too small proportion in bank balance sheet. This too high ratio in total liability/total asset was one of alarming factor to banks. As a result, leverage ratios showed those 3 banks were high- ly leveraged and most of the debt was borrowing. Furthermore, Moody’s Financial Model also conveys liquidity situations in banks. Liquidity ratio determines a company's ability to pay off its short-terms debts obligations. Generally, the higher the value of the ratio, the safer banks are to cover short-term debts. Ideally, the current ratio should be at least 2/1 or greater. If it is less than 2/1, then it is necessary to investigate more about credit line. When it is 1/1 or worse, many times credit is denied unless additional investigation about cash flow reinforces the ability to pay in the short term liability. However, cur- rent asset/current liability ratios in 3 banks were all little above 1, indicating that the probability to failure of those 3 banks to quite high. Moreo-
  20. 20. 20 ver, cash flow/ net sale and cash flow/ total asset ratio was too small to ensure liquidity for the banks. If this situation was carried on, may be in the future, credit rating for those banks would be very low. So far, in profitability ratios, ROA for 3 banks were only about 5 to 6%, suggesting little profit for bank operations. As a result, after analy- sis those ratios by Moody’s model, it can be concluded that Banks in Vietnam, representative by 3 banks under our research, did not make big profits due to the fact that they had too much debt, use debt ineffectively and not use equity well to finance its operation and not liquid enough to pay off their short term debt. C. S&P S&P has some ratios that are the same as those in Moody’s model, for example, EBIT/ Interest Expense and EBITDA/Interest Expense. However, In S&P Financial Method, it also suggests several things that Moody’s ratios do not mention. Firstly, it should be talk about net operating income/total debt ratio. In general, the higher the coverage ratio is the better off a bank will be as they are able to make their debt payments using funds from their net operating income. In other words, when the ratio is greater than 1, it indi- cates that the bank has enough income generated from the investment property to cover all his debt obligations. Unfortunately, those ratios under 3 researched banks are extremely low and less than 1. One more time, it implies the alarming part in Vietnamese bank, having too much debt and then cannot pay by using operating income. The next ratio is total Debt/EBIT. A high debt/EBIT ratio suggests that a firm may not be able to service their debt and can result in a low- ered credit rating. Conversely, a low ratio can suggest that the firm may want take on more debt if needed and it often warrants a relatively high credit rating. Consequently, taking account into 3 banks, their ratios were always very high, more than 10 times, illustrating that those banks could not able to pay their debt in the properly manner.
  21. 21. 21 MARITIME BANK NAM A BANK TRUST BANK Coverage Interest Ratios Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 EBIT/ Interest Expense 1.2490 1.3638 1.2400 1.0187 1.1499 1.2282 1.2397 1.2095 1.2909 EBITDA/ Interest Expenses 1.2573 1.3720 1.2453 Net Operating Income/ Total debts 0.0166 0.0193 0.0156 0.0057 0.0095 0.0186 0.0128 0.0142 0.0213 Leverage ratios Total debt/EBIT 14.027 16.008 13.896 6.6184 16.9253 12.4011 16.1472 16.2762 12.3187 Total debt/EBITDA 13.934 15.913 13.837 Total debt/ Capitalization 16.416 16.978 17.228 3.5696 7.1831 5.6710 4.1348 4.4723 5.0703 Profitability ratios ROE 16.90% 21.75% 18.29% 0.75% 4.21% 6.37% 3.56% 2.93% 7.25% Net operating income/ Sale 0.1987 0.2612 0.1892 0.0314 0.1255 0.1861 0.1569 0.1477 0.2189 The last but not least critical ratio in S&P Model is Return on Equity. This ratio measures the amount of net income returned as a percent- age of shareholders equity or Return on equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. And for our 3 banks, those ratios were higher than ROA, not because of high net income but due to very low equity used in banks. Given an example, it can be seen that for Maritime bank in 2010, net income was more than 1.1 billion VND while total equity was just about 6 billion VND, 17 times less than total liability. In summary, S&P help to answer the question what if the banks have profits with the money they borrow. However, data showed that all bank were in heavy debt and not be able to pay those debt.
  22. 22. 22 D. ALTMAN Z-FACTOR We will use this model created by Edward I. Altman to predict the bankruptcy possibility of Mar- itime Bank, Nam A Bank, and Trust Bank. The Z’’-model should be applied to estimated for non- manufacturer industrials and emerging market credits. The formula is: Z = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 (Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altman_Z-score) With: X1 = Working capital / Total assets X2 = Retaining earnings / Total assets X3 = EBIT / Total assets X4 = Book value equity / Book value of total liabilities The rule of thumb for this model is: Z > 2.6  Safe zone 1.1< Z < 2.6  Grey zone Z < 1.1 Distress zone The calculation for Z’’-scores of three bank is showed in the following table: Maritime Bank Nam A Bank Trust Bank 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 X1 0.0979 0.1360 0.0059 0.1186 0.1114 0.0214 0.1428 0.2119 0.1503 X2 0.0027 0.0025 0.0036 0.0017 0.0051 0.0096 0.0078 0.0054 0.0119 X3 0.0672 0.0590 0.0680 0.1180 0.0519 0.0686 0.0499 0.0502 0.0678 X4 0.0609 0.0589 0.0580 0.2801 0.1392 0.1763 0.2419 0.2236 0.1972 Z 1.1364 1.3162 0.5667 1.8337 1.2077 0.8109 1.5068 1.9140 1.6414 ‘Grey’ ‘Grey’ Distress ‘Grey’ ‘Grey’ Distress ‘Grey’ ‘Grey’ ‘Grey’ After estimating the Z-scores, the results show us quite unfortunate outputs. All three banks have their Z-value less than 2.6 mostly, indicating they are possibly vulnerable to bankruptcy. In fact, the
  23. 23. 23 Maritime Bank has recorded an average of 1.0064, Nam A Bank’s is 1.2841, and Trust Bank’s is 1.6874 for the period of 2008-2010. Particularly, in 2010, Maritime Bank and Nam A Bank falls into the distress zone, with the Z-score less than 1.1. It shows all three banks are not in good financial condition, warning that they need to more concern about their future operation. However, the result of Z-model seems to be not correct. Although the 2008 Z-value of banks are not attractive, they have not faced any potential bankruptcy problems since 2008. In fact, Maritime is even said to have the highest ROE among banks in Vietnam market. Moreover, they has earned posi- tive net incomes after taxes in both 2009 and 2010. Thus, we can conclude that Z-model is unappro- priate to estimate the possibility of bankruptcy for banks. Although the models of Altman are easy to calculate, there are several drawbacks. While the Z- scores gains wide acceptance by experts and investors to predict the bankruptcy possibility of public- ly held manufacturing, private held and non-manufacturing companies, there are many arguments that neither any Altman Z-models are sufficient enough for use with financial companies. The reason is differences of financial companies' balance sheets, and their frequent use of off-balance sheet items. A number of important issues affecting financial health of banks such as credit risks, interest risks, default risks, etc are not addressed in the models. In other words, it should be noted that Z- score is just a tool to predict probability of distress, a measure of economic bankruptcy, rather than providing how exactly the banks would be based on historical data of their balance sheets and in- come statements. Another shortcoming is that, according to empirical research, Altman’s model only provide the highest accurate prediction for two years. Also, the model are quite insufficient when applying the same formula to estimating different types of industrial sectors with only four or five common financial ratios with assumption of linear relationship. As a result, we can conclude that the Altman Z-factor model is not useful tool to analysis the banks’ financial health. E. VARIZI’S MODEL
  24. 24. 24 MARITIME BANK NAM A BANK TRUST BANK Coverage Interest Ratios Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Current Ratio 1.1098 1.1591 1.0072 1.1533 1.1521 1.0311 1.1807 1.2937 1.1976 Quick Ratio 0.7207 0.6507 0.7797 0.3348 0.5298 0.5059 0.4942 0.4504 0.5342 Time Interest Earn 1.2490 1.3638 1.2400 1.0187 1.1499 1.2282 1.2397 1.2095 1.2909 Leverage ratios Total liabilities/Total assets 0.9426 0.9444 0.9451 0.7812 0.8778 0.8501 0.8052 0.8173 0.8353 Equity/Total liabilities 0.0609 0.0589 0.0580 0.2801 0.1392 0.1763 0.2419 0.2236 0.1972 Short-term debts/Equity 15.5326 15.3633 15.0197 3.5350 5.9958 4.5940 4.0578 3.9482 4.6197 Profitability ratios ROE 16.90% 21.75% 18.29% 0.75% 4.21% 6.37% 3.56% 2.93% 7.25% ROA 6.72% 5.90% 6.80% 11.80% 5.19% 6.86% 4.99% 5.02% 6.78% Profit Margin 12.30% 17.31% 12.84% 1.17% 7.78% 11.27% 10.60% 6.83% 14.69% Net income/Total assets 0.97% 1.21% 1.00% 0.16% 0.51% 0.96% 0.69% 0.54% 1.19% Retained earnings/Total as- sets 0.27% 0.25% 0.36% 0.17% 0.51% 0.96% 0.78% 0.54% 1.19% Efficiency ratios Asset turnover 0.0789 0.0699 0.0781 0.1410 0.0661 0.0848 0.0655 0.0785 0.0813 Fixed assets turnover 11.7175 17.2658 14.6433 1.9879 1.6911 2.3453 1.2909 1.4475 1.3230 Inventory turnover 0.1550 0.0995 0.2927 0.1830 0.0989 0.1543 0.0742 0.0682 0.1040 Inventory to Net working capital 3.5445 3.1953 31.7583 5.3404 4.0926 16.8737 3.7996 2.8714 3.3577 (Source: Financial statements of Maritime Bank, Nam A Bank & Trust Bank in 2008-2010)
  25. 25. 25  Coverage ratios Falling in the gap 1.24 to 1.36, time interest earns mean Maritime Bank can be able to pay its in- terests using its income generated during those 3 years. For Nam A Bank, this ratio is 1.02 in 2008 and increases to 1.23 in 2010. It is also the same story for Trust Bank with its average coverage ratio is 1.247. Thus, we can say all three banks have its profit earned in years sufficient enough to pay in- terest expenses. How about the liquidity of the banks? According to financial statements, current ratios of these banks are more than 1, thus we can. However, it should note that the ratios tend to decline. In fact, in 2010, three banks have their current ratios decrease about 0.1, compared to 2009. Banks need to take closely look at this ratio’s movement in the future. Quick ratios of Maritime, Nam A and Trust Bank are less than 1, thus they seem to be illiquidity when using only available current assets, excluding loan amounts. As a result, we can conclude that all three banks are not well liquidity, however, somehow they are still in safe position.  Leverage ratios Leverage ratio of Maritime Bank shows that total liabilities to total assets ratios are always more than 94%, and equity to total lia- bilities just slightly higher than 0. So, Mari- time is highly leveraged, using a lot of debts to finance rather than its equity. It is highly risky if the bank does not pay careful attention of its operation and specifically, efficiency of using high leverage. Meanwhile, Nam A Bank and Trust Bank use safer level of debt, with the proportions of liabili- ties are about 78% - 88%, but still high. For a bank, it is understandable for them to use mostly debt to finance. Banks should take control over their leverage usage because high leverage ratios means higher chance leading to bankruptcy when problems arise.  Profitability ratios 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2008 2009 2010 Total liabilities to total assets ratios in 2008-2010 Maritime Bank Nam A Bank Trust Bank
  26. 26. 26 Firstly, according to its financial statements, Maritime Bank’s returns on equity are quite high during this period. In fact, in 2008, it is 16.90%, in 2009, 21.75% and it is 18.29% for 2010. ROEs of Maritime are much more than Nam A Bank and Trust Bank. Meanwhile, returns on assets are around 6-7% in 2008-2010. As mentioned above that Maritime uses mostly leverage to finance which causes higher risk, then this large gap between ROE and ROA is understandable. Net profit margin in 2008 is 12.3%, increasing to 17.31% in 2009, and reduce in 2010 to 12.84%, which is quite high. As a result, Maritime Bank can be said to have stably good profitability, however, it needs to improve its efficiency of using assets to generate income, rather relying too much on debts. Its retained earnings to total assets ratios are very low also due to the fact that the institution seldom uses equity for profit making. The second is Nam A Bank. There are signifi- cant growth in net profit margin. In fact, the margin of Nam A increases from 1.17% to 7.78% in 2009 and 11.27% in 2010. This is great improvement. However, there is an issue need to be addressed. Due to increase in using debt, ROE increase very fast when ROA decrease more than half from 2008 to 2009, thus Nam A Bank’s asset usage is quite inefficiency when using more debt financing. How- ever, an increase to 6.86% of ROA in 2010 shows that Nam A Bank does have improvement. Since the bank majorly uses debt to finance, the retained earnings to total assets are low. Lastly, Trust Bank has its ROA increase stably to 6.78% in 2010. Its profit margin is fluctuated, 10.60% in 2008, falling to 6.83% in 2010 and increasing very fast in 2010 to 14.69%. The result is a ROA in 2008-20010 ROE in 2008-20010 Profit margin in 2008-20010 Maritime Bank Nam A Bank Trust Bank 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2008 2009 2010 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 2008 2009 2010 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 2008 2009 2010
  27. 27. 27 more than double amount of ROE in 2010, 7.25%, compared to 2009’s with 2.93%. Trust Bank seems to be also improving its assets usage in order to generating income.  Efficiency ratios Generally, all three banks have its assets turnover around 6-9%, indicating that the institutions are not well efficient at using its asset to generating income. The number indicates there is a need to rethink current strategies and processes, with an eye toward making better use of available resources. However, the numbers of the ratio in three banks show that they are still in a safe level. Fixed asset turnover ratios are extremely high in those banks, especially Maritime Bank. This is understandable since the proportion of fixed assets in bank is often not large.. Inventory turnover rates is generally good. Maritime Bank has the best inventory turnover, with 29.27% in 2010, implying that the bank does well at control their expenses of debt. Nam A has 2010 inventory turnover of 15.43%, while Trust Bank records 10.40%. Furthermore, inventory to net working capital ratios are at very big number in all three institutions, giving that the banks are low liquidity. REVIEW: After analyzing the financial statements of Maritime Bank, Nam A Bank and Trust Bank using, we can see that all three banks are somehow in safe level, but they have problems with liquidity, high leverage utilization, and inefficient asset management. Also, the model helps to de- termine that banks has good profitability in 2008-2010, however, they reply too much on debt fi- nancing to generate income. In addition, it is pleased to tell that three banks seem to have good con- trol over their cost of borrowing. In conclusion, we can predict that Maritime, Nam A and Trust Bank are not vulnerable to bankruptcy, but there are several issues they should take attention to.
  28. 28. 28 CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

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