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Quaid-i-Azam and Early Problems of Pakistan
On the eve of its creation Pakistan faced a number of stupendous problems which hardly had any parallel in the history of
the world especially of any newly born state. She had too many burdens to carry and too many problems to solve. She
came into being almost with practically no central administration of office routine. She was a state without any practicable
economic or geographic basis, political organization or political tradition with any pertinence to modern conditions.
Militarily she was weak and defenseless, with enemies, not reconciled to her establishment, busy in conspiring to
strangulate her on its very birth. But fortunately she had a great leader and organizer in person of Quaid-i-Azam to steer
the ship of her destiny to safety and security. Almost single handedly he grappled with all these problems which would
have broken a man of lesser mettle. But he was not a man to be over-powered by any danger, challenge or obstacle that
confronted him. Under his inspired leadership the nation also showed its inherent strength to grapple with these problems
with remarkable determination and success.
Pakistan‟s very existence was threatened and the happiness of her independence, marred by an unjust Boundary Award.
After the third June Plan, the Quaid had been confronted with the problem of demarcating the boundaries of India and
Pakistan. In order to determine Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas, three commissions (Punjab Boundary
Commission, Bengal Boundary Commission and District Sylhet Boundary Commission) were appointed. Muslim and non-
Muslim members were equally represented in these commissions. While Sir (Later Lord) Cyril Radcliffe was Chairman of
all those Boundary Commissions, other members were as follows:
The Muslim members of Punjab Boundary Commission were:
1. Justice Din Mohammad and;
2. Justice Muhammad Munir
The Non-Muslim Members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were:
1. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan and
2. Justice Teja Singh.
Similarly, in the Bengal Boundary Commission the following were the Muslim Members:
1. Justice Abu Saleh Muhammad Akram and:
2. Justice S.A. Rehman.
The Non-Muslim members of the Bengal Boundary Commission were:
1. Justice BijanKunarMukherjea and;
2. Justice C.C. Biswas.
The Quaid-i-Azam originally favoured asking the U.N. to nominate three members of each commission. Nehru argued that
it would involve intolerable delay. The Quaid then proposed that three Law Lords from the U.K. be appointed to the
Boundary Commission as impartial members. But again was told that the elderly persons would not bear scorching heat of
India‟s summer season1. Radcliffe “Knew virtually nothing about India and had never written about it”.2
Radcliffe was to draw his boundary lines ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In
doing so he would „take into account other factors‟. The other factors‟ were neither elaborated nor properly defined. The
Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan protested “violently” against a statement made by Mr. Henderson, the Under-
Secretary of state in the Parliament on 14 July: “The provision that other factors‟ will be taken into account has been made
primarily to enable the commission to have regard to the special circumstances of the Sikh community in the Punjab,
where considerations such as the location of their religious shrines can reasonably be taken into account up to a point”.3
The Pakistanis maintain that the unspecified other factors‟ phrase was incorporated in order to cover vital mental
reservations which depict that the inside story of the Award was replete with dishonesty and fraud”4. Justice Mehar Chand
Mahajan who was a non-Muslim member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, stated in his autobiography:
“I was not inclined to accept the invitation as it seemed to me then that this commission was a farce and decision would be
taken by the Viceroy himself”.5
The Chairman of the Commission presided over two of the four procedural meetings on 14 and 15 July 1947 and did not
attend any session of the regular public sittings. Since there was disagreement and virtually a tie between the Muslim and
non-Muslim members of these commission, so practically, it was the Chairman‟s Award.
It appears that Radcliffe‟s interpretation of the phrase of „other factors‟ did not favour Pakistan but India only. The popular
belief in India at the time of declaration of the Award was that “Radcliffe will award as His Excellency dictates. That was
a truly popular belief “and nothing “would” shake their conviction” that this was so6. He included Muslim majority areas
in Bharat but did not give the benefit of the same to the inclusion of areas in Pakistan7. He “jeopardized the Muslim
interests” through the device of “other factors.” “This legal quibbling, fallacious arguments and principles” worked only to
the benefit of „one party”8.
East Bengal being an exclusively raw jute producing area, Calcutta, a home of jute industry and districts of Nadia and
Kutli, should have been awarded to Pakistan. Darjeeling and Jalpaigari were also handed over to Bharat. Instead of
awarding the whole Sylhet District and the contiguous Muslim majority areas Assam, only Sylhet District was transferred
to Pakistan. The referendum in Sylhet had resulted in a majority of 55,578 votes in favour of joining East Bengal 239,619
votes were in its favour and 184,041 against9. In the Punjab Award, the tehsils of Ferozepur, Zira, Ajnala, Batala and
Gurdaspur which comprised of an overwhelming majority of population of the Muslims, were awarded to Bharat. The
tehsils of Julundur and Nakodar were also given to Bharat.
According to the 1941 census, percentages of contiguous Muslim majority tehsils were as follow:
Name of the Tehsil
Percentage of Muslim
Gurdaspur tehsil 52.1
Batala tehsil 55.06
Shakargarh tehsil 51.3
Ferozepur tehsil 55.2
Zira tehsil (FerozepurDistric) 65.2
Nakodar Tehsil 59.4
Jullundur tehsil 51.1
Ajnala tehsil (Amritsar District) 59.4
Name of the Tehsil
Percentage of Muslim
Thana Majitha (Tehsil Amritsar) 51.9
Gurdaspur was a Muslim majority area and “the whole of it had to go to Pakistan”. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan a
non-Muslim member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, revealed in his biography that according to the “provisional
boundaries agreed upon between the two dominions, “the entire district of Gurdaspur “had been assigned to Pakistan.11
Rushbrook Williams points out:
“Many observers have found substance in the Pakistan complaint that the entire Indian complaint would have been
impossible but for the allocation of Gurdaspur to India by the Radcliffe Award”.12
Alastair Lamb in his work also admits:
To award “the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District to Pakistan” was “tantamount to directing the State of Jammu and
Kashmir to joint Pakistan. A Pakistani Gurdaspur would surely be the signpost pointing towards a Pakistani Jammu and
As to the three tehsils of Ferozepur” Ferozepore, Zira and Fazilka, the Chairman conveyed to the two learned judges (Din
Muhammad and Muhammad Munir) that they were being included in Pakistan14. But Radcliffe‟s final Award had
“illegally and unjustifiably deprived Pakistan of a number of contiguous Muslims majority areas. In Gurdaspur District,
two contiguous Muslims Majority tehsils, Gurdaspur and Batala, were given to Bharat alongwithPathankot tehsil. The
Muslims majority tehsil, Ajnala in the Amritsar District, was also handed over to Bharat. In the Jallundur district, the
Muslim majority tehsils, Nakodar and Jallundur, were assigned to Bharat. The Muslims majority tehsils, Zira and
Ferozepore, in the Ferozepur district…..were also transferred to Bharat. All of these Muslim majority areas were
contiguous to West Punjab”.15
So, it were the Muslims who had mainly suffered in the award of all the three Commissions. Consequently, Pakistan was
deprived of fairly a large territorial area which was not only strategic but economically vital as well. A tehsil in India was
more or less as large as English county. It appears that the Muslims majority areas were deliberately and consciously
handed over to Bharat. Ferozepur contained the headworks of one of the most important canals in the Punjab which was of
vital importance for this agricultural country.
Similarly, “without Gurdaspur, India would have no practical land access to Kashmir and its vacillating Hindu Maharaja,
Hari Singh, would have had no choice except to link Kashmir‟s destiny to Pakistan”16. The tearing of the Muslim area of
Gurdaspur district from Pakistan had been precisely so devised as to facilitate and ensure India‟s communications with
Jammu and Kashmir17. The Pakistanis believe that a “deliberate policy” was sought to „strangle Pakistan”.18
Besides these glaring injustices to the Muslims the Radcliffe Award produced no natural boundary line between the two
countries which were hostile to each other. Soon the anomalies of the Award became manifest:
“In places, the headworks of a canal system ended up in one country, the embankments which protected them in another.
Sometime the line ran down the heart of a village, leaving a dozen huts in Indian, a dozen more in Pakistan. Occasionally it
even bisected a home, leaving a front door opening on to India and a rear windows looking into Pakistan. All the Punjab‟s
jails wound up in Pakistan. So, too, did its solitary lunatic asylum”.19
Pakistan was given a boundary which not only deprived it of predominantly, Muslim areas and its sources of canal water
but made the frequency of border incidents inevitable: in the absence of natural barriers as boundary line between the two
states, their frontiers became vulnerable.
So, the British divided “two of India‟s great provinces, the Punjab and Bengal…….If Jinnah insisted on dividing India to
get his Islamic state, then the very logic he‟d used to get it would compel Mountbatten to divided the Punjab and Bengal as
part of the bargain”.20
Perhaps its object was to make Pakistan not economically a viable state. The Quaid strongly protested and opposed this
division as it was raised:
“not with a „bonafide‟ object, but as a sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness…..firstly to create more difficulties in
the way for the British Government and secondly to unnerve the Muslims by opening and repeatedly emphasizing that the
Muslims will get a truncated or mutilated, moth-eaten Pakistan. This clamour is not based on any sound principle”.21
The Quaid further added and argued:-
“It is a mistake to compare the basic principle of the demand of Pakistan and the demand of cutting up provinces
throughout India into fragmentation. I hope that neither the Viceroy nor His Majesty‟s government will fall into this trap
and commit a grave error”.22
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 had laid down that geographically contiguous areas should be demarcated into regions to
form the new states. The Muslim League at first expected that the Sikhs would prefer to remain in Pakistan, as they would
be a much more effective minority there than in a larger set-up in India. Consequently the Quaid made repeated efforts to
bring home to the Sikhs the desirability of their choice for Pakistan23. But Sikh leadership was in no mood to accept
possibility of partition, and when it actually materialized they had committed themselves so much to the Hindus that they
had no alternative but to demand partition of the Punjab, by which Pakistan lost a substantial areas of its territory. The
Quaid after careful thought had also finally come to the conclusion that the Sikh‟s inclusion as a permanent hostile
minority would be dangerous to the interests of Pakistan and a constant threat to its integrity24. He, therefore, contented
himself with “moth-eaten” and “truncated” Pakistan and relying upon the fair-mindedness of the British people gave an
assurance that his country would accept and abide by the decision of the Boundary Commission25. Radcliffe, announced
an unjust award for Pakistan. He gave away to India some sizeable Muslim majority areas against the settled and agreed
principles of territorial demarcation. The Muslim majority areas of Gurdaspur provided India with road link to Kashmir
which helped her to occupy and later on maintain her illegal hold over the valley. The award also threw the hydroelectric
and canal system of the undivided Punjab out of order. Madhopur and FerozepurHeadworks of Canals irrigating Pakistani
areas were given away to India. The supply lines of the Mandi Hydro-electric works were also disrupted26. All this
brought an endless chain of problems for the newly established state of Pakistan.
Though shocked by the Award, the Quaid strictly maintained his noted constitutional stance. When urged by associated to
protest, he replied, “No, we agreed to arbitration – we must abide by that arbitration”27. He further commented on the
award in a speech broadcast on 30th October 1947 in the following words: “The division of India is now finally and
irrevocably effected. No doubt we feel that the carving out of this great independent Muslim State has suffered injustices.
We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible, and the latest blow that we have received was the Award of the
Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse; and it may not be a judicial but a political
award, but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honorable people, we must abide by it. It may be our
misfortune but we must bear up this one more below with fortitude, courage and hope”.28
Partition of India was accompanied by mass-killings of a magnitude hardly known in recent history. The Refugee problem
and the Muslim genocide in India was important issue. The issue posed a serious problem between the two Dominions and
threatened Indo-Pakistan relations. The demand of Pakistan and the idea of Muslims having their own land, was so
attractive for the Indian Muslims that many of them were prepared to leave their homes and hearths and migrate to the new
state. The Muslims from every nook and corner of the sub-continent wanted to come to Pakistan. However, their planned
massacre and genocide, gave them no option except to rush for the migration. The mass migration of the India Muslims
towards Pakistan, was bound to cripple the economy of the new state. The Muslims genocide in India, followed by the
refugee problems, created bad blood among the two Dominions.
The question arises, why Muslims from all over India wanted to migrate to Pakistan? Impressed with the spirit of
enthusiasm of Pakistan, the Muslims from all over India, particularly from Delhi Province and the Western district of U.P.
(besides East Punjab), wanted to migrate to Pakistan from India. But more vital factor was the coercive means adopted by
the Sikhs backed by the Hindus. Francis Mudie, Governor of the Punjab, wanted to stop the inflow of Muslim refugees
from India, except from East Punjab. An emergent meeting of the Pakistan Cabinet was held in two sessions on 14 October
1947 at Karachi which lasted for five hours. Mudie and Mamdot suggested plan for speedy solution of Refugee problem
Consequently, Liaquat stated that the Government of Pakistan “must refuse in any way to facilitate abandonment by
Muslim of their homes and properties in India outside East Punjab”.29
The Prime Minister of Pakistan thought that if the Government of India were to implement their reiterated promises truly
to give full protection to their Muslim materials honestly and lonely, the question of evacuation of Muslims nationals, from
Delhi and U.P would not arise. He quoted the speech of sardarVallabhai Patel. Deputy Prime Minister of India, who while
addressing the Hindus and Sikhs at Amritsar on 30th September 1947, declared that India‟s interest in getting all their men
and women across the border and sending out all Muslims from East Punjab.”30
So, in a rejoinder on 14th October 1947 to SardarVallabhai Patel‟s statement, Liaquat stated that”
“We consider that the best interests of India and Pakistan are served by giving the fullest protection to minorities by the
creation of conditions which will enable them to stay in their ancestral homes with safety. We are, therefore, absolutely
opposed to mass migration of Muslims from Delhi, Western U.P. or other areas outside the East Punjab”.31
The question arises, if Pakistan was created for the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to enable them to order their
lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam, why Muslims were not allowed to migrate to Pakistan from every part of
It appears had Pakistan done so, it would not have borne the strain and stress of such a huge number of refugees, an
overwhelming majority of whom belonged to the poor class. They would have been an enormous burden on the exchequer
of Pakistan. The fact of the matter was that what Pakistan had already committed to accept (i.e. seven million refugees),
was also beyond its means. Realizing Pakitan‟s weak financial position, the Indian Government was “encouraging the
exodus of Muslims: 12 Refugee train were sent to Pakistan from U.P. and Delhi, 3 from Saharanpur and one from Meerut
to Pakistan”32. The dispatch of these trains from Delhi and U.P. towns, was contrary to the agreement arrived at between
the Governments of Pakistan and India.
The Government of Pakistan, therefore, was contemplating of demanding more space that might be adjacent to its territory
and wanted to submit its case to the U.N. for decision in case the Muslims of India were further compelled to migrate to
Pakistan and the Indian Government failed to protect their life, honour and property.33
It is clear that neither Mountbatten nor any expatriate British officer in India tried to prevent the Indian leaders from
adopting such a course: They neither ensured the Indian Muslims safety of their lives and properties, nor discouraged their
migration to Pakistan. It appears that Mountbatten was “fully aware of the Akali-RSSS (RashtryiyaSawayamSevakSangh)
conspiracy to eliminate the Muslims but had refused to take action”.34
The objectives of the „Sikh Plan‟ were:
(a) Extensive sabotage and destruction of Muslim life and property; and
(b) Elimination of Muslims from the Sikh Belt along the eastern border of the West Punjab.35
Mountbatten did nothing (took no concerted action) against the Hindu-Sikh leaders who indulged in open incitement to
violence against the Muslims. The militant section of the Sikhs and RSSS wanted “to throttle Pakistan by eliminating the
It brought in its wake brutal killings of Muslims all over India, particularly in East Punjab, Delhi, Calcutta, Hyderabad and
Kashmir. It presented the first major challenge to Pakistan. When the Muslim refugees from West Punjab told their tales of
woe, a wave of strong indignation spread throughout the country. At the beginning of August 1947, widespread rioting
broke out in the Punjab which intensified as the date of the partition of India drew near. There is considerable evidence to
show that the riots were started by the Sikhs and the RashtriyaSwayamSevak Sangha37. On the announcement of the
partition plan in March 1947, and the resignation of KhizerHyat ministry, master Tara Singh, the Sikh leader, openly called
for violent resistance. He stood at the steps of the Legislative Assembly Chamber in Lahore, rattled his kirpan (sword or
dagger), and raved, “This will decide‟38. Unfortunately, that was the opening of a horrible chapter of carnage in the words
of London times, reported from Jullundur on 24 August:
More horrible than anything we saw during the war, is the universal comments of experienced officers, British and Indian,
on the present slaughter in east Punjab. The Sikhs are clearing East Punjab of Muslims, Butchering hundreds daily, forcing
thousands to flee westward, burning Muslim villages and homesteads, even in their frenzy burning their own. This
violence has been organized from the highest level of Sikh leadership, and it is being done systematically, sector by
According to another report:
On 15 August the day of liberation was strangely celebrated in the Punjab. During the afternoon, a Sikh mob paraded a
number of Muslim women naked through the streets of Amritsar, raped them, and then hacked some of them to pieces with
Kirpans and burned the others alive.40
There is substantial evidence that rioting in west Punjab was a repercussion of the massacre in East Punjab. Auchinleck, in
his farewell letter to Major-General Rees, stated „the whole movement was undoubtedly planned long beforehand and soon
gave rise to inevitable repercussions in the West Punjab‟41. In September 1947, widespread violence and disturbance
broke out against Muslims in Delhi, forcing a large number of them to flee to Pakistan, particularly to Karachi which was
swarming with refugees from Delhi.
The situation in the Punjab was grim. Whole sections of Lahore. Ameritsar, Sheikhupura, Jullundur, and indeed most of
the principal cities of the Punjab were in flames. In the villages, armed bandits plundered, burned, massacred, and raped
women. Thousands of women – Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh – were abducted, never to be seen again by their relatives. The
Punjab Boundary Force, containing both Muslim and non-Muslim troops and commanded by British senior officers, was
utterly incapable of maintaining peace. Its troops refused to fire on members of their own communities. It had to be
disbanded, leaving the armies of Pakistan and India responsible for their respective area. The Muslims living in Sikh states
in East Punjab met the worst fate. They did not even have protection of the Indian Army42. AbulKalam Azad stated from
personal knowledge that some members of the former undivided Indian Army killed Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and
Muslims in India43. In Kapurthala state, with a Sikh ruler, Muslims were in a majority. All of them were either killed or
driven out. Those who survived were harassed by guerilla groups, went without food and sleep, and encountered
unprecedented floods along the escape routes. More were drowned than slaughtered and very few could reach Pakistan.44
In addition to the problems of maintaining law and order and preventing Muslims from attacking the minority community,
the West Punjab Government was soon saddled with an equally difficult task for rehabilitating refugees who had already
started pouring in thousands into West Punjab.
The London Times of 4th September, 1947, reported that a column of Muslims refugees twenty miles long, and estimated
at twenty thousand;45 most of them on foot, had straggling into the border town of Kasur, some thirty five miles south of
Lahore, since early morning of 3rd September, 1947. 46 The problem was not merely one of absorbing on setting these
refugees on the lands left by Hindus or Sikhs but also that of feeding, clothing and rendering medical aid to them as they
arrived in most pitiable conditions.
The Governments of India and Pakistan, having failed to stop the slaughter, decided at the end of August to assist the
complete evacuation of Muslims from East Punjab and of non-Muslims from West Punjab. A joint Military Evacuation
Organization was set up in Lahore. Mixed guards were provided for the refugee camps as well as armed escorts for foot,
railway, and motor convoys47. Within a matter of weeks, over twelve million people had left their homes and gone forth
on foot, by bullock-cart, by railway, by car, and by plane to seek shelter and safety in the other dominion. They had no
earthly possessions save the clothes they wore and, more often than not, these were in tatters. They had seen babies killed,
corpses mutilated, and women dishonored. Death had stalked them on the way. Tens of thousands had died on the road of
starvation and disease, or had been killed by Sikh murder gangs48. The Pakistan government estimated that in the
exchange of population, excluding those from Kashmir, approximately 6,500,500 refugees came into Pakistan. Of these,
5,200,000 came from East Punjab and East Punjab states, 360,000 from Delhi and the remainder from other parts of
northern India49. It is believed that about 1,000,000 Muslims lost their lives or were abducted. The number of refugees
West Punjab had to accommodate exceded by some 1,700,000 the number of refugees who had left50. The main burden of
rehabilitating refugees was borne by West Punjab which lay in the path of incoming refugees. Other provinces did not fully
co-operate in settling refugees in their provinces as well.
Under the circumstances, the central government was compelled to assume powers for settling refugees and a proclamation
under Section 102 of the adapted Government of India Act, 1935 was issued on 27 August 1948 as under:
Whereas the economic life of Pakistan is threatened by circumstances arising out of the mass movement of population
from and into Pakistan, a state of emergency is hereby declared.51
The next day, it was decided that out of the large number of refugees in West Punjab‟s campus, Sindh must absorb
200,000, the NWFP 100,000, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and the Balochistan 100,000, and West Punjab was to settle an
additional 100,000. These plans were only partially successful. According to the 1951 census, the number of refugees
settled in Sindh was 540,000 as against 900,000 evacuees; and in NWFP 51,000 had been settled against 269,000
On October 11, 1947, the Quaid-i-Azam gave his clarion call. Enumerating the problems which Pakistan had to face in this
regard he said, “Unfortunately, the birth of Pakistan was attended by a holocaust unprecedented in history. Hundreds of
thousands of defenceless people have been mercilessly butchered and millions have been displaced from their hearths and
homes. People who till yesterday were leading a decent and prosperous life are today paupers with no means of livelihood.
A good many of them have already found asylum in Pakistan. More are still stuck up in East Punjab awaiting evacuation.
That they are still on the other side of the border is not due to the fact that we have been unmindful of their sad plight. The
evacuation or those unfortunate persons have been our first concern and everything that is humanly possible is being done
to alleviate their suffering. As you are aware, the Prime Minister has shifted his headquarters to Lahore and we have set up
an Emergency Committee of the cabinet of deal with the situation as it develops from day to day.”53 He continued “The
disorders in the Punjab have brought in their wake the colossal problem the rehabilitation of millions of displaced persons.
This is going to tax our energies……..It has made the difficulties inherent in the building of a new state…….This is a
challenge to our very existence and if we are to survive as a nation and are translate our dreams about Pakistan into reality,
we shall have to grapple with the problem facing us with redoubled zeal and energy. Our masses are today disorganized
and disheartened by the cataclysm that has befallen them. Their morale is exceeding low and we shall have to do
something to pull them out of slough of despondency and galvanize them into activity”.54
The task of receiving, housing, feeding, clothing, settling and rehabilitating these millions presented a huge administrative
challenge. The violence upheavals immediately following the partition had shattered the economy, communications and
peaceful conditions in the country. The situation was saved by the spirit and determination of the people and their faith in
Quaid‟s leadership, from turning into a complete chaos and disorder.
The Quaid, therefore, moved his headquarters to Lahore in order to give his personal attention to the grave situation. His
vision, courage and wisdom in handling the situation filled the refugees with hope and determination and kindled their
faith in the new country. Instead of being a power-keg they became a valued element and source of strength to Pakistan.
His soul-stirring speeches revived the faith and confidence of the people, particularly the refugees, leading to concerted
and determined efforts which saved the country from collapse and ruin.
As the Governor – General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam had to negotiate an instrument of accession with each of the states
wishing to join the country. There were 562 states throughout British India. Pakistan was contiguous with only fourteen,
which included the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The rest were geographically linked with the Indian Union. On the
question of whether the states could become independent, there was a difference of opinion between the Congress and the
Muslim League. The Congress maintained that since the states did not have the means to establish international relations or
to declare war, they could not become sovereign independent states and should enter the political structure of one or the
other dominion government. The League felt that the states were under no compulsion to join either dominion and should
be left free to decide for themselves. However, Jinnah said it was in the mutual interest of the states and dominion
governments to make necessary adjustments55. Moreover, there was real conflict of interest over the two largest states,
Kashmir and Hyderabad. Kashmir, contiguous to Pakistan, had a Muslim majority and a Hindu ruler. Hyderabad,
contiguous to India, had a Hindu majority and a Muslim ruler. India wanted to hold on to both Kashmir and Hyderabad.
Kashmir was an integral part of the Muslim concept of Pakistan. Hyderabad, which had been ruled by a Muslim dynasty
from the days of the Mughal Empire, occupied a special place in the sentiments of Muslim India. Muslim League leaders
were in deep sympathy with Hyderabad‟s desire to be independent.
With the persuasion of Mountbatten and the skill of V.P. Menon, secretary to the concerned department, and the cunning
of Sardar Patel, the minister in charge, the accession of the states of India continued and the fear of possible balkanization
of India was put to rest. V.P. Menon drew up an instrument of accession for defence, external affairs, and communications
and a standstill agreement to cover existing arrangements for customs, currency, and similar matters. Sardar Patel assured
the Princes that their states would be autonomous but for the three above subjects. The scheme was simple and
statesmanlike. Instead of entering into long and difficult negotiations with each individual state, every state was confronted
with two standard documents from which no variation was allowed. It was in the obvious interest of most of the states to
enter into a standstill agreement but they were told that this was not possible without an instrument of accession. Sardar
Patel and V.P. Menon handled the Princes firmly and skillfully but the real credit for maneuvering them into signing the
instrument of accession goes to Mountbatten‟s diplomacy56. He addressed the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947 in his
capacity as Crown Representative and gave a reception on 28 July. On both occasions, he advised, canvassed, and
persuaded the Princes to sign the instrument of accession in favour of the dominion of India.
By contrast, he did nothing for Pakistan although as Crown Representative he owed an equal duty to both dominions. On
the countrary, in every disputed case of accession, he threw his weight in favour of India. He also plyed a major role in the
occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian forces. He paid little heed to the principle underlying the partition of
India „when he accepted the accession to Indian dominion of Kapurthala which had Sikh rulers but 64 per cent of the
population was Muslim‟57.
Junagadh was the first state to accede to Pakistan and on the very day of the transfer of power, its Government announced
the decision of the state to accede to Pakistan. It actually went through all the legal processes on 15 September 1947.58
Infact the State had applied for accession earlier. The Ruler of Janugadh sent Mr. Ismail Ibramani, his Secretary for
Constitutional Affairs to Karachi-who met the Quaid on 12 August, 1947 and communicated to him the decision of the
State59. It was a state in Kathiawar with 4017 square miles of territory and 8 lakh population and nearly 300 miles from
Karachi60. The state was a reverse of Kashmir: Hindu in population but the Ruler was a Muslim. Nawab Sir Mahabat
Khan RasulKhanji, a Muslim, was its ruler at the time of independence who had “freely and voluntarily offered”61 the
accession of the state to Pakistan.
The Indian Government immediately responded with large scale troop concentrations along the borders of Junagadh and
other states in Kathiawar which had acceded to Pakistan. The British chief of Staff of India wrote a joint letter to cabinet
stating that the armed forces of India were in no position to undertake a serious campaign and that the British soldiers
could not take part in any operation which would involve clashes with another Dominion; so the issue be settled by
negotiation. Military action in Kathiawar may lead to war between the two Dominions and with the bulk of the army
involved no internal security, the army is in no position to wage war62. Mountbatten “strongly disapproved” their measure
and put them under great pressure. He called in three officers and sharply rebuked them. The paper was withdrawn and it
was made sure that such incidents did not recur again63. On 16th September 1947, the day after the accession, the Prime
Minister of Junagadh addressed a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, making an earnest appeal for help by lodging a
strong protest with the Indian Government to prevent invasion of its areas, by providing actual armed assistance in the
form of immediate landing of a fighter or a bomber with a spare Dakota on its air fields at Keshod and sending a battalion,
equipped with modern arms by sea to Veraval. The Prime Minister of Junagadh also protested over the Indian blockade of
his state as its supplies were being cut off, including food and petrol consigned to Jamnagar and other ports for
transmission to Junagadh had been withheld. The communications of Junagadh were threatened on all sides and postal and
telegraph services endangered. A bi-weekly air services, which Janagadh had with Karachi, was ordered to be discontinued
by India. The Prime Minister of Junagadh also submitted that Pakistan should not allow the Indian Union to take the law in
its own hands.
On 18th September, the Governor- General of Pakistan sent a telegram to the Governor-General of India stating that there
were large troop concentrations along the borders of Junagadh and other States in Kathiawar which had acceded to
Pakistan. The former made it clear to the latter that any encroachment on Junagadh sovereignty or its territory would
amount to hostile act” and that in no case Indian Dominion troops or troops of States acceding to India should violate
Junagadh territory under any pretext whatsoever. The reply was received on 22 September, stating; Information about large
troop concentrations around Junagadh not correct. India however confessed that its Government had sent a small force of
troops to its own areas. The Indian Government tightened the blockade of Junagadh which, despite protests from the
Government of the latter had driven (its) people to verge of starvation. It also set up a parallel Government on its own
(Indian) territory which the Government of Pakistan considered as unfriendly act towards Pakistan. The Prime Minister of
Pakistan pointed out to the Prime Minister of India in his telegram on 2 October, 1947:
It is regrettable that subversive activities against Junagadh State are not only being carried out but are actually being
encouraged by certain authorities. Crimes against persons and property of Junagadh State subjects are being committed in
adjoining areas of Indian Dominion. To permit your subject or subjects of any State which acceded to the Indian Dominion
to carry on these subversive activities constitutes a breach of the Constitutional and international obligations imposed on
the Government of India.64
The Indian Government also stopped food, petrol and all communications, mail, telegraphic, telephonic, between Junagadh
State and the outside world in order to starve the State into submission. It refused to recognize Junagadh‟s accession to
Pakistan, and increased its military and police forces within Junagadh‟s territory which caused a great deal of panic among
Junagadh‟s peaceful population and serious embarrassment to the laller‟s administration.
To quote the British Foreign Office files:
Pakistan accepted Junagadh‟s accession, but Indian solved the problem in her own favour by a display of force. She
blames Pakistan for accepting junagadh‟s accession, but claims that her own acceptance of Kashmir‟s accession is
perfectly justifiable. This does not make sense.65
The Prime Minister of Junagadh sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 25 October 1947 informing the latter
about a clear violation of Pakistan territory” as the Indian forces had occupied Amrapur and Khijadia and two or three
villages all outlying main Junagadh territory on 24 October. Further telegrams were sent by him on 26 and 27th October
and on 2 and 8 November, thereby keeping in touch with the Government of Pakistan and intimating the latter about the
incidents of his state.66
However, on 8 November, the Dewan (Prime Minister) of Junagadh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, sent Major Harvey Jones, the
Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council, with a letter to Mr. Buch, the Indian Regional Commissioner at Rajkot.
This letter requested the Government of India to take over the administration of Junagadh in order to save the State from
complete administrative breakdown and pending an honorable settlement of the several issues involved in Junagadh‟s
accession‟ (67). The letter and Shah Nawaz Bhutto‟s behaviour encouraged the Indian Government which promptly
occupied Junagadh by force.
Pakistan protested but in vain as the Indian armed forces (equipped with tanks, armoured cars and other modern weapons)
took over the administration (of Junagadh) on 9th November, 1947. The Government of Pakistan called it an unjustified
aggression on Pakistan territory and refused to recognize it68. Though the Ruler of Junagadh had declared the accession of
his State with Pakistan, its Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, handed over the administration of the State to Indian pending
negotiations. The latter stated that this did not mean that Junagadh had joined the Indian Union. On 8 November, he flew
to Karachi for important consultations with the Nawab of Junagadh. Reaching Karachi on 11 November Mr. Bhutto told
the A.P.I that Junagadh was still a part of Pakistan and the State only asked the Indian Union to help in the maintenance of
law and order69. The Indian Government had encouraged neighboring Hindu State which had acceded to India to create
trouble on the borders of Kathiawar States, including Junagadh70. The question arises whether Mr. Bhutto (Dewan of
Junagadh) was competent to ask India to help the State in the maintenance of its law and order which had acceded to
Pakistan? The Government of Pakistan pointed out that the Dewan was not entitled to negotiate settlement. It contended
that since Junagadh had lawfully acceded to Pakistan, so neither the Dewan nor even the Ruler himself could negotiate a
settlement with India. Therefore, India should withdraw its forces from the State, hand back the administration to the
Nawab and refrain from committing acts of violence and subversion against Junagadh. So it lodged a strong protest against
the coup d‟etat of the Government of India in Junagadh as the Indian action constituted a clear and unwarranted violation
of Pakistan territory, a direct act of hostility and a breach of international law71. Mountbatten‟s biographer confesses:
Legally Pakistan was in the right.72
The question arises: Once a state has had acceded to a Dominion, did the Instrument of Accession permit the ruler or his
agent to hand over its administration to another Dominion before the renouncement of the Accession? If not what was the
validity of Junagadh‟s subsequent action? Was not the Indian action in taking over the administration of the State, without
Pakistan consent a patently hostile act?
The Quaid-i-Azam wanted to send Pakistan forces to Junagadh and assist the State. To quote Vice Admiral Jefrord who
was then head of Pakistan Navy:
At a Defence Council meeting on this question (Indian invasion and occupation of Junagadh) the Quaid was, naturally
keen to go to the aid of the State Government. This would obviously have meant an invasion fleet of transports, escorted
by the Navy and with the subsequent landing covered by Naval bombardment. I was forced to tell the Quaid that the only
ammunition we had was that carried the ships which could all be fired away in an hour. Without hesitation the Quaid said:
In view of the Admiral‟s statement it would be suicidal attempt to intervene. Mr. Jinnah was a realist.73
So on this crucial question, whether Pakistan should render any military assistance to Junagadh, or reoccupy the State from
the Indian hold, the expatriate Britishers, particularly Vice – Admiral Jefford had played a significant role in the foreign
policy behaviour of Pakistan. The Britishers employed in Pakistan followed a „policy of inactivity‟ towards the state of
Junagadh which had acceded to Pakistan. “The Pakistan Times” depicting the foreign policy behaviour of India and
Pakistan pointed out: while India, played the part of an unscrupulous bully on the side or Pakistan have not some of our
statesmen (perhaps British employees) also behaved like credulous green horns.74
The Government of Pakistan not only advised the State authorities to act with the utmost caution but also themselves
refrained from sending a single solider to Junagadh. All they did was to send 7,000 tons of food grains to feed the starving
population of Junagadh and Manavadar despite the occupation of the latter by Indian forces75. Manvadhar was a State in
Kathiawar. It was infact a chieftain, though an independent one, and was contiguous to Junagadh. The Khan of
Manavadhar declared its accession with Pakistan by signing the Instrument of Accession on 24 September 1947.
The Indian Government without any notice or intimation to Pakistan and without justification of any kind, took possession
of it by force on 22 October, 1947. After the illegal occupation of Manavadhar by India. The Muslims were terrorized by
Indian armed forces. They were forced to send a cable to the UN Security Council that the situation in Manawdhar was
peaceful and were threatened that their properties would be confiscated in case they go to Pakistan. The Government of
Pakistan protested against the Indian occupation of Manavadhar and condemned Indian aggression by calling it totally
illegal and unconstitutional76 in its Press communiqué issued from Lahore on November 3, 1947.
Mangrol though a chieftain was a feudatory of Junagadh. Being feudatory to Junagadh, the Sheikh, ruler of Mangrol, had
no authority to accede independently to India or Pakistan. Since the Chief of Mangrol had no independent status, so its
accession followed automatically after Junagadh whose vassal it was. Despite this fact, the Government of India coerced
its chief to sign Instrument of Accession with India. The latter however, renounced his accession with in an hour or two of
his signature and before the Instrument of Accession had been signed by the Governor-General of India.77
The Shaikh not only withdrew and made notification of his withdrawal from the accession but also signified his intention
of acceding to Pakistan. The Government of India sent troops to occupy Mangrol in spite of a clear understanding that it
would not be done.
Babriawad was also a feudatory land-holding estate of Junagadh and never an Indian State at all in any sense of the terms.
India claimed that it had acceded to her but that claim was purely fictitious as it was not a ruling state, and had no standing
either to accede or not a accede to any Dominion. The Government of Indian sent troops for its occupation in order to
encircle Junagadh. The talukas of Sardargarh and Bantva also applied for accession to Pakistan but similarly they were
also occupied by the Indian troops without furnishing any intimation to the Government of Pakistan.78
The Maharaja of Jodhpur also expressed his wish to join Pakistan. He was coming to Karachi in order to sign the
Instrument of Accession but was hijacked to Delhi. Mountbatten warned the Maharaja. He made it clear that from a purely
legal standpoint there was no objection to the ruler of Jodhpur acceding to Pakistan; but the Maharaja should consider
seriously the consequences of doing so, having regard to the fact that he himself was a Hindu, that his State was populated
predominantly by Hindus and that the same applied to the State surrounding Jodhpur.79
The Quaid-i-Azam had offered Jodhpur the best terms: use of Karachi as a free port; free import of arms; jurisdiction over
the Jodhpur-Hyderabad (Sindh) railway; and supply of grain to famine threatened districts on the condition that Jodhpur
would declare its independence on August 15, 1947 and then join Pakistan.80
The above-mentioned States: Junagadh, Manavadhar, Mangrol, Jodhpur etc. had acceded to Pakistan voluntarily and
freely. They had full right to do so as they were entitled to do under the agreed scheme of partition and the Indian
Independence Act, 1947 and thus became part of Pakistan. Junagadh and Manavadharinfact signed the Instrument of
Accession with Pakistan. As soon as the accession was announced, India started a war of nerves, against these two States
and certain other smaller states in Kathiawar. India‟s military action against these states amounted to a direct attack and
aggression against Pakistan which the latter could reply by force. Pakistan however, refrained from taking military action.
The role played by the expatriate British officers in both Dominions, India and Pakistan, was significant. While British
officers in India led by Mountbatten tried their utmost to merge even such states with India which had declared their
accession with Pakistan and used military force without any hesitation, their counterparts in Pakistan endeavored their
utmost to refrain the latter in adopting counter measures against its traditional rival.
Hyderabad was a large state with an area of 82,692 square miles and a population between 17 and 18 millions, with its rich
economic resources. India was determined to occupy Hyderabad by force. On 11 June 1948, Nehru declared at Naini Tal
that talks of an independent and sovereign Hyderabad was absurd. The Nizam, its ruler, wanted the state to be independent.
He therefore addressed a letter to the British King as well as Prime Minister Attlee on 8 September 1947 reminding them
of his ancestors and his loyalty to the British:
The privilege that I and my ancestors have had of associating with the British Empire for about a centry and a half. I still
firmly believe that you Government through the good offices of Lord Mountbatten the Governor-General, can exert
sufficient morals and material influence to bring about an honourable and amicable settlement between the Dominion of
India and Hyderabad without impairing the dignity of my house and my people and without putting my State to material
disadvantage. In the absence of such settlement, I foresee a great deal of internal and external disorders, bloodshed and
chaos such as now prevalent in the East and West Punjab and other parts of India which can indeed even now be avoided
The Nizam appealed to the British Government to intervene but the latter adopted a lukewarm attitude and refused to
mediate between the Nizam and the Indian Government. Prime Minister Attlee told the Nizam:
I do not think my Government is in a position to tender advice to the Indian Government or to Your Exalted Highness as to
the precise constitutional relationship. I believe it to be the case that the Indian Government have agreed that Lord
Mountbatten as Governor-General should continue to play a part in the negotiations between India and Hyderabad.82
Winston Churchill, the Leader of the Opposition, told the House of Commons that Hyderabad was entitled to UN
membership: that, out of 54 members of the UN, 39 have smaller population, 20 smaller territory and 15 smaller
revenue83. On 21 August 1948, Hyderabad first brought the dispute between India and Hyderabad before the Security
Council under Article 35, paragraph 2 of the Charter as the Indian Government, despite its Standstill Agreement with
Hyderabad on 29 November 1947, had continued:
The economic blockade which had started prior to that date…..with increasing intensity and included even such items as
medicine, chlorine for purifying water and other basic essentials…..It has also been indicated that the blockade may soon
be followed by military invasion.
Although India had entered into Standstill agreement with Hyderabad yet it was not observed by the former. The Prime
Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali pointed out:
This Standstill Agreement, however, unfortunately, never came to be observed in spirit or letter by the Indian Union…..I
hope this matter will receive the British government‟s and in particular Mr. Attlee‟s and you (Bevin‟s) sympathetic and
Mountbatten tried his utmost through Walter Monckton, the constitutional Adviser to the Nizam, to merge the State of
Hyderabad with the Indian Union. He himself confessed before a crowded audience in London on 29 June 1948 that: “We
have had long discussions on how to fit this great State, with its 17,000,000 population, into the picture……It was heart
breaking to Sir Walter Monckton, and to myself that the proposals we jointly worked out were not accepted.85
The Nizam, on the other hand, leveled charges against Mountbatten and the Indian Government that they failed to supply
arms and ammunition which was urgently needed for the internal security of Hyderabad as they would have under the
Standstill Agreement: that when Hyderabad tried to import arms and ammunition from other sources, the Indian
Government did nothing to prevent border raids inspite of the repeated representations: that the Indian Government sent
their soldiers in mufti to create trouble inside Hyderabad: that the economic blockade of the State since 15 August, was
intensified. The Nizam also accused Britian of sacrificing tried friends because they had too little nuisance value.86
Realizing that his repeated requests to the British Government had borne no fruit, the Nizam turned towards America and
requested President Truman to mediate and use his good offices to settle the dispute between Hyderabad and India.
Unluckily, the response from this quarter, too, was not encouraging as the President replied that the extension of good
offices was usually successful only when requested by both parties. But since America had not heard from India on the
matter, so he could not comply with the request87. In the meanwhile India created trouble in Hyderabad, Pakistanis believe
that an organized campaign of border incidents and raids was started by India. Subversive activities were encouraged
The state of Jammu and Kashmir posed a threat to the stability of the new nation with seemingly endless hostility between
India and Pakistan. The state had about 80 percent Muslims, but its ruler was Hindu. The Indian government secured,
under questionable circumstances an instrument of accession from the Hindu Maharaja on 27 October 1947, thus opening
the way to India‟s military intervention in Kashmir. Under Mountbatten‟s direct guidance airborne units of the Indian
Army landed in Srinagar, thus halting the advance of liberation forces outside Srinagar. This was most shocking to the
people of Pakistan because from the time the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was passed, Kashmir had been regarded as an
essential part of Pakistan, both politically and economically.88
When India sent its forces to Kashmir, the Quaid-i-Azam immediately ordered the officiating C-in-C Pakistan Army,
General Gracey as General Frank Messervy, first C-in-C of Pakistan Army, was in London at that time to send troops into
Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Pass and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu. The Quaid-i-
Azam at once instructed Francis Mudie, Governor of the Punjab, who was with him, to telephone Gracey to obey his
orders immediately. But an acrimonious conversation followed in which general Gracey attributed to Sir Francis Mudie
language of undiplomatic tone and imperiousness89. It is lamentable that the British C-in-C of Pakistan Army did not obey
the orders of the Quaid-i-Azam. First, he tried to persuade the Quaid that this was not possible, because the Pakistan Army
was not in full strength nor fully equipped. When the Quaid did not listen to his excuses, he refused to obey. Had the
orders of the Quaid-i-Azam been obeyed, troops moved to their objectives and a few PAF fighters flown to intercept
Indian war planes, the story of Kashmir would have been different. But, unfortunately the acting C-in-C of Pakistan Army
was a Barister and not a Pakistani.90
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands were also suddenly allotted to India although they never formed the subject of
discussion or agreement between the two parties at any time. Neither historically nor geographically they were parts of
India. Their tribes were not connected with the Indian population by ethical, religious or cultural ties. These island were
British possessions and administered by the Central Government so they did not fall in the same category as other Chief
commissioners Provinces reserved to the Governor-General under the Act of 1935. Pakistan‟s claim to these islands was
very strong: since the only channel of communication between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was sea, so they
were important for it and could conveniently serve the purpose of refueling bases for vessels playing between the two
parts. On the other had, India had not such claim91. Although Mountbatten knew the utility of these islands for Pakistan
yet he pleaded for the congress and consequently the islands were handed over to India and not Pakistan.92
The states that were contiguous to West Pakistan and had a Muslim majority and Muslim rulers were quite a few,
Bhawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kharan, Makran, Dir, Swat, Amb and Chitral. Bahawalpur acceded to Pakistan on 3
October 1947, followed by Kahirpur, Chitral, Swat, Dir, and Amb during the next few months. The states of Las Bela,
Makran, Kharan, and Kalat, after protracted negotiations, acceded to Pakistan by the end of March 1948.93
The Princes, who were lured into signing the instruments of accession in favour of India, met a sad end. They lost control
of their states, even their own assets, in a few years and their states were absorbed into the contiguous state provinces of
the Indian Union.
Pakistan has had to face several forces working to cripple and thwart her very existence. Geographically she had been
placed in an extremely delicate situation, with her two parts i.e., East and West Pakistan separated from each other by a
„hostile distance‟ of over a thousand miles. The ambitious and militant rulers of this „hostile distance‟ have been
expressing and planning hostile design against her existence right from the very beginning. For them Pakistan was only a
transient phase, a tactical treat that did not affect their strategic aims. The tragic events immediately following the partition
in the withholding of military stores and other assets and illegal occupation of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kahsmir, bear
eloquent testimony to India‟s persistent hostility towards Pakistan and her ambition to truncate Pakistan” and encircle her
territory, weaken her militarily and strangle her economically. This could hardly be an enviable situation, much less for a
country like Pakistan. The first and the foremost problem faced by Quaid-i-Azam immediately after the establishment of
Pakistan was, therefore, the ensure the security of the country.
The division of assets between India and Pakistan was a significant issue, on the eve of independence between the two
Dominions. It was the moral and legal obligation of the British Government in general and Mountbatten as the last Viceroy
in particular to ensure the supply of its due share of assets to Pakistan-military stroes as well as cash balances. Had
Pakistan received its due share of assets, it would have ushered in an era of cordial relations between the two states. But,
with the background of traditional Hindu-Muslim rivalry before partition, the leaders of the two dominions started their
relations in a climate of mutual suspicion, distrust, fear and jealousy. Pakistan believed that India will not allow her to rest
in peace and will destroy her whenever she has an opportunity and India thought that whenever Pakistan gets an
opportunity, she will move against India and attack her.94
Since Pakistan was placed in a miserable and deplorable condition after independence, so, if the Indian leaders in general
and Mountbatten in particular, had tried to help Pakistan at the crucial time, it would have been appreciated not only by the
Pakistanis statesmen, politicians and public but by the whole world at large. But to the surprise of the Pakistanis, the Indian
foreign policy behavior, instead of helping Pakistan, further aggravated its position. Rushbrook Williams points out:
The Hindus feeling that Pakistan need not have emerged at all is important politically, because it shaped the Indian attitude
and influenced Indian behavior, towards Pakistan, not only in the early critical days…..but in the later years.95
The following issues clearly indicate India‟s antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan in matters related to assets; first, India
withheld agreed share of Pakistan‟s military assets. The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee, with sub-committee for
the Army, Navy, Air Force and Finance had made agreed recommendations, which were accepted by the Joint Defence
Council that army assets between the two Dominions be divided in the proportion of 64% to India and 36% to Pakistan.
The report of the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee
“Military opinion is unanimous that this general principle for the division of movable assets is so obviously found on
common sense and practical considerations as to be incontestable. The Indian Government, however, is apparently
determined to contest it to the last ditch. I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present India Cabinet is
implacably determined to do all their power to prevent the establishments of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In
this I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers and indeed by all responsible British officers cognizant
of the situation since the 15th August……the Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers. Civil officials and others have persistently
tried to obstruct the work of partition of Armed Forces….Their aim is to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or
indeed anything of the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores held in the arsenals and depots in India. This is an
The above quoted stunning report of Claude Auchinleck, Supreme Commander of the armies of India and Pakistan was
sent to British Prime Minister on 28 September, 1947, just six weeks after the Partition. If the Indian leaders, on account of
their rivalry and antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan, obstructed the work of division of military assets, it was the legal
as well as moral duty of Mountbatten and Auchinleck to carry on the process till Pakistan received its just share. Perhaps
Mountbatten was not interested at all in handing over Pakistan‟s just share of military assets and Auchinleck consequently
John Connell had made the following comments on the pressure of Indian leaders on Auchinleck in the following words:
“Continually subjected by the political leaders of India to deceitful and underhand interference which amounted in the end,
to complete sabotage….Even the fundamental responsibilities of Government to bring the civil war, slaughter and
destruction to an end and restore law and order – they (the Indian leaders) regarded as of secondary importance. What
mattered to them, above all else, was to cripple and thwart the establishment of Pakistan as a viable, independent nation;
and since the Joint Defence Council and the Supreme Headquarters were, in their view, the main obstacles on their road to
the fulfillment of this aim, these must be swiftly and systematically undermined.”97
Like Mountbatten, General Auchinleck too was originally opposed to partition but entrusted with the task of division of
assets, when the latter and his team mates tried to perform their duties seriously, they were continuously and virulently
accused of being pro-Pakistan and partial by the Hindus, whereas the truth was that they had merely tried to do their duty
impartially and without fear, favour or affection which was universally acknowledged by all fair-minded people.
While the Indian leaders did not cooperate, Auchinleck confessed that the attitude of Pakistan had been reasonable and
cooperative throughout. That was natural as Pakistan had practically nothing of her own, and the reserves of stores which
were lying in India, were essential for this country in order to strengthen its defence.
Mountbatten did not: ensure the supply of Pakistan‟s share of military assets. Instead he cut short98 the joint Defence
Council‟s life by four months and on 30 November 1947 Auchinleck relinquished his post as Supreme Commander99.
This created inherent military weakness for Pakistan Army. Though Pakistan‟s share of the stores was 160 train-load of
military equipment and weapons100, but what it actually received, was a nominal one. Out of 165,000 tons of ordnance
stores due to her, only 4,703 tons she had received101. Important arms and ammunition were not received by Pakistan.
“The share of tanks, guns, specialist and transport vehicles and their spares was never received.102
The cruel turn was that Pakistan‟s share of heavy military stores, aero planes, ordances, vehicles and factories went to
India, as was the case with many other things.103 Out of 36% of Pakistan‟s share of military assets, India dispatched not
more than two percent and even then no arms and ammunitions were sent.104
India released only items of general nature, including a considerable amount of perishable ones, unwanted and obsolete
quantities of anti-gas and water-proofing equipment, shoes and boots meant either for Gurkhas or West Africans, and other
personal equipment, either too small or too big for the use of Pakistani soldiers. A number of packing cases were found to
be full of bricks105 stones and wrecked equipment.
It appears that Mountbatten and Indian leaders were determined to make Pakistan a weak and feeble state, to be at the
mercy of India. Out of 420,000 soldiers in the combined Indian Army and Air Force, Pakistan took 15,000.106 Out of the
40 ordnance depots containing reserves of all types of stores, equipment, ammunition, vehicles, only 5 small depots were
situated in pakistan territory. There was only one Training Centre, the staff college at Quetta in pakistan, at the time of
Partition. We got one Air Squadron at the time of partition……Our Air Force at the time of Partition had 224 officers, 50
cadets and 2309 airmen.107
Like the Army and the Air Force, the Pakistan Navy was also in a dilapidated condition. At the time of partition, Pakistan
had neither any Naval Headquarters nor any Naval Dockyard. Chittagong, in particular, had no arrangements whatsoever
for its naval defence. Our share of the Naval officer personnel included only ten Pakistanis – one captain, six lieutenant –
commanders and three Engineers…..All the Naval training centres were in India and non in Pakistan.108
The combined defence forces of Pakistan inherited at the time independence, were little more than a skeleton and without
proper weapons ammunition and equipment. At the time of partition she hardly inherited even a single formed military unit
or a single exclusively Muslim battalion. Several units still had Hindu and Sikh commanding officers and a number of
Hindus held appointments at Pakistan G.H.Q.109 Almost all the battalions and regiments had, therefore, to be regrouped.
The army was also short of commissioned officers especially in technical branches such as engineering and artillery. The
Muslim officers particularly lacked staff experience. As a first step a military academy and an engineering centre were
created at Kakul and Risalpur respectively. There was obviously much more on sound lines to do and the government had
to find means to build the army with the help of military experts.
Even though Quaid-i-Azam as a great champion of peace and international amity, he had no illusions in this respect. He
was convinced that the first necessity for each independent country was to have strong defences. He declared that the
security of Pakistan was our primary duty. He said, “While giving the fullest support to the United Nations Charter, we
cannot afford to neglect our defences…..the primary responsibility for the defence of Pakistan will rest with us…..the
weak and the defenceles, in this imperfect world, invite aggression from other”110. His Government, therefore, had to
devote much more resources meager in themselves in order to build a strong armed forces even at the cost of
developmental work. Emphasizing the need for a strong and efficient Air Force he said, “A country without a strong Air
Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her Air Forces as quickly as possible. It must take its rights
place in securing Pakistan‟s defence”111
He reminded the officers and men to Pakistan Army that although the battle of Pakistan‟s freedom had been won, a harder
battle to preserve that freedon was still in progress and that the battle had to be fought to a successful conclusion if
Pakistan were to survive as a great nation. Addressing the Pakistan Army in Malir on 21st February, 1948, he said, “We
have to prove ourselves fit for our newly won freedom. You have fought many a battle on the far-flung battlefields of the
globe to rid the world of the Fascist menace and make it safe for democracy. Now you have to stand guard over the
development and maintenance of Islamic democracy you will have to be alert, very alert for the time for relaxation is not
yet there. With faith, discipline and selfless devotion to duty, there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot achieve”112.
Pakistan was faced with another major problem i.e., the absence of an organized administrative machinery. She possessed
neither the proper equipment nor the trained personnel. In fact she needed everything from paper to desks, men and money.
In this respect India did her best to add to her difficulties and even stifle her very existence. She unjustifiably held up
Pakistan‟s share of personnel, equipment and finance‟s. The special trains carrying essential files and record from Delhi to
Karachi were reported to have either been burnt of derailed113. Pakistan was therefore thrown on her own resources to
build up a new administrative machinery right form the very scratch. She had not only to establish a new government but
also to fund a new capital.
The administrative machinery inherited by Pakistan, consists of nothing but bits and pieces. Some of these pieces were of
high quality but these were few in relation to the rest. First there was the handful – it was no more of thoroughly
experienced men, generally with the background of an oxford or Cambridge college and an Inn of Court, who represented
the solid if small Muslim element in the Indian Civil Service on the Bench, at the Bar, and in the learned profession. Not
many of them had taken an active part in political life, but their experience of responsibility made them invaluable. Next
were the more numerous, but still pitiable small, band of well-trained Muslim officials who held senior – but rarely the
most senior posts in all India Service such as Police, Accounts, Forests, and Engineering. Below them again were the
minor Muslim officials of the former Provincial Services; men with useful training, but with little practice in
It was round these three classes that the new administrative machinery of Pakistan had to be built up. Their numbers were
inadequate: most of them had insufficient practical experience of the tasks which awaited them. Many Junior officials had
to be promoted over-rapidly, because senior posts must be filled: recruitment for Junior ranks had to be extemporized out
of rather haphazard material until a new Public Serivce commission could be appointed and set to work. On the whole, it
was remarkable that, in the face of appalling difficult problems, the extemporized machine worked as well as it did in the
early months after partition.115
Recalling the initial difficulties of the Pakistan government, Liaquat Ali Khan observed”: another difficulty we had to
encounter was that all Government servants were given the option to serve in whichever of the two Dominions they liked,
although it was known, that majority of experienced high grade officials being non-Muslims, it would be difficult to run
the Government of Pakistan. We had urged in vain that the Government servants should be compelled to stay on where
they were arguing that there was no reason why those who could serve a foreign Government, could not serve their own.
The agreed percentage of Muslim representation in the All – India Service was 25, but it was found on actual calculation to
be not more than eleven, with a nominal proportion of gazetted officers. Just think how short of officers we were at the
start. Peons were plentiful but peon cannot run the Government.116
The country, therefore, suffered from acute shortages in trained staff, accommodation, records office equipment, and
communication. The new capital Karachi lacked an adequate secretariat building. The Governor-General‟s house provided
the only visible symbol of the central Administration. Officers and Clerks who had opted for Pakistan had to report on duty
as soon as they reached Karachi. But they had nowhere to go. Not a building was available, and the first few offices which
came into being were housed under trees and on pavements117. Hastily constructed tin sheds provided the bulk of office
accommodation118. Some persons pitched tents, borrowed or rented, in the open ground119. There was no proper
equipment to run the administration. Pakistan‟s share of office equipment and furniture could not be obtained from India
by August 15, 1947, and even what was obtained could not all be moved to Karachi because of the disruption of
communication by disturbances. Though local purchases were made, yet there were great shortages. Typewriters and
telephones, and at times, even the most ordinary supplies, like pens pencils papers, desks and chairs, were not easily
available. It was reported that some of the Minister used wooden boxes as their tables and had practically no filling
system120. Not all the relevant files and records could be duplicated in Delhi and brought to Karachi. Despite these heavy
and heart – rending odds, the first few pioneers of Pakistan; administrative machinery started their work with remarkable
zeal, devotion and determination to overcome all kinds of hazards. Quaid‟s personality provided them all with the
necessary inspiration. His popularity, prestige, untiring dedication and devotion proved a tremendous asset to the infant
state in organizing itself into a going concern.
In an Eid Message on August 18, 1947, he addressed his people in the following words: “This is our first Eid immediately
following in the heralding of free, independent, sovereign Pakistan having been established. This day of rejoicing
throughout the Muslim world so aptly comes immediately in the wake of our national State being established, and
therefore, it is a matter of special significance and happiness to us all. I wish on this auspicious day a very happy Eid to all
Muslims wherever they may be throughout the world the Eid will usher in, I hope, a new era of prosperity and will mark
the onward march of renaissance of Islamic culture and ideals. I fervently pray that Almighty God make us all worthy of
our past and hoary history and give us strength to make Pakistan truly a great nation amongst all the nations of the world.
No doubt we have achieved Pakistan, but that is yet the beginning of an end. Great responsibilities have come to us, and
equally great should be our determination and endeavour to discharge them, and the fulfillment thereof will demand of us
efforts and sacrifices in the cause of no less for constructive work in building up of our nation than what was required for
the achievement of the cherished goal of Pakistan. The time for real solid work has now arrived, and I have no doubt in my
mind that the Muslim genius will put its shoulder to the wheel and conquer all obstacles in our way on the, road which may
Let us not, on this occasion, forget those of our brethren and sisters who have sacrificed their all so that Pakistan may be
established and we may live. We fervently pray that their souls may rest in peace and we shall never forget the memory of
those who are no more and those who have suffered. For many, Eid will be not an occasion of such great joy and rejoicing
as in Pakistan. Those of our brethren who are minorities in Hindustan may rest assured that we shall never neglect or forget
them. Our hearts go out to them, and we shall consider no effort too great to help them and secure their well-being for I
recognize that it is the Muslim minority provinces in this sub-continent who were the pioneers and carried the banner aloft
for the achievement of our cherished goal of Pakistan. I shall never forget their support, nor I hope the majority Muslim
provinces in Pakistan will fail to appreciate that they were the pioneers in the vanguard of our historic and heroic struggle
for the achievement of Pakistan which today in an accomplished fact.”121
Though established against very heavy and formidable odds, Pakistan lacked strong cohesive forces. She was in fact and
unstable mixture of provinces and powerful leaders who, amidst the emotions of religion and harsh relations of politics,
had joined together under a strong leader to meet an emergency. Each group had its own interests which gave birth to the
feelings of provincialism and parochialism which were as dangerous as threats from the neighboring hostile India. 122
A “separatist movement” in East Pakistan and a “secessionist movement in the North West Frontier Province supported by
Afghanistan”123 were the most serious problems in the political life of Pakistan after 1947. Quaid-i-Azam strongly
condemned both these trends as the negation of the very principle on which Pakistan was claimed and achieved.
Though Muslims of Bengal and West Pakistan were united to defend their religion and culture, they began to harbour
certain suspicions and doubts after 1947. In the few first month of crisis immediately following the independence need for
cohesive unity and the lack of experienced administrators in East Pakistan led to strong centralization in the hands of the
central government at Karachi. Numerous officials were sent from West Pakistan, especially from the Punjab to fill posts
in the East wing. While mainly honest, a goodly number of these imported officials had little sympathy with the Muslim
Bengali‟s whom they regarded as backward and crude124. Soon the governed began to complain that they were being
neglected in the way of development schemes and allocation of revenues.
Another irritant was the apparent determination of the Central Government to adopt Urdu as the official language of the
country.125 The Bengalis, however, challenged this move and demanded political, linguistic and financial parity with
West Pakistan. All the more, Bengali‟s Chief Minister, Hussein S. Suherawardy, demanded Bengali‟s complete
independence in 1947 and, on being rebuffed by Quaid-i-Azam, decided not to live in Pakistan126. On August 31, 1947
Suharwardy accepted Gandhi‟s invitation to work with him in putting out the embers of Communal discord in Calcutta.
Their Joint efforts met with success, and Calcutta and Bengal were spared the horrors perpetrated in the Punjab.127 The
TamuddunMajlis, a private social organization of East Pakistan, demanded Bengali as the language of instruction,
administration and means of communication in East Bengal as early as September 1947, only a month after Pakistan was
established. However, it was ignored till the December of that year when it was feared that Urdu alone would be the
language of the State128. The language movement started off in earnest in 1948 that the State language129. Mr. Jinnah
made the statement on the assumption that one language unites a new nation and that nobody, except anti-Pakistan
agitators, were against Urdu. Of Jilani Kamran, giving Bengali, the status of a national language; making it national
language; were in no way fair or justifiable steps. The advocacy of Bengali was only to make it and the Devanagari script
the rivals of the national language Urdu so that the creation and strengthening of nationalism would be impeded.130
A group of Pushtu-speaking Pathans, posed an other serious threat in the form of a secessionist movement in the North-
West Frontier Province. These restless, belligerent, and fiercely individualistic tribes had never been pacified even by the
British administrators. Some of the Afghan patriots tried to take advantage of the opportunity to bid for a wide belt of
territory along the frontier on the grounds that the British tile it had not been based on solid grounds, while some of the
hostile Pathans of the boundary region wished to avail themselves of the Civil Chaos in the Plains to engage in looting.
The new government, however, shorn of every device for social or military control, had to face ad check these problems
with dedicated resolve if with anything else.
Another problem related to the framing of a Constitution. Despite all problems and difficulties, which beset the country
and absorbed the attention of the government, the Quaid wanted the constituent Assembly to devote itself earnestly to the
task of constitution making. Addressing members of Assembly on 11th August 1947, he said, “The constituent Assembly
has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future constitution
of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the federal legislature of Pakistan. We
have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the Federal Legislature of Pakistan………Remember
that you are now a sovereign legislative body and you have got all the powers. It therefore places on you the great
responsibility31. But unfortunately he died too early. Everything was still unsettled except the fact that Pakistan had come
to stay. The pattern of government had yet to be determined, the broad outlines of the State policies, domestic as well as
foreign, to be worked out and the kind of society to be built was still not known.
At the time of Independence, it appeared that Pakistan was beset with enormous economic problems and difficulties.
Under the provisions of the Indian independence Act, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935 became, with certain
adaptations, the working Constitution of Pakistan132. Even before partition, doubts had continually been cast on its
economic and financial viability. Speaking at the ceremony of the presentation of the new Pakistani coins and notes to him,
the Quaid-i-Azam said, “When we first raised our demand for a sovereign and independent state of Pakistan there were
few false prophets who tried to deflect us from our set purpose by saying that Pakistan was not economically feasible.
They painted extremely dark pictures of the future of our state and its financial and economic soundness”.133
When the British Journalist Beverley Nichols interviewed the Quaid-i-Azam in December, 1943, the first question he
asked was about the economic aspect of Pakistan: “Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer under Pakistan”? The
Quaid-i-Azam‟s reply was characterized: “The Muslims are tough People, lean and hardy, if Pakistan means that they will
have to be a little tougher, they will not complain. But why should it mean that? What a conceivable reason is there to
suppose that the gift of nationality is going to be an economic liability?”134
The hostile Hindu propaganda had also concentrated itself on the same theme. They started an anti-Pakistan campaign to
prove that Pakistan would soon collapse financially. Attempts were, therefore, made to deprive her of coal and canal
waters; a debt of Rs 550, 000,000, owing to her was dishonored135. The Punjab massacres and the disputes over cash
balances, defence stores, Kashmir, Canal water, and other questions were also products of the Indian aggressive designs
aimed at strangling her economy on the eve of its very birth. The Indian leaders reckoned that, since Pakistan was not
economically viable while India was, they could, without serious injury to themselves, hasten her collapse by an
Many of Pakistan‟s economic problems were the result of the lack or nearly total absence of modern industries on the eve
of her independence. Though in East Pakistan, she produced 70 percent of the world‟s jute, she did not possess a single
jute mill except a few babing-presses136. The jute produced in East Pakistan, had, therefore, to be sent to Calcutta for
industrial process. This left the farmers and in fact the economy of the East wing at the mercy of Indian mill owners for a
reasonable price of their product. The same position existed about the cotton crop in West Pakistan. In 1947, of the
1,500,000 cotton bales produced, only went to the mills on Pakistani territory137. Though cotton was the largest cash crop
in West Pakistan, there were only a few cotton – mills – quite inadequate to handle it. In the whole country less than
77,000 kilowatts of generating capacity existed138. At the time of independence, Pakistan had, therefore, practically no
industries to start with, no factories to press its jute, no mill for its cotton, and no tanneries for its hides. Speaking on the
occasion of the foundation-stone laying ceremony of the ValikaTaxtile Mills, Quaid-i-Azam emphasized the need for
industrialization in these words: “Pakistan, at present mostly an agricultural state and for manufactured goods it is
dependent upon the outside world”139. If Pakistan was to become a modern nation, industrialization would have to be one
of the first aims.
Pakistan was also faced with problem of the lack of financial skills of expertise. Before partition, most of the junior
officers and clerks in banks and insurance companies big mercantile concerns and the Government offices that dealt with
economies had been Hindus or Sikhs: and their departure in 1947-48 for a while created cause something like chaos in
Pakistan140. For example, East Pakistan had only 5 percent of the total number of industrial workers of undivided Bengal
at the time of partition. Industries, Banks, insurance companies, commercial house, Import and export firms,
communication centres, power stations, and educational institutions were all located in Calcutta141. Similarly, in West
Pakistan, the people were less well-educated and less politically mature than those in India.
Pakistan was also poor and ill developed in mineral wealth. Her total coal, production that too of an inferior quality
amounted to a meager 500,000 tons a year. She had no accessible iron-ore; very little oil, limited to the Attock area West
of Rawalpindi; and no rich mineral like India‟s manganese or thorium; though rock-salt was available in the Khewra
mines, its money earning power was meager.142
There was a shortage of electricity power in both the wings. A large area in West Punjab was dependent for its electricity
needs upon the Mandi Hydroelectric Works in East Punjab. The total installed capacity in the country at the time of
partition was only 75,028 k.w., but lack of repairs and of competent staff greatly reduced the actual capacity. In East
Pakistan, the capacity was only 15,600 k.w. The Karnaphuli Hydro-Electric Project was still in its developmental stage.
East Pakistan had been dependent for its supplies of fuel from India; this created numerous difficulties for getting coal and
oil from across the border. Very little exploration of oil and mineral resources in Pakistan had been carried out before
partition143. Rail and road communications were also poor and ill-developed. Agriculture by which 80 percent of the
population lived, was still carried on by antiquated and inefficient methods in which mechanization played no part at
Ports of Karachi and Chittagong, were poorly equipped to deal with incoming and outgoing Cargo145. East and West
Wings were separated by 1,200 miles by air and 3,000 miles by sea. Establishment of Telephone communication between
them was an urgent necessity.
At the time of partition, West Pakistan had a surplus of food grains, but East Wing faced a deficit in rice, its staple food
crop though West Pakistan had a surplus of rice, yet there were difficulties of procurement and transport. On some
branches of the railway system in West Pakistan, services had to be suspended because of the shortage of coal. Shipping
was scarce. Food shipments from West Pakistan were fortunately arranged in time. After January, 1948, there was a wheat
shortage in West Pakistan due to the refugees influx. In some districts there was scarcity of wheat and no surpluses were
available from abroad.146
Hindus had been actively trying to undermine the economic fabric of Pakistan even before it came into existence. They had
almost exclusively been controlling trade and industry in the part of India which became Pakistan. The Civil and Military
Gazatte of Lahore, in its issue of 6th May, 1947 wrote that the Punjab national Bank had decided to transfer the registered
office of the company from Lahore to Delhi. Two more important Banks and two premier insurance companies are
contemplating to move out of the Punjab. The total capital under flight is estimated at Rs. 250 crores”. The Gazette also
produced the words of a Hindu bankers, “After us the deluge. We are leaving Pakistan an economic desert”.147
In undivided India, banking too had been a virtual nonopoly of Hindus. During the partition days (from June 3 to August
15, 1947) most Hindu – managed banks transferred their headquarters and funds from Pakistan to India. The Punjab
disturbances completed the process of 487 offices of scheduled banks in West Pakistan, only 69 were left after partition
148. Only one bank – the Muslim-owned Habib Bank – moved its headquarters from India to Pakistan. Credit facilities
were thus greatly curtailed and a special effort had been undertaken in this respect.
The establishment of a new administration and the vast influx of refugees had thrown a heavy financial burden upon the
new government. The disruption of communications and trade had brought business activity and revenue receipts to a low
level. Areas of taxes left behind by evacuees could not be recovered. The standstill arrangement with India under which
each dominion was to receive only the revenue collected in its own operated was unfavorable for Pakistan. Taxes were
collected to the head offices of firms, most of which were located in India. Central excise duties were levied at points of
manufacture, and India refused to give rebates of duty on excisable commodities exported to Pakistan149. Quaid-i-Azam‟s
government, however, had to secure capital. Especially foreign exchange, in order to build new industries, power projects,
and adequate irrigation schemes. The story of Pakistan‟s economic struggle in 1947-48 was on “of advances setbacks,
natural catastrophes, and invaluable „Good Samaritan”150.
In addition to these problems of social and economic development, Pakistan had also to face a heavy burden of defence.
The staggering burden of military expenditures occasioned by the cold war with India – which became hot for a brief
period in Kashmir – diverted funds from essential nation-building services like health, education, and irrigation.151
Amidst these numerous difficulties, problems and shortages, the work of development was undertaken in full earnestness.
Despite the most discouraging condition, Quaid-i-Azam Government was able to make astonishing strides in building an
economically viable state. The new state of Pakistan needed a leadership which could inspire confidence in the people and
weld them together into one solid whole despite cultural pluralism. Such leadership could only be provided by Quaid-i-
Azam who by virtue of having led the common struggle for freedom, symbolized their deepest hopes and aspirations for a
comprehensive life as sovereign nation. He alone could inspire hope in moments of despair and galvanise the people to a
mighty concerted effort to overcome the odds and difficulties with their path in the beginning was beset.
Reference: Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan
Publisher: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore. 2006
Notes and References
1. H.V. Hodson, the Great Divide, London, 1985, P. 346.
2. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, P. 179.
3. The Statesman, 15 July 1947.
4. The Pakistan Times, 10, July, 1948, p. 4a.
5. Mahajan, Mehr, Chand, Looking Back; The Autobiography, Bombay, 1963, p. 114.
6. N. Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Vol. XII, No. 326, p. 492.
7. The Eastern Times, 28 August 1947, p,i.e.
8. The Pakistan Times, 19 August 1947, p. 4a.
9. N. Mansergh, op. cit, Vol.XII, No. 162, pp. 226-27.
10. The Partition of the Punjab; A compliation of official Documents, Vol.I, p. XIII.
11. Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Op. cit, pp. 116, 264-65.
12. Rushbrook Williams L.H., The State of Pakistan London, 1966, p. 84.
13. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1864 – 1990. Roxford Books, 1991, pp. 114-15.
14. The Civil and Military Gazette, 25 April 1958.
15. The Partition of the Punjab, op. cit,., Vol. I, P. XXVIII.
16. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierr, op. Cit., P. 281.
17. The Pakistan Times, 10 July 1948, p. 4a.
18. Ibid, 7 July 1948, p. 6a.
19. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, op.cit, p. 282.
20. Ibid., P. 104.
21. Dr. Muhammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, Mountbatten‟s Anti-Pakistan Role, Lahore 1995, P.34.
23. MatlubulHasanSaiyid, Muhammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study, p. 447.
26. I.H. Qureshi, A short History of Pakistan. P. 229.
27. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: creator of Pakistan, p. 188.
28. Ch. Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, p. 221.
29. M. RafiqueAfzal (ed). Speches and Statement of Quaid-i-MillatLiaquat Ali Khan (1941-51) p. 250.
30. Ibid, p. 125
31. Ibid, p. 126.
32. The Pakistan Times, 16 October 1947, p. 1a.
33. Ibid, 21 October 1947, p. 1c.
34. Ibid, 22 October 1947, p. 1c.
35. Ibid, 7 July, 1948, p. 6a. See editorial: „The guilty Men‟.
36. Liaquat to the British Prime Minister, Telegram No. 363 September 23rd, 1947:
37. See appendices to „The Sikh Plan‟ and „The Sikhs in Action‟, published by the West Punjab Government,
38. Muhammad Zafarullah, Khan, The Forgotten years: Merriors of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan Edited by
A..H. Batalvi, Lahore 1991, p. 139.
39. Ian Stephense, Pakistan: Old Country, New Nation, London. 1963, p. 183.
40. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op. cit., p. 256.
41. Ibid., p. 258.
42. Hamid Khan Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Karachi, 2001, p. 82.
43. MaulanaAbulKalam Azad, India wins Freedom, Calcutta 1959, p. 202.
44. Richard Symonds, Making of Pakistan, Karachi 1966, p. 83.
45. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op. cit., p. 261.
46. K.B. Sayeed , Pakistan in the formative phase. P. 263.
47. Richard Symonds, op. cit. p. 83.
48. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op. cit. p. 261.
49. Richard, Symonds, supra, note 35, p. 83.
50. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op. cit. p. 264.
51. Ibid., p. 267.
52. Ibid., pp. 267-8.
53. Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi, Speches, statements & messages of the Quaid-i-Azam, Lahore 1996, Vol. 4, p.
2624 – 25.
54. S.M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, p. 421.
55. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op.cit., p. 229.
56. Ibid., p. 231.
57. Ibid., p. 234.
58. V.P., Menon, Story of the integration of Indian States, p. 123.
59. The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1947, p. 4c.
60. Ibid. 13 November 1947, p. 5a.
61. Ibid. 11 November 1947, p. 6a.
62. H..V, Hodson, op.cit. p. 432.
63. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: the official biography, London 1985, p. 443.
64. Dr. Mohammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op.cit. pp. 123-24.
65. F.O 371: 69712 F 4095/6/85/G, 15 March, 1948.
66. UNSCOR, Third Year, 241-260 Meeting, 5th February, and 2nd March 1948, pp. 200 – 02.
67. H.V. Hodson, op. cit. pp. 438-39.
68. The Pakistan Times, 13 November, 1947, p. 5a.
69. Ibid, 11 November 1947, p. 1b.
71. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 440.
72. Philip Ziegler, op. cit., p. 444.
73. Dr. Muhammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op. cit. p. 27.
74. The Pakistan Times, 11 November, 1947.
75. Ibid., 13 November 1947.
76. Ibid. 4 November, 1947. p. 1a.
77. Ibid, 13 November 1947, p. 5a.
78. Dr. Mohammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op. cit. p. 129.
79. V.P. Menon, op. cit., 112-13, 17, 22-23.
80. N. Mansergh, op. cit, Vol. XII, No.385, p. 603.
81. Dr. Muhammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op. cit. p. 130-31.
83. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 454, Columns 1728, 1730, 30 July 1948.
84. Dr. Mohammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op. cit. p. 131 – 32.
85. The Pakistan Times, 1 July 1948, p. 8b.
86. Ibid., 20 July 1948, p. 5a.
87. The New York times, 10 September, 1948.
88. Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi 2001, p. 84.
89. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 457.
90. The Pakistan Times, 4 September 1981, p. 1h.
91. N. Mansergh, op.cit, Vol…XI. No. 480 p. 859. No. 536, p. 938 – 39.
92. Ibid., NO. 365, p. 674, No. 463, p. 832.
93. Ch. Mohammad Ali, op. cit., P. 235-36.
94. Abdul Kalam, Azad, India Wins freedom, p. 226.
95. Rushbrook Williams, op. cit., p. 18.
96. Dr. Mohammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, op. cit. pp. 69 – 70.
97. John Connel, Auchinleck, London, 1959, p. 912.
98. Dr. M. Aslam, Qureshi, Anglo – Pakistan Relations, 1947 – 76, Lahore 1976, p. 74.
99. The Pakistan Times, 2 December 1947, p. 1b.
100. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 20.
101. The Pakistan Times, 3 January 1948, p. 3a.
102. Malik Feroz Khan Noon, From Memory, p. 209.
103. Pakistan Horizon, The Fundamentals of Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy: A Group Study, Vol. IX, No. 1, March 1956
104. Major General FazalMuqeem, The Story of Pakistan Army, p. 39.
105. Mohammad Ayub Khan, op. cit, p. 20.
106. Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the rise of China, New York 1964, pp. 124 – 25.
107. M. RafiqueAfzal, Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-MilatLiqauat Ali Khan, pp. 213.
108. Ibid., p. 212
109. Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 260.
110. The Eastern Times. January 27, 1948.
111. M. Rafiq Khan and S. Stark Herbert, Yound Pakistan, London, 1951, p. 53.
112. The Eastern Times, February 24, 1948.
113. K.B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 261.
114. L.F.Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, London 1962, p. 31.
115. Ibid, p. 32.
116. Speeches and Statement of Quaid-e-MillatLiaquat Ali Khan, p. 209.
117. M.H. Saiyid, op.cit., p. 449.