Kazakhstan china


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  • This country is a landlocked state and shares borders with Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Traditionally, Kazakhstan has been an ally and more than a partner to Russia since the two countries have the same cultural, ethnic, language and historic backgrounds. However, Kazakhstan has declared a “multivectoral” policy1 which means a willingness to develop and improve strategic, diplomatic and economic relations with the major geopolitical powers in the international arena, namely, China, Russia, the US, Europe and the Muslim world.2 Within that list, China ranks as one of the highest priorities for Kazakhstan to collaborate with for many reasons. “resource nationalism”, i.e. the perception by producer country governments that hydrocarbons resources are a means to nation-building.
  • “Resource Warriors,” Asian Wall Street Journal, July 23 1997.G. Christoffersen, “China's Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas”, The National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, 9, 2 (1998), p. 3.http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1069823/beijings-energy-ambitions-threatened-lack-waterThe regularity of official visits between Kazakh and Chinese officials is major evidence of the strong connection between the two countries. Two countries in particular, Iran and Sudan (which account for 11% and 5% of China’s imported oil), have been the focus of the international community—the first for its nuclear adventurism and the second for its human rights violations in the Darfur region. International attention on these states, and China’s willing relations with them, jeopardize the success of China’s “peaceful rise” policy, raising questions whether China will be a responsible actor as its sphere of influence expands.
  • Traversing 2,800 km just to reach the Chinese border (still far away from China’s coastal demand centers),8 and with a capacity of only a few hundred thousand barrels per day, this project is hardly economically attractive. Yet China was willing to invest in this pipeline in order to establish the route.
  • the development of mutual collaboration between the two countries in the oil and gas sector has significant importance for the further improvement of friendly and neighborly relations, and that it would meet the interests of the people of both states.
  • http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/China-slakes-oil-thirst-Kazakhstan-to-sell-2659788.phpCNPC funded the construction cost of $806 million for the thousand-lm leg from Atasu and Alashankou
  • 2008: China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail.Barrels per dayOnly about half of its total capacity—due to pricing disputes and problems with supply availability that created gaps, only partially filled with Russian crude from western Siberia. and also because lighter, less waxy Russian oils are blended with waxy Kazakh crudes during the winter to prevent them from solidifying and blocking the line.
  • Kazakhstan china

    1. 1. Globalization and environment Kazakhstan and China for oil – examine Kazakhstan external relations to China in relation to oil Lau Yin Yu Nina 52226060
    2. 2. Outline • Kazakhstan • China • Bilateral Oil Cooperation • Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline • Restraints • Conclusion
    3. 3. Kazakhstan • The largest energy producer and exporter in the Central Asian and Caspian region, has generally pursued economic policies based on oil-led economic development. • In the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s political and economic elite pushed more vigorously than others in Central Asia for privatization and other pro-market economic reforms – and some economists have argued that the imperative of achieving greater economic independence from Russia pushed them further in that direction. • Oil remains its most important industry and most valuable export • “Resource Nationalism”
    4. 4. Kazakhstan • The country's main oil reserves are located in the western part of the country, where the five largest onshore oil fields (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe, Mangistau, and Uzen) are located
    5. 5. CHINA • New Resource Warriors • The majority of China’s imported energy comes from the Middle East and Africa, accounting for 45% and 28.7% • China’s demand for oil is expected to more than double by 2030. • “pipelines through China from Central Asia and Russia would help to diversify Northeast Asian energy supply - reducing the region’s dependence on supplies from the Middle East” (Christoffersen) • Aspirations to become a global energy player
    6. 6. Bilateral oil cooperation
    7. 7. Bilateral oil cooperation • September 1997: Framework Agreement on Projects for Fields Development and Construction of West Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline between CNPC and Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Kazakhstan – Pipeline to go from Atyrau to Alashankou – CNPC will secure minimal guaranteed transportation volume of 20 mty and financing for the project • 1999: Agreement on Cooperation in the Oil and Gas Sector between the Governments of Kazakhstan and China • 2003: Agreement on Joint Study of the Two-Stage Construction of the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline between KMG and CNPC – Agreed to prepare Feasibility Study for two-stage construction of the pipeline
    8. 8. Bilateral oil cooperation • 2004: China and Kazakhstan announced the building of the oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; Agreement on the Main Principles for Construction of the Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline between KMG and CNPC • 2005: Agreement on Joining KazTransOil’s and Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline Systems • 2006: Agreement on Operation and Maintenance of the Atasu-Alashankou Pipeline between Kazakhstan-China Pipeline company and KazTransOil • October 2009: China and Kazakhstan completed an extension of the oil pipeline all the way to western Kazakhstan.
    9. 9. Agreement on collaboration in oil and gas sector • 1997 • Both states will undertake all necessary measures and actions to support and encourage the establishment of direct connections between corresponding agencies, enterprises and companies; and will research further approaches to develop the oil and gas sector and the extension of its scope. • Supported the construction of a pipeline which would connect the Western part of Kazakhstan with the Western region of China. • China approved the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) as the company responsible for the construction of a pipeline, the financing arrangements and the preparation of the Technical- Economical Justification of the project. • Kazakhstan agreed to provide land lots and construction sites for the construction of a pipeline, guaranteed to provide pipeline security, and also stabilized the export duties for oil and import taxes for the necessary construction equipment.
    10. 10. Kazakhstan- china oil pipeline
    11. 11. Kazakhstan-china oil pipeline • Partnership: • KazStroyService: the leading engineering- construction company in Kazakhstan • KazMunayGas: the state-owned oil and gas company of Kazakhstan • China National Petroleum Company (CNPC): one the world’s largest oil and gas suppliers, providers and engineering-construction firms
    12. 12. Kazakhstan-china oil pipeline • China’s first transnational pipeline and Kazakhstan’s first transnational pipeline to its neighbour to the east. • The project was undertaken by the Sino-Kazakh pipeline company, a “50:50 venture • Currently capacity is at 14 million tons per year • Expected nominal capacity of 20 million tons per year in 2014. • The total cost of the project has been estimated at US$3-3.5 billion; phase two of the project, initially supposed to cost around US$700 million, cost an estimated US$850 million.
    13. 13. Kazakhstan-china oil pipeline • Three sections: Length Completed From Keniyak to Atyrau 279 miles 2003 From Atasu to Alashankou 613 miles 2005 Kenkiyak to Kumkol -- 2009
    14. 14. Kazakhstan-china oil pipeline • Rules for pipeline access – All potential shippers are guaranteed equal access to the pipeline when capacity is available – CNPC and KMG have priority rights of accessing the pipeline capacity – Pipeline capacity, first of all, will be used to fulfill the obligations under long-term oil transportation agreements – If one of the parties does not use its pipeline capacity in full, the other party has the right to use such unused capacity – In case transportation volumes under contracts exceed the pipeline capacity, the rights for transportation will be executed according to the shares of KMG and CNPC in the Project Company
    15. 15. In reality… • The pipeline current capacity is approximately 200,000 bpd • 2008: China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail. • In December 2007, the pipeline carried an average of 102,600 bpd • Only about half of its total capacity • Reason: Current Kazakh production does not yet completely fill the line
    16. 16. Constraints • The transport of construction vehicles, equipment, personnel and pipes in this huge and remote region are a logistic nightmare. • Heavy pipes must be healed over huge distances over soft sands, • Wear and tear construction vehicles in this environment is so severe that they require monthly service and replacement • Construction workers need to be conveyed to and from working camps and pumping stations daily
    17. 17. • Insufficient diameter • The pipeline could only be an economic success if the pipeline could deliver 20 million tons of oil annually. • The 311 mile (approximately 500 kilometres) pipeline that existed for most of the way between Kenkiyak and Atasu had to be rebuilt. Constraints
    18. 18. conclusion • China wins - It gains what it sees as “secure oil supplies • Kazakhstan wins too - It gains a crude export route independent of Russia and a new market for its oil. • Meet Kazakhstan's national security interests, and provide an outlet to meet China’s growing demand for oil. • Downside: PRC can potentially control the price paid for the oil
    19. 19. Reference Blinick, A. (28 March 2014). The Kazakh-China Oil Pipeline: “A Sign of the Times”. Retrieved from http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/working_papers/WorkigPaper22-Blinick.pdf Collins, B. & Erickson, A. (2012). CHINA’S OIL SECURITY PIPE DREAM: The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports. Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 (2), p89-111. Energy Global. (28 March 2014). Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline could start operating at its full capacity by 2014. Retrieved from http://www.energyglobal.com/news/pipelines/articles/Kazakhstan_to_China_oil_pipeline_could_start_operating_at_its_full_capacity_ by_2014.aspx Hendrix, L. & Chow, E. (2010). Central Asia’s Pipelines: Field of Dreams and Reality. NBR Special Report, Vol. 23, p 66-72. Herberg, M. (2010). Pipeline Politics In Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes. NBR Special Report, Vol. 23, p 66-72Kazakhstan - US Energy Information Administration (EIA). (28 March 2014). Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=kz
    20. 20. Reference Lee, P. (2005). China’s quest for oil security: oil (wars) in the pipeline? The Pacific Review, Vol. 18 (2), p265–301. Nathan, J. (28 March 2014). Kazakhstan Oil Supply Chain: Despite Upstream Synergy, the Republic Faces Downstream Challenges in Global Markets. Retrieved from http://orgs.bloomu.edu/gasi/Proceedings%20PDFs/Nathan1.pdf OGEL. (2006). The Kazakhstan-China Pipeline. Retrieved from http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=2329 Olcott, M. (2007). Kazmunaigazk: Kazakhstan's National Oil and Gas Company. Retrieved from http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/baker/studies/noc/docs/NOC_Kaz_Olcott.pdf Pirani, S. (2012). Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Constraints on Export. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Retrieved from http://www.qclub.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/central-asian-and-caspian-gas- production-and-the-constraints-on-export.pdf Saurbek, Z. (2008). Kazakh-Chinese Energy Relations: Economic Pragmatism or Political Cooperation? China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1), p79-93.