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PT Lapindo Brantas: The Mudflow

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PT Lapindo Brantas: The Mudflow

  1. 1. PT Lapindo Brantas and Sidoarjo MudflowCase Study For Lessons From FlopsInformation Entrepreneurship Developed by: Fransisca Katherina Rumambi - G1200547C15 September 2012 FRUMAMBI001@e.ntu.edu.sg Knowledge Management - WKWSCI Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
  2. 2. Company Profile Aburizal Bakrie A business tycoon and member of government coalition Joint Venture PT Lapindo Brantas, Tbk An Indonesian oil and gas exploration company
  3. 3. Problem: What Happened? Company’s failure to install casing around the well to the levels required Indonesian mining regulation DISASTER! PT Lapindo Brantas The mud started The pressurised mud Banjar Panji I gas The unstoppable seeping into the well at forcing its way to the exploration well mudflow started in a depth of around 1,800 survey about 180 m reached more than Sidoarjo m and cement plugs near the well 3,000 m
  4. 4. Lack of careful planning andthorough analysis to deal with the risks that might occur in drilling area
  5. 5. Attempts To Stop the Mudflow
  6. 6. Impacts • 12 villages – 350 hectares of • The mud swamped irrigation channel farm land buried and drainage. • 30 factories affected by the • The drinking water pipes affected of mudflow – thousands of toxic people lost their jobs • The disposal into the Porong River • Infrastructure has been and the sea affects the river damaged extensively (toll ecosystem and the aquaculture roads, power transmission industry systems, gas • 42 rice fields, fish and shrimp ponds pipelines, national artery Infrastructure Environment have been destroyed roads) People Health • 3,000 patients registered • 60,000 people have been affected by gas hydrogen forced from their home sulphide (H2S) • 3,500 families were displaced • 81% victims suffered from lung problems • 200 died from poor health
  7. 7. Human Rights Case: This Is NOT a Natural Disaster 15 August 2012 – The Indonesian Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) announced that the Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo was a human rights violation and PT Lapindo Brantas was responsible for the man-made disaster PT Lapindo Brantas violated 15 basic rights (right to life, safety, health, housing, employment, education, socia l security and education) and failed to guarantee victim’s basic rights since 2006 disaster – Police Investigation Under Criminal Code
  8. 8. Lesson Learnt: The Sustainability Principle Exploitative SUSTAINABILITY Short-term PRACTICE Approach
  9. 9. What Should Have They Done? – What Should They Do Next?1. To conduct thorough research if it 1. To provide emergency was safe enough to do the gas funding and support to the exploration in the particular drilling victim area 2. To supply manpower and2. To conform drilling security expertise in efforts to find a procedure (Did not install the casing solution drilling) 3. To reduce the growing social3. To conduct appropriate training impact from the expanding session for their technical experts lake of mud (Did not cover the drilling hole)4. Legal permission in the middle of dense population
  10. 10. References 1. Ade Mardiyanti (2010, February 21). Muddying The Truth: A New Documentary Looks At Sidoarjo. Retrieved August 27, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/arts/muddying-the-truth-a-new-documentary-looks-at-sidoarjo/359892 2. Amir Tejo (2010, October 21). Rail Safety Fears After Latest Sidoarjo Cave-in. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/rail-safety-fears-after-latest-sidoarjo-cave-in/402592 3. Desy Sagita (2009, May 29). Three Years of Mudflow Misery. Retrieved August 27, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/three-years-of-mudflow-misery/278177 4. Farouk Arnaz (2010, May 30). Lapindo Mudflow Case Can Be Reopened: National Police. Retrieved August 26, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/lapindo-mudflow-case-can-be-reopened-national-police/521071. 5. Fidelis A. Satriastanti (2010, May 28). After 4 Years of Mud, Sidoarjo Blame Question Lingers. Retrieved August 25, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/indonesia/after-4-years-of-mud-sidoarjo-blame-question-lingers/377582. 6. Fidelis A. Satriastanti (2011). Walhi Contends Corruption In Indonesia Mudflow Aftermath. Retrieved August 27, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/walhi-contends-corruption-in-indonesian-mudflow-aftermath/347729. 7. Fidelis A. Satriastanti (2010, April 15), “Great At Work” In Lapindo Mudflow Probe. Retrieved August 27, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/indonesia/graft-at-work-in-lapindo-mudflow-probe/369739. 8. Fidelis A. Satriastanti (2011, May 31). Learning From Lapindo: Five Years On, What Now?. Retrieved August 26, 2012 from http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/blogs/learning-from-lapindo-five-years-on-what-now/444204. 9. PT Lapindo Brantas Tbk (2012). Retrieved August 28, 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PT_Lapindo_Brantas. 10. Sidoarjo Mudflow (2012). Retrieved August 28, 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidoarjo_mud_flow.
  11. 11. Any questions?

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