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Kow Kuroda's talk at Concept Workshop, Japan Psychological Association 2011

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I was invited to Concepts Workshop of Japan Psychological Association, 2011, Japan and delivered a talk. This is the slides of what I talked about then.

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Kow Kuroda's talk at Concept Workshop, Japan Psychological Association 2011

  1. 1. Beyond  Super&icial  Embodiment   Theories  of  Concepts 概念の  “表面的な”身体基盤論を越えて Kow Kuroda 黒田 航 京都大学 and 京都工芸繊維大学(非常勤) 早稲田大学 情報教育研究所 (招聘研究員) 日本心理学会ワークショップ (WS011) 日本大学 文理学部, 2011/09/15 1Thursday, September 15, 2011
  2. 2. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Outline  of  My  Talk n I examine possible (if not likely) answers to the question: n What are concepts for? n thereby suggesting possible (if not likely) answers to the question: n Why is embodiment caused? n But I’m not quite sure if I’m successful or not. 2 2Thursday, September 15, 2011
  3. 3. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Excuses n I am a linguist who loves to think about fundament- al issues. n I’m too philosophical a person to be a psychologist. n This makes my talk philosophical and my slides with n fewer graphs, numbers for experimental result, equations n but ashamedly more thoughts and words n I added as many pictures as I can not to get you (too) bored. 3 3Thursday, September 15, 2011
  4. 4. What  Are  Concepts  for? 4Thursday, September 15, 2011
  5. 5. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) refs Naïve  yet  Fundamental  Questions n People talk about concepts and conceptualizations in a variety of fields such as n Linguistics: Laoff (1987), Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999) n Cognitive Psychology: Murphy (2002), Glenburg 1997 n Developmental Psychology: Piaget and Inhelder (1962) n Artificial Intelligence/Robotics: Searle (1980), Harnad (1990), et seq., 谷口 (2011), Hawkins and Blakeslee (2004) n Ontology/Knowledge Engineering: Gruber (1993), et seq. 5 5Thursday, September 15, 2011
  6. 6. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r References n Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: University of Chicago Press. n Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind. University of Chicago Press. n Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson (1980). Metaphors We Live By. n Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson (1999). The Philosophy in Flesh. Basic Books. n Murphy, G. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts. MIT Press. n Glenberg, A. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(1): 1– 19. n Inhelder, B & J. Piaget. (1958). The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. Basic Books. n Piaget, J. & B. Inhelder. (1962). The Psychology of the Child. Basic Books. n Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417–457. n Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena 42: 335–346. n 谷口 忠大 (2011). コミュニケーション するロボットは創れるか: 記号創発シス テムへの構成論的アプローチ. NTT出版. n Hawkins, J. & Blakeslee, S. (2004). On Intelligence: How a New Understanding of the Brain Will Lead to the Creation of Truly Intelligent Machines. Times Books. n Gruber, T. R. (1993). A translation approach to portable ontology specifications. Knowledge Acquisition 5: 199–220. 6 6Thursday, September 15, 2011
  7. 7. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Murphy, G. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts, MIT Press. Naïve  yet  Fundamental  Questions n Let me ask: n Exactly what are concepts and conceptualizations? n I ask this because: n There is no operational definition of concepts. n And the definition of conceptualization refers to concepts. n This is my conclusion after a long search for it in the vast literature. n All that we can find is only theoretical definitions. n Operational definition is missing even in reference work like Murphy (2002). 7 7Thursday, September 15, 2011
  8. 8. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Surprise  (at  Least  to  Me) n Even Murphy (2002) provides no operational definition of concepts. n He only says: n In general, I try to use the word concepts to talk about mental representations of classes of things, and categories to talk about the classes themselves. (Murphy 2002: 5) n Concepts are the glue that holds our mental world together. When we walk into a room, try a new restaurant, [...], we must rely on our concepts of the world to help us understand what is happening. [...] If we have formed a concept (mental representation) corresponding to that category (the class of objects in the world), then the concept will help us understand and respond appropriately to a new entity in that category. (Murphy 2002: 1) n Murphy, like many other working psychologists, takes a naïve concepts-categories correspondence theory. 8 8Thursday, September 15, 2011
  9. 9. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Surprise  (at  Least  to  Me) n Another quotation n There is a real temptation for researchers in the field of concepts to get carried away on the “everything is concepts” bandwagon that I have started rolling here. [...] Although in unguarded moments I do think that everything is concepts, that is not as restrictive a belief as you might think. Concepts may have a variety of forms and contents, and this is part of what has made the field so complex. (Murphy 2002: 3) n It’s interesting to ask how such a variety arise. n If correspondence assumption implies that the environmental complexity brings about it. But is it true? 9 9Thursday, September 15, 2011
  10. 10. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Surprise  (at  Least  to  Me) n Murphy (2002) is, perhaps rightly for a working psychologist, only concerned with the questions: n How are concepts represented in the mind/brain? n What behavioral data favors or disfavors particular models of concepts? n without questioning: n What are concepts for? n What are concepts after all? 10 10Thursday, September 15, 2011
  11. 11. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Glenberg, A. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(1): 1–19. Naïve  yet  Fundamental  Questions n Now, I ask the following, prima facie naïve question: n What are concepts for? n by echoing Glenberg’s (1997) intriguing question: n What is memory for? n Remark n While Glenberg tries to reduce basic functionalities of memories to conceptualizations, I do the opposite. 11 11Thursday, September 15, 2011
  12. 12. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) 黒田 航. 2010. 超常記憶症候群の理論的含意. In 認知科学会第27回大会発表論文集, pp. 789–792. Outline  of  My  View n Given the potentially full memory (PFM), n Concepts are indices over the PFM. n Conceptualizations are local networks of concepts that are mutually strengthening. n Elaboration of the proposal in 黒田 (2010) n Suggestions to make: n People need concepts for effective management of their virtually unlimited memories. 12 12Thursday, September 15, 2011
  13. 13. Concepts  out  of   Potentially  Full  Memory 13Thursday, September 15, 2011
  14. 14. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r My  Theory n In a nutshell, n Concepts are indices for whatever classes of perception stored in the potentially full memory. n Embodiment is the way perception is organized using such indices and other devices for information retrieval. n In what follows, I present motivations for my view. 14 14Thursday, September 15, 2011
  15. 15. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) J. Price & B. Davis (2008). The Woman Who Can't Forget. Free Press. Parker, E.S., L. Cahill, & J.L. McGaugh (2006). A case of unusual autobiographical remembering. Neurocase 12(1): 35-49. Luria, A.R. (1987). The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book about Vast Memory. Harvard University Press. Memory  Disorders n Jill Price’s exceptional autobiographic memory n described by Parker, Cahill and McGaugh (2006) n first official case of hyperthymestic syndrome n Solomon Shereshevsky’s exceptional mnemonics n described in Luria (1987) n anecdotal case of hyperthymestic syndrome? 15 15Thursday, September 15, 2011
  16. 16. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Grandin, T. (1996). Thinking in Pictures: and Other Reports from My Life with Autism. Vintage “Savant”  Syndrome n Unusual memory performances in “savants” n Temple Grandin n who “thinks in pictures” n Kim Peek n hyper event mnemonist due to FG syndrome (Opitz- Kaveggia syndrome) n and many more n the number of reported “savants” increasing 16 16Thursday, September 15, 2011
  17. 17. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Treffert D.A. (2009). The savant syndrome: an extraordinary condition. A synopsis: past, present, future. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond Series B. Biol. Sci. 364 (1522): 1351–1357. “Savant”  Syndrome n According to Treffert (2009): n One in ten autistic people have savant skills. n 50% of savants are autistic; the other 50% often have psychological disorders or mental illnesses. n Prodigious savants have very little disability. n quoted from Wikipedia “savant syndrome” 17 17Thursday, September 15, 2011
  18. 18. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Roediger, H.L. & K. B. McDermott (2000). Memory distortions. In E. Tulving & F.I.M. Craik (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Oxford University Press. What’s  Unusual  with  Them? n What’s unusual those people suffering memory disorders or savant syndrome is that n They perform extraordinarily detailed and precise remembering n In “normal” people, by contrast, n There are two general classes of errors in remembering: omission and commission. In the former, people fail to recollect a prior event when they try to retrieve it. In the latter, people remember events quite differently from the way they happened, or they remember an event that never happened at all. (Reodiger and McDermott 2000) 18 18Thursday, September 15, 2011
  19. 19. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r What’s  Wrong  with  Them? n What’s wrong with those “exceptional” figures with “unusual” talents in memory? n Possibility 1 n They happened to acquire exceptional ability to memorize and recall. n Possibility 2 n They happened to acquire exceptional ability to recall, given that memorization ability stays the same. 19 19Thursday, September 15, 2011
  20. 20. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r What’s  Wrong  with  Them? n If Possibility #1 is correct, n they suffer both hyper-memorization and hyper- recollection. n If Possibility #2 is correct, n they suffer only hyper-recollection. n Points n Possibility #1 is stronger than Possibility #2. So, Possibility 2 needs to be preferred, with other things being equal. n Either way, PFM is confirmed but Possibility #2 is preferable. 20 20Thursday, September 15, 2011
  21. 21. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r What’s  Wrong  with  Them? n My guess: n Hyper-recollection is a disorder in which recollect- ion is ill controlled. n More specifically, n Hyper-recollection is a disorder in which recollect- ion is not properly suppressed. 21 21Thursday, September 15, 2011
  22. 22. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Bjork, R.A. & E.L. Bjork (1992). A new theory of disuse and an old theory of stimulus fluctuation. In A.F. Healy, et al. (eds.), From Learning Processes to Cognitive Processes: Essays in Honor of William K. Estes, Vol.2, pp.35–67. Earlbaum McGaugh, J. (2006). Memory and Emotion. Columbia University Press. Good  Memory  is  Double-­‐edged n Good memory is a benefit, but too good memory is a pain and even a torture. n the more you can remember, the more convenient your life is. n the more you forget, the less you regret. n If forgetting is adaptive (Bjork & Bjork 1992; McGaugh 2006), n then what’s the line between good memory and too good memory? n Possible answer: n Good memory is beneficial as far as remembering is well controlled and therefore selective enough. 22 22Thursday, September 15, 2011
  23. 23. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) McGaugh, J. (2006). Memory and Emotion: The Making of Lasting Memories. Columbia University Press. 月元 敬 (2008). 抑制に基づく記憶検索理論の構成. 風間書房. Where  Does  Selectivity  Come  from? n Memory is an interaction between M and R: n Memorization system M stores virtually all perceptual inputs unselectively. n Recollection system R retrieves data stored in M selectively. n In more detail, n All data in M have potential to be automatically recollected, but their recollection potential is suppressed as soon as they are stored. n System R somehow implements to release the suppression. n This is a theoretical possibility not seriously investigated yet except in McGaugh (2006) and 月元 (2008) 23 23Thursday, September 15, 2011
  24. 24. Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 24Thursday, September 15, 2011
  25. 25. Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 25Thursday, September 15, 2011
  26. 26. Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 26Thursday, September 15, 2011
  27. 27. Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 27Thursday, September 15, 2011
  28. 28. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 28 28Thursday, September 15, 2011
  29. 29. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 29 29Thursday, September 15, 2011
  30. 30. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 30 30Thursday, September 15, 2011
  31. 31. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 31 31Thursday, September 15, 2011
  32. 32. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 32 32Thursday, September 15, 2011
  33. 33. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n misactivation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 33 33Thursday, September 15, 2011
  34. 34. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r How  System  Can  Break  Down n Types of disorders n between I and M n encoding error n between S and M n suppressing error n between R* and S n releasing error n between M and C n transfer error 1 n between M and O n transfer error 2 n over-activation on R* n triggering error Memory System W as a Whole Recollection System R Storage System M Releasing=Anti-suppression System R* Suppression System S Consciousnes C encoding 1 encoding 2 suppressor 1 suppressor 2 releaser 1 releaser 2 recollection 1 recollection 2 steady leank out 1 steady leank out 2 dummy causation 2 dummy causaion 1 34 34Thursday, September 15, 2011
  35. 35. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Roediger, H. L. (1990). Implicit memory: Retention without remembering. American Psychologist 45, 1043-1056 What  Causes  Hyper-­‐recollection? n People who suffer hyper-recollection n can remember all or most of what they store in memory n By contrast, normal people n can’t remember most of what they store in memory n Possibility n Unusually effective indexing is made or suppression is not enough in hyper-recollection. n But this is only true of explicit memory. As for implicit memory (Roediger 1990), n Both people with and without hyper-recollection can access most of what they store in memory. 35 35Thursday, September 15, 2011
  36. 36. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Open  Questions  and  New  Problems n Open questions n How encoding is achieved/implemented n New problems n How indexing is achieved/implemented n How suppression is achieved/implemented n How releasing is achieved/implemented n Long-term potentiation (LTP) is relevant to them all. 36 36Thursday, September 15, 2011
  37. 37. From  Concepts  to   Conceptualizations? Or  Just  Another  Virtus  Dormitiva? 37Thursday, September 15, 2011
  38. 38. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Gruber, T. R. (1993). A translation approach to portable ontology specifications. Knowledge Acquisition 5: 199–220. Conceptualizations  instead  of   Concepts n “Conceptualization” is one of the recent buzzwords in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics. n More and more people talk about “conceptualizations” instead of “concepts” per se. n Even people working with ontology (Gruber 1993) do so. n But I, for one, am very at a loss n What people really mean by conceptualization. n And aren’t you like me? n Let’s listen to the voice of Glenberg (1997) who is one of the trend makers. 38 38Thursday, September 15, 2011
  39. 39. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Glenberg  1997 n starts with stating the following challenge: n Most memory theories presuppose that memory is for memorizing. What would memory theory be like if this presupposition were discarded? Here, I approach memory theory guided by the question “What is memory for?” n and expounds his idea like the following: n I examine the literature on memory (the second source) for evidence that cognitive structures are indeed embodied, and why that is so. I will propose that memory involved in service of perception and action in a three- dimensional environment, and that memory is embodied to facilitate interaction withe the environment. 39 39Thursday, September 15, 2011
  40. 40. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Glenberg  1997 n In a nutshell, n Thus, what is memory for? Its primary function is to mesh the embodied conceptualization of projectable properties of the environment (e.g., a path or a cup) with embodied experiences that provide nonprojectable properties. Thus the path becomes the path home and the cup becomes my cup. This meshed conceptualization, the meaning, is in the service of control of action in a three- dimensional environment. n The basic claim is that an individual’s memory serves perception and action. Memory meshes nonprojectable features with projectable features of the environment to suggest actions for that person in that situation. These patterns of action are what make the environment meaningful to that person. This framework provides a way to address meaning, symbol grounding, recollective and automatic uses of memory, and language comprehension. (p.17) 40 40Thursday, September 15, 2011
  41. 41. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: University of Chicago Press. Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind. University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson (1980). Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson (1999). The Philosophy in the Flesh. Basic Books. Glenberg  1997 n adopts the embodied cognition framework proposed by Lakoff (1987), Johson (1987) and Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999) n attempts to n explain meanings away in terms of embodiment or embodied cognition. n relates it to the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990, et seq.) n reduce basic functionalities of memories to embodied cognition. n rejects the multiplicity of memory, thereby denying the idea of task- wise specialization of memory into memories. 41 41Thursday, September 15, 2011
  42. 42. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Glenberg  1997 n What’s wrong? n Glenberg (1997) appears to assess positive sides only. n Why? 42 42Thursday, September 15, 2011
  43. 43. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Reasoning  in  Embodiment  Theory n Following work by Johnson and Lakoff, Glenberg (1997) reasons roughly as follows: n Claim n Concepts are embodied and therefore are not symbols that need grounding. n Reason n Concepts are part of a conceptualization, n and n all conceptualizations are embodied. 43 43Thursday, September 15, 2011
  44. 44. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Isn’t  Embodiment  Another  Virtus   Dormitiva? n If my understanding is correct, we need to be concerned with the following possibility: n Isn’t embodiment another virtus dormitiva in cognitive psychology? n Note n virtus dormitiva is a superficial explanation of the cause of the sleepiness that follows opium dose. n appeared in play Le Malade Imaginaire (1673) by Molière’s (or Jean-Baptiste Poquelin) n The Imaginary Invalid (or The Hypochondriac) 44 44Thursday, September 15, 2011
  45. 45. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Isn’t  Embodiment  Another  Virtus   Dormitiva? n The statement “Conceptualization is embodied” is superficial unless n conceptualization itself is precisely defined and adequately described n and n embodiment itself is precisely defined and adequately described. n I don’t think either condition is met (yet), and I recommend to get around the second task and to concentrate on the first task first. 45 45Thursday, September 15, 2011
  46. 46. Where  Do  Meanings   Come  from? 46Thursday, September 15, 2011
  47. 47. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Searle, J. 1980, Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417–457. Harnad, S. 1990. The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena 42: 335–346. Root  of  Embodiment n Quest for embodiment virtually started when people started to question and reconsider the foundations of classical cognitive science, artificial intelligence (including robotics). n First appearance in the early 80’s n Chinese room debate triggered by Searle (1980) n Resurrection in the early 90’s n Symbol grounding problem (Harnard 1990, et seq.) 47 47Thursday, September 15, 2011
  48. 48. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r What  is  at  Stake? n You can build an artificial system to simulate human cognitive behavior B when you do it by programming, n What guarantees the correspondence between targeted behavior B and computational simulation S? n More specifically, n How do symbols used in the system get meaningful? n More fundamentally n Is it possible to design intelligent systems? 48 48Thursday, September 15, 2011
  49. 49. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Brooks, R. (1991), Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence 47 (1-3): 139–159. Maturana, H. R. and F. J. Varela. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge. Shambhala Publications. Varela, F. J., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind. MIT Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception (translated by Colin Smith). Humanities Press. Two  Reactions n Revival of “constructivist” approach n Brooks (1991), Harnad (1990), et seq., 谷口 2011 (referring to Piaget & Inhelder (1962), Maturana & Valera (1987)) n Hawkins and Blakeslee (2004) n Inquiry into embodied meaning n Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), Varela, et al. (1991), Glenberg (1997) n anticipated by Merleau-Ponty (1962) 49 49Thursday, September 15, 2011
  50. 50. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r What  are  Meanings? n Here comes the crucial question: n What are meanings after all? n This is a bitch of a question that nobody was ever successful to answer. 50 50Thursday, September 15, 2011
  51. 51. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Here  Comes  Embodiment  Thesis   n Some people (with reductionist tendency) proposed: n Hey, the answer is easy! meanings are (by)product of, or epiphenomenon to embodied cognition, or simply embodiment. n suggested by Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999), Harnad (1990), Varela, et al. (1991) n and followed by Glenberg (1997) n Implications n You will be (finally) able to define meanings if you do intensive research into embodiment. 51 51Thursday, September 15, 2011
  52. 52. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Borghi, A. M., Glenberg, A, M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2004). Putting words in perspective. Memory & Cognition 32, 863-873. Glenberg, A. M. & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9, 558-565. Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 577-609. Conditions  on  Embodiment n How about Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) (Glenberg & Kashak 2002; Borghi, et al. 2004)? n ACE is predictable if recollection system R indexes sources of extrovert signals for muscular controlsas well as perceptual images stored in M. n More generally, n Perceptual symbol system (Barsalou 1999) is a natural consequence if bodily movements work as virtual perceptual inputs to memory system as well as true perceptual inputs from the environment 52 52Thursday, September 15, 2011
  53. 53. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Astonishing  Possibility n Another (not mutually exclusive) possibility n Isn’t system R part of motor control system? n I cannot be sure, but it’s not theoretically impossible. n If it’s true, it means that n thinking itself is a (kind of) motion. n Caveat: n In this case, though, R is not properly for recollect- ion. 53 53Thursday, September 15, 2011
  54. 54. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) Hawkins, J. & Blakeslee, S. (2004). On Intelligence: How a New Understanding of the Brain Will Lead to the Creation of Truly Intelligent Machines. Times Books. Hawkins, J. and D. George (2006). Hierarchical Temporal Memory: Concepts, Theory, and Terminology. Numenta, Inc. [http://www.numenta.com/Numenta_HTM_Concepts.pdf] Relevant  Work n Hawkins & Blakeslee (2004) n presents Memory-Prediction Framework (MPF) n incorporated into what is latter called Hierarchical Temporal Memory (Hawkins and George 2006) n puts far more emphasis on memory-driven automation than traditional AI which cherish symbol processing. n 谷口 2011 n applies Piagetian developmental perspective to build “robots who can communicate with human”. 54 54Thursday, September 15, 2011
  55. 55. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Bodily competence Performance #internalrepresentations Performance with schemas Performance without schemas #internal representations generated Effects  of  embodiment n 谷口 2011: 133 n plot of the performance ratio of number of internally generated schemas against robot’s bodily competence (= degree of articulateness) 55 55Thursday, September 15, 2011
  56. 56. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Where  Are  Schemas? n Last question to ask: n Where are schemas? n Possible answer n Schemas residing in R are concept-like entities n Schemas residing in M are motor schemas n They are different in kind. n If this is true, it would not be valid to say that “everything is concepts” (Murphy 2002) 56 56Thursday, September 15, 2011
  57. 57. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Is  Embodiment  a  “Solution”? n Embodiment thesis should advance our understanding of meanings by answering the question: n Where do meanings come from? n but I am skeptical about hasty claims like: n Embodiment explains meanings away. n Why? Because it just begs the question: n What are embodied? And what is embodiment for? n Without reasonable account for them, embodiment thesis remains the analogue of virtus dormitiva. 57 57Thursday, September 15, 2011
  58. 58. Anti-­‐conclusion 58Thursday, September 15, 2011
  59. 59. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r Used  Pieces  of  a  Puzzle n Basics in Psychology of Concepts n Murphy 2002 n Memory Disorders n Jill Price n Hyperthymestic syndrome aftter Parker, Cahill & McGaugh 2001 n Solomon Shereshevsky n Luria 1986 n Unusual Memory Performances in Savant Syndrome n Temple Grandin n Kim Peek n Symbol Grounding Problem in AI n Searle 1980 n Harnad 1990, et seq. n 谷口忠大 2011 n Concepts and Conceptualizations n Gruber 1993, et seq. n Embodiment of Concepts/ Conceptualizations n Glenberg 1997, Glenberg & Kaschak 2002 n Barsalou 1999 n Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999 n Memory-Prediction Framework n Hawkins & Blakeslee 2004 n Hawkins & George 2006 59 59Thursday, September 15, 2011
  60. 60. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r My  Concerns n Mainly, n it’s upside down to try to derive properties/functionalities of memories/functionalities from properties of conceptualizations. n More specifically, n it’s wrong to say that memories are in service of effective use of conceptualizations. n Reason n Attempt to reduce meanings to embodiment is premature without enough description of meanings at reasonable quality. 60 60Thursday, September 15, 2011
  61. 61. 日本心理学会WS “概念” 2011/9/15 黒田 航 (Kow Kuroda) r My  Concerns n Unlike opportunistic proponents, I hold n behavioral science of mind/brain has not yet advanced to tell exactly what meanings are. n This is because n we are still missing a “language” with which meaning are described at satisfiable precision. 61 61Thursday, September 15, 2011
  62. 62. Thank  You  for  Your   Attention 62Thursday, September 15, 2011

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