Populism 2007 For Pozorblog

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Populism in East Central Europe

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Populism 2007 For Pozorblog

  1. 1. The Dynamics of Populism in Slovakia and the Czech Republic Kevin Deegan-Krause Wayne State University Detroit, Michigan, USA
  2. 2. A Brief Agenda <ul><li>Populism in General </li></ul><ul><li>Definitions </li></ul><ul><li>Consequences </li></ul><ul><li>Populism and Issue Dimensions </li></ul><ul><li>Populism in Slovakia and the Czech Republic </li></ul><ul><li>A Brief History of Slovak and Czech Populism </li></ul><ul><li>Slovak and Czech Populism Today </li></ul><ul><li>Bad Guesses About the Future </li></ul>
  3. 3. Populism in General: Definitions My Ally + Voters = Popul ar My Opponent + Voters = Popul ist
  4. 4. <ul><li>Inherent Pathology </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Lang: Over simplification </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Papadopolous: Over promising </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Tismaneanu: False reality </li></ul></ul>Populism in General: Definitions
  5. 5. <ul><li>Empirical Analysis </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Kurt Weyland: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ left-out” voters, direct appeal, bypassing institutions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Margaret Canovan: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ appeal to the people, against the power structure” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Cas Mudde: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ pure people v. corrupt elite” </li></ul></ul>Populism in General: Definitions
  6. 6. <ul><li>Organizational </li></ul><ul><li>Strong leader who seeks </li></ul><ul><li>direct tie with voters </li></ul><ul><li>Stylistic </li></ul><ul><li>Appeals that are moralistic </li></ul><ul><li>and idiosyncratic </li></ul><ul><li>Programmatic </li></ul><ul><li>Attacks all elites per se </li></ul><ul><li>on behalf of “the people” </li></ul>Populism in General: Definitions <ul><li>Not </li></ul><ul><li>Consensual leadership </li></ul><ul><li>or party institutionalization </li></ul><ul><li>Not </li></ul><ul><li>Pragmatic compromise </li></ul><ul><li>or systematic programs </li></ul><ul><li>Not </li></ul><ul><li>Attacks only on some elites </li></ul><ul><li>or on behalf of some groups </li></ul>
  7. 7. Populism in General: Definitions Programmatic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Moralistic Idiosyncratic Stylistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people
  8. 8. Populism in General: Definitions <ul><li>Is “Populism” a concept worth using? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>On one hand </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>It is tainted </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>There is little inherent linkage </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>On the other hand </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Everybody does it </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Connection practical if not inherent </li></ul></ul></ul>
  9. 9. Populism in General: Consequences <ul><li>Is Populism worth fearing? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Canovan’s Shadow of democracy. These characteristics have positives and negatives. </li></ul></ul>Strong leader Direct Approach Morality Selectivity Opposing “Bad” Elites Defending the People Strong leader Weak Institutions Moralism Idiosyncracy Opposing “Good” Elites Pandering to the Mass
  10. 10. Populism in General: Consequences <ul><li>Is Populism worth fearing? Defining “The People” </li></ul>Imprecise terminology to cover the notion of an undefined “us” who need the trains to run on time, and a “them” who block it in the name of democratic procedures that we simply cannot afford “ The People” Not “The People” Compatible Position Poor Rich Economic Left Co-ethnics Domestic ethnic groups and co-ethnic “traitors” Nationalism Radical Right Co-citizens Foreign powers and their domestic “agents” Isolationism Euroskepticism Anti-Americanism Believers Non-believers Fundamentalism Well-behaved Criminals Law and Order “ The Besieged” “ The Obstructionists” Authoritarianism
  11. 11. Populism in General: Issue Divides <ul><li>Populism and Other Issues: Petr Ucen’s Analysis </li></ul>Other Issue Positions of Populist Parties Nationalist 70% Authoritarian 60% Xenophobic 43% Social 37% None 30%
  12. 12. Populism in General: Issue Divides <ul><li>Populism and Other Issues: Petr Ucen’s Analysis </li></ul>Issue Combinations of Populist Parties Authoritarian/National 60% Authoritarian/Xenophobic 43% Xenophobic/National 43% Social/National 37% Social/Authoritarian 27% Social/Xenophobic 10%
  13. 13. Populism in General: Issue Divides <ul><li>Populism and No Other Issues? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Petr Ucen </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Alan Sikk </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Populism in General: Issue Divides Programmatic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Moralistic Idiosyncratic Stylistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people Anti-elite program hard to sustain while in power
  15. 15. Populism in General: Issue Divides Programmatic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Moralistic Idiosyncratic Stylistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people Anti-elite program hard to sustain while in power
  16. 16. <ul><li>Dynamics: Populism’s Tragic Flaw </li></ul>Time in power  Populism in General: Issue Divides Populist Programmatic Appeal
  17. 17. <ul><li>Dynamics: Compensating for Populism’s Tragic Flaw </li></ul>Time in power  Populism in General: Issue Divides Populist Programmatic Appeal Clientelistic or Other Appeal
  18. 18. <ul><li>Dynamics: Compensating for Populism’s Tragic Flaw </li></ul>Time in power  Populism in General: Issue Divides Populist Programmatic Appeal Other Programmatic Appeal Clientelistic or Other Appeal
  19. 19. <ul><li>Dynamics: Permanence </li></ul>left right Populism in General: Issue Divides
  20. 20. <ul><li>Dynamics: Permanence </li></ul>national cosmopolitan Populism in General: Issue Divides
  21. 21. <ul><li>Dynamics: The permanence of the ephemeral </li></ul>non-populist populist Populism in General: Issue Divides
  22. 22. Time in power  Populism in General: Issue Divides <ul><li>Dynamics: The permanence of the ephemeral </li></ul>Populist Party 1 Populist Party 2 Populist Party 3
  23. 23. <ul><li>Macro Level Evidence? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rapid Decline Once in Power </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Rapid Replacement </li></ul></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides
  24. 24. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Decline Once in Power </li></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides
  25. 25. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Replacement-Lithuania </li></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides Colored boxes denote new parties
  26. 26. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Replacement-Bulgaria </li></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides
  27. 27. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Replacement-Estonia </li></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides
  28. 28. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Replacement-Latvia </li></ul>Populism in General: Issue Divides
  29. 29. Populism in Slovakia and the Czech Republic
  30. 30. Populism in SK and CZ: Assessment
  31. 31. Populism in SK and CZ: Assessment Programmatic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Moralistic Idiosyncratic Stylistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people Framework
  32. 32. Populism in SK and CZ: Assessment Moralistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people Idiosyncratic Stylistic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Programmatic Framework
  33. 33. Populism in SK and CZ: Assessment Moralistic Against All Elites On Behalf of All people Idiosyncratic Stylistic Weak Institutions Strong Leader Organizational Programmatic ZRS 1994 Score=18 or 100% SDL 1994 Score=12 or 50% Example
  34. 34. Populism in SK and CZ: (Tentative) Assessment
  35. 35. Populism in SK and CZ: (Tentative) Assessment Year Characteristic HZDS KDH DU SDK SDKU ANO SNS SDL ZRS SOP Smer KSS SMK 1992 strong leader 3 2         2 2         1 avoids constraining organization 2 2         2 1         2 places morality over pragmatism 3 3         2 2         3 offers idiosyncratic program 2 1         2 1         1 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 3 1         3 3         2 attacks all elites 2 1         2 2         2 Sum 15 10         13 11         11 1994 strong leader 3 2 2       3 2 3       1 avoids constraining organization 1 1 2       2 1 3       1 places morality over pragmatism 3 3 2       3 2 3       3 offers idiosyncratic program 2 1 2       2 1 3       1 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 3 1 2       3 3 3       2 attacks all elites 2 1 2       2 2 3       2 Sum 14 9 12       15 11 18       10 1998 strong leader 3     2     3 1   2     1 avoids constraining organization 1     2     2 3   3     1 places morality over pragmatism 2     2     3 2   2     3 offers idiosyncratic program 2     2     2 1   3     1 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 3     2     3 2   3     2 attacks all elites 2     1     2 1   2     2 Sum 13     11     15 10   15     10 2002 strong leader 3 1     2 3 3       3 1 1 avoids constraining organization 2 1     2 3 3       3 2 1 places morality over pragmatism 2 3     2 3 3       2 3 3 offers idiosyncratic program 2 1     1 2 3       3 1 1 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2 1     2 3 3       3 2 2 attacks all elites 3 1     1 2 3       3 3 2 Sum 14 8     10 16 18       17 12 10 2006 strong leader 3 1     2   3       3   1 avoids constraining organization 2 1     2   2       2   1 places morality over pragmatism 1 3     2   3       2   3 offers idiosyncratic program 3 1     1   3       2   1 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2 1     2   3       3   2 attacks all elites 3 1     1   3       3   2 Sum 14 8     10   17       15   10
  36. 36. Populism in SK and CZ: (Tentative) Assessment
  37. 37. Populism in SK and CZ: (Tentative) Assessment Year Characteristic ODS ODA US SZ KDU- CSL CSSD KSCM LSU HSD- SMS SPR- RSC Dek. Od. 1992 strong leader 2 2     1 3 1 2 2 3   avoids constraining organization 2 2     1 2 1 2 2 3   places morality over pragmatism 2 2     3 2 3 2 2 3   offers idiosyncratic program 1 1     1 1 1 1 2 3   claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2 2     1 2 2 2 1 3   attacks all elites 1 1     1 3 3 2 2 3   Sum 10 10     8 13 11 11 11 18   1996 strong leader 2 2     1 3 1     3   avoids constraining organization 1 2     1 1 1     3   places morality over pragmatism 2 2     3 2 3     3   offers idiosyncratic program 1 1     1 1 1     3   claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2 2     1 3 2     3   attacks all elites 1 1     1 3 3     3   Sum 9 10     8 13 11     18   1998 strong leader 3   2   1 3 1         avoids constraining organization 2   2   1 1 1         places morality over pragmatism 2   2   3 2 3         offers idiosyncratic program 1   1   1 1 1         claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2   2   1 2 2         attacks all elites 1   1   1 3 3         Sum 11   10   8 12 11         2002 strong leader 3   1   1 2 1       2 avoids constraining organization 2   2   1 1 1       3 places morality over pragmatism 2   2   3 2 3       3 offers idiosyncratic program 1   1   1 1 1       3 claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2   2   1 2 2       3 attacks all elites 2   1   1 1 3       3 Sum 12   9   8 9 11       17 2006 strong leader 2     3 1 2 1         avoids constraining organization 2     2 1 1 1         places morality over pragmatism 2     3 3 2 3         offers idiosyncratic program 1     2 1 1 1         claims to represent &quot;whole people&quot; 2     2 1 3 2         attacks all elites 2     3 1 1 3         Sum 11     15 8 10 11        
  38. 38. Populism in SK and CZ: Assessment
  39. 39. Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  40. 40. <ul><li>Is There a Populism Issue Divide? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>What would we expect to see if there were? </li></ul></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  41. 41. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Replacement? </li></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  42. 42. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Decline Once In Power? </li></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides ZRS SOP ANO Smer
  43. 43. <ul><li>Micro Patterns: Satisfaction followed by disillusion </li></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  44. 44. <ul><li>Departing members of ANO more likely than continuing members to believe that: </li></ul><ul><li>Powerful do not care about me (16%) </li></ul><ul><li>Elections offer a chance for people like me to have a say (16%) </li></ul><ul><li>Politicians behave with restraint (13%) </li></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  45. 45. Departing members of Smer not more likely than continuing members to believe the same propositions Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  46. 46.  Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Decline Once in Power </li></ul>
  47. 47. <ul><li>Macro Patterns: Rapid Decline Once in Power </li></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: Issue Divides
  48. 48. <ul><li>Has Smer “routinized” its populism? </li></ul><ul><li>Evidence: </li></ul><ul><li>In institutional development </li></ul><ul><ul><li>New party organization </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>New name: Smer-Social Democracy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Choice of redistribution tolerant partners </li></ul></ul><ul><li>In the electorate </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Leftist leanings </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Poor v. rich </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Stronger redistributionist profile among all voters </li></ul></ul>Populism in SK and CZ: The Future
  49. 49. Has Smer Routinized Populism? ZRS ANO Smer Time  Non-Routinized Populism Populism in SK and CZ: The Future
  50. 50. ZRS ANO Smer New Party or Parties Time  Non-Routinized Populism Has Smer Routinized Populism? Populism in SK and CZ: The Future
  51. 51. ZRS ANO Smer Routinized Populism Time  SOP Has Smer Routinized Populism? Populism in SK and CZ: The Future
  52. 52. All material used here availalable at www.pozorblog.com Kevin Deegan-Krause Wayne State University Detroit, Michigan, USA [email_address]

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