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Sitnl erp sec-2011

J

This presentation tries to raise awareness on SAP Security (Platform security). Some default settings that might need adjustment are shown.

Sitnl erp sec-2011

J

This presentation tries to raise awareness on SAP Security (Platform security). Some default settings that might need adjustment are shown.

Sitnl erp sec-2011

1 of 16

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Sitnl erp sec-2011

  • 1. www.erp-sec.com All about SAP Security (except authorizations) 1
  • 2. DISCLAIMERS Disclaimer 1: This presentation is not comprehensive, SAP platform security is a very wide area of expertise (focus is on part of the Abap stack here) Disclaimer2: We do not encourage Hacking/Cracking whatsoever in ANY form. This presentation is here to help you gain inside and get awareness on some specific SAP platform security and into the minds of seasoned computer criminals, so that you can forestall their attempts and pre- empt all harmful attacks. Hacking IS illegal!
  • 3. TOPICS COVERED Following topics are covered and „glued together‟ into a scenario: ”How to get rich in 5 simple steps” (OK, that can be less, but where‟s the fun in that?!) 1 Use Default users 2 Use OS command execution 3 Use Password parameters 4 Use The power of RFC calls 5 Use SAP Gateway Meet FBI‟s most wanted BlackHat hacker: Miss G! 3
  • 5. 1.Default Accounts Risk:Well, that‟s an open door! Mitigation: •Rsusr003 to check •Deactivate sap* by setting parameter login/no_automatic_user_sapstar = 1 and create SAP* in clients where it does not exist •Change passwords/Lock accounts •Not only on PRD, but on the ENTIRE landscape •Don‟t delete SAP*/DDIC •Don‟t forget TMSADM! More info: •http://help.sap.com •Oss note1568362
  • 7. 2. OS command execution Info: SM49/SM69, RSBDCOS0 are known and can be protected. But other flaws exist in SAP that allow OS command injection. Just reported 5 vulnerable FM‟s to SAP Security team. Risk: Execution of OS commands is dangerous when done from application level since the <SID>adm user is highly privileged and has a database trust. Become the <SID>adm user and the DB is yours !! Mitigation: •PATCH, make sure security notes are implemented, secure <SID>adm with strong authentication, and don‟t give SAP_ALL. More info: •http://www.bizec.org/wiki/Controlled_Operating_System_(OS)_Command_Execution •The SAP Security notes
  • 8. DEMO: OS command execution
  • 9. 3. Password parameters Info: Some default password parameters have settings that need to be adjusted. Two important ones: • login/password_downwards_compatibility = 1 • login/min_password_lng = 6 Risk: Weak password hashes can be easily bruteforced Mitigation: If your landscape is NW 7.0 or newer; set parameter login/password_downwards_compatibility = 0, delete old hashes and make sure hashes are protected in USR tables or disable passwords if you use SSO. No SSO? Set login/min_password_lng >= 8 More info: http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70/helpdata/en/22/41c43ac23cef2fe10000000a11408 4/content.htm
  • 11. 4. The power of RFC calls Info: Many times I hear “It is only a system user, so it cannot be abused”. Think again! And no SAP system is needed for that, there are RFCSDK‟s for many programming languages! Risk:Almost any action/transaction in SAP can also be performed by RFC Calls via non-dialog--users. Mitigation: • Implement SAP Gateway protection. It can by DEFAULT be used to execute remote OS commands as <SID>ADM • Make sure to implement proper network segmentation with Firewalls, so no RFC calls can be made from frontends • Protect non-dialog users by using strong passwords (and do not give them SAP_ALL) •only create RFC destinations with stored credentials or system trust from systems of higher security classification to systems of lower security classification (e.g. from PRD -> DEV, never trust DEV systems in a PRD system, never EVER have a RFC with SAP_ALL user from Sandbox to PRD, etc.)
  • 12. DEMO: The power of RFC calls
  • 13. 5. SAP Gateway Info: This component handles RFC traphic. It exists on all SAP ABAP systems and even on some JAVA nowadays. By default it is totally unprotected Risk: Execution of OS commands as <SID>adm user (remember the DB trust!?). This component has a HIGH risk. Mitigation: •Implement ACL via reg_info and sec_info. •Network segementation to prevent RFC execution from user network •Much more specific information, see SAP Security guides
  • 14. 5. SAP Gateway DEMO: The Gateway
  • 15. 5. SAP Gateway DEMO: The Gateway
  • 16. 5. SAP Gateway Questions? THANK YOU! Any Questions?