Lean Startup- a primer for Entrepreneurs

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Become Plan A

The problem is 9 / 10 startups fail.

Normally a lack of customers not a failure of product

It’s not about having a better plan A

It’s finding a better path to a plan that works

Until now, it’s been based on gut or intuition

There has been no rigours process for stress testing a plan a- and that is what the lean startup framework provides

Lean Startup is a rigiorous process for iterating from plan a to a plan that works

It’s about having a vision and refining and testing it with controlled experiments

Get out of the building and go talk to customersLean Startups are not about asking customers what features they want- it’s about validating your vision. Testing how customers react to that vision

Focus on the right actions- Startups are inheriently chaoticRight Action- Right Time

Agile development, customer development, lean manufacturing, OODA applied to the process of innovation

The F-85 was being beaten by the MiGs- they were technically superior to the F86’s

They needed a solution

A Maverick pilot worked out something- the Russians had very strict command and control procedures. They didn’t learn very quickly, so when the Americans learnt new tricks, it took ages for the Russians to learn how to overcome them, despite their technical ability. They thought that a higher quality cycle produced higher quality results. Boyd discovered, the quicker you cycle through the learning, the better the result. He invented the OODA loop.John Boyd (military strategist)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJohn BoydJanuary 23, 1927 – March 9, 1997 (aged 70)Place of birthErie, PennsylvaniaPlace of deathWest Palm Beach, FloridaResting placeArlington National CemeteryAllegianceUnited States of AmericaService/branchUnited States Air ForceYears of service1945–1947 (Army Air Corps)1951–1975RankColonelBattles/warsKorean WarVietnam WarAwardsLegion of Merit (4)Other workMilitary strategist, AuthorColonel John (Richard) Boyd (January 23, 1927 – March 9, 1997) was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon consultant of the late 20th century, whose theories have been highly influential in the military, sports, and business.Contents [hide]1 Biography2 Military theories3 The OODA Loop4 Foundation of theories5 Elements of warfare6 Military Reform7 Maneuver warfare and the Marines8 D-N-I.net9 See also10 Notes11 References12 External links[edit]BiographyBoyd was born on January 23, 1927 in Erie, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the University of Iowa with a Bachelor's degree in economics[1]:33 and, after an extended period as a fighter pilot, from Georgia Tech with a Bachelor's degree in industrial engineering.[1]:103As a high school graduate, Boyd enlisted in the United States Army and served in the Army Air Forces from 1945 to 1947, assigned as a swimming instructor in occupied Japan. After graduating from the University of Iowa, he served as a U.S. Air Force officer from July 8, 1951, until his retirement on August 31, 1975.[2] He was dubbed "Forty Second Boyd" for his standing bet as an instructor pilot that beginning from a position of disadvantage, he could defeat any opposing pilot in air combat maneuvering in less than forty seconds. According to his biographer, Robert Coram, Boyd was also known at different points of his career as "the Mad Major" for the intensity of his passions, as "Genghis John" for his confrontational style of interpersonal discussion, and as the "Ghetto Colonel" for his spartan lifestyle.[3]Boyd died of cancer in Florida on March 9, 1997 at age 70. He was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery on March 20, 1997.[3][edit]Military theoriesDuring the early 1960s, Boyd, together with Thomas Christie, a civilian mathematician, created the Energy-Maneuverability, or E-M, theory of aerial combat. A legendary maverick by reputation, Boyd was said to have "stolen" the computer time to do the millions of calculations necessary to prove the theory, but it became the world standard for the design of fighter planes. At a time when the Air Force's FX project (subsequently the F-15) was foundering, Boyd's deployment orders to Vietnam were canceled and he was brought to the Pentagon to re-do the trade-off studies according to E-M. His work helped save the project from being a costly dud, even though its final product was larger and heavier than he desired. However, cancellation of that tour in Vietnam meant that Boyd would be one of the most important air-to-air combat strategists with no combat kills. He had only flown a few missions in the last months of the Korean War, and all of them as a wingman.With Colonel Everest Riccioni and Pierre Sprey, Boyd formed a small advocacy group within Headquarters USAF which dubbed itself the "Fighter Mafia". Riccioni was an Air Force fighter pilot assigned to a staff position in Research and Development, while Sprey was a civilian statistician working in Systems Analysis. Together, they were the visionaries who conceived the LFX Lightweight Fighter program, which ultimately produced both the F-16 and F/A-18 Hornet, the latter a development of the YF-17 Light Weight Fighter. Boyd's acolytes were also largely responsible for developing the Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II or "Warthog" ground-support aircraft, though Boyd himself had little sympathy of the "air-to-mud" assignment.[4]After his retirement from the Air Force in 1975, Boyd continued to work at the Pentagon as a consultant in the Tactical Air office of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation.Boyd is credited for largely developing the strategy for the invasion of Iraq in the first Gulf War. In 1981 Boyd had presented his briefing, Patterns of Conflict, to Richard Cheney, then a member of the United States House of Representatives.[1] By 1990 Boyd had moved to Florida because of declining health, but Cheney (then the Secretary of Defense in the George H. W. Bush administration) called him back to work on the plans for Operation Desert Storm.[5][6][1] Boyd had substantial influence on the ultimate "left hook" design of the plan.[7]In a letter to the editor of Inside the Pentagon, former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak is quoted as saying "The Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he'd commanded a fighter wing or a maneuver division in the desert."[8][edit]The OODA LoopBoyd's key concept was that of the decision cycle or OODA Loop, the process by which an entity (either an individual or an organization) reacts to an event. According to this idea, the key to victory is to be able to create situations wherein one can make appropriate decisions more quickly than one's opponent. The construct was originally a theory of achieving success in air-to-air combat, developed out of Boyd's Energy-Maneuverability theory and his observations on air combat between MiGs and F-86s in Korea. Harry Hillaker (chief designer of the F-16) said of the OODA theory, "Time is the dominant parameter. The pilot who goes through the OODA cycle in the shortest time prevails because his opponent is caught responding to situations that have already changed."Boyd hypothesized that all intelligent organisms and organizations undergo a continuous cycle of interaction with their environment. Boyd breaks this cycle down to four interrelated and overlapping processes through which one cycles continuously:Observation: the collection of data by means of the sensesOrientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one's current mental perspectiveDecision: the determination of a course of action based on one's current mental perspectiveAction: the physical playing-out of decisionsOf course, while this is taking place, the situation may be changing. It is sometimes necessary to cancel a planned action in order to meet the changes.This decision cycle is thus known as the OODA loop. Boyd emphasized that this decision cycle is the central mechanism enabling adaptation (apart from natural selection) and is therefore critical to survival.Boyd theorized that large organizations such as corporations, governments, or militaries possessed a hierarchy of OODA loops at tactical, grand-tactical (operational art), and strategic levels. In addition, he stated that most effective organizations have a highly decentralized chain of command that utilizes objective-driven orders, or directive control, rather than method-driven orders in order to harness the mental capacity and creative abilities of individual commanders at each level. In 2003, this power to the edge concept took the form of a DOD publication "Power to the Edge: Command...Control...in the Information Age" by Dr. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. Boyd argued that such a structure creates a flexible "organic whole" that is quicker to adapt to rapidly changing situations. He noted, however, that any such highly decentralized organization would necessitate a high degree of mutual trust and a common outlook that came from prior shared experiences. Headquarters needs to know that the troops are perfectly capable of forming a good plan for taking a specific objective, and the troops need to know that Headquarters does not direct them to achieve certain objectives without good reason.In 2007, strategy writer Robert Greene discussed the loop in a post called OODA and You. He insisted that it was "deeply relevant to any kind of competitive environment: business, politics, sports, even the struggle of organisms to survive", and claimed to have been initially "struck by its brilliance".[edit]Foundation of theoriesBoyd never wrote a book on military strategy. The central works encompassing his theories on warfare consist of a several hundred slide presentation entitled Discourse on Winning & Losing and a short essayentitled Destruction & Creation (1976).In Destruction & Creation, Boyd attempts to provide a philosophical foundation for his theories on warfare. In it he integrates Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics to provide a context and rationale for the development of the OODA Loop.Boyd inferred the following from each of these theories:Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem: any logical model of reality is incomplete (and possibly inconsistent) and must be continuously refined/adapted in the face of new observations.Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle: there is a limit on our ability to observe reality with precision.Second Law of Thermodynamics: The entropy of any closed system always tends to increase, and thus the nature of any given system is continuously changing even as efforts are directed toward maintaining it in its original form.From this set of considerations, Boyd concluded that to maintain an accurate or effective grasp of reality one must undergo a continuous cycle of interaction with the environment geared to assessing its constant changes. Boyd, though he was hardly the first to do so, then expanded Darwin's theory of evolution, suggesting that natural selection applies not only in biological but also in social contexts (such as the survival of nations during war or businesses in free market competition). Integrating these two concepts, he stated that the decision cycle was the central mechanism of adaptation (in a social context) and that increasing one's own rate and accuracy of assessment vis-a-vis one's counterpart's rate and accuracy of assessment provides a substantial advantage in war or other forms of competition.[edit]Elements of warfareBoyd divided warfare into three distinct elements:Moral Warfare: the destruction of the enemy's will to win, via alienation from allies (or potential allies) and internal fragmentation. Ideally resulting in the "dissolution of the moral bonds that permit an organic whole [organization] to exist." (i.e., breaking down the mutual trust and common outlook mentioned in the paragraph above.)Mental Warfare: the distortion of the enemy's perception of reality through disinformation, ambiguous posturing, and/or severing of the communication/information infrastructure.Physical Warfare: the destruction of the enemy's physical resources such as weapons, people, and logistical assets.[edit]Military ReformJohn Boyd's briefing Patterns of Conflict provided the theoretical foundation for the "defense reform movement" (DRM) in the 1970s and 1980s. Other prominent members of this movement included Pierre Sprey, Franklin 'Chuck' Spinney, William Lind, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Testing and Evaluation Thomas Christie, Congressman Newt Gingrich, and Senator Gary Hart. The Military Reform movement fought against what they believed were unnecessarily complex and expensive weapons systems, an officer corps focused on the careerist standard, and overreliance on attrition warfare. Another reformer, James G. Burton, disputed the Army test of the safety of the Bradley fighting vehicle. James Fallows contributed to the debate with an article in The Atlantic Monthly titled "Muscle-Bound Superpower", and a book, National Defense. Today, younger reformers continue to use Boyd's work as a foundation for evolving theories on strategy, management and leadership.[edit]Maneuver warfare and the MarinesIn January 1980 Boyd gave his briefing Patterns of Conflict at the Marines AWS (Amphibious Warfare School). This led to the instructor at the time, Michael Wyly, and Boyd changing the curriculum, with the blessing of General Trainor. Trainor later asked Wyly to write a new tactics manual for the Marines.[1]:382 Wyly then went on, with Lind and others, guided by General Alfred M. Gray, Jr. to write Warfighting.[9]Wyly, Lind, and a few other junior officers are credited with developing concepts for what would become the Marine model of maneuver warfare.Wyly, along with Pierre Sprey, Ray Leopold, Franklin 'Chuck' Spinney, Jim Burton, and Tom Christie were described by writer Coram as Boyd's Acolytes[1]:182, a group who, in various ways and forms, promoted and disseminated Boyd's ideas throughout the modern military and defense establishment.[edit]D-N-I.netD-N-I was the name of a website, Defense and the National Interest, that was funded and run by some of the Acolytes. Chet Richards announced that it would be shut down in 2009, and this happened on or about 23 November 2009. A copy of the announcement, and some discussion of it by fans, can still be found on the Zenpundit blog. The D-N-I.net name was bought by some other party, and is now the entrance to aporn site. Lynn Wheeler created a search protocol on the Wayback Machine to preserve the site and it's contents, including a collection of virtually all of Boyd's slideshows and writings. The Project On Government Oversight also hosts a preserved version of the site at http://dnipogo.org/.[edit]See alsoUnited States Air Force portal[edit]Notes^ a b c d e f Coram, Robert (2002). Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Little, Brown & and Company. p. 355. ISBN 0316881465.^ (Hammond, 1997)^ a b Hillaker, Harry (July 1997). "Tribute To John R. Boyd". Code One Magazine. Retrieved 2007-01-25.^ Daniel Ford, A Vision So Noble (2010), p. 11^ Ford, Daniel. A Vision So Noble: John Boyd, the Ooda Loop, and America's War on Terror. CreateSpace (May 4, 2010) p. 23-4.^ Wheeler, Winslow T. and Lawrence J. Korb. Military Reform: A Reference Handbook. Praeger; 1 edition (September 30, 2007) p. 87.^ Wheeler, Winslow T. and Lawrence J. Korb. Military Reform: A Reference Handbook. Praeger; 1st ed. (September 30, 2007) p. 87.^ Hammond, Grant Tedrick. The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. Smithsonian Books; Illustrated ed. (May 2001) p. 3.^ United States Marine Corps, 1997[edit]ReferencesBoyd, John. "Destruction and Creation" (PDF), available from Goal Systems InternationalCoram, Robert. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. New York: Little, Brown, 2002. ISBN 0-316-88146-5 and ISBN 0-316-79688-3. Biography; contains "Destruction & Creation".Hammond, Grant T. (2001). The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution Press. ISBN 1-56098-941-6 and ISBN 1-58834-178-X. An explanation of Boyd's ideas.Henrotin, Joseph. L'Airpower au 21ème siècle. Enjeux et perspectives de la stratégieaérienne. Bruxelles: Bruylant (RMES), 2005. Perhaps the best book (but in French...) on air strategy. Widely details John Boyd's theories.Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. ISBN 0-86531-862-X. Based on John Boyd's theories.Osinga, Frans. Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007. ISBN 0-415-37103-1. Aims to provide a better understanding of Boyd's ideas concerning conflict and military strategy. Contains a full description and explanation of all of his presentations. Takes reader beyond rapid OODA loop idea and demonstrates direct influence on development of Network Centric Warfare and Fourth Generation Warfare. Argues Boyd is first postmodern strategist.Richards, Chet. Certain To Win: The Strategy Of John Boyd, Applied To Business. Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2004. ISBN 1-4134-5377-5 and ISBN 1-4134-5376-7. Develops the strategy of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd for the world of business.United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting. Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 1997 (1989). PCN 9800000600.[edit]External linksBoyd, John: Q&A Videos and Audio Clip of his Conceptual Spiral presentationCorrell, John. "The Reformers". Air Force Magazine Online.Cowan, Jeffrey: From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting. Defense in the National InterestFord, Daniel: A Vision So Noble: John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and America's War on Terror. Warbird Books ISBN 978-1451589818Richards, Chet, compiler: Briefings - Colonel John R. Boyd, USAF. Air Power AustraliaThere original D-N-I.net website, as recorded by the Wayback machine: D-N-I.net

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. Remember- the number of cycles through the loop is key to success, not the quality of each iteration. Then apply lean manufacturing and you create the lean startup loop.OODA loopFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from OODA Loop)The OODA loop (for observe, orient, decide, and act) is a concept originally applied to the combat operations process, often at the strategic level in both the military operations. It is now also often applied to understand commercial operations and learning processes. The concept was developed by military strategist and USAF Colonel John Boyd.Contents [hide]1 Overview2 Application of the OODA loop3 See also4 References4.1 Notes4.2 Bibliography[edit]OverviewDiagram[1] of a decision cycle known as the Boyd cycle, or the OODA loop.The OODA loop has become an important concept in both business and military strategy. According to Boyd, decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. An entity (whether an individual or an organization) that can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby "get inside" the opponent's decision cycle and gain the advantage. FransOsinga argues that Boyd's own views on the OODA loop are much deeper, richer, and more comprehensive than the common interpretation of the 'rapid OODA loop' idea.[2]Boyd developed the concept to explain how to direct one's energies to defeat an adversary and survive. Boyd emphasized that "the loop" is actually a set of interacting loops that are to be kept in continuous operation during combat. He also indicated that the phase of the battle has an important bearing on the ideal allocation of one's energies.Boyd’s diagram shows that all decisions are based on observations of the evolving situation tempered with implicit filtering of the problem being addressed. These observations are the raw information on which decisions and actions are based. The observed information must be processed to orient it for further making a decision. In notes from his talk “Organic Design for Command and Control”, Boyd said,The second O, orientation – as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previous experiences – is the most important part of the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act.[3]As stated by Boyd and shown in the “Orient” box, there is much filtering of the information through our culture, genetics, ability to analyze and synthesize, and previous experience. Since the OODA Loop was designed to describe a single decision maker, the situation is usually much worse than shown as most business and technical decisions have a team of people observing and orienting, each bringing their own cultural traditions, genetics, experience and other information. It is here that decisions often get stuck,[4] which does not lead to winning, sinceIn order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries--or, better yet, get inside [the] adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop. ... Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries--since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against.[3]The OODA loop, which focuses on strategic military requirements, was adapted for business and public sector operational continuity planning. Compare it with the Plan Do Check Act (PDCA) cycle or Shewhart cycle, which focuses on the operational or tactical level of projects. [5]As one of Boyd's colleagues, Harry Hillaker, put it in "John Boyd, USAF Retired, Father of the F16" [6]:The key is to obscure your intentions and make them unpredictable to your opponent while you simultaneously clarify his intentions. That is, operate at a faster tempo to generate rapidly changing conditions that inhibit your opponent from adapting or reacting to those changes and that suppress or destroy his awareness. Thus, a hodgepodge of confusion and disorder occur to cause him to over- or under-react to conditions or activities that appear to be uncertain, ambiguous, or incomprehensible.Writer Robert Greene wrote in an article called OODA and You [7] thatthe proper mindset is to let go a little, to allow some of the chaos to become part of his mental system, and to use it to his advantage by simply creating more chaos and confusion for the opponent. He funnels the inevitable chaos of the battlefield in the direction of the enemy.[edit]Application of the OODA loopConsider a fighter pilot being scrambled to shoot down an enemy aircraft.Before the enemy airplane is even within visual contact range, the pilot will consider any available information about the likely identity of the enemy pilot: his nationality, level of training, and cultural traditions that may come into play.When the enemy aircraft comes into radar contact, more direct information about the speed, size, and maneuverability, of the enemy plane becomes available; unfolding circumstances take priority over radio chatter. A first decision is made based on the available information so far: the pilot decides to "get into the sun" above his opponent, and acts by applying control inputs to climb. Back to observation: is the attacker reacting to the change of altitude? Then to orient: is the enemy reacting characteristically, or perhaps acting like a noncombatant? Is his plane exhibiting better-than-expected performance?As the dogfight begins, little time is devoted to orienting unless some new information pertaining to the actual identity or intent of the attacker comes into play. Information cascades in real time, and the pilot does not have time to process it consciously; the pilot reacts as he is trained to, and conscious thought is directed to supervising the flow of action and reaction, continuously repeating the OODA cycle. Simultaneously, the opponent is going through the same cycle.How does one interfere with an opponent's OODA cycle? One of John Boyd's primary insights in fighter combat was that it is vital to change speed and direction faster than the opponent. This is not necessarily a function of the plane's ability to maneuver, rather the pilot must think and act faster than the opponent can think and act. Getting "inside" the cycle—short-circuiting the opponent's thinking processes—produces opportunities for the opponent to react inappropriately.Another tactical-level example can be found on the basketball court, where a player takes possession of the ball and must get past an opponent who is taller or faster. A straight dribble or pass is unlikely to succeed. Instead the player may engage in a rapid and elaborate series of body movements designed to befuddle the opponent and deny him the ability to take advantage of his superior size or speed. At a basic level of play, this may be merely a series of fakes, with the hope that the opponent will make a mistake or an opening will occur, but practice and mental focus may allow one to reduce the time scale, get inside the opponent's OODA loop and take control of the situation—to cause the opponent to move in a particular way, and generate an advantage rather than merely react to an accident.The same cycle operates over a longer timescale in a competitive business landscape, and the same logic applies. Decision makers gather information (observe), form hypotheses about customer activity and the intentions of competitors (orient), make decisions, and act on them. The cycle is repeated continuously. The aggressive and conscious application of the process gives a business advantage over a competitor who is merely reacting to conditions as they occur, or has poor awareness of the situation.The approach favors agility over raw power in dealing with human opponents in any endeavor. John Boyd put this ethos into practice with his work for the USAF. He was an advocate of maneuverable fighter aircraft, in contrast to the heavy, powerful jet fighters that were prevalent in the 1960s, such as the F-4 Phantom II and General Dynamics F-111. Boyd inspired the Light Weight Fighter Project that produced the successfulF-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet, which are still in use by the United States and several other military powers into the twenty-first century.[edit]See alsoUnited States Air Force portalJohn Boyd (military strategist) Control theoryDecision cycleManeuver warfareNursing processProblem solvingStrategySWOT analysisSystempunkt[edit]References[edit]Notes^ Boyd (1995)^ Osinga, passim^ a b Boyd^ Ullman^ Kotnour^ Hillaker^ Greene[edit]BibliographyBoyd, John, R., The Essence of Winning and Losing, 28 June 1995 a five slide set by Boyd.Greene, Robert, OODA and YouHillaker, Harry, Code one magazine, "John Boyd, USAF Retired, Father of the F16", July 1997,Kotnour, Jim, "Leadership Mechanisms for Enabling Learning Within Project Teams" in Proceedings from the Third European Conference on Organizational Knowledge, Learning and Capabilities, Proceedings OKLC 2002Linger, Henry, Constructing The Infrastructure For The Knowledge Economy: Methods and Tools, Theory and Practice, p. 449Osinga, Frans, Science Strategy and War, The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, ISBN 0-415-37103-1.Richards, Chet, Certain to Win: the Strategy of John Boyd, Applied to Business (2004) ISBN 1-4134-5377-5Ullman, David G., “OO-OO-OO!” The Sound of a Broken OODA Loop, Crosstalk, April 2007,Ullman, David G., Making Robust Decisions: Decision Management For Technical, Business, and Service Teams. Victoria: Trafford ISBN 1-4251-0956-XCategories: Military terminology | Military acronyms | United States Air Force | Intelligence analysis | Strategy

MVP - In a great market -- a market with lots of real potential customers -- the market pulls product out of the startup.

Achieving product/market fit requires at least 40% of users saying they would be “very disappointed” without your product.

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