Scared Straight: Mitigating OWASP Top 10 with PHP

1. SCARED STRAIGHT MITIGATING OWASP TOP 10 WITH PHP

2. DISCLAIMER

3. DISCLAIMER • I am NOT a “security expert"

4. DISCLAIMER • I am NOT a “security expert" • But I know a little about web security

5. DISCLAIMER • I am NOT a “security expert" • But I know a little about web security • Taken SANS DEV422: Defending Web Application Security Essentials

6. DISCLAIMER • I am NOT a “security expert" • But I know a little about web security • Taken SANS DEV422: Defending Web Application Security Essentials • I don’t know everything

7. ASSUMPTIONS

8. ASSUMPTIONS • This is an introduction-level talk

9. ASSUMPTIONS • This is an introduction-level talk • You know enough PHP to be dangerous

10. ASSUMPTIONS • This is an introduction-level talk • You know enough PHP to be dangerous • You’ve heard of some security vulns

11. ASSUMPTIONS • This is an introduction-level talk • You know enough PHP to be dangerous • You’ve heard of some security vulns • Again, I don’t know everything

12. TALK STRUCTURE

13. TALK STRUCTURE • What is the risk?

14. TALK STRUCTURE • What is the risk? • Typical Impact

15. TALK STRUCTURE • What is the risk? • Typical Impact • How is it exploited?

16. TALK STRUCTURE • What is the risk? • Typical Impact • How is it exploited? • How to prevent it when using PHP?

17. OWASP http://www.owasp.org

18. O W A S P

19. Open Web Application Security Project

20. OWASP • Non-proﬁt focused on improving security of application software • Focused on awareness of risks and education on mitigating those risks • Kansas City chapter meets every other month • Next meeting: Thursday, February 10, 2011 at Johnson County Community College • Free! No registration required, but RSVPs appreciated

21. http://www.owasp.org

22. OWASP Top 10 (2010) Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

23. INJECTION

24. INJECTION SI T? I Tricking an application into unintended HAT W commands in the data sent to an interpreter -Interpreter--- -Injection--- Database SQL Injection Shell Command Injection File System File Injection/Inclusion PHP PHP Injection

25. CT INJECTION PA IM IC AL Technical Impact: SEVERE T YP Entire database read or modified Access files on the filesystem Uses a program's elevated privileges to carry out unauthorized execution

26. LO I TE D? INJECTION P T EX I SI HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

27. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW

28. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL

29. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts

30. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts OS user and database accounts

31. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts OS user and database accounts Limit attack vectors

32. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts OS user and database accounts Limit attack vectors Sandbox execution

33. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts OS user and database accounts Limit attack vectors Sandbox execution Firewall web-facing machine

34. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Limit access rights of your application accounts OS user and database accounts Limit attack vectors Sandbox execution Firewall web-facing machine Close unused ports and services

35. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO OW SYSTEM LEVEL KU IT H D Limit access rights of your application accounts OES T OS user and database accounts HIS F OR YO Limit attack vectors Sandbox execution Firewall web-facing machine Close unused ports and services U

36. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW APPLICATION LEVEL “Filter Input, Escape Output” Examples: HTML SQL / DATABASE

37. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW HTML Injection

38. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO SQL Injection - Prepared Statements HOW

39. T I T? INJECTION EN R EV P TO HOW SQL Injection Source: http://xkcd.com/327/

40. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)

41. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser

42. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser Single Request Exploit

43. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser Single Request Exploit Specially crafted URL injecting JavaScript or other defacement code

44. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser Single Request Exploit Specially crafted URL injecting JavaScript or other defacement code Persistent Request Exploit

45. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser Single Request Exploit Specially crafted URL injecting JavaScript or other defacement code Persistent Request Exploit Saved in the ﬁle itself or more commonly in a database

46. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) ? IS IT AT Malicious data delivered to an W H innocent user's browser Single Request Exploit Specially crafted URL injecting JavaScript or other defacement code Persistent Request Exploit Saved in the ﬁle itself or more commonly in a database Delivered to all visitors just by visiting the page

47. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) CT PA IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

48. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) CT PA IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Steal stored browser data... Session IDs & cookies Account numbers Usernames Deface website Redirect user to phishing or malware site

49. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) LO I TE D? EXP SI T I HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

50. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO HOW “Filter Input, Escape Output” Validate / Sanitize user input Escape user input sent to a Database or the Browser

51. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO HOW

52. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Filter Input HOW

53. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Filter Input HOW Use PHP ﬁlter_* methods

54. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Filter Input HOW Use PHP ﬁlter_* methods http://www.php.net/manual/en/ref.ﬁlter.php

55. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Filter Input HOW Use PHP ﬁlter_* methods http://www.php.net/manual/en/ref.ﬁlter.php

56. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Escape Output HOW

57. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Escape Output HOW htmlentities() ???

60. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Escape Output HOW htmlentities() ??? MEH

61. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Escape Output HOW http://htmlpuriﬁer.org/

62. CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) NT I T? VE P RE TO Escape Output HOW http://htmlpuriﬁer.org/

63. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION MANAGEMENT

64. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented

65. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented HTTP is “stateless”

66. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented HTTP is “stateless” HTTP sends credentials with every request

67. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented HTTP is “stateless” HTTP sends credentials with every request Credentials are usually a Session ID

68. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented HTTP is “stateless” HTTP sends credentials with every request Credentials are usually a Session ID Attack is possible when attacker gets a valid Session ID

69. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION IT?AND SESSION MANAGEMENT IS HAT Authentication or Sessions are W improperly implemented HTTP is “stateless” HTTP sends credentials with every request Credentials are usually a Session ID Attack is possible when attacker gets a valid Session ID Remember Firesheep?

70. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION PA AND SESSION MANAGEMENT CT L IM Technical Impact: CA SEVERE I T YP

71. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION PA AND SESSION MANAGEMENT CT L IM Technical Impact: CA SEVERE I T YP An attacker might be able to...

72. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION PA AND SESSION MANAGEMENT CT L IM Technical Impact: CA SEVERE I T YP An attacker might be able to... Login without a valid password

73. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION PA AND SESSION MANAGEMENT CT L IM Technical Impact: CA SEVERE I T YP An attacker might be able to... Login without a valid password Change another user’s personal info

74. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION PA AND SESSION MANAGEMENT CT L IM Technical Impact: CA SEVERE I T YP An attacker might be able to... Login without a valid password Change another user’s personal info Assume another user’s identity by just clicking a link

75. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION D? AND I TE SESSION MANAGEMENT P LO T EX I SI HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

76. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION T? T I SESSION MANAGEMENT VEAND N P RE TO HOW Rely on strong authentication and session management controls Integrate Shibboleth into your application

77. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION T? T I SESSION MANAGEMENT VEAND N P RE TO HOW Proper Session Storage Default conﬁg stores sessions in a global temp directory

78. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION T? T I SESSION MANAGEMENT VEAND N P RE TO HOW Proper Session Regeneration Always run session_regenerate_id() after an escalation in authentication/authorization

79. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION T? T I SESSION MANAGEMENT VEAND N P RE TO Proper Session cookie handling HOW Only allow session cookies over secure connections Only allow session cookies over HTTP (not JavaScript) Only allow session IDs in cookies (not in the URL)

80. BROKEN AUTHENTICATION T? T I SESSION MANAGEMENT VEAND N P RE TO Use HTTPS HOW NEVER deliver unencrypted network trafﬁc when in HTTPS http://test.ku.edu/page2.php ==> http://webmedia.ku.edu/jquery.js https://test.ku.edu/page2.php ==> https://webmedia.ku.edu/jquery.js

81. INSECURE DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES

82. INSECURE DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES SI T? I HAT Users without proper credentials W can view secure data Do any users have only partial access to certain types of system data?

83. INSECURE DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

84. INSECURE DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Depends on the value of the secure data Flaws can compromise all data referenced by an insecure object

85. INSECURE DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW User clicks link “My Account” User accesses “My Account” page at URL: http://mybank.com/account/2055 User increments parameter in the URL: http://mybank.com/account/2056 User is granted access

86. INSECUREIT? T DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES EN R EV Use Array Map to P Obfuscate URL Parameters TO HOW

87. INSECUREIT? T DIGITAL OBJECT REFERENCES EN EV Use switch() to test for valid values P R TO HOW

88. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)

89. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) SI T? I HAT Victim's browser is tricked into issuing a W command to a vulnerable web application

90. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) SI T? I HAT Victim's browser is tricked into issuing a W command to a vulnerable web application HTTP is “stateless” - Credentials are included with every request If the user visits another website while still authenticated... Any request back to the application is considered authentic

91. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

92. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application?

93. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application? What could they make you do?

94. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application? What could they make you do? Make Transactions?

95. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application? What could they make you do? Make Transactions? Close Accounts?

96. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application? What could they make you do? Make Transactions? Close Accounts? Change Password?

97. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW A vulnerable web application allows destructive actions (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE) when using $_GET http://mydomain.com/ﬁle.php?action=delete&id=12345

98. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW A vulnerable web application allows destructive actions (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE) when using $_GET http://mydomain.com/ﬁle.php?action=delete&id=12345

99. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Destructive actions are executed with minimal or no veriﬁcation of the origin of the request HTTP POST => http://mydomain.com/ﬁle.php?action=delete

100. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Destructive actions are executed with minimal or no verification of the origin of the request HTTP POST => http://mydomain.com/file.php?action=delete Only marginally more difficult to forge a POST

101. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW A few easy ways...

102. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW A few easy ways... Invalidate user sessions quickly

103. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW A few easy ways... Invalidate user sessions quickly Encourage users to logout (they don’t)

104. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW A few easy ways... Invalidate user sessions quickly Encourage users to logout (they don’t) Don’t implement “Remember Me” features

105. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW Implement a CSRF Token Add a secret, not automatically submitted, token to ALL sensitive requests Verify token exists and matches the expected value before executing the request

106. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW Implement a CSRF Token Generate token and store in user's session Source: http://shiﬂett.org/articles/cross-site-request-forgeries

107. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW Implement a CSRF Token Use token in POST form Source: http://shiﬂett.org/articles/cross-site-request-forgeries

108. CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW Implement a CSRF Token Validate when POST received Source: http://shiﬂett.org/articles/cross-site-request-forgeries

109. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION

110. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION SI T? I HAT Running web applications on a secure foundation W

111. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION SI T? I HAT Running web applications on a secure foundation W From the Operating System up through Apache All PHP extensions All installed libraries on the server

112. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

113. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Install backdoor through missing security patch

114. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Install backdoor through missing security patch Install malware on the server

115. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Install backdoor through missing security patch Install malware on the server “Root” the server

116. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Install backdoor through missing security patch Install malware on the server “Root” the server All your data is stolen

117. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

118. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW

119. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW SYSTEM LEVEL Update to latest application versions Install security patches Monitor vulnerabilities list

120. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T I T? EN R EV P TO OW KU IT H D SYSTEM LEVEL OES T HIS F Update to latest application versions Install security patches OR YO Monitor vulnerabilities list U

121. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW APPLICATION LEVEL Use latest available version of PHP Update third-party software when available Monitor mailing lists

122. SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION T I T? EN R EV P TO HOW APPLICATION LEVEL Use latest available version of PHP Update third-party software when available Monitor mailing lists

123. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE

124. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE SI T? I Incorrectly storing and transmitting HAT W conﬁdential data

125. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE SI T? I Incorrectly storing and transmitting HAT W confidential data Database data Log files Backup files Password files

126. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE SI T? I HAT What is considered secure data at KU? W Data protected by FERPA Data protected by GLB Data subject to PCI (credit or payment card industry) standards Data subject to other Federal or state confidentiality laws Donor or prospect information Passwords and PINs Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Personnel data Individually identifiable information created and collected by research projects Certain research data with National Security implications Data subject to protection pursuant to non-disclosure agreements Audit working papers Data protected by attorney/client privilege Email covering topics listed above Source: https://documents.ku.edu/policies/Information_Services/APPENDIX_1_Data_Classif_Policy.htm

127. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE SI T? I HAT What is considered secure data at KU? W Data protected by FERPA Data protected by GLB Data subject to PCI (credit or payment card industry) standards Data subject to other Federal or state confidentiality laws Donor or prospect information Passwords and PINs Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Personnel data Individually identifiable information created and collected by research projects Certain research data with National Security implications Data subject to protection pursuant to non-disclosure agreements Audit working papers Data protected by attorney/client privilege Email covering topics listed above THIS LIST IS NOT ALL INCLUSIVE Source: https://documents.ku.edu/policies/Information_Services/APPENDIX_1_Data_Classif_Policy.htm

128. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T PAC IM IC AL Technical Impact: T YP SEVERE

129. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T PAC IM IC AL Technical Impact: T YP SEVERE Attacker accesses or modiﬁes conﬁdential data Intellectual property stolen You or KU might get sued Makes the company look bad in the press

130. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T PAC IM IC AL Business Impacts: T YP SEVERE High risk of... signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss legal liability public distrust harm ...if this data is disclosed

131. INSECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

132. INSECURE? CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T IT EN R EV P TO HOW

133. INSECURE? CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T IT EN R EV P TO HOW Identify all sensitive data and all places it is stored

134. INSECURE? CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T IT EN R EV P TO HOW Identify all sensitive data and all places it is stored Don’t store private data in public_html

135. INSECURE? CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T IT EN R EV P TO HOW Identify all sensitive data and all places it is stored Don’t store private data in public_html Don’t invent your own encryption algorithm

136. INSECURE? CRYPTOGRAPHIC STORAGE T IT EN R EV P TO HOW Identify all sensitive data and all places it is stored Don’t store private data in public_html Don’t invent your own encryption algorithm Don’t transmit conﬁdential data over unencrypted means

137. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS

138. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS SI T? I HAT Unauthorized users can view private pages W Public users could access your admin functionality

139. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

140. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS T PAC IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Attackers invoke functions and services they’re not authorized for Access other user’s accounts and data Perform privileged actions

141. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW User accesses URL http://mydomain.com/user/profile User changes role of URL http://mydomain.com/manager/profile http://mydomain.com/admin/profile

142. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Presentation Layer Access Control

143. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Presentation Layer Access Control DOESN’T WORK

144. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Unlinked URLs http://mydomain.com/you/will/never/ﬁnd/this/index.html

145. FAILURE TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS I TE D? P LO T EX I SI HOW Unlinked URLs http://mydomain.com/you/will/never/ﬁnd/this/index.html DOESN’T WORK

146. FAILURE ?TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS T IT EN R EV P TO Check credentials on every page HOW

147. FAILURE ?TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS T IT EN R EV P TO Check credentials on every page HOW Disallow requests to unauthorized page types http://mydomain.com/uploads

148. FAILURE ?TO RESTRICT URL ACCESS T IT EN R EV P TO Check credentials on every page HOW Disallow requests to unauthorized page types http://mydomain.com/uploads Test it!

149. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION

150. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I HAT W

151. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W

152. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols

153. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data

154. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent

155. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent Between:

156. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent Between: Server and user

157. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent Between: Server and user Backend databases

158. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent Between: Server and user Backend databases Colleagues

159. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION SI T? I Sending conﬁdential data over HAT W unencrypted protocols Failure to identify all sensitive data Failure to identify all places sensitive data is sent Between: Server and user Backend databases Colleagues Internal Communications

160. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION CT PA IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP

161. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION CT PA IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Expose users’ conﬁdential data Account theft

162. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application... Use conﬁdential data?

163. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED OI PL T EX I SI What is considered secure data at KU? HOW Data protected by FERPA Data protected by GLB Data subject to PCI (credit or payment card industry) standards Data subject to other Federal or state confidentiality laws Donor or prospect information Passwords and PINs Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Personnel data Individually identifiable information created and collected by research projects Certain research data with National Security implications Data subject to protection pursuant to non-disclosure agreements Audit working papers Data protected by attorney/client privilege Email covering topics listed above Source: https://documents.ku.edu/policies/Information_Services/APPENDIX_1_Data_Classif_Policy.htm

164. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW

165. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application...

166. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application... Use conﬁdential data?

167. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application... Use conﬁdential data? Send it over email?

168. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application... Use conﬁdential data? Send it over email? Send it to a database?

169. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Does your application... Use conﬁdential data? Send it over email? Send it to a database? Use HTTPS for ALL authentication requests?

170. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW

171. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Do you...

172. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Do you... Have encrypted email setup between colleagues?

173. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Do you... Have encrypted email setup between colleagues? Use encrypted IM chat between colleagues?

174. INSUFFICIENT ?TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION T ED I P LO T EX I SI HOW Do you... Have encrypted email setup between colleagues? Use encrypted IM chat between colleagues? Store your account passwords in a password safe?

175. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Don’t use KU Email Form to send conﬁdential data

176. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Don’t use KU Email Form to send conﬁdential data 1. Build a web form that stores it in a secure database

177. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Don’t use KU Email Form to send conﬁdential data 1. Build a web form that stores it in a secure database 2. Build a page to download or browse the info

178. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Don’t use KU Email Form to send conﬁdential data 1. Build a web form that stores it in a secure database 2. Build a page to download or browse the info 3. Only allow speciﬁc users to access it using Shibboleth

179. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Don’t use KU Email Form to send conﬁdential data 1. Build a web form that stores it in a secure database 2. Build a page to download or browse the info 3. Only allow speciﬁc users to access it using Shibboleth

180. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Use secure protocols to transmit and store data

181. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Use secure protocols to transmit and store data Ever try to FTP to www2.ku.edu without SFTP?

182. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Use secure protocols to transmit and store data Ever try to FTP to www2.ku.edu without SFTP? Store conﬁdential data in our secure Oracle database

183. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Require HTTPS on all secure pages

184. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Require HTTPS on all secure pages

185. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Setup email encryption between colleagues http://www.technology.ku.edu/ca/install/

186. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Setup Off-The-Record chat encryption http://www.h-i-r.net/2011/01/introduction-to-encrypted-internet-chat.html

187. INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORT LAYER PROTECTION I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW KeePass Windows: http://keepass.info/ Mac: http://www.keepassx.org/ Free & Open-Source

188. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS

189. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS SI T? I HAT W URL Redirects built by the web application can be exploited if unvalidated Appears as a valid URL but contains a payload Internal redirects are common External redirects are becoming more common

190. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS CT PA IM Technical Impact: AL MODERATE IC T YP Install malware Phishing site Bypass authorization controls

191. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS TE D? I P LO T EX I SI HOW Source: Dave Wichers OWASP Top 10 Presentation

192. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS I T? T EN R EV P TO HOW Avoid using redirects and forwards as much as possible If used, don’t use user-input parameters If using user-input... Use Array Map to Whitelist URL Parameters

193. UNVALIDATED REDIRECTS AND FORWARDS I T? T EN R EV Use Array Map to P Whitelist URL Parameters TO HOW

194. Questions?

195. My Challenge to you Read the OWASP Wiki http://www.owasp.org Review your code http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Review_Guide http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project

196. Sources OWASP Sources: - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard Project. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS> - OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet> - OWASP Code Review Project. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Review_Guide> - OWASP Testing Project. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project> - OWASP Top 10 - 2010: The Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks. Dave Wichers, OWASP Board Member. <http:// owasptop10.googlecode.com/files/OWASP_Top_10_-_2010%20Presentation.pptx> - OWASP XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet. <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting) _Prevention_Cheat_Sheet> Links: - Setting up encrypted email at KU. http://www.technology.ku.edu/ca/install/ - Introduction to Encrypted Internet Chat. http://www.h-i-r.net/2011/01/introduction-to-encrypted-internet-chat.html Software: - HTMLPurifier <http://htmlpurifier.org/> - KeePass <http://keepass.info/> - KeePassX <http://www.keepassx.org/> - WebScarab <http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project> Photos: http://www.flickr.com/photos/mrbenn/2337943659/ http://www.flickr.com/photos/12836528@N00/4294660659/ John Kary | johnkary@ku.edu http://xkcd.com/327/ Web Development & Interface Design University of Kansas, Information Technology January 2011 KU Web Developers Meeting

Scared Straight: Mitigating OWASP Top 10 with PHP

Scared Straight: Mitigating OWASP Top 10 with PHP

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