SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 5
Download to read offline
April 2009, Volume 20, Number 2 $12.00




                Reading Russia
          Ghia Nodia Garry Kasparov Ivan Krastev
Andrei Piontkovsky Nadia Diuk Leon Aron Andrei Illarionov
         Vitali Silitski Lilia Shevtsova Archie Brown
         The 2008 Freedom House Survey
                       Arch Puddington

      The Consequences of Democratization
                      Giovanni Carbone

              Manuel Hidalgo on Venezuela
      Marco Verweij & Riccardo Pelizzo on Singapore
               E. Gyimah-Boadi on Ghana
             Zoltan Barany on NATO at Sixty
                 Oisín Tansey on Kosovo

           Religion and Democracy
                    Jean Bethke Elshtain
Reading Russia


         the siloviki in charge

                             Andrei illarionov




Andrei Illarionov is senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for
Global Liberty and Prosperity, and president of the Institute of Eco-
nomic Analysis in Moscow. From 2000 to 2005, he was chief economic
advisor to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Illarionov received his
doctorate in economics from St. Petersburg University in 1987.


Who are the holders of political power in Russia today, and what is the
relationship between them and the rest of Russia’s people? The answer
to the first question boils down to the siloviki (sometimes called “se-
curocrats” by political scientists). These are the people who work for, or
who used to work for, the silovye ministerstva—literally “the ministries
of force”—charged with wielding coercion and violence in the name
of the state. All told, there are 22 such agencies in today’s Russia. The
best known is the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the
Soviet-era KGB secret-police and spy agency. Other coercive agencies
are associated with the Interior Ministry, various branches of the mili-
tary, the state prosecutor’s office, the intelligence services, and so on.
Whatever their specific institutional affiliation, all siloviki have in com-
mon a special type of training that sets them apart from civilians. This
training provides the skills, motivation, and mental attitude needed to
use force against other people.
   The distinguishing feature of enforcement in today’s Russia is that it
does not necessarily mean enforcement of law. It means enforcement of
power and force, regardless of law and quite often against law.
   The personnel of each of these enforcement agencies, whether still
in active service or retired, form unified groups—often informal but
real and potent nonetheless—that can be called brotherhoods or corpora-
tions. There is a hierarchy as well as a high level of in-group allegiance
in them. Most current and former members of the enforcement agencies
form the siloviki caste as a distinctive part of society.
   At the peak of this caste are current and former secret-police op-

              Journal of Democracy Volume 20, Number 2 April 2009
  © 2009 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
70                                                      Journal of Democracy

eratives. First among equals are the FSB agents, followed by agents of
the KGB-spinoff Federal Protective Service (FSO) and the Prosecutor-
General’s Office. Although members of military intelligence (GRU) and
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) play a role in the caste, they
occupy a somewhat lower position in the power hierarchy. It is hard
to find anyone among major political decision makers in Russia today
with a background in the Interior Ministry or the Ministry of Defense
(apart from the GRU): The positions of these ministries and their per-
sonnel are clearly subordinate. The real power belongs instead to the
operatives and veterans of the secret-police, political-intelligence, and
internal law-enforcement bodies. This is important because the profes-
sional training, ethical principles, interests, and assumptions (regarding
friends, colleagues, and allies, as well as foes) of this key subset of the
siloviki must form a major object of study for those who wish to under-
stand Russian politics today.
   The members of “Siloviki Incorporated” (SI) share a strong sense
of allegiance to the group; an attitude of relative flexibility regarding
short- and medium-term goals; and rather strict codes of conduct and
honor, including the ideas of “always taking care of one’s own” and
not violating the custom of omert`a (silence). As one might expect in a
group with roots in the secret-police and intelligence services, members
place great emphasis on obeying superiors, showing strong loyalty to
one another, and preserving strict discipline. There are both formal and
informal means of enforcing these norms. Those who violate the code
are subject to the harshest forms of punishment, including death.
   Those who belong to SI see themselves as an elite. Their training
instills in them a feeling of being superior to the rest of populace, of
being the rightful “bosses” of everyone else. For those who remain on
active duty, their perquisites of office include two items that confer real
power in today’s Russia: the right to carry and use weapons, and an FSB
credential (known as a vezdehod) that acts as a carte blanche giving its
owner the right to enter any place, office, building, or territory whatso-
ever, public or private.
   As in any corporate entity, members have both individual and group in-
terests that do not necessarily coincide. For example, when it comes to who
owns the assets that SI has seized—one case involved the expropriation of
the Sibneft oil company in 2005—members have been observed arguing
ferociously with one another. Yet whatever rifts may open up within SI,
the gulf between it and the rest of Russian society remains far wider.
   Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power at the end of the 1990s, siloviki
have spread to posts throughout all the branches of power in Russia. Ac-
cording to a 2006 study by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, the head of the Cen-
ter for the Study of Elites at the Russian Academy of Sciences, people
with a security background filled 77 percent of Russia’s top 1,016 gov-
ernmental positions.1 Of these, only about a third stated their affiliation
Andrei Illarionov                                                         71

openly. Speaking at the Lubyanka—the Moscow headquarters building
that the FSB inherited from the KGB—on “Security Organs Day” (known
as “Chekist Day”) in December 1999, Putin said that “the mission of the
group of FSB officers sent undercover to work in the government is being
accomplished successfully.” With the state as their base, the siloviki have
taken over key business and media organizations as well. There are now
few areas of Russian life where the SI’s long arm fails to reach.

     Democracy, Dictatorship, and Something Between
   Our second question, about the relationship between the powerholders
and everyone else, basically asks what kind of regime Russia has. There
are many different ways of classifying political regimes. I prefer to divide
them into three principal categories based upon the level of political and
other freedoms that the citizens enjoy. The freest kind of regime is democ-
racy, the kind that provides the least freedom is dictatorship, and the one
that lies between them may be called authoritarianism.
   A telltale indicator is the role played (or not played) by organized,
legal political opposition. In a democracy, such opposition will not only
have a formal right to exist, but will operate without serious hindrance
from the authorities, and will have regular chances to compete peace-
fully for power and replace incumbents in an orderly, regular manner
prescribed by rules made known to all beforehand.
   A dictatorship has none of these things. Instead, opposition is forbid-
den and harshly suppressed; if it comes to power, it will only be by some
violent rupture such as a coup or invasion. In an authoritarian regime,
finally, organized political opposition can exist, but it will face serious
de facto and de jure obstacles and no real path to a peaceful assumption
of power. Thus in an authoritarian regime as well as a full-blown dicta-
torship, fundamental political changeovers are likely to be violent.
   Based on this scheme, I would classify the current regime in Russia
as an example of a “hard” (fully elaborated) authoritarian regime shad-
ing toward becoming a “soft” (somewhat inchoate) dictatorship. For or-
dinary Russian citizens, this means the presence of some tangible level
of personal freedoms, but a nearly complete absence of any substantial
political rights, a seriously reduced scope for the exercise of civil lib-
erties, and significant limits to one’s personal security. Organized op-
position to the regime is nearly nonexistent, and there is no chance for
opposition politicians to come to power in a peaceful way. Not only
political activists, but also independent journalists, lawyers, and others
who might form rallying points for discontent, suffer sporadic terroriza-
tion to keep them cowed and living in fear.
   The most important characteristic of the current regime in Russia
is that real power belongs to no one person, family, party, or ethnic
group, but rather to a de facto corporation of secret-police operatives.
72                                                              Journal of Democracy

Powerful secret-police establishments have been seen before. Russia
inherited its own from the old USSR. The SS and its Gestapo in Nazi
Germany formed something like a state within a state. So did SAVAK in
the Shah’s Iran a few decades ago. Yet none of those secret-police orga-
nizations possessed supreme political power, and all had political mas-
ters from outside their ranks. The regime in today’s Russia is therefore
unique, since so far there has been no other relatively developed country
in which a secret-police organization has captured supreme power.
   This atypical character makes the always difficult task of political fore-
casting harder still. The stability of any regime depends on many factors,
including its authorities’ readiness to use force to suppress opposition and
dissent. Even at times when such measures have not been necessary, the
siloviki regime has shown itself willing to use them, often leaning toward
the side of harshness. This ought to give us some hint of what to expect
should the regime face a real challenge in the form of economic, social,
political, or external upheavals. The thought is not consoling.
   Since its outset, the siloviki regime has been aggressive. At first it fo-
cused on actively destroying centers of independent political, civil, and
economic life within Russia. Upon achieving those goals, the regime’s
aggressive behavior turned outward beyond Russia’s borders. At least
since the assassination of the former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yan-
darbiyev in Doha, Qatar, on 14 February 2004, aggressive behavior by
SI in the international arena has become the rule rather than the excep-
tion. Over the last five years, the regime has waged ten different “wars”
(most of them involving propaganda, intelligence operations, and eco-
nomic coercion rather than open military force) against neighbors and
other foreign nations. The most recent targets have included Ukraine
(subjected to a “second gas war” in early 2009), the United States (sub-
jected to a years-long campaign to rouse anti-American sentiment), and
most notoriously, Georgia (actually bombed and invaded in 2008).
   In addition to their internal psychological need to wage aggressive
wars, a rational motive is also driving the siloviki to resort to conflict.
War furnishes the best opportunities to distract domestic public opinion
and destroy the remnants of political and intellectual opposition with-
in Russia itself. An undemocratic regime worried about the prospect
of domestic economic, social, and political crises—such as those that
now haunt Russia amid recession and falling oil prices—is likely to be
pondering further acts of aggression. The note I end on, therefore, is a
gloomy one: To me, the probability that Siloviki Incorporated will be
launching new wars seems alarmingly high.


                                      NOTES
        1. See “Russia: Expert Eyes Security Ties Among Siloviki,” 20 December 2006.
     Available at www.rferl.org/content/article/1073593.html.

More Related Content

What's hot

Ukraine human rights report 2017
Ukraine human rights report 2017Ukraine human rights report 2017
Ukraine human rights report 2017DonbassFullAccess
 
Доповідь про порушення прав людини
Доповідь про порушення прав людини Доповідь про порушення прав людини
Доповідь про порушення прав людини RBC-Ukraine
 
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politics
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party PoliticsAn Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politics
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politicsinventionjournals
 
2018 february - gulc symposium -- roc
2018 february  - gulc symposium -- roc2018 february  - gulc symposium -- roc
2018 february - gulc symposium -- rocEthan S. Burger
 
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...Oleh Ivanov
 
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5ddave lane
 
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014Larry Catá Backer
 
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...gordana comic
 
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing Sample
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing SampleKarlijn Tummers Academic Writing Sample
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing SampleKarlijn Tummers
 

What's hot (9)

Ukraine human rights report 2017
Ukraine human rights report 2017Ukraine human rights report 2017
Ukraine human rights report 2017
 
Доповідь про порушення прав людини
Доповідь про порушення прав людини Доповідь про порушення прав людини
Доповідь про порушення прав людини
 
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politics
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party PoliticsAn Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politics
An Appraisal of the Current State of Affairs in Nigerian Party Politics
 
2018 february - gulc symposium -- roc
2018 february  - gulc symposium -- roc2018 february  - gulc symposium -- roc
2018 february - gulc symposium -- roc
 
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...
The Representation of citizens’ Foreign Policy orientations by Ukraine’s Domi...
 
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d
262_TeamBII_Letter_to_Congressional_Leaders_32011%5b1%5d
 
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014
Backer secularlibhobbylobbypp3 2014
 
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...
The crisis of democracy in the western balkans, authoritarianism and eu stabi...
 
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing Sample
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing SampleKarlijn Tummers Academic Writing Sample
Karlijn Tummers Academic Writing Sample
 

Viewers also liked

міхнова самопоміч
міхнова самопоміч   міхнова самопоміч
міхнова самопоміч Olena Ursu
 
методические рекомендации по разработке рп цикла од.
методические рекомендации по разработке рп  цикла од.методические рекомендации по разработке рп  цикла од.
методические рекомендации по разработке рп цикла од.Demanessa
 
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttila
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia  Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttilaKohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia  Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttila
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttilaHeidi Anttila
 
Evaluation
EvaluationEvaluation
Evaluationharps123
 
A ENERXIA
A ENERXIAA ENERXIA
A ENERXIAevilig
 
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~Takao Oyobe
 
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in Istanbul
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in IstanbulPresentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in Istanbul
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in IstanbulOlena Ursu
 
Матвійчук P
Матвійчук PМатвійчук P
Матвійчук POlena Ursu
 
Presentation on grants
Presentation on grantsPresentation on grants
Presentation on grantsOlena Ursu
 
Carpineto, A Tour of Tuscany
Carpineto, A Tour of TuscanyCarpineto, A Tour of Tuscany
Carpineto, A Tour of TuscanyMajor Brands
 
Simple past
Simple pastSimple past
Simple pastbensu70
 
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильная
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильнаяCaf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильная
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильнаяOlena Ursu
 
Final Evaluation.5
Final Evaluation.5Final Evaluation.5
Final Evaluation.5harps123
 
Skype lesson 1 power point
Skype lesson 1 power pointSkype lesson 1 power point
Skype lesson 1 power pointKaren Bailey
 
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Email
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising EmailElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Email
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Emailcampaigncloudos
 

Viewers also liked (20)

міхнова самопоміч
міхнова самопоміч   міхнова самопоміч
міхнова самопоміч
 
методические рекомендации по разработке рп цикла од.
методические рекомендации по разработке рп  цикла од.методические рекомендации по разработке рп  цикла од.
методические рекомендации по разработке рп цикла од.
 
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttila
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia  Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttilaKohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia  Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttila
Kohti yhteistä toimintakyvyn arviointia Sillalla seminaari 0203 2012 anttila
 
Evaluation
EvaluationEvaluation
Evaluation
 
A ENERXIA
A ENERXIAA ENERXIA
A ENERXIA
 
Smart AT
Smart ATSmart AT
Smart AT
 
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~
20121021 Lean!! Lean!! Lean!! ~DevLOVEと現場と私~
 
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in Istanbul
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in IstanbulPresentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in Istanbul
Presentation by Tulchyn municipality for regional consultations in Istanbul
 
管理英文
管理英文管理英文
管理英文
 
Матвійчук P
Матвійчук PМатвійчук P
Матвійчук P
 
Presentation on grants
Presentation on grantsPresentation on grants
Presentation on grants
 
Carpineto, A Tour of Tuscany
Carpineto, A Tour of TuscanyCarpineto, A Tour of Tuscany
Carpineto, A Tour of Tuscany
 
Simple past
Simple pastSimple past
Simple past
 
Sit, stay, good art
Sit, stay, good artSit, stay, good art
Sit, stay, good art
 
Elp
Elp Elp
Elp
 
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильная
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильнаяCaf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильная
Caf inform polityky-2014_vinnica_правильная
 
Final Evaluation.5
Final Evaluation.5Final Evaluation.5
Final Evaluation.5
 
Skype lesson 1 power point
Skype lesson 1 power pointSkype lesson 1 power point
Skype lesson 1 power point
 
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Email
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising EmailElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Email
ElectionMall Cloud and Online Fundraising Email
 
Sit, stay, good art
Sit, stay, good artSit, stay, good art
Sit, stay, good art
 

Similar to 01 text illarionov_06 oct

Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern Caucasus
Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern CaucasusDizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern Caucasus
Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern CaucasusEthan Burger
 
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne
 
Businessman Candidates.pdf
Businessman Candidates.pdfBusinessman Candidates.pdf
Businessman Candidates.pdfJhon Mejer Purba
 
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docx
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docxAuthoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docx
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docxjesuslightbody
 
Fiedler & la saine 2005
Fiedler & la saine 2005Fiedler & la saine 2005
Fiedler & la saine 2005jbmckenzie10
 
Paul grubach a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...
Paul grubach   a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...Paul grubach   a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...
Paul grubach a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...RareBooksnRecords
 
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power point
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power pointglobal trend Chapter 1.presentation power point
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power pointyohannisyohannis54
 
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society report
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society reportThe Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society report
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society reportIlya Ponomarev
 
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptx
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptxPolitical science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptx
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptxRoseMaeRAgramonte
 
Presentation science politic
Presentation science politicPresentation science politic
Presentation science politicRoslan Amran
 
Political institutions
Political institutionsPolitical institutions
Political institutionsZeeshan Ahmed
 
The munificent approach in social science
The munificent approach in social scienceThe munificent approach in social science
The munificent approach in social scienceAlexander Decker
 
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...Alexander Decker
 

Similar to 01 text illarionov_06 oct (19)

Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern Caucasus
Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern CaucasusDizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern Caucasus
Dizziness from Success -- Russia\'s Policy in the Northern Caucasus
 
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...
Opposition in authoritarian regimes – a case study of Russian non-systemic op...
 
Businessman Candidates.pdf
Businessman Candidates.pdfBusinessman Candidates.pdf
Businessman Candidates.pdf
 
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docx
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docxAuthoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docx
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docx
 
Fiedler & la saine 2005
Fiedler & la saine 2005Fiedler & la saine 2005
Fiedler & la saine 2005
 
Paul grubach a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...
Paul grubach   a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...Paul grubach   a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...
Paul grubach a critique of the charge of anti-semitism - the moral and poli...
 
Statement Of Purpose For International Relations
Statement Of Purpose For International RelationsStatement Of Purpose For International Relations
Statement Of Purpose For International Relations
 
Political research paper
Political research paperPolitical research paper
Political research paper
 
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power point
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power pointglobal trend Chapter 1.presentation power point
global trend Chapter 1.presentation power point
 
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society report
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society reportThe Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society report
The Russian Opposition - Julia Pettengill, Henry Jackson Society report
 
Theories of I.R-2
Theories of I.R-2Theories of I.R-2
Theories of I.R-2
 
Theories of I.R-2
Theories of I.R-2Theories of I.R-2
Theories of I.R-2
 
FNS Independent Research Project
FNS Independent Research Project FNS Independent Research Project
FNS Independent Research Project
 
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptx
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptxPolitical science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptx
Political science- Disciplines and Ideas in the Social Sciences.pptx
 
Presentation science politic
Presentation science politicPresentation science politic
Presentation science politic
 
Political institutions
Political institutionsPolitical institutions
Political institutions
 
Theories of Sovereignty
Theories of SovereigntyTheories of Sovereignty
Theories of Sovereignty
 
The munificent approach in social science
The munificent approach in social scienceThe munificent approach in social science
The munificent approach in social science
 
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...
A psychological perspective to the rule of law in nigeria and implications fo...
 

More from jhenri5

Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vf
Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vfAna eco média_suisse allemanique_vf
Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vfjhenri5
 
Détente1 ivoir
Détente1 ivoirDétente1 ivoir
Détente1 ivoirjhenri5
 
Imagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasoImagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasojhenri5
 
Imagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasoImagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasojhenri5
 
07 text elshtain_20 oct
07 text elshtain_20 oct07 text elshtain_20 oct
07 text elshtain_20 octjhenri5
 
06 text kalilzad_13 oct
06 text kalilzad_13 oct06 text kalilzad_13 oct
06 text kalilzad_13 octjhenri5
 
05 text yudhoyono_13 oct
05 text yudhoyono_13 oct05 text yudhoyono_13 oct
05 text yudhoyono_13 octjhenri5
 
03 text krastev_06 oct
03 text krastev_06 oct03 text krastev_06 oct
03 text krastev_06 octjhenri5
 
02 text hassner_06 oct
02 text hassner_06 oct02 text hassner_06 oct
02 text hassner_06 octjhenri5
 
08 text haqqani_20 oct
08 text haqqani_20 oct08 text haqqani_20 oct
08 text haqqani_20 octjhenri5
 

More from jhenri5 (10)

Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vf
Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vfAna eco média_suisse allemanique_vf
Ana eco média_suisse allemanique_vf
 
Détente1 ivoir
Détente1 ivoirDétente1 ivoir
Détente1 ivoir
 
Imagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasoImagesdu faso
Imagesdu faso
 
Imagesdu faso
Imagesdu fasoImagesdu faso
Imagesdu faso
 
07 text elshtain_20 oct
07 text elshtain_20 oct07 text elshtain_20 oct
07 text elshtain_20 oct
 
06 text kalilzad_13 oct
06 text kalilzad_13 oct06 text kalilzad_13 oct
06 text kalilzad_13 oct
 
05 text yudhoyono_13 oct
05 text yudhoyono_13 oct05 text yudhoyono_13 oct
05 text yudhoyono_13 oct
 
03 text krastev_06 oct
03 text krastev_06 oct03 text krastev_06 oct
03 text krastev_06 oct
 
02 text hassner_06 oct
02 text hassner_06 oct02 text hassner_06 oct
02 text hassner_06 oct
 
08 text haqqani_20 oct
08 text haqqani_20 oct08 text haqqani_20 oct
08 text haqqani_20 oct
 

Recently uploaded

World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...
World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...
World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
 
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;j
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;jEmbed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;j
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;jbhavenpr
 
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
 
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[bhavenpr
 
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdf
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdfPress-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdf
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdfbhavenpr
 
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive Summary
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive SummaryDominican American Coalition PAC Executive Summary
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive SummaryRDE GROUP CORP
 
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
 
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
 
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdf
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdfisraeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdf
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdfssuser5750e1
 
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musina
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In MusinaTop^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musina
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musinadoctorjoe1984
 
Embed-3-1-1.pdf The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:
Embed-3-1-1.pdf  The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:Embed-3-1-1.pdf  The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:
Embed-3-1-1.pdf The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:bhavenpr
 
Encore portal Project PPt on live portal
Encore portal Project PPt on live portalEncore portal Project PPt on live portal
Encore portal Project PPt on live portalEshantRawat2
 
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental Health
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental HealthPositive Effects Of Social Media On Mental Health
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental HealthTheUnitedIndian
 
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!Abdul-Hakim Shabazz
 
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...alpha012343210
 
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
 
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatórios
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatóriosR$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatórios
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatóriosMaurílio Júnior
 

Recently uploaded (18)

World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...
World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...
World Politics as Black & White Iran and Israel or how people fall victims of...
 
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;j
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;jEmbed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;j
Embed-4-1-1.pdf vm ;sdkp[kdp[kpdkpodp;p;j
 
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
17052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
 
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[
Embed-4-3 (1).pdf cvxx'f['df[p'lf][l][fl][fl][][l[
 
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdf
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdfPress-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdf
Press-Information-Bureau-14-given-citizenship.pdf
 
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive Summary
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive SummaryDominican American Coalition PAC Executive Summary
Dominican American Coalition PAC Executive Summary
 
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
19052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
 
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
16052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
 
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdf
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdfisraeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdf
israeil_bnetaniahou_panel_report_eng.pdf
 
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musina
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In MusinaTop^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musina
Top^Clinic ^%[+27785538335__Safe*Women's clinic//Abortion Pills In Musina
 
Embed-3-1-1.pdf The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:
Embed-3-1-1.pdf  The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:Embed-3-1-1.pdf  The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:
Embed-3-1-1.pdf The ECI direction on April 2, 2024 can be read here:
 
Encore portal Project PPt on live portal
Encore portal Project PPt on live portalEncore portal Project PPt on live portal
Encore portal Project PPt on live portal
 
#become occult member for money ritual +2349028448088
#become occult member for money ritual +2349028448088#become occult member for money ritual +2349028448088
#become occult member for money ritual +2349028448088
 
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental Health
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental HealthPositive Effects Of Social Media On Mental Health
Positive Effects Of Social Media On Mental Health
 
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!
Have A Complimentary Cheat Sheet, On Us!!!
 
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...
CaseThe legal victory in the turmeric patent case safeguarded traditional kno...
 
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
21052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdf
 
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatórios
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatóriosR$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatórios
R$ 78 milhões: Estado aprova 593 propostas para acordos diretos de precatórios
 

01 text illarionov_06 oct

  • 1. April 2009, Volume 20, Number 2 $12.00 Reading Russia Ghia Nodia Garry Kasparov Ivan Krastev Andrei Piontkovsky Nadia Diuk Leon Aron Andrei Illarionov Vitali Silitski Lilia Shevtsova Archie Brown The 2008 Freedom House Survey Arch Puddington The Consequences of Democratization Giovanni Carbone Manuel Hidalgo on Venezuela Marco Verweij & Riccardo Pelizzo on Singapore E. Gyimah-Boadi on Ghana Zoltan Barany on NATO at Sixty Oisín Tansey on Kosovo Religion and Democracy Jean Bethke Elshtain
  • 2. Reading Russia the siloviki in charge Andrei illarionov Andrei Illarionov is senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, and president of the Institute of Eco- nomic Analysis in Moscow. From 2000 to 2005, he was chief economic advisor to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Illarionov received his doctorate in economics from St. Petersburg University in 1987. Who are the holders of political power in Russia today, and what is the relationship between them and the rest of Russia’s people? The answer to the first question boils down to the siloviki (sometimes called “se- curocrats” by political scientists). These are the people who work for, or who used to work for, the silovye ministerstva—literally “the ministries of force”—charged with wielding coercion and violence in the name of the state. All told, there are 22 such agencies in today’s Russia. The best known is the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet-era KGB secret-police and spy agency. Other coercive agencies are associated with the Interior Ministry, various branches of the mili- tary, the state prosecutor’s office, the intelligence services, and so on. Whatever their specific institutional affiliation, all siloviki have in com- mon a special type of training that sets them apart from civilians. This training provides the skills, motivation, and mental attitude needed to use force against other people. The distinguishing feature of enforcement in today’s Russia is that it does not necessarily mean enforcement of law. It means enforcement of power and force, regardless of law and quite often against law. The personnel of each of these enforcement agencies, whether still in active service or retired, form unified groups—often informal but real and potent nonetheless—that can be called brotherhoods or corpora- tions. There is a hierarchy as well as a high level of in-group allegiance in them. Most current and former members of the enforcement agencies form the siloviki caste as a distinctive part of society. At the peak of this caste are current and former secret-police op- Journal of Democracy Volume 20, Number 2 April 2009 © 2009 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press
  • 3. 70 Journal of Democracy eratives. First among equals are the FSB agents, followed by agents of the KGB-spinoff Federal Protective Service (FSO) and the Prosecutor- General’s Office. Although members of military intelligence (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) play a role in the caste, they occupy a somewhat lower position in the power hierarchy. It is hard to find anyone among major political decision makers in Russia today with a background in the Interior Ministry or the Ministry of Defense (apart from the GRU): The positions of these ministries and their per- sonnel are clearly subordinate. The real power belongs instead to the operatives and veterans of the secret-police, political-intelligence, and internal law-enforcement bodies. This is important because the profes- sional training, ethical principles, interests, and assumptions (regarding friends, colleagues, and allies, as well as foes) of this key subset of the siloviki must form a major object of study for those who wish to under- stand Russian politics today. The members of “Siloviki Incorporated” (SI) share a strong sense of allegiance to the group; an attitude of relative flexibility regarding short- and medium-term goals; and rather strict codes of conduct and honor, including the ideas of “always taking care of one’s own” and not violating the custom of omert`a (silence). As one might expect in a group with roots in the secret-police and intelligence services, members place great emphasis on obeying superiors, showing strong loyalty to one another, and preserving strict discipline. There are both formal and informal means of enforcing these norms. Those who violate the code are subject to the harshest forms of punishment, including death. Those who belong to SI see themselves as an elite. Their training instills in them a feeling of being superior to the rest of populace, of being the rightful “bosses” of everyone else. For those who remain on active duty, their perquisites of office include two items that confer real power in today’s Russia: the right to carry and use weapons, and an FSB credential (known as a vezdehod) that acts as a carte blanche giving its owner the right to enter any place, office, building, or territory whatso- ever, public or private. As in any corporate entity, members have both individual and group in- terests that do not necessarily coincide. For example, when it comes to who owns the assets that SI has seized—one case involved the expropriation of the Sibneft oil company in 2005—members have been observed arguing ferociously with one another. Yet whatever rifts may open up within SI, the gulf between it and the rest of Russian society remains far wider. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power at the end of the 1990s, siloviki have spread to posts throughout all the branches of power in Russia. Ac- cording to a 2006 study by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, the head of the Cen- ter for the Study of Elites at the Russian Academy of Sciences, people with a security background filled 77 percent of Russia’s top 1,016 gov- ernmental positions.1 Of these, only about a third stated their affiliation
  • 4. Andrei Illarionov 71 openly. Speaking at the Lubyanka—the Moscow headquarters building that the FSB inherited from the KGB—on “Security Organs Day” (known as “Chekist Day”) in December 1999, Putin said that “the mission of the group of FSB officers sent undercover to work in the government is being accomplished successfully.” With the state as their base, the siloviki have taken over key business and media organizations as well. There are now few areas of Russian life where the SI’s long arm fails to reach. Democracy, Dictatorship, and Something Between Our second question, about the relationship between the powerholders and everyone else, basically asks what kind of regime Russia has. There are many different ways of classifying political regimes. I prefer to divide them into three principal categories based upon the level of political and other freedoms that the citizens enjoy. The freest kind of regime is democ- racy, the kind that provides the least freedom is dictatorship, and the one that lies between them may be called authoritarianism. A telltale indicator is the role played (or not played) by organized, legal political opposition. In a democracy, such opposition will not only have a formal right to exist, but will operate without serious hindrance from the authorities, and will have regular chances to compete peace- fully for power and replace incumbents in an orderly, regular manner prescribed by rules made known to all beforehand. A dictatorship has none of these things. Instead, opposition is forbid- den and harshly suppressed; if it comes to power, it will only be by some violent rupture such as a coup or invasion. In an authoritarian regime, finally, organized political opposition can exist, but it will face serious de facto and de jure obstacles and no real path to a peaceful assumption of power. Thus in an authoritarian regime as well as a full-blown dicta- torship, fundamental political changeovers are likely to be violent. Based on this scheme, I would classify the current regime in Russia as an example of a “hard” (fully elaborated) authoritarian regime shad- ing toward becoming a “soft” (somewhat inchoate) dictatorship. For or- dinary Russian citizens, this means the presence of some tangible level of personal freedoms, but a nearly complete absence of any substantial political rights, a seriously reduced scope for the exercise of civil lib- erties, and significant limits to one’s personal security. Organized op- position to the regime is nearly nonexistent, and there is no chance for opposition politicians to come to power in a peaceful way. Not only political activists, but also independent journalists, lawyers, and others who might form rallying points for discontent, suffer sporadic terroriza- tion to keep them cowed and living in fear. The most important characteristic of the current regime in Russia is that real power belongs to no one person, family, party, or ethnic group, but rather to a de facto corporation of secret-police operatives.
  • 5. 72 Journal of Democracy Powerful secret-police establishments have been seen before. Russia inherited its own from the old USSR. The SS and its Gestapo in Nazi Germany formed something like a state within a state. So did SAVAK in the Shah’s Iran a few decades ago. Yet none of those secret-police orga- nizations possessed supreme political power, and all had political mas- ters from outside their ranks. The regime in today’s Russia is therefore unique, since so far there has been no other relatively developed country in which a secret-police organization has captured supreme power. This atypical character makes the always difficult task of political fore- casting harder still. The stability of any regime depends on many factors, including its authorities’ readiness to use force to suppress opposition and dissent. Even at times when such measures have not been necessary, the siloviki regime has shown itself willing to use them, often leaning toward the side of harshness. This ought to give us some hint of what to expect should the regime face a real challenge in the form of economic, social, political, or external upheavals. The thought is not consoling. Since its outset, the siloviki regime has been aggressive. At first it fo- cused on actively destroying centers of independent political, civil, and economic life within Russia. Upon achieving those goals, the regime’s aggressive behavior turned outward beyond Russia’s borders. At least since the assassination of the former Chechen president Zelimkhan Yan- darbiyev in Doha, Qatar, on 14 February 2004, aggressive behavior by SI in the international arena has become the rule rather than the excep- tion. Over the last five years, the regime has waged ten different “wars” (most of them involving propaganda, intelligence operations, and eco- nomic coercion rather than open military force) against neighbors and other foreign nations. The most recent targets have included Ukraine (subjected to a “second gas war” in early 2009), the United States (sub- jected to a years-long campaign to rouse anti-American sentiment), and most notoriously, Georgia (actually bombed and invaded in 2008). In addition to their internal psychological need to wage aggressive wars, a rational motive is also driving the siloviki to resort to conflict. War furnishes the best opportunities to distract domestic public opinion and destroy the remnants of political and intellectual opposition with- in Russia itself. An undemocratic regime worried about the prospect of domestic economic, social, and political crises—such as those that now haunt Russia amid recession and falling oil prices—is likely to be pondering further acts of aggression. The note I end on, therefore, is a gloomy one: To me, the probability that Siloviki Incorporated will be launching new wars seems alarmingly high. NOTES 1. See “Russia: Expert Eyes Security Ties Among Siloviki,” 20 December 2006. Available at www.rferl.org/content/article/1073593.html.