Jk lomborgpresentation-v7

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Jk lomborgpresentation-v7

  1. 1. Why we should act Jonathan G. Koomey, Ph.D. Project Scientist, LBNL Consulting Professor, Stanford University April 9th, 2010 1

  2. 2. What responsibility do we have to the future? 2

  3. 3. A personal view of insurance 3

  4. 4. Key points about climate 4

  5. 5. If
we
don’t
alter
course,
we’ll
end
up
where
we’re
headed
 MIT
(Sokolov
et
al.)
2009
 Global
average
surface
 temperature
is
heading
well
 outside
the
range
experienced
 during
the
tenure
of
Homo
 IPCC
2007
scenarios
to
 sapiens
on
Earth
(slide
courtesy
 2100
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐>
 of
John
P.
Holdren,
Harvard
 University,
modified
by
JK).
 Year
2000
 concentra/ons
 5

  6. 6. One example: in a warming world, summers will get a LOT hotter 6
 Derived
from
data
and
analysis
in
Hayhoe
et
al.
2008

  7. 7. Long residence time of CO2 means big reductions needed to stabilize temps. Change in T (degC) relative to preindustrial levels 4.5 30 Annual carbon emissions (GtC/year) 4.0 25 3.5 3.0 20 2.5 15 2.0 1.5 10 Stabiliza/on
case
 Stabiliza/on
case
 1.0 5 0.5 0.0 0 2000 2050 2100 2000 2050 2100 Change
in
world
temperatures
 World
C
emissions
 Con/nued
growth
and
flat
emissions
scenario
are
taken
from
the
IIASA
GGI
database
(A2r
and
B2,
respec/vely).

Stabiliza/on
 case
is
adapted
from
the
B2
480
ppm
scenario.

hTp://www.iiasa.ac.at/web‐apps/ggi/GgiDb/
 7

  8. 8. The longer we wait, the harder the task will be Area
under
both
curves
is
the
 same,
corresponding
to
the
 same
emissions
budget.

 Stabiliza/on
curve
is
the
same

 as
in
the
previous
slide.
 8

  9. 9. Most capital existing in 2050 will be built between now and then Percentage of total stock in 2050 Assumes growth in electricity use, GDP, and population from IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2009. Lifetimes 9
 of capital stock 50 years for power plants and comml bdgs, 30 yrs for industrial, and 100 years for residences.
  10. 10. Lomborg claims he’s bringing economic reasoning to the climate issue. 10

  11. 11. That’s a worthy goal. 11

  12. 12. What does the neoclassical economics literature say? 12

  13. 13. Analyzing a pollution externality: the standard approach Op/mal
tax
 4/9/10
 13

  14. 14. Nordhaus of Yale says… •  “Global warming is a serious problem that will not solve itself…There is no case for delay. The most fruitful and effective approach is for countries to put a harmonized price–perhaps a steep price–on greenhouse gas emissions…” (optimal price = $7.40/tonne CO2 in 2005 rising between 2 and 3% real each year to account for rising damages) W. Nordhaus, A Question of Balance, pp.28-29 (p.15-16 for optimal price). 14

  15. 15. Yohe of Wesleyan says… •  “Simple economics tells you that the most cost-effective way of responding is to start now.” •  “We should start with a price for carbon in, say, 2008…at $15 per ton increasing at the rate of interest.” – Quoted in Scientific American online, November 26, 2007. David Biello was the interviewer. 15

  16. 16. Anthoff, Tol, and Yohe say •  “We show that the social cost of carbon lies anywhere in between 0 and $120,000/tC. However, if we restrict these two parameters to match observed behavior, an expected social cost of carbon of $60/tC ($16/tCO2) results. If we correct this estimate for income differences across the world, the social cost of carbon rises to over $200/tC ($55/tCO2).” –Anthoff et al. 2008, Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon 16

  17. 17. Galiana and Green say… •  “Our technology-led policy also includes a variant on carbon pricing…a $5 charge levied on each tonne of CO2 emitted… [that] would be allowed to gradually rise, doubling, say, every 10 years.” – Lane et al. 2009. Copenhagen Consensus on Climate: Advice for Policy Makers. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center. <http://www.fixtheclimate.com> 17

  18. 18. Lomborg’s conclusions from Copenhagen Consensus: Wait and see, no (or tiny) carbon taxes, no other climate policies, only R&D on mitigation technologies and geoengineering. 18

  19. 19. Lomborg says… •  “Short-term carbon emission reductions through carbon taxes [even ones as low as $0.50/ton] are a ‘poor’ response to global warming [and] cutting carbon through cap- and-trade would be an even poorer solution.” – Lomborg’s introduction to Lane et al. 2009. Copenhagen Consensus on Climate: Advice for Policy Makers. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center. <http:// www.fixtheclimate.com> 19

  20. 20. He also says •  “[Instead of implementing] ambitious, early, and large carbon-cutting programs…it would be smarter to act cautiously by implementing a low carbon tax of about $0.5 per ton…and increase it gradually through the century .” –Lomborg, Bjorn. 2009. Beyond the Carbon Crusade. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center. August. <http:// www.fixtheclimate.com> 20

  21. 21. ? 21

  22. 22. In addition, neoclassical economics has its limits… 22

  23. 23. Neoclassical economic models biased towards •  underestimating damages –  Many impacts not convertible to dollars with precision or at all –  Potential nonlinearities and feedbacks not represented well or at all •  overestimating mitigation costs –  Using incomplete technology + policy portfolios –  Omitting learning and increasing returns to scale –  Ignoring options that save money and reduce C 23

  24. 24. Pascal’s wager for climate •  What if I’m wrong? –  At most a 1-2 year delay of achieving a certain global GDP level because of costs of action (but costs will almost certainly be much lower) –  Shift away from fossil fuels, which is good for other reasons (avoids local air pollution, coal waste, mining accidents, and oil dependence. Also allows us to compete better with China) •  What if Lomborg’s wrong? –  Catastrophic, irreversible, and unpredictable damages to the global life-support systems upon which we all depend 24

  25. 25. Conclusions •  The science about climate risks is clear: our current path is not sustainable •  Arguments for delay do not reflect current thinking in neoclassical economics or the realities of the climate system. •  We buy insurance against catastrophic risks all the time, and should do the same for climate by investing in a low carbon future •  We have many proven money saving and low-cost options, we just need the will to act –  And acting will substantially lower costs because of learning-by-doing, but we only learn if we DO. 25

  26. 26. Our responsibility: To create the future 26

  27. 27. Useful web sites •  Nice summary for lay people of recent issues in the climate debate: <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-0228- climate-science-questions-20100302,0,2670932.story> •  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: <http:// www.ipcc.ch/> •  Policy + science: <http://climateprogress.org> •  Climate science: <http://www.realclimate.org/> •  More on science: <http://www.skepticalscience.com/> •  McKinsey on climate: <http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ ccsi/> •  Copenhagen consensus site: <http:// www.copenhagenconsensus.com/> •  The Lomborg Errors site is very thorough: <http:// www.lomborg-errors.dk/> 27

  28. 28. Sources cited •  Anthoff, David, Richard S.J. Tol, and Gary W. Yohe. 2008. Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon. Dublin, Ireland: Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Working paper No. 252. September. <http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/20080904135651/WP252.pdf> •  Hayhoe, Katharine, Cameron Wake, Bruce Anderson, Xin-Zhong Liang, Edwin Maurer, Jinhong Zhu, James Bradbury, Art DeGaetano, Anne Marie Stoner, and Donald Wuebbles. 2008. "Regional climate change projections for the Northeast USA." Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change. vol. 13, no. 5-6. June. pp. 425-436. •  IEA. 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. Paris, France: International Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). November. <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/> •  Lane, Lee, J .Eric Bickel, Isabel Galiana, Chris Green, and Valentina Bosetti. 2009. Copenhagen Consensus on Climate: Advice for Policy Makers. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Consensus Center. <http://www.fixtheclimate.com> •  Meinshausen, Malte, Nicolai Meinshausen, William Hare, Sarah C. B. Raper, Katja Frieler, Reto Knutti, David J. Frame, and Myles R. Allen. 2009. "Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2 degrees C." Nature. vol. 458, April 30. pp. 1158-1162. <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v458/ n7242/full/nature08017.html> •  Nordhaus, William D. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. See especially the excellent introductory chapter for interested lay people. •  Sokolov, A.P., P.H. Stone, C.E. Forest, R. Prinn, M.C. Sarofim, M. Webster, S. Paltsev, C.A. Schlosser, D. Kicklighter, S. Dutkiewicz, J. Reilly, C. Wang, B. Felzer, J. Melillo, and H.D. Jacoby. 2009. Probabilistic Forecast for 21st Century Climate Based on Uncertainties in Emissions (without Policy) and Climate Parameters. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Climate Change. Report #169. January. Latest BAU forecast for the world. •  DOWNLOAD HANDOUT FOR FURTHER READING: http://files.me.com/jgkoomey/iibjd8 28

  29. 29. Backup slides 29

  30. 30. It is fashionable today to assume that any figures about the future are better than none. To produce figures about the unknown, the current method is to make a guess about something or other–called an “assumption”–and to derive an estimate from it by subtle calculation. The estimate is then presented as the result of scientific reasoning, something far superior to mere guesswork. This is a pernicious practice that can only lead to the most colossal planning errors, because it offers a bogus answer where, in fact, an entrepreneurial judgment is required. — E.F. SCHUMACHER 30

  31. 31. Nature op-ed on hacked emails "Nothing in the e-mails undermines the scientific case that global warming is real — or that human activities are almost certainly the cause. That case is supported by multiple, robust lines of evidence, including several that are completely independent of the climate reconstructions debated in the e-mails." 31

  32. 32. AP on hacked emails "LONDON — E-mails stolen from climate scientists show they stonewalled skeptics and discussed hiding data — but the messages don't support claims that the science of global warming was faked, according to an exhaustive review by The Associated Press…The AP studied all the e-mails for context, with five reporters reading and rereading them — about 1 million words in total…." hTp://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=9319400
 32

  33. 33. What do we know about climate? •  “Unequivocal” that the earth’s climate is warming •  More than 90% certainty that human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases are the cause (Findings
from
IPCC
2007
WGI,
AR4)
 33

  34. 34. Average global temperatures* and sea levels are up, snow cover is down *and
the
models
reproduce

 these
historical
temperature
 changes
well.
 34

  35. 35. Dramatic recent changes in CO2 and CH4 concentrations “We
know
humans
are
responsible
for
the
CO2
 spike
[since
pre‐industrial
/mes]
because
fossil
 CO2
lacks
carbon‐14,
and
the

drop
in
 atmospheric
C‐14
from
the
fossil‐CO2
addi/ons
 is
measurable.”
 –John
P.
Holdren,
Harvard
University
 Source
of
graphs:

IPCC
Working
Group
1
Summary
for
Policy
 Makers,
Fourth
Assessment
report,
2007.
 35

  36. 36. McKinsey cost curve 36

  37. 37. Significant emissions reductions possible in US at zero net cost Actual
 Base
case
 57%
of
2020
 savings
from
 electricity,
 28%
from
 transport
 Advanced
case
 Brown, Marilyn A., Mark D. Levine, Walter Short, and Jonathan G. Koomey. 2001. "Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future." Energy Policy (Also LBNL-48031). vol. 29, no. 14. November. pp. 1179-1196. Full report: hTp://www.ornl.gov/sci/eere/cef/
 37

  38. 38. 2 degrees C warming limit •  Keeps global T within humanity’s experience •  Implies cumulative GHG emissions “budget” •  Limit itself now widely accepted (e.g., G8 in 2009), but implications are not well known –  Global emissions must turn down in a decade, down 50% by 2050, more soon afterwards –  Waiting has a real cost –  We must act quickly on many fronts •  It’s Sputnik, not Apollo 38

  39. 39. 2 deg C and fossil fuel reserves Source:
Meinshausen
et
al.
2009
.
NB
this
graph
uses
Gt
CO2,
not
C
 39

  40. 40. Delaying makes no sense in the warming limit context •  When we act makes a difference •  Delaying action on climate –  eats up the budget –  makes required reductions more rapid, more difficult, and more costly later –  sacrifices learning and reduces possibilities for future action (learning by doing requires that we DO!) •  Remember, energy techs don’t ∆ fast and atmospheric residence time of C is ~100 yrs 40


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