ANCIENT GREECE  vii-The Second Military Revolution
PRINCIPAL TOPICSI. ThrasybulosII. EpaminondasIII. The Second Military Revolution, 362-336
ΘρασύβουλοςThrasybulos
Θρασύβουλος                                                          born c.440s                                     Thras...
411-after an oligarchic coup in Athens, the pro-democracy sailors at Samos electedhim navarch, making him a primary leader...
“Thrasybulus’ call for peace and union between the two camps was rejected bythe oligarchs, who expected Spartan aid. In Sp...
The Athenians came close to respecting the terms of the amnesty…. nonetheless,the decades of war followed by months of ter...
THE CRISIS OF THE POLIS AND THE AGE OF SHIFTING HEGEMONIES                                                                ...
“ Spartans were noble in death but insufferable in victory….a graceless diplomacyregularly led the Spartans to lose the pe...
In the revived democracy established in 403 BC, Thrasybulus became amajor and prestigious leader.... Thrasybulus seems to ...
In 394 BC The Battle of the Nemea River was fought between Sparta and her alliesthe Achaians, Eleians, Mantineians, and th...
Throughout his career, Thrasybulus defended democracy at Athens against itsopponents. He was one of the few prominent citi...
ΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣ                    ANABASISIncreasingly, the Greeks’ service as mercenaries was eagerlysought and just as willing...
LIGHT INFANTRYOne Athenian general made a significant contribution to the art of war.Iphicrates organized bodies of lightl...
LIGHT INFANTRY              Agrianian Peltast by Johnny                        Shumate                 The Agrianians were...
LIGHT INFANTRY              Agrianian Peltast by Johnny                        Shumate                 The Agrianians were...
In the case of Sparta, the [Peloponnesian War], althoughresulting in victory, brought about a peculiar predicament. Apeopl...
ἘπαµεινώνδαςEpaminondas
Ἐπαµεινώνδας   Epaminondas, an               idealized figure in                 the grounds ofEpaminondas       Stowe House
Boeotia, “the dancing ground of war”                      V.D. Hanson, The Soul of Battle, p. 30
The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his bes...
The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his bes...
King Kleombrotus led a Spartan forceof 11,000 into Southern Boeotia tofight a Theban force of 6,000commanded by Epaminonda...
Until now, tactical success had depended primarily onpreventing one opponent from overlapping another’s force, asituation ...
Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, after p. 19
Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on preventingone opponent from overlapping another’s force, a situation...
At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel linesopposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebansi...
At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel linesopposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebansi...
The battle plan worked to perfection. Epaminondas led the attackon the left, which crushed the opposing Spartan right. He ...
Epaminondas’ ability to seize the initiative and, at a critical point,to bring to bear on the battlefield a striking force...
The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his bes...
The final card of            Epaminondas was now            on the table; in the past            Helot insurrections had  ...
Throughout Greece there is evidence that homosexual relationships were acontributing factor to unit morale. In Sparta, for...
Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,generals, and writers once echoed off thes...
Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,generals, and writers once echoed off thes...
THE SECOND MILITARYREVOLUTION
THE SECOND   Niketerion (victory             medallion) bearing the MILITARY             effigy of king Philip II of      ...
this “friend of horses” was born son of                        King Amintas iii and Queen Euridice i                      ...
The royal army of Macedon was Philip’s, not [his son] Alexander [theGreat]’s. It had been formed and led for more than twe...
THE MACEDONIAN MILITARYMACHINEphalanx-mercenary, not free farmer hoplitai; hand-picked “tallest & strongest”   the spear-l...
Philip brought to Western warfare an enhanced notion of decisive war.True, the Macedonian’s face-to-face, stand-up fightin...
Philip and his son           knew only two           ways to acquire           gold: to dig it out           of the ground...
Philip’s men, too, were a completely different breed from the Greekhoplites of the city-state. In his lost comedy Philip, ...
Warriors who wore cords around their waists until they had killed a manin battle, who could not even sit at meat with thei...
Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.22
DIRECTION                                                        the Phalanx was made up of 6 the Taxis was made up of 6  ...
358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in                 Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the ...
358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in                                       Epirus) sealed an alliance with Ph...
Philip brought many Athenians to hiscapital to add luster to his court343/2-he secured Aristotle as a tutor forAlexander a...
when viewing a core area early 4th c.    map always added by 359             begin with the added by 336              key,...
when viewing aPhilip was the beneficiary of almost       core area early 4th c.    map alwaystwo centuries of patient stat...
A WARY EYE TO THENORTHTwo Athenian politicians, rivals, both famous for their oratory, castnervous glances toward the new ...
Demosthenes Practising Oratoryby Jean-Jules-Antoine Lecomte du Nouy              (1842–1923).    Demosthenes used to talk ...
A modern collage representingDemosthenes’ Third Philippic      the chairs are on the Πνύξ   the acropolis and Mount Υµηττό...
A View of the Speaker’s Platform (βεµα)             on the Πνύξ
“I am told that in those days [431-404] the Spartans and all our other enemieswould invade us for four or five months---du...
It is probably true that Philip excited rivalries between the Greek states,having as a goal the exploitation of opportunit...
“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation                     of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy, Phil...
“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation                          of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy,...
“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation                             of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiploma...
“bypassing Thermopylae in emulation                             of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiploma...
Since the well-chosen position of the allies prevented Philipfrom using his favorite strategy he had to provoke a gap in t...
...that fatal gap at last opened between the Greek centre andthe Theban brigades on their right. Superior discipline,ironi...
[The Sacred Band were]wiped out to a man atChaironeia (338); Philipwas struck by theappearance of the huddledmasses of the...
“the chains of Greece”
The Thebans...drew the conclusion [at Coronea] that they [like the Spartans] mustdrill also. When, at Leuctra, they came t...
With the emergence of the mercenary, and his near-relation the full-timeprofessional soldier, ancient armies completed the...
It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in theconscript levies of the Revolution, a milit...
It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in theconscript levies of the Revolution, a milit...
Greece 2ii 2nd  Military Revolution
Greece 2ii 2nd  Military Revolution
Greece 2ii 2nd  Military Revolution
Greece 2ii 2nd  Military Revolution
Greece 2ii 2nd  Military Revolution
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

Greece 2ii 2nd Military Revolution

956 views

Published on

This presentation reflects new material from the West Point Atlas of Ancient Warfare and the writings of Peter Green

Published in: Education
0 Comments
1 Like
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total views
956
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
5
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
24
Comments
0
Likes
1
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Greece 2ii 2nd Military Revolution

  1. 1. ANCIENT GREECE vii-The Second Military Revolution
  2. 2. PRINCIPAL TOPICSI. ThrasybulosII. EpaminondasIII. The Second Military Revolution, 362-336
  3. 3. ΘρασύβουλοςThrasybulos
  4. 4. Θρασύβουλος born c.440s Thrasybulos died 388 BCThrasybulus receiving an olive crown for his successful campaign against the Thirty Tyrants. From Andrea Alciatos Emblemata, 1531
  5. 5. 411-after an oligarchic coup in Athens, the pro-democracy sailors at Samos electedhim navarch, making him a primary leader of the successful democratic resistance411-410-commanded along with Alcibiades and others at several Athenian victories404-after Athens’ defeat he led the resistance to the Spartan-imposed oligarchicgovernment known as the Thirty Tyrantshe commanded a small force of democratic exiles which invaded Attica: first they defeated the Spartan garrison next, the forces of the oligarchy, killing the leading tyrant Critias, Plato’s uncle403-he restored the democracy and made a conciliatory peace, no bloody reprisals
  6. 6. “Thrasybulus’ call for peace and union between the two camps was rejected bythe oligarchs, who expected Spartan aid. In Sparta, however, the murderousarrogance of Lysander...was making many powerful men nervous, including thekings Agis and Pausanius. Marching into Attica, Pausanius took the lead andmasterminded...the reconciliation of the various Athenian parties…. Under hisaegis the Athenians agreed on the first recorded amnesty in history. Under itsterms, only the Thirty and their chief officers could be brought to justice forcrimes committed before 403; all others were compelled to renounce the manybitter grievances that had accumulated. In September Thrasybulus led his menunopposed to the Acropolis, where they sacrificed to Athena in gratitude for thesalvation of the city and their own safe return. The work of reestablishing thedemocracy then began. Pomeroy et al., p.352
  7. 7. The Athenians came close to respecting the terms of the amnesty…. nonetheless,the decades of war followed by months of terror under the Thirty had taken aheavy toll, and there was no lack of people eager to assign blame for Athens’problems. The colorful Socrates had annoyed jealous parents whose young sonshad lionized him….three Athenians...zeroed in on the eccentric old philosopherwho haunted the public spaces of Athens confuting the careless in argument.Socrates (470-399) had been quick to identify the drawbacks of democracy, andhe had also been the teacher of (at least) two men who in different ways hadharmed Athens: Alcibiades and Critias. The amnesty prevented his accusers fromcharging him with inciting his pupils with treason, so instead they brought...anaccusation [ 1] he did not believe in the gods of the state [2] he taught new gods;and [3] he corrupted the young. Pomeroy et al., pp.352-353
  8. 8. THE CRISIS OF THE POLIS AND THE AGE OF SHIFTING HEGEMONIES Pomeroy et al. chapter title“Years of futile warfare, accompanied by economic difficulties and attendant civil strife, ledmany people to question their relationship to the world around them. Already around themiddle of the fifth century Greek thinkers had begun to ask key questions about the humancommunity. What was the purpose of civic life? Why had people come together in communitiesin the first place? Were the laws of the polis in accord with nature [κατα φυσις] or in conflict[αντι] with it? Why were some people free and others slaves? How were Greeks different fromnon-Greeks? Should Greeks war with other Greeks and enslave them when victorious? To these questions others came to be added. Why should some have so much more thanothers? Did the autonomous city-state provide the best way of life? Did the exclusion of womenfrom decision making go without saying? Was warfare worth the sacrifices it entailed? Asmaller group debated larger questions---the nature of justice, of piety, of courage, of love. op. cit. p. 361
  9. 9. “ Spartans were noble in death but insufferable in victory….a graceless diplomacyregularly led the Spartans to lose the peace after winning the war…. “Jubilant after bringing Athens to its knees in 404, Sparta housed significantimperialist factions supporting the aggressive policies of Lysander and KingAgesilaus. In 395 Sparta’s alienated allies combined against it. The resulting[Corinthian] war ended in 387 [with Spartan victory], but continued high-handedbehavior on Sparta’s part caused existing resentments to fester. In 377 Agesilaus’provocative policies resulted both in the formation of a new Athenian navalconfederacy [the Second Athenian Confederacy] and in the alliance of Athens andThebes. By 371 Thebes was strong enough to defeat Sparta on the battlefield and theyears that followed saw Thebes cripple Sparta still further by the liberation ofMessenia. The Theban ascendancy died, however, when their charismatic leaderEpaminondas was killed in battle, and revolts during the 360s and 350s graduallyweakened the Athenian confederacy. The resulting vacuum would be filled byMacedon under the resolute leadership of Philip.” Pomeroy et al., pp.363-364
  10. 10. In the revived democracy established in 403 BC, Thrasybulus became amajor and prestigious leader.... Thrasybulus seems to have advocated amore radically democratic policy than the populace was willing to acceptat the time; he called for reinstating pay for political service, and soughtto extend citizenship to all the metics and foreigners who had foughtalongside him against the Thirty. He was initially cautious aboutoffending Sparta, but, when Persian support became available at thestart of the Corinthian War, he became an advocate of aggressive action,and about this time seems to have regained his preeminence in Athenianpolitics. He initiated the rebuilding of the long walls, which had beendemolished at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and commanded theAthenian contingents at Nemea and Coronea; these two defeats,however, damaged his political stature, and he was replaced at the headof the state by Conon, whose victory at Cnidus had ended Spartasdreams of naval empire. Wikipedia
  11. 11. In 394 BC The Battle of the Nemea River was fought between Sparta and her alliesthe Achaians, Eleians, Mantineians, and the Tegeates against a coalition of Boetians,Euboeans, Athenians, Corinthians, and Argives. This was to be the last clear-cutvictory that Sparta enjoyed. It was also the largest hoplite battle the Greeks everfought. The tactics were similar to all otherGreek hoplite battles, except that whenthe armies were arrayed, with theSpartans having the customary honor ofbeing on the right, the army drifted rightas it advanced. This was not good for theSpartan allies, as it exposed the soldiersto a flanking attack, but it gave theSpartans the opportunity to use theirsuperior coordination and discipline toroll up the flank of the Athenians, whowere stationed opposite. The result of thebattle was a victory for Sparta, even Hercules slaying the Nemean lion.though her allies on the left suffered Detail of a Roman mosaic from Llíria (Spain).significant losses. This willingness to accept losses on the left flank for flanking position on the right wasa dramatic change from typical conservative hoplite military tactics.
  12. 12. Throughout his career, Thrasybulus defended democracy at Athens against itsopponents. He was one of the few prominent citizens whom the Samians trustedto defend their democracy, and whom the fleet selected to lead it through thetroubled time of conflict with the 400. Later, in his opposition to the ThirtyTyrants, Thrasybulus risked his life when few others would, and his actions wereresponsible for the quick restoration of democracy. In the words of CorneliusNepos, This most noble action, then, is entirely Thrasybuluss; for when the Thirty Tyrants, appointed by the Lacedaemonians, kept Athens oppressed in a state of slavery, and had partly banished from their country, and partly put to death, a great number of the citizens whom fortune had spared in the war, and had divided their confiscated property among themselves, he was not only the first, but the only man at the commencement, to declare war against them.Modern historian John Fine points to the clemency shown by Thrasybulus andother democrats in the wake of their victory over the Thirty as a key contributiontowards reestablishing stable government in Athens. While many city-statesthroughout the Greek world broke down into vicious cycles of civil war andreprisal, Athens remained united and democratic, without interruption, untilnear the end of the third century, and democracy, albeit interrupted severaltimes by conquest or revolution, continued there until Roman times, severalcenturies later. Wikipedia
  13. 13. ΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣ ANABASISIncreasingly, the Greeks’ service as mercenaries was eagerlysought and just as willingly offered. During this period, forexample, one of the great epics of military history was enacted by10,000 Greek mercenaries who were in the employ of a Persiansatrap, Cyrus. In a battle for control of the throne of Persia, Cyruswas killed and his Asiatic troops panicked and fled. The 10,000Greeks stood alone, undefeated, but over 1,500 miles fromfriendly territory. Their march out (ἀνάβασις) under theleadership of Xenophon [a noble student of Socrates] was aremarkable feat, and served as a prologue to the later conquests ofAlexander. Thomas E. Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p. 15
  14. 14. LIGHT INFANTRYOne Athenian general made a significant contribution to the art of war.Iphicrates organized bodies of lightly armed infantry, calling them peltasts fromtheir pelta or small round shields. Actually they were a lighter version of thehoplites---smaller shield, lighter spear, less armor, but greater freedom ofmovement. Through drill, they perfected their discipline, preserving theirmobility and firepower with the javelin while maintaining cohesion anddefensive power, so that they no longer feared to encounter hoplites. Thisdevelopment was only possible under a mercenary system with professionalsoldiers. The old citizen soldier could fight in a phalanx, but the new peltastrequired long hours of detailed training and competent leadership. In essence,the peltast served as a tactical link between the hoplite and the irregular forces. Ibid.
  15. 15. LIGHT INFANTRY Agrianian Peltast by Johnny Shumate The Agrianians were especially prized by Alexander the Great. Peter Green calls them his Gurkhas.
  16. 16. LIGHT INFANTRY Agrianian Peltast by Johnny Shumate The Agrianians were especially prized by Alexander the Great. Peter Green calls them his Gurkhas.
  17. 17. In the case of Sparta, the [Peloponnesian War], althoughresulting in victory, brought about a peculiar predicament. Apeople trained exclusively for war with their neighbors nowfound themselves compelled to exercise their lead innonmilitary relations. The role was one for which theSpartans’ peculiar institutions had not only left themunprepared, but also positively unfitted. In a way, therefore,her victory was Sparta’s undoing, although she dominatedevents for another 30 years. The wars also had a direct andpersonal impact on the Spartan warrior, the key to the state’ssuccess. The years of fighting reduced the body of superblytrained hoplites from about 5,000 (in 479 BC) to about 2,000(in 371 BC). By then, another city-state was contesting thesupremacy of Sparta. Ibid.
  18. 18. ἘπαµεινώνδαςEpaminondas
  19. 19. Ἐπαµεινώνδας Epaminondas, an idealized figure in the grounds ofEpaminondas Stowe House
  20. 20. Boeotia, “the dancing ground of war” V.D. Hanson, The Soul of Battle, p. 30
  21. 21. The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensurea slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his ownallies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neitherweaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army andencountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and werenow eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear thegreatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until thetwilight of the hoplite age. Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159
  22. 22. The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensurea slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his ownallies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neitherweaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army andencountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and werenow eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear thegreatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until thetwilight of the hoplite age. Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159
  23. 23. King Kleombrotus led a Spartan forceof 11,000 into Southern Boeotia tofight a Theban force of 6,000commanded by Epaminondasthe latter was “one of the very rarestof generals, a great leader who wasalso an innovator“he realized that ‘the Spartans wouldnever change their traditional shocktactics, the success of which dependedon an advance in perfect order, allspears...striking the enemy’s frontsimultaneously’--JFC Fuller Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series,accordingly, he devised a tactic that text, p. 15; map, after p. 19would...throw them into disorder
  24. 24. Until now, tactical success had depended primarily onpreventing one opponent from overlapping another’s force, asituation that would endanger the flanks and rear of aphalanx. Normally, when two forces advanced towardanother in phalangial formation, there was a tendency foreach force to drift to its right. Ibid.
  25. 25. Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, after p. 19
  26. 26. Until now, tactical success had depended primarily on preventingone opponent from overlapping another’s force, a situation thatwould endanger the flanks and rear of a phalanx. Normally, whentwo forces advanced toward another in phalangial formation,there was a tendency for each force to drift to its right.Accordingly, most commanders put their best men on their right,which later be came known as the position of honor. In manycases, battles resulted in each force’s right defeating its opponent’sleft; victory or defeat then depended upon which force couldrecover soon enough to bring its right around to the flank or therear of the opponent’s right. Naturally, the force that was bettertrained and drilled and could accomplish this more rapidly thanthe other. because in all of Greece no force was better drilled thanthe Spartan army, it retained a distinct advantage in thetraditional battle. Ibid.
  27. 27. At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel linesopposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebansinto an oblique order. Ibid.
  28. 28. At Leuctra, instead of drawing up his troops in parallel linesopposite the Spartan forces, Epaminondas formed the Thebansinto an oblique order. The idea was to concentrate heavily on theleft and push this flank ahead so as to defeat the enemy’sformidable right, while at the same time the reduced-strengthTheban center and right advanced more slowly and in echelon.The threat of the Theban center and right served to prevent theSpartans from reinforcing their own right. Simply stated, theobject was to meet shock with supershock. Epaminondas put hisbest troops on the left, not the right, and arranged them in aformation at least 50 ranks deep. He took the risk that hisweakened center and right would be able to pin...the Spartanforces to their front, until the massed formation on the left couldbe driven home. This novel formation, however, had a weaknesson the flanks.... To protect [there], Epaminondas stationed anelite group of Theban warriors (The Sacred Band) on the leftflank, while on the right flank, ahead of his withdrawn center, heplaced the Theban cavalry. Ibid.
  29. 29. The battle plan worked to perfection. Epaminondas led the attackon the left, which crushed the opposing Spartan right. He thenwheeled against the flank of the remaining Spartan troops at themoment his center and right threatened to engage them in front.The result was an overwhelming Theban victory. Ibid.
  30. 30. Epaminondas’ ability to seize the initiative and, at a critical point,to bring to bear on the battlefield a striking force superior to thedefender’s was the crucial factor in his success. That he was ableto do this in spite of total numerical inferiority is a tribute to hisreasoning and tactical acumen….The oblique order ofEpaminondas fixed the entire enemy line in position and enabledhim to drive home his main thrust before the weakness in his owncenter and right had been detected by the Spartans. No finerillustration of the principles of Mass and Economy of Force* is tobe found in ancient military history. op. cit., p. 16 *These two principles of war are defined as follows: Mass: Concentrate superior combat power at the critical time and place. Economy of Force: Emphasize the principle effort and restrict the strength of secondary efforts
  31. 31. The ... tactical breakthrough of the general Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra in371 was not merely that he put his best on the left to a depth of 50 shields to ensurea slugfest with the Spartan elite right, but that by doing so he ensured to his ownallies---and Sparta’s confederates across the battlefield as well---that neitherweaker side would have to face their betters and play the role of sacrificial lambs.The next winter Epaminondas invaded Laconia with a unified army andencountered Peloponnesian states that appreciated his past magnanimity and werenow eager to join him. How odd that the basic idea that a leader should bear thegreatest risk in battle by putting his men on the left of the phalanx waited until thetwilight of the hoplite age. Hanson, A War Like No Other, p.159
  32. 32. The final card of Epaminondas was now on the table; in the past Helot insurrections had failed not out of a shortage of manpower…369 but simply because there was no initial window of protection for the revolutions to consolidate their toehold. Now his Thebans would provide that critical breathing space... 370 op. cit., p. 98
  33. 33. Throughout Greece there is evidence that homosexual relationships were acontributing factor to unit morale. In Sparta, for example, the separation of thesexes at an early age, together with attitudes peculiar to other Greeks on the role ofwomen, resulted in overtly homosexual relationships centering on life in thebarracks. No doubt such strong ties extended to the battlefield and must helpexplain Spartan heroism, most notably in defeats from Thermopylai (480) toLeuktra (371), where men chose annihilation rather than the shame of flight. Yet themost extreme example was not among the Dorians but rather in Thebes. There theSacred Band, composed of 150 homosexual couples (something unknown even atSparta), for some fifty years fought heroically in the city’s most desperate battlesand were wiped out to a man at Chaironeia (338); Philip was struck by theappearance of the huddled masses of their paired corpses. (Plut. Pel. 18-19; Mor.761 a-d; Xen. Symp. 8.32) Hanson, Western Way of War, pp.124-125
  34. 34. Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,generals, and writers once echoed off these hills before their speakers fell in thealluvial mud of the battlefield. Well off to the distance there is the small hillock ofSkopê (“Lookout Hill), where the greatest military man Greece ever produced, theliberator Epaminondas died in 362---his retainers pulling out a spear from his gutsas he gazed down at his retreating Theban army, which had broken on the news thatits beloved general had been carried off and was bleeding to death on the hill abovethem. Hanson, A War Like No Other, pp.154-155
  35. 35. Mantinea is, in fact, full of ghosts. The voices of Greece’s greatest statesmen,generals, and writers once echoed off these hills before their speakers fell in thealluvial mud of the battlefield. Well off to the distance there is the small hillock ofSkopê (“Lookout Hill), where the greatest military man Greece ever produced, theliberator Epaminondas died in 362---his retainers pulling out a spear from his gutsas he gazed down at his retreating Theban army, which had broken on the news thatits beloved general had been carried off and was bleeding to death on the hill abovethem. Hanson, A War Like No Other, pp.154-155
  36. 36. THE SECOND MILITARYREVOLUTION
  37. 37. THE SECOND Niketerion (victory medallion) bearing the MILITARY effigy of king Philip II of Macedon, 3rd century AD, probably minted during the reign of EmperorREVOLUTION Alexander Severus.
  38. 38. this “friend of horses” was born son of King Amintas iii and Queen Euridice i 368-365--a hostage in Thebes, at the home of Epaminondas, became the eromenos of Pelopidas 359-the deaths of his elder brothers, King Alexander ii and Perdiccas iii, allowed him to take the throne appointed regent for his infant nephew Amyntas iv, he brushed him aside andΦίλιππος Β ὁ Μακεδών began his reignPhilip II of Macedōn 382-359-336
  39. 39. The royal army of Macedon was Philip’s, not [his son] Alexander [theGreat]’s. It had been formed and led for more than twenty years byPhilip, while Alexander was at its head for little more than half thatperiod. It was King Philip who crafted a grand new army; Philip whosupplied it, led it, and organized it differently from anything in pastGreek practice---in order to kill other Greeks. As it turned out, Alexanderfound his inheritance even more useful for killing Persians. Hanson, Carnage and Culture; Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, p. 74
  40. 40. THE MACEDONIAN MILITARYMACHINEphalanx-mercenary, not free farmer hoplitai; hand-picked “tallest & strongest” the spear-lengthened from 8 to 16-18 feet, a sarissa, a true pike; little or no body armor. “They could always rely on making their first strike before the enemy got to grips…”-Green the first four or five rows, not three were thrusting--40% more spearheads in the killing zone--”a storm of spears”-PolybiusCompanion Cavalry (hetairoi)-elite body of aristocratic horsemen, heavily armoredon strong mounts. “...adept at spiking their opponents through the face”-Green“shield bearers” (hypaspists)-another infantry with more armor and shorterspears. Green uses the British term, “Guards regiment”professional corps of light infantry, slingers, archers and javelineers [peltasts] roundedout the composite army group, supplying preliminary bombardment and reserve support Op. cit., pp. 74-75
  41. 41. Philip brought to Western warfare an enhanced notion of decisive war.True, the Macedonian’s face-to-face, stand-up fighting was reminiscentof the shock assaults of the Greek phalanxes of the past. The runningcollisions of massed infantry, the spear tip to the face of the enemy, werestill the preferred creed of any Macedonian phalangite. But no longerwere Macedonians killing merely over territorial borders. Battle wasdesigned predominantly as an instrument of ambitious state policy.Philip’s destructive mechanism for conquest and annexation was aradical source of social unrest and cultural upheaval, not a conservativeGreek institution to preserve the existing agrarian community….thecenterpiece of a new total war of brutal annihilation which the world hadnot yet seen. 0p.cit., p. 77
  42. 42. Philip and his son knew only two ways to acquire gold: to dig it out of the ground or to steal it from someone weaker than themselves-- Greenφιλιππου
  43. 43. Philip’s men, too, were a completely different breed from the Greekhoplites of the city-state. In his lost comedy Philip, the playwrightMnesimachus (ca. 350 BC.) makes his characteristic Macedonianphalangites brag: Do you know against what type of men you’ll have to fight? We who dine on sharpened swords, and drink down blazing torches as our wine. Then for dessert they bring us broken Cretan darts and splintered pike shafts. Our pillows are shields and breastplates… (Mnesimachus frg. 7 [cf. Athenaeus 10.421b] 0p.cit., p. 77
  44. 44. Warriors who wore cords around their waists until they had killed a manin battle, who could not even sit at meat with their fellows until they hadspeared a wild boar single-handed, who drank from cattle horns likeVikings---such men were not the stuff of which a cultural renaissance ismade. Most Macedonian nobles preferred the more manly pleasures ofhunting, carousing, and casual fornication. Sodomy---with young boysor, at a pinch, with each other---they also much enjoyed; but they had nointention of letting it be contaminated with decadent Platonic notions ofspiritual uplift. The simultaneous presence in Alexander’s headquartersof tough Macedonian officers and Greek civilian intellectuals was toproduce untold tension and hostility…. Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, p. 11
  45. 45. Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.22
  46. 46. DIRECTION the Phalanx was made up of 6 the Taxis was made up of 6 Taxeis, infantry battalions, 1,536Syntagmai, 256 soldiers each soldiers each Griess, ed., West Point Military History Series, p.23
  47. 47. 358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son Alexander 356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took that name the night before she became pregnant with Alexander she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a great fire was kindled--Plutarch Olympias Ὀλυμπιάςca. 375–316 BC her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles, mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping cult all would influence her son, Alexander
  48. 48. 358-Arymbas, the new king of Molossia (a tribe in Epirus) sealed an alliance with Philip, also new to the throne of Macedonia, with his sister Myrtale she was Philip’s fourth wife, mother to his first son Alexander 356-Philip’s race horse won at Olympia, so she took that name the night before she became pregnant with Alexander she dreamed a thunderbolt entered her (Zeus) and a great fire was kindled--Plutarch Olympias Ὀλυμπιάς ca. 375–316 BC her fierce personality, claim of descent from Achilles, mysticism, devotion to Dionysus’ snake-worshiping cult all would influence her son, AlexanderZeus seduces Olympias. Fresco by Giulio Romano between 1526 and 1534, in Palazzo del Te, Mantua, Italy.
  49. 49. Philip brought many Athenians to hiscapital to add luster to his court343/2-he secured Aristotle as a tutor forAlexander and his companionsthis formative relationship deeplyinspired Alexander. Intellectually curious,he would bring Greek scholars on hiscampaignshe would send back specimens of floraand fauna to his tutor from as far away asIndia323-this link continued until their deathsin the same year
  50. 50. when viewing a core area early 4th c. map always added by 359 begin with the added by 336 key, scale & added after 336 orientationCorinthian League 337other Greek statesPersian empire
  51. 51. when viewing aPhilip was the beneficiary of almost core area early 4th c. map alwaystwo centuries of patient state building added by 359 begin with the added by 336 key, scale & added after 336 orientation Corinthian League 337fifth century collaboration with Persia other Greek statesshielded Macedon from its neighbors Persian empiregrain and timber financed Hellenizing359-Philip ii faced a severe crisis,threats from Greeks and non-Greeksbut his new army and shrewdleadership led to expansion, firstnorthward, over “barbarians”then southward, into Thessaly,famous for its horses (and cavalry)
  52. 52. A WARY EYE TO THENORTHTwo Athenian politicians, rivals, both famous for their oratory, castnervous glances toward the new Macedonian army. Philip first expandedhis state to the east, conquering Chalcidice and Thrace; then southwardtowards the Greek heartland.Isocrates tried to distract him, urged Philip to “free the Greeks” of AsiaMinor, most of whom were once again vassals of a renewed PersianEmpire. Demosthenes was the more implacable enemy. He warned hisfellow Athenians in a famous series of attacks, the Philippics. They haveadded a word to our vocabulary for a hard-hitting political tirade.
  53. 53. Demosthenes Practising Oratoryby Jean-Jules-Antoine Lecomte du Nouy (1842–1923). Demosthenes used to talk with pebbles in his mouth and recited verses while running. T strengthen his voice, he o spoke on the seashore over the roar of the waves.
  54. 54. A modern collage representingDemosthenes’ Third Philippic the chairs are on the Πνύξ the acropolis and Mount Υµηττός form the backdrop
  55. 55. A View of the Speaker’s Platform (βεµα) on the Πνύξ
  56. 56. “I am told that in those days [431-404] the Spartans and all our other enemieswould invade us for four or five months---during, that is, the actual summer---and would damage Attica with infantry and citizen troops, and then return homeagain. And so old fashioned were the men of that day---nay rather, such truecitizens…but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. But now, as I amsure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no issue isdecided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it is not because heleads a column of heavy infantry that Philip can march wherever he chooses, butbecause he has attached to himself a force of light infantry, cavalry, archers,mercenaries, and similar troops. And whenever, with such advantages, he fallsupon a State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another noone goes out in defense of its territory, he brings up his engines and besiegesthem. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are alike to him---that there isno close season during which he suspends operations. Demosthenes, Third Philippic, quoted in Kagan, ed., Problems in Ancient History, p. 429
  57. 57. It is probably true that Philip excited rivalries between the Greek states,having as a goal the exploitation of opportunities for Macedonianpenetration of the south. It is also probably true that… Demosthenes, havingearlier decided that Philip was a grave threat… trifled with the facts whilemarshaling Athenian resistance to Macedonia, and gave less than duecredence to Philip’s several conciliatory overtures to Athens. At anyrate,...relations between Athens and Macedonia grew increasingly strained,as Philip consolidated his position in Thrace and Thessaly, and, on oneoccasion, penetrated as far southward as Thermopylae. This strainedrelationship reached the point of open break in 340 B.C., when Philipunsuccessfully laid siege to...Byzantium, and coincidentally seized most ofthe Athenian grain fleet. In response, Athens declared war. Griess, ed., pp.25-26
  58. 58. “bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy, Philipinvaded in thesummer of 338 BC
  59. 59. “bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy, Philipinvaded in thesummer of 338 BCNext, he advanced toElatea and captured it
  60. 60. “bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy, Philipinvaded in thesummer of 338 BCNext, he advanced toElatea and captured it Diversionary attackhe sends part of hisforces back aroundMt. Parnassos
  61. 61. “bypassing Thermopylae in emulation of an earlier Persian army”--Griesshaving exhausteddiplomacy, Philipinvaded in thesummer of 338 BCNext, he advanced toElatea and captured it Diversionary attackhe sends part of hisforces back aroundMt. ParnassosHis main force nowattacks the Thebansand Athenians atChaeronea (Χαιρώνεια)
  62. 62. Since the well-chosen position of the allies prevented Philipfrom using his favorite strategy he had to provoke a gap in theirposition. This he accomplished by withdrawing his right. As theAthenians advanced, the gap opened and 18-year-oldAlexander, riding at the head of the Companions, began hischarge to glory.
  63. 63. ...that fatal gap at last opened between the Greek centre andthe Theban brigades on their right. Superior discipline,ironically, had sealed the fate of the Sacred Band. They heldtheir formation; the troops at the centre did not. Into the gapthus opened, at the head of Macedonia’s finest cavalry division,thundered the young crown prince...while a second mountedbrigade attacked the Sacred Band from the flank. Very soon theThebans were completely surrounded. Green, pp. 75-76
  64. 64. [The Sacred Band were]wiped out to a man atChaironeia (338); Philipwas struck by theappearance of the huddledmasses of their pairedcorpses. Hanson, vide supra
  65. 65. “the chains of Greece”
  66. 66. The Thebans...drew the conclusion [at Coronea] that they [like the Spartans] mustdrill also. When, at Leuctra, they came to confront the Spartans again, their drilledphalanx overmassed the Spartan’s right and won the day. It was thus that the principles of drill and manoeuvre infiltrated the Greek worldat large. But there was another infiltrator: hierarchy…. Once the practice of drill and manoeuvre took root outside the egalitarian armyof Sparta, officer rank acquired a different status….The mercenary had been afamiliar figure in the Greek military world from early times and in Alexander’s daywas...a mainstay of both his own and of the Persian army. By definition themercenary was a man under authority….In the mercenary, a master of drill andmanoeuvre (Alexander always rated them highest among his opponents), and atthe same time an instrument of purely military hierarchy, we encounter theseparation of citizenship from warriordom in its most extreme form. John Keegan, The Mask of Command, pp. 124-125
  67. 67. With the emergence of the mercenary, and his near-relation the full-timeprofessional soldier, ancient armies completed the transformation both of theirnature and of their relationship with the state. They also, as it happened,rehearsed and anticipated identical transformations to those that the armies ofWestern Europe would undergo when they emerged from warriordom at the endof the Middle Ages, passing for the second time through the heroic stage, whichresurrected itself after imperial rule by the Romans. And Europe’s early modernarmies were to display exactly that mixture of soldier-types so characteristic ofthose of the Mediterranean world before Roman power beat all into the sameshape on its legionary anvil. Mercenaries and professionals, officered by warrioraristocrats, formed the backbone of French and Habsburg armies from thesixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Town militias, equivalents of the city-statearmies of Greece, succeeded in surviving for much of the same period. op. cit., pp. 125-126
  68. 68. It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in theconscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged andthen overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the veryfew ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on theirown terms and defeat them in battle. op. cit., p. 126
  69. 69. It was not until the 1790s that these mutiform bodies were to encounter, in theconscript levies of the Revolution, a military model which first challenged andthen overcame their dominance. Wellington was to prove himself one of the veryfew ancien régime officers with the talent to meet Revolutionary armies on theirown terms and defeat them in battle. op. cit., p. 126 But, that’s a story that’s already been told...

×