Leveraging Human Factors for Effective Security Training, for ISSA 2013 CISO Forum, in Pittsburgh July 2013

1. ©2009CarnegieMellonUniversity:1 Leveraging Human Factors for Effective Security Training ISSA CISO Forum 2013 Jason Hong Associate Professor Carnegie Mellon University CTO and Co-Founder Wombat Security Technologies

5. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:5 Human Factors Issues in Cybersecurity • Studying human factors issues in cybersecurity for 9+ years – Why do people fall for phishing scams? – How can we train people in a manner that is fun, effective, and measurable? – How can we build better user interfaces and security warnings?

7. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:7 Today’s Talk • Discuss some of our research findings – Better user interfaces for avoiding attacks – Teaching people effectively • A model for thinking about cybersecurity awareness and education • Three cross-cutting strategies for effective cybersecurity training

8. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:8 • Every browser now has basic anti-phishing detection built in • Are these user interfaces effective? • Our 2008 study on warnings • And what does it mean for training?

12. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:12 Tested These Four Interfaces • Shopping study – IE Passive Warning – IE Active Block – FireFox Active Block – Control (no warnings or blocks) • Overall results – Passive warning completely ineffective – About half of people still fell for IE warning – No one fell for FireFox warning S. Egelman, L. Cranor, and J. Hong. You've Been Warned: An Empirical Study of the Effectiveness of Web Browser Phishing Warnings. CHI 2008.

14. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:14 Screenshots • MSIE 7 Active Block • Half still fell for phish despite the warning (?) • Habituation (similar warnings) • Two pathological cases • Most saw the warning, but many did not believe it • “Since it gave me the option of still proceeding to the website, I figured it couldn’t be that bad”

15. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:15 Two Takeaways • Better interfaces can dramatically reduce security problems • Model for warnings also relevant for cybersecurity in general – See the warning? – Understand it? – Believe it? – Motivated? – Can and will act?

17. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:17 Cybersecurity Training Model Example: Passwords Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act? Don’t reuse passwords Common security risk How to change Secure and memorable Stories of breaches Require changes

18. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:18 Cybersecurity Training Model Example: Smartphone Security Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act? Have a PIN on device (about 50% don’t) How to do it on device Avoiding bad PINs At end of training Start with upper mgt

19. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:19 Cybersecurity Training Model Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act? • Most training starts with awareness • Unfortunately, most training also stops with awareness

21. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:21 Cybersecurity Training Model • Effective training needs to address all these steps • Strategy #1 – Foster better mental models Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act?

24. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:24 Mental Models Impact Security • Ex. visibility in Facebook – Suppose you have a private Facebook album, but tag someone. Can that person see it or not? • Ex. app stores – All apps are vetted by Google, so they are all safe to download. Correct?

27. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:27 Incomplete Mental Models Can Still Be Useful • Rick Wash’s work on folk models – Hackers are technical geeks that do it for fun – Hackers seek personal info – Hackers only target big fish – Hackers only look for big databases of info – People took different precautions • Incomplete models may still be an improvement over current state – Degrees of better and worse

28. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:28 Cybersecurity Training • Cybersecurity education should foster better mental models – Awareness – Who and why? – Fixing common misconceptions – Actionable items Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act?

29. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:29 Case Study: Phishing Attacks • Interviewed 40 people as part of an “email study” (Downs et al, SOUPS 2006) • Only 55% of participants said they had ever noticed an unexpected or strange- looking URL – Most did not consider them to be suspicious

30. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:30 Example: Phishing Attacks • 55% of participants reported being cautious when email asks for sensitive financial info – But very few reported being suspicious of email asking for passwords • Knowledge of financial phish reduced likelihood of falling for these scams – But did not transfer to other scams, such as an amazon.com password phish

31. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:31 • Strategy #2: Tailor delivery of training for your audience – We’re all busy – A lot of training is boring (wall of text) – Little chance to test what you just learned Cybersecurity Training Teachable Moments Micro-Games

32. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:32 PhishGuru Simulated Phishing • Create teachable moments thru simulated phishing emails • If recipient falls for it, show intervention that teaches what cues to look for – Useful for people who don’t know what they don’t know (low awareness)

36. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:36 Evaluation of PhishGuru • Is simulated phishing effective? – We’ve done 4 peer-reviewed studies showing embedded training works well – About 50% decrease in falling for phish after one training P. Kumaraguru et al. Protecting People from Phishing: The Design and Evaluation of an Embedded Training Email System. CHI 2007. P. Kumaraguru et al. School of Phish: A Real-Word Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Training. SOUPS 2009.

37. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:37 Results of One Study • Tested 500+ people in one month – 1 simulated phish at beginning of month, testing done at end of month • ~50% reduction in falling for phish – 68 out of 85 surveyed recommend continuing doing this sort of training in the future “I really liked the idea of sending [org] fake phishing emails and then saying to them, essentially, HEY! You could've just gotten scammed! You should be more careful – here's how...”

38. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:38 • Strategy #2: Tailor delivery of training for audience – Create “teachable moments” – Micro-games for training – Just sending training via email (ineffective) – Attending all day classes (boring, can’t test skills) – Watching videos (can’t test skills) Cybersecurity Training

39. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:39 Strategy #3: Use Concepts from Learning Science • Area of research examining learning, retention, and transfer of skills • Example principles – Learning by doing – Immediate feedback – Conceptual-procedural – Reflection – … many others

40. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:40 What About Motivation? Aware of the security issue? Knowledge of what actions to take? Motivated to act? • Training also needs to address motivation • Open question as to best approaches for cybersecurity

41. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:41 What Motivates People? • Extrinsic factors (outside factors) – Pay – Privilege, Reputation – Certificates, trophies – Punishment • Can’t just slap it on, has to be appropriate and thought through

43. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:43 What Motivates People? • Intrinsic value of task – Fun – Curiosity – Challenge, mastery • Same as before, can’t just slap it on • Cybersecurity and intrinsic motivation may be hard to reconcile • Intrinsic and extrinsic may conflict

44. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:44 What Motivates People? • Social factors – Reciprocity (you help me, I help you) – Altruism – Norms – Social proof – Identification with group • Large untapped potential, but open question as to how to best leverage

48. ©2013CarnegieMellonUniversity:48 Summary • Better user interfaces • Cybersecurity training model – Better mental models – Tailor delivery – Learning science • Lots of opportunities for motivating people, but still open question

Leveraging Human Factors for Effective Security Training, for ISSA 2013 CISO Forum, in Pittsburgh July 2013

Leveraging Human Factors for Effective Security Training, for ISSA 2013 CISO Forum, in Pittsburgh July 2013

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