Negotiating strategically

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Negotiating strategically

  1. 1. •-mvAinilemyolManagemerHtXlCVTIVl. 1989. Vol III. No. I.pp J7-M Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically Grant T. Savage John D. Blair Ritch i. Sorenson Texas Tech UniversityW hen David Peterson, director of services for Dicker- son Machinery, arrives at his office, he notes fourj|)poinlmcnts on his schedule. With his lengthy experience Choosing Negotiation Strategies in fiegoliating impoilant contracts for this large-equipment Petersons appointments are not unicjue. Researchers repair service, be does not take long to identify the agenda .md scholars have examined similar situations. What strategic lor each appointment. advice does tbe negotiation literature offer tor handling A sieering c luich disk salesman from Roadworks will these four situations?arrive al 8:30 a.m. Peterson has relied for years on disks One of the best developed approat hcs is ,i.,<inK iho-supplied by Catcrpilku and knows those disks can provide ory. which focuses on maximizing substantive outcomc^s in ihc 8.000 hours of service Dickerson guarantees. Price is an negotiations, Peterson would probably do well by foe using issue in Peterson s selection of a supplier, but more impor- on only tbe best possible outcome for Dickorson Machinery lant is a guarantee on the life span of the part. in his meetings with the salesman and the employee: He A mcrting is sc hedulod at 9:30 with a met h.inif who alrodcly has a good contract fora steering wheok lute h. bul if hjs swapped a new (ompany battery tor o used baitery from thesdlesTTian can cjffei a better deal. Peterson will taktit; and hib own truck. This "trade" is. of course, against company in the case of the employee. Peterson will bear him out bul[)()licy. and the employee has been reprimanded and lold hi-, foresees no need to deviate from company polic y. iHxl paycheck will ho clocked. However, the mechanic In contrast, an exclusive focus on maximii^ing thewants to disc uss the matter. (ofiipanys substantive outcomes would probably not work A representative tor Taf c o. a large road-building con- in the other two situations: Tarco m.iy continue being serv- iidctor. is scheduled for 10:00 a,m, Peterson has been inter- iced elsewhere unless enticed to try Dickerson: and duringested in this service contract for a couple of years. He the union negotiations, strategies to maximize outcomes for believes that if he can secure a short-term service contract manageinent only could force a strike.with T.irco, Diekcrsons high-f|ualitv mec hanica! service and Another well-developed strategic approiic h is win-guarantees will result in a long-term service relationship witb win problem solving, li is designed to maximize outcomes ihe contractor. The night before, Peterson had dinner with for both parties and maintain positive relationships. This l.itcos repttsentative. and this morning he will provide a approach ccjuld work in the union negotiation, but the lout ot service facilities anci discuss the short-term contract outcome would probably be a compromise, ncii .l true win-with him. win solution. A meeting with fiiiiiia^emcnt representatives for Win-win negotiation probably is not the best strategy union negotiations is scheduled for 1.00 p.m. That meeting in the other three situations. Either Roadworks salesmanwjll probtibiy lost .i couple ol hours. Peterson is concerned meets the guarantee and beats current prices, or he does because the cc)m|),iny has losi money on the shop undor- not: trying to fiticJ a win-win solution woulcJ probably be aHoingcontr<3ct talks.,incJ now the union is demanding higher waste of time. Similarly, because the meeting with thewages and threatening to strike. The t ompany c annot afford employee will occur after company rules have been applied,.1 (jroiongcd strike, but it also c annot dttorcf to increase poyat a win-win solution is probably not in the company s bestI iirrent scTvice firoclut lion r.ites. Negotiating .i contract will interest. Lastly, an attempt to maximize the companys sub-tu)i be easy. stantive outcomes in a short-term service contract with Tarco {ould hinder long-term contract prospects. 37
  2. 2. February, 79S9 Any one approach to negotiation clearly will not Each interaaion with another negotiator constituteswork in all situations. Executives need a framework for an episode that draws from current and affects future rela-determining what strategies are best in different situations. tionships. Intertwined with pure concerns about relation-We believe the best strategy depends on desired outcomes. ships are concerns about substantive outcomes. Many timesIn this article, we characterize the two major outcomes at negotiators are motivated to establish or maintain positiveissue in the previous examples as substantive and relation- relationships and willingly "share the pie" through mutuallyship outcomes. Although both types of outcome have been beneficial collaboration. Other negotiations involve substan-(iiscussed in the literature, relationship outcomes have tive outcomes that can benefit one negotiator only at thereceived much less attention. Our contention is that a sys- expense of the other (a fixed pie). These cases often motivatetematic model of strategic choice for negotiation must negotiators to discount the relationship and claim as much ofaccount for both substantive and relationship outcomes. In the pie as possible.articulating such a model, we suggest that executives can Most negotiations, however, are neither clearly win-approach negotiation strategically by assessing the negotia- win nor win-lose situations, but combinations of both (antion context: considering unilateral negotiation strategies; indeterminate pie). Such mixed-motive situations, in whichtransforming unilateral into interactive negotiation strate- both collaboration and competition may occur, are particu-gies: and monitoring tactics and reevaluating negotiation larly difficult for managers to handle strategically.-" The rela-strategies. tionship that exists prior to the negotiation, the relationship that unfolds during negotiations, and the desired relation- ship often will determine whether either negotiator will beAssessing the Negotiation Context motivated to share the pie, grab it, or give it away. At ru( itil context for any negoliation is the managerscurrent and desired relationship with the other party. Unfor-tunately, in their rush to secure the best possible substantiveoutcome, managers often overlook the impact of the nego-lidtion on their relationships. This oversight can hurt a man-agers relationship with the other party, thus limiting his orher ability to obtain desired substantive outcomes now or inthe future. Assessing The Negotiation Context NtGOTIAIION CONTEXT: Re dtive Power and Leve of Cont iti MANAGERS STRATFCY EXISTING NEGOTIATION XSUBSTANTIVE SITUATION EPISODE / OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATION OTHER PARTY S STRATEGY 38
  3. 3. Consider Both Retationshipi and Substance When Negotiating Strategically In any case, managers should keep existing and These questions will help managers determinedesired relationships in mind as they bid for substantive whether their relationship with the other party Is based onoutcomes. For example, when negotiators are on the losing independence, dependence, or interdependence. Addi-enti of a win-lose negotiation, they should examine the tionally, these questions should help executives considerimplications of taking a short-term loss. During his third how and whether their relationship with the other parlyappointment, Petersons willingness to make only minimal should be strengthened or weakened. Often managers willgains in service contracts for the short term may create a find themselves or their organisations in interdependeniposilivf relationship that will lead to a lucrative, long-term relationships that have both beneficial and detrimcnl.ilcontract with Tarco. The relative importance of possible aspects. These relationships are called mixed-motive situa-substantive and relationship outcomes should help execu- tions in the negotiation literature because they providetives decide whether and how to negotiate. To guide their incentives for both competitive and cooperative actions.decision process, managers should begin by assessing ihoir In his relationship with the Roadwork salesman.relative power and the level of conflict between them and Peterson has considerable power. He is satisfied wiih histhe other party. Both are key determinants of their current current vendor and has other vendors wanting to sell himrcLitionship with the other party. the same product. The numerous choices available allow Exhibit 1 illustrates the negotiation context, showing him to make demancJs on the salesman. Similarly. Petersonihose aspects of the situation and negotialion episode that li.ts more relative power than the mechanic. On the olher^hape relationship and substantive outcomes. Exisling levels hand, he has relatively little power wiih Tarco. since theof power and conflict influence (1) the relationship between contractor can choose from a number of equipment-servicethe executive and the other party and (2) (he negotiation shops. Moreover. Tarcos representative did noi make thestrategies they choose. These strategies are implementeci initial contact and has not actively sought Dickersonsthrough appropriate tactics during a negoliation episocie —a services.one-on-one encounter, a telephone call, or a meeting with rtiultiple parties — and result in substantive and relationshipoutcomes. Level ol Conflict The multiplearrows linking strategies, tactics.and the The levei of conflict underlying a potentkil negoti.i- tUHOtialion episode in Exhibit 1 show the monitoring proc- lion establishes how the negotiators perceive the affectiveess through which both the manager and the other party dimension of their relationship — ihat is. ils degree of sup-refine their strategies and tactics during an episode. A com- fjorliveness or hostility. Managers can assess the relaliori-plex .lnd lengthy negotialion.such asj union tontratt nego- shi[is level of conflict by identifying the difleretices betweenli.ition. m.iy include many episodes; a simple negotiation edc h partys interests. On what issues do both parties agree?m.iy be (omj^leted within one episode. Each episode, On what issues do they disagree? How intense and hownonetheless, influences future negotiations by changing the ingrained are these differences?"managers and the other party s relative power, the level of Answers to these c]uestions will reve.il whcMhcrconflict between them. ,ind their relationship. negotiations will easily resolve differences and whether ihe relationship is perceived as supportive or hostile. TheseRelative Power questions, like the questions about relative power, should also help exec utivesccinsidcn how <in</whether ihe relation- The relative power of the negotiators establishes an ship should bestrenglhenecl or weakened. Very tew negcili-important aspect of their relationship: the extent of each ations begin with a neutral relationship. Indexed, the affective|).irty s defiendence on the olher. Researchers have found slate of the relationship may be a primary reason fcjr nego-lh.il individuals assess their power in a relationship and tiating with a powerful other party. es[iec i.illy if ihe rcLiticm-( hoose whether Io (ompete, iK(ommo(Jate, tollaborote. or ship has deteriorated or been parliciiLirlv supportivc-withdraw when negotiating with others. Managers can In Petersons case, neutral to positive relationshipsassess their power relative to the other party by comparing exist with the Roadwork salesman and the Tarco representa-their respective abilities to induce compliance through the tive. However, his relationships with the mechanic and thecontrol of human .ind material resources. To what extent cio union are potentially hostile. Eorexomfile. mtin.igemeni andihey each control key material resources? To what extent do union representatives have .ilreacK h.id (ontronl.ilions.ihey each control the deployment, arrangement, and Their conflict may escalate if the relationship is notadvancement of people within the organization?*" and both sides are not willing to make concessions." 39
  4. 4. February. 1989Considering a Unilateral Negotiation Strategy fxhihit 2 Before selecting a strategy for negotiation, a managershould consider his or her interests and the interests of the Considering a Unilateral Negotiation Strategyorganization. These interests will shape the answers to twobasic questions: (1) Is the substantive outcome very impor-tant to the manager? and (2) Is the relationship outcomevery important to the manager? Is the Substantive Outcomt Very Importanl Four unilateral strategies (see Exhibit 2) emerge from lo the Manager?the answers: trusting collaboration, firm competition, opensubordination, and active avoidance. We call these unilat- Yes Noeral strategies because in using them, managers consideronly their own interests or the interests of their organization. Slratony SIignoring for the time being the interests of the other party. The unilateral strategies presented in Exhibit 2 are TRUSTINGLY OPENLY Yes COLLABORATE SUBORDINATEsimilar to the conflict management styles suggested by the when boih types of when the priority is cjncombined works of Blake and Moulon. Hall, and Kilmann outcomes are very foldtionship ouiconiosand Thomas." However, while we agree that personalities importantand conflict-management preferences influence a persons Isihcability to negotiate, our selection of terms reflects our focus Relationship Sitiidtion 1 Sifiwifon 2on strategies instead of styles. For example. Johnston uses the Outcome Very Strdtef^y PIterm "subordination" to refer to a strategy similar to the ImporianI lo (heconflict-management style variously termed "accommoda- Manager? FIRMLY COMPETE ACTIVELY AVOIDtion" (Kilmann and Thomas), "smoothing" (Blake and Mou- when the priority is cm NEGOTIATINGton), or "yield-lose" (Hall)." We, however, see using the substantive outcomes when neithei typeo*openly subordinative strategy as more than simply "rolling No ouicome is very importantover and playing dead" or "giving away the store." Rather.this strategy is designed to strengthen long-term relational Sitii.iiifin 4ties, usually at the expense of short-lerm substantive out-comes. Our discussion below also goes beyond Johnstonsconception, showing how a negotiator can focus the openlysubordinative strategy according to his or her substantivegoals. Our view is consistent with research that suggests that Trustingly collaborative strategies generally are easi-individuals adopt different strategies in different relational est to use and most effective when the managers organiza-contexts.-We anticipate that managers success with these tion and the other party are interdependent and mutuallyunilateral strategies depends on their ability to exhibit a supportive. These circumstances normally create a trustingvariety of conflict styles. To highlight the role of relationship relationship in which negotiators reciprocally disclose theirand substantive priorities, we describe these four unilateral goals and needs. In this climate, an effective problem-solvingstrategies in their most extenuated, ideal form, and articulate process and a win-win settlement typically result.their underlying assumptions. In many ways our descriptions 2. Open Subordination (SI), If managers are moroare classic depictions of each type of strategy. Two of these concerned with establishing a positive relationship withstrategies — competition and collaboration — are frequently another party than obtaining substantive outcomes, theydisc ussed in the conflict and negotiation literature. should openly subordinate. We use the term subordination 7. Trusting Collaboration (Cl). In general, if both instead of accommodation to differentiate this strategicrelationship and substantive outcomes are important to the choice from a conflict-management style. An openly subor-organization, the manager should consider trusting collabo- dinative strategy is a yield-win strategy that usually providesration. The hallmark of this strategy is openness on the part of desired substantive outcomes to the other party but rarely toboth parties. By encouraging cooperation as positions are the manager. A subordinative strategy may be used regard-asserted, the executive should be able to achieve important less of whether the manager exercises more, less, or equalrelationship and substantive outcomes. The executive seeks power relative to the other party. Our argument is thata win-win ouicome both to achieve substantive goals and subordination can be an explicit strategic negotiation behav-maintain a positive relationship. ior — not simply a reflection of power. If the manager has little to lose by yielding to the substantive interests of the other party, open subordination can be a key way for him or her to dampen hostilities, increase support, and foster more interdependent relationships. 40
  5. 5. Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically 3. Firm Competition (PI). If substantive interests are reactions or long-term approaches to the substantive issuesimportant bul ihe relationship is not, the manager should under negotiation? Are those actions likely to c hange the(onsitJer firmly competing. This situation often occurs when partys degree of dependence on, or interdependence* with,managers have little trust for the other party or the relation- the organization? The answers will depend on (1) the historyship is not good to begin with. In such situations, they may of the executives relations with the other party and (2) thewant to exert their power to gain substantive outcomes. To influence of key individuals and groups on the manager andenact this competitive strategy, they may also become highly ihe other party.aggressive, bluffing, threatening the other party, or other- In short, executives should take into account bothwise misrepresenting their intentions. Such tactics hide tht- their own and the other partys substantive and relationshipmanagers actual goals and needs, preventing the other party priorities in choosing a negotiating strategy. Exhibit 3 is afrom using that knowledge to negotiate its own substantive decision tree designed to help managers decide which(>ut( omes. Not surprisingly, the creciibility of (he exet utives strategy to use. The left side represents, in a ciifferent form,.ij^gressive tactics and, thus, the "success of (he firmly compet- the analysis in Exhibit 2: thus. Exhibit 3 also shows how thei!ivt strategy often rests on the organizations power vis-a-vis managers substantive and relationship priorities lead to U/JJ-ihc other party. When following a firmly competitive strat- Litoral strategies based solely on the managers position. Theegy, the manager seeks a win-lose substantive outcome and right side illustrates how ihesc unilateral strategies may beis willing to accept a neutral or even d bad reLitionship. continued, modified, or replaced after ihe mtin.iger consid- 4. Active Avoidance (AT). Managers should consider ers the other partys potential or apparent priorities.",((lively avoiding negotiation if neither the relationship nor Managers should examine the appropriateness of .ithe substantive outcomes are important to them or the unilateral negotiation strategy by accounting for the otherorganization. Simply rctu-.ing o negoliaio is ihe most (Jiret t partys priorities before they use ii. Sometimes such s rutiny cand active form ol avoitJance. Exe(utives cin simply tell the will simply justify its use. For example, when hothsubst.intivtother party they are not inierestcd in or willing lo negotiate. and relationship outcomes are important to an executive,Such an action, however, will usually have a negative impact the appropriate unilateral strategy is trusting collaboration. Ifon the organizations relationship with the other party. tho manager antici[iatOS thai tho othor party also values bothMoreover, managers must dcierniine which issues uro a substanlivo .HHI tc^Luionship ouicomos (soo Exhibit 3. Situa-v.isteof time to negotiate. We Ireat dvoicJjnc clikcsuhorcii- tion 1), ho or she would continue [o favor this strategy. Alti.iiion, as an explicit, strategic behavior ralher than as ,n other times, scrutiny of tho other partys priorities may sug-o|)iic;)n (aken by default when the manager is uncertain gest some modifications. We discuss next each of the intor-.ihout what lo do. .Ktivo varialions of tho classic, unilateral strategies. However, we retogni/e that ihese utiiI.iUt>il sir.iic- 7. Pri/H ;/)/oc/ Collaboration (C2). Tho CI collabora-gifs ,irc most successful only in a limited set of situations. In tivo strategy dssumos that tho othor party will reciprocateI he next section wo include various intoraciiw modifit at ions whenever tho executive discloses information. However, ifiluit make these classic. unilateral strategies applicable lo .1 ihe manager nogotiatos oponly and tho othor party is not!(!([ set of negoli.ilicjn situ.itions. opon or is rompotitivo. the manager could bo victimized. Under such circumstances, the manager shcjuld use tho modified collaborative strategy of princ iplod collaboration.-Intoraclivo Negotiation Strategies Rather than relying on only trust and reciprcjcity, the man- ager persuades the other party to conduct negotiations [.iclorc using ihc uniLilcMtil strategics sLiggcstccJ hy based on a sot of mutually agreed upon principles thai willI hibii 2, ihitvccutivc should examine the negotiation from ijcMiofit oach nogoliator.each partys perspective. The choice of a negotiation strategy 2. Focused Subordination (S2). The openly subordi-should be based not only on the interests of the executive or native strategy (SI) assumes that tho substantive outcome isoig.mi/.itioti, l)ut also on the interests of the other parly. The c)t little importance to tho organization. Somotimos, how-m.ui.igcn should antit i[ijtc the olher partys substantive and ovor. an organi/.uicm has [)oth substantive and iolali()nshi|)rrl.itionship [priorities, assessing how the negotiation is likely interests, but tho olhor parly has liltle stake in oithor interest.lo progress when the parties interact. This step is crucial By discovering and then acquiescing to those key needs thatl)(( JuscMht unilalcrai sir.ttegies described above could leati aro of interest only to the other party, the manager can stilllo ^i.ivc [irolilenis il the other parivs priorities ciittcr. For gain some subslantive outcomes for tho organization whilecv.implc, when using c^ither trusting collaboration or open assuring a rolativoly positivo relationship outcome. Horo,suhoKJInation. the manager is vulnerable to exploitaticjn it managers both create substantive outcomes for tho otherthe oihor party is concerned only about substantive oui- party and achieve substantive outcomes for themselves or( onics. WhcMi (iniic ifialiti^ the other partys substjntivo anci lhoir organization.i(Liti()rishi|) piiorltiis. executives should consider the kintisol > tions ihe Cither party might take. Are those actions likely i cIo he supportive or hostile? Will they represent short-torm 41
  6. 6. February. 7989 [xhibil J Selecting an Interactive Strategy MANAGERS PRIORITIES K ihc subMjntivc h ihc s ihe subslaniive Is the relationship i)ul(om( very impotiani outt ome vory importani ouicome very imporianl outcome very im[Kictant 10 ihc mjrtjf^cr? lo ihr manager? lo the other parly? lo the olher party? SUGGESTED STRATEGIES Cl; TfustingColijboration C2; Principled Collaboration PI; Firm Competition P2: Soh Competition SI: Open Subordinjiion S2: f(KUsi(i SulHirdinalion A l ; Aftive Avoidance (refuse Ki ncgoiiatel A2: P-issiye AvoidantP ((icknate neKOtialionI A i : Respcinsivi Avoidance (apply rc^ubtionsl 3. Soft Competition (P2). Under some circumstances Transforming iinihloral Strategiesthe directness of the firmly competitive strategy (PT) mayneed to be softened. For example, even though the manager The model of strategic choice in Exhibit 3 connedsmay place little importanceon the relationship outcome, this unilateral and interactive negotiation strategies. In manyrelationship may be very important to the other party. If the instances the interactive strategies are modifications of theother party is powerful and potentially threatening, the unilateral strategies. We base the cJecision to modify ormanager would be wise to use a competitive strategy that replace a unilateral strategy almost c^xclusivoly on tho tnan-maintains the relationship. Here the executive would avoid dgers and other partys differing outcome priorities. Thieehighly aggressive and other "dirty" tactics. outcome conditions and three sets of assumptions influenc c 4. Passive Avoidartce (A2). If the manager does not the choice of interactive strategies.consider either the relationship or ihe substantive outcome 7. Outcome Conilition Ono: The manager may v,iluvimportant but the other party views the negotiation as (/xTC/cinUns/i/p. bul tho aiher party n)ay not. Forcx.itnplc.aimportant for a relationship outcome, the manager probably manager who assumes that irust anci cooperatic^n will resultshouid delegate the negotiation. By passively avoiding the in a fair outcome may be taken advantage of by anothernegotiation, ihe manager allows someone else within ihe party who is concerned with only substantive outcomes.organization to explore possible outcomes for ihe organiza- Hence, we suggest either priticiplctJ collabor.ilioti ot softtion and keep the relationship from becoming hostile. Dele- competition for such cases to ensure that the other p.irlygating ensures that possible opportunities arc not ignored does not take advantage of the manager (see Exhibit ^,while freeing the executive from what appears to be a low- Situation 2). On the other hand, the manager may simplypriority negotiation. want to create a long-term business relationshif) with SOIIH- 5. Responsive Avoidance (A3). By contrast, if the one who currently Is inlore^.led in neithet sul)stjntiv( not manager considers neither the relationship nor the substan- relationship outcomes. In these cases ihe manager shoukl live outcome important and ihe other party considers the choose to subordinate in a focusedfashion —rather than lo substantive outcome importani and the relationship unim- trustingly collaborate — to establish a relationship with the portatit, ihe manager should re^Li/afothe issue. Direct Inter- olher party (see Exhibit 3. Situation 4). action with the other party is not necessary; the manager can be responsive but still avoid negotiating by either applying standard operating procedures or developing new policies thai address the other parlys concern. 42
  7. 7. Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically 2. Outcome Condition Two: The manager may not Illustrations of Negotiation-Strategy Transformations value the relationship, but the other party may. Given only their own substantive priorities, managers would firmly To demonstrate more concretely how Exhibit 3 compete or actively avoid negotiation under these circum- works, we will examine how Dickersons Peterson might act stances. However, if the other party is interested in the if he were to follow the decision tree to choose his negotia- relationship, the manager may not have to compete firmly to tion strategies. obtain desired substantive outcomes. The manager may col- 7. From Avoidance to Collaboration or Competition. laborate or softly compete and still gain substantive goals In planning to meet with the steering clutch salesman. Peter- without alienating the other party (see Exhibit 3, Situations son first considers whether the substantive outc ome is very 5-8). Such strategies may also foster a long-term relationship important to Dickerson Machinery. Because the company wiih substantive dividends for the manager. already has a satisfactory source for clutch disks, the substan- Similarly, in situations where neither substantive nor tive outcome is not very important. Second, Peterson con- relationship outcomes are important to the manager but the siders the importance of the relationship ouicome. Given relationship is important to the other party, the manager may that Dickerson Machinery currently has no ties with Road- choose an interactive strategy other than avoidance. The works and Peterson foresees no need to establish a long- other party is in a position to choose a subordinative strategy lerm relationship, the relationship outcome is not very and may offer substantive incentives to the manager. If the important either. Based on Petersons priorities only, unilat- manager chooses principled collaboration or soft competi- eral avoidance strategy (Al) seems appropriate. tion, he or she may gain some positive substantive outcomes However, Peterson now considers the salesmans (see Exhibit 3. Situation 13). priorities. First, is the substantive outcome important to the 3. Outcome Condition Three. Both parties may value salesman? Obviously, it is — Roadworks is a struggling, new the relationship, but the manager may not value substantive company and needs nc^w clients. Second, is the relationship outcomes. In these cases, whether or not ihe other party is ouicome important to Roadworks? Because the salesmati interested in substantive outcomes, the manager may choose works on a commission with residuals, he probably desires a a trustingly collaborative strategy to maintain positive ties long-term sales contract, so the relationship ouicome is with ihe other party (see Exhibit 3, Situations 9 atxl 11). important. The salesmans priorities suggest that he wouici 4. Transformation Assumptions. Underlying these probably collaborate trustingly (C1|. three outcome conditions are three sets of assumptions. After answering the questions forming the decision First, we assume that most relationships will involve some tree in Exhibit 3 (see Situation 13). Peterson has two optionsmixture of dependence and interdependence as well as lor an interactive strategy. Since he is in a position of power.some degree of supportivetiess and hostility. Second, we he (Joes not need to make concessions. Moreover, iheassume that most negotiators will view the relationship out- salesman may have producis worthy of consicJer.ition, Thus.come as important under four separate conditions — high Peterson can engage in principled collaboration (C2) orinterdependence, high dependence, high supportiveness, softly compete (P2). In other words, he can collaborate basecJor high hostility — or possible combinations of those c ondi- on principles, taking a strong stand on wh.it he expec ts in ations. Third, from .t managers perspective, eac h of the basic sales contract; or he can softly c ompete by making procluc tstrategies has a different effect with regard to power and demands that do not offend ihe salesman.conflict: (1) collaborative strategies strengthen the interde- 2. From Collaboration to Subordiriation. For ihe|)endence of the manager and the other party while also situation with the contractor, the relationship outcome isenhancing feelings of supportiveness, (2) subordinative very important to Dickerson Machinery hut ihe immediate,siralegies increase the other partys dependence on the substantive ouicome is not. Peterson realizes th.it Die kcrsonmanager while also deemphasizing feelings of hostility, and needs Tarcos business for long-term stability but does not(3) competitive strategies decrease the managers depend- need lo make a profit in the short term. Therefore, hisence on the other party but may also escalate feelings of unilateral strategy would be to subordinate openly (SI). Hehostility. decides toch.inge his strategy from the iruslingly coll.il)or.i- Thus many of the interactive negotiation strategies in tlve (Cl) approach he has used in past dealings with Tarco.Exhibii 3 seek to enhance interdependent relationships orf.ivnrably shift the balance of dependence within a relaiion-shi[). These same strategies also attempt lo d.itnpen feelingsoi hostility or heighten feelings of supportiveness. 43
  8. 8. February, 1989 As Peterson considers the contractors priorities, he Monitoring and Reevaluating Strategiesanticipates that the substantive outcome is important toTarco but the relationship outcome is not, Tarcos represen- After implementing their interactive strategy, man-tative has made clear the need for reliable service at the agers should monitor the other partys UK tics. How the olhcrlowest possible price: conversely. Tarco has not responded party acts will signal its strategy. Based on the olher partysto Petersons bids to provide service for more than two years. tactics, executives can (1) determine if their assumptions anilPeterson recognizes, based on Exhibit 2. that Tarco can com- expectations about tbe other partys strategy are accur.iiepete firmly (PI). After assessing both parties priorities using and (2) modify, if needed, their strategies during this .indthe decision tree (see Exhibit 3. Situation 10), he decides he subsequent negotiation episodes. Exhibit 1 provides anshould continue with an interactive strategy of open subor- overview of this process. The arrows linking strategies todination (SI), Such a strategy is more likely to induce Tarcos tactics and the negotiation episode represent how tacticsrepresentative to offer a contract than the trustingly collab- (1) are used to implement a strategy (first arrow). (2) provideorative strategy he has used previously. For example, he is information to each party (second, reversed arrow), iindprepared to subordinate by offering a "winter special" to (3) may affect the choice of alternative strategies during areduce labor costs by 10),,, cutting competitive parts costs by negotiation episode (third arrow).15V.., and providing a new paint job at 50"<, the normal costsor providing a 6-montb deferment on payment, all in addi-tion to paying for ihe trip to the plant. Tactics 3. From Competition (o Collaboration. Petersons More specifically, we view i.ictic • in two ways: (1) .is >analysis of the negotiation with the labor union includes an clusters of specific aclions associated with the inifjkmcnt.t-assessment of the recent history of and level of conflict tionof one strategy or another, and (2) ab actions thot derivebetween the union and tbe company. Previous episodes in their strategic impact from the particular phase of the nego-ihis contract negotiation have led botb the union and Dick- tiation in which they are used. In Exhibit 4. we combine theseerson Machinery to change their priorities. During the first two perspectives to provide executivc^ wilh desaipiions olfew episodes, both parties focused on only substantive out- competitive, collaborative, and subcjrdinativc t.ictits acrosscomes and ignored relationship oulcomes, using firmly various phases of negotiation. We suggest that most negc;)ti,i-competitive strategies. Also, during tbese earlier episodes, tions go through four phases: (1) tbo search for an arena .mdboth sides demands hardened to the point where the union agenda formulation. (2) ihe st.iling of (lem.inds and offers.threatened to strike and management threatened to give no (3) ,1 ndrtowingof diflerences.dnd (4) tin.il b.ugjiriing," Notincreases in wages or benefits. every negotiation will involve all of these phases. R.ithei, Now. however. Peterson believes thdt boih substjn- these phases characterize typic.il negotiations in mixe<l-tive and relationship outcomes are important to Dickerson. motive situations, Henc e, <i spot ific phase may be skipped orThe company wants lo find a way to increase productivity never attained."without giving much of an inc rease in pay and benefits. It Eot example, the search tot,in arcn.i in whic h t i x .nryalso does not want to lose good mechanics or stimulate a out discussions may be unnecessary tor some ongoing nego-strike. Dickersons unilateral strategy under these new con- tiations: however, most negotiations will initially involveditions should be Irustingly collaborative (CI). some Phase 1 interaction aboul the item^ to be discussed. From analyzing the unions position, Peterson realizes During the second ph.ist, both ihc m.ui.iger .ind ifie ollictthat both the substantive and relationship outcomes should party express their preferences anci cst.iblish their ccjinniil-be important to the union. His informal discussions with ments to specific issues and outcomes. The third phase ni.iunion representatives have assured him that both sides are ho skipped.although it usu.illvoccursif the manager and ihrnow concerned about maintaining the relationship. None- othor party are t.ir .ip.irl in iheir prelerontc^s .ind commii-theless, the union riearly wants an increase in pay and hono- ments, Botb sidesm.iy.idd or delete b.irg.iiriirig rieni^or shitlfils even though it also does nol want a strike. In short, the preferences tc^ avoid an impasse. Tho fourth phase corii-union now is likely to trustingly collaborate but could easily pletos the negotiation: Tho manager and tho other p.irushift its priorities and choose to firmly compete. reduce their oltornatives, making joint decisions .ihout (n h As he enters the negotiation strategy session this item until a lindl agreement is reac hed.afternoon. Peterson plans to recommend to the manage-ment negotiation team (he use of a principled c olldborative(C2) strategy (see Exbibit 3. Situation 2). Because of the cur-rent instability in tbe relationship, he does not want to pro-vide the union with .iny opportunity lo exploit a perceivedweakness that a more trustingly collaborative strategy mightcreate. 44
  9. 9. Consider Both Relationships and Substance Vi/hen Negotiating Strategically Exhibit 4 should help managers recognize (1) how Roevaluating Negotiation Strategiesusing certain tacticsduring various phases of a negotiation isessential to implementing their strategy and (2) how the Take, for example, Petersons appointment with the lac tics of the olher party reflect a particular strategic intent. mechanic who had swapped a battery from <i c ompany truck An unanticipated strategy implemented by the other party with his own used battery. Going into the negotiation. Peter- ni.iy indicate that the executive inaccurately assessecj the son decides that his unilateral strategy should be trusting nc^gotiation context or under- or over-estimated the strength collaboration: The mec hanic is highly skilled ^md would beot the other partys priorities. Hence, once the manager hard lo replace, yet the infraction is a serious matter, He alsorecognizes the other partys actual strategy, he or she should antif ipales ihat the employee will be inleiesled primarily inie.issess the negotiation, repeating the process discussed in retaining,igcK)d relationship with Dickersons management.previous sections to check the appropriateness of his or her Hence. Peterson decides to stick with trusting collaborationstrategies. as his interactive strategy (see Exhibit 3. Situation 3). Sometimes, however, the other partys use of an However, during the frrst five minutes ot the meeting.unanticipated strategy does not mean the executives assess- Petersons efforts to discuss returning the battery to thement of the negotiation context was inaccurate. In Exhibit 3. company and removing the infraction from the mechanicssome combinations of the managersand other partys prior- personnel record are repeatedly rebuffed by the employee.ities result in ihe listing of two interactive strategies. Man- Instead, ihe mec h.inic threatens to retire early fmm Die ker-agers should normally use the first (left-hand) strategies in son and collect the benefits (Jue him unless Petersonthese listings. The secondary (right-hand) strategies are sug- tr.msters him. Peterson recognizes that the mechanic isgested as countermoves the executive should use if the employing competitive tactics to set the agenda, whichother party uses a strategy different from the one expected. reflects an interest in substantive outcomes but little c:oncernbut the executive remains convinced that his or her diagno- for relationship outcomes.sis is accurate. Exhibit 4 Using Tactics Across Negotiation Phases Negotiation Phases Negotiation Tactics COMPETITIVE COLLABORATIVE SUBORDINATtVE The Search tor j n Arena Seek lo {ondud negotiations on Seek lo ronduci negoliations on Seek to conduci negotiations on the and A^;onc).i FofmuLition manaKcrs home {ground neutral ground olher parlys ground Demand diMussion (^t managers Elicit the other partys agenda items Elicit the olher parlys agenda ilems agenda ilcms: curtail disruwions of and assert managers items: in< or- and subvert managers items olhcT partys items porale both ContecJe lo the cither partys l^-nofc or cJis( ouni the olher parlys Consider other partys demands and demands and requesis demands and requesls requests Ihe Stating of tnsisi other parly make initial alters Alternate initial offers and cJemands Make initial offers or demands on a .indOtfcfs or demand*; on all ilems on items with other party olher party-feievani items Respond with very low offers or Respond wiih moderate offers or Make high offers or low (Jemands very high demands moderate demands Accept the other partys commit- Commii ioea<h item; exaggerate Incite ate reasons for managers ments lo items; explain managers managers position and distrcdit tomniitment lo item outcomes: commitments other parlyi> probe the other partys reasons N.ir rowing of Diifcronccs Demand ihat olher party make Seek equitable exchange of conces- Concede to ihr oiher [)artys (oncessions: bark up demand sions wiih the other party demands with ihreaK Delete, add, or yickJ items il muUial Delete, add. or yield to any oihcr Delete, add, or yield only on low interesis converge parly-relevant ilem manager-interesl items Honestly assess managers and other Acknowledge ihe other partys Magnify degree ol managers con- parlys c oncessions concessions; downplay managers cessions; downplay olher parlys concessions I ir]<il Se(>k large (ont cssions from tlic Seek equitable exc hange of i one es- Yield to ihe other parlys relevant olhci p.iily sions from ihe other party preferences by accepting low offers Concede only minimally on hij^h Seek rmitually beneficial outcomes and making low demands manager-interest iti-ms when t one ecling or ac < epting < on- LJse concessions on low manager- cessions on items interest items as hargaining c hips 45
  10. 10. February, 1989 As the negotiation enters the next phase. Peterson 2. We assume that most relationships will Involveconsiders the mechanics apparent priorities and reevaluates some mixture of dependence and interdependence.his own priorities. Now neither the substantive nor the rela- Furthermore, we posit that most negotiators will view thetic:>nship outcomes are very important to him. He knows that relationship outcome as important when it is characterizedDickerson has no opening for the mechanic at any other by either high interdependence or high dependence. Col-shop; moreover, if the employee wants to leave, the rela- laborative strategies will strengthen the interdependence oftionship is of litile value. Based on this reassessment (see the organization and the other party, subordinative strate-Exhibit 3, Situation 14). Peterson sees that he has two interac- gies will increase the other partys dependence on the organ-tive strategic options: He can regulate the matter (A3) by ization, and competitive strategies will decrease the organi-pressing criminal charges or compete firmly (PT) with the zations dependence on the other party. Our .ldvice .iboiitemployee. negotiation strategies is directed particularly toward m.ni- Rather than withdraw from the interaction, Peterson agers who want to enhance relationships of interdepend-decides to compete firmly and tells the mechanic that unless ence or favorably shift the balance of dependence within athe battery is returned, he will do c^verything he can legally relationship.do to prevent the mechanic frorTi receiving optima! sever- 3. We also recognize that the history and level otance benefits. If the employee refuses to return the battery. c onflict between an organization and ancJther party stronglyPeterson can still request Dickersons legal department to file influence each negotiators attitude toward the existing rela-criminal charges against him (A3) as a way to publicize and tionship. Feelings of hostility, we assume, will beescal.ited byenforce a legitimate regulatory approach designed to help .1 competitive strategy; in contrast, feelings of hostility will bethe company avoid this kind of negotiation. deemphasized by a subordinative strategy. Following this same logic, feelings of supportiveness will be enhanced by .i collaborative strategy. Several of the strategies suggested in Figure 3 — trusting collabotation. solt competition, openDiscussion subordination, and passive anc) responsive avoidance — Most of the negotiation literature focuses on substan- attempt to dampen hostilities and increase supportivenesstive outcomes without systematically considering the ways between the manager and the other party.negotiations affect relationships. The approach we have 4. Our advice to executives is simultaneously well-taken undersc ores how negotiation strategies should address supported and spec ulative. On one hanti, th(>{. lassie (itnikii-both parties substantive and relationship priorities. Further, eral) strategies suggested in Exhibit 3 arc lairly well supportedwe encourage executives proactively to view negotiation as within the negotiation literature; the link between thesean indeterminate, reiterative, and often confusing process. It strategies and both relationship and substantive outcomes istec]uires them to anticipate and monitor the other partys the special focus of our .lppro.u h. On the other h.ind. theactions. The other partys tactics will inform managers as to effectiveness ol the inleroctivestr.ilegies suggested tti I xhibilwhether their assumptions about the other partys priorities 3 rem.iins open to coniinuing empirical investigation. Weand strategy are correct. Based on this assessment, managers have developed this Interactive mocJel ol strategic c hoice bycan modify their negotiation strategies as needed during linking our c oncerns about relationship outcomes with whatcurrent or future episocies. is currently known about the basic strategies of negoti.itiori. Managers should heed, however. a few caveats about Although the three sets of .issumptions we tnakeour advice: ahout relationships are usually warranted in most organi- T. Uncierlying the strategic choice model in Exhibit 3 zation-related negotiations, executives should carefully con-is the assumption that most negotiations are of the mixed- sider whether their situations fit with these constraints beloirmotive sort: that is. the rnanjger and other party usually using tHir sirjtej;ic choice model (Exhibit 3), However.negotiate over several substantive items. Some items have reg.irdless ol the situation, we believe that managers willpotential outcomes that can benefit both negotiators; others generally be more effec live negotiators when they c aretullvhave potential outcomes that can benefit only one negotia- assess both (1) the reialionship and the substantive aspects ottor. Under these conditions, collaborative, competitive, and any potential nej-otiaiion and (2) what is importani to thesubordinative strategies may all come into play as the nego- other party and what is important to them, • tiators seek either win-win, win-lose, or yield-win substan- tive outcomes. Our emphasis in the model is on win-winsubstantive outcomes brought about through collaborativestrategies (Cl and C2). 46
  11. 11. Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically Endnotos 12. M . l . K n a p p , ! . ! . P u t n a m , a n d I . J.Davis, • • M t p C o n l l i i t i n O i n a n i / a l i o n s : W h e r e D o W e C.o F r o m H e r e ? " /,(n>t,i.;efne/(( lois wish to thiink the thtec .inonymous Fdilori.il Rc-view Bo.ird C,,mnnnii.ititui Qiuntvilv. 19H8, 1,414-429: Putnam atid Wilson, f tidtioic 5; and ). Sullivan, R. B. Pctctson, N. Kamed.i, .ind |. Sliiniad.i." I he Relaiion- , .and constiudive suggestions tor inipioving the manusiript. ship Between Contlitt Resolution Appioaihcs.ind liust — A Cross C ultural 1. ihiinciderilsreportcdirilbisvignelte.itidtbroLigbout the.Ktrdeaje Smds, Ai.nlmiyot M.iii.iiii-niriU /oi/ni.i/, IJHl, 24,Hn3-«TJ, tiasedonadiral experiences in a multi-slaie m.ichinerv servicing compatiy. 1.). We (.ill these siratefiesinfer.K live because the lake into .Kiount 2. SeeH.Raillas //ie,-f(.(/i(/5c(e/i( eo/Ne,i,>o(i.ir(on,C aml)ndgc,MA: ilieiri1eraitiv(ette( t ol ihe ni.in.ij^etsdnd the other parlys antit ip,iied oi I t.irv.ird University Press. 1982, lof .idisc ussion ol howg,ime theory c an help .Ktual [ i i i o r i l i e s f o i H c r n i n ^ siil)st.intive and reLiiionsbip outioriies, liilei- icnoti.ilors maximi/e iheii subsl.intive outcomes under a diverse set ol .ii tivestiatcKies based on anti( ipatin^ rhc other p.irtys prior ities.as we l.itci ilisiuss in some length, may be changed to relied more i losely the adual .!. HolhR. J , , priorities ol ihe other party, as levealed thiough the interaction during .i Wilhuiil C.ivittti In (BosUJti: t-iounhloti-Milflin, 1981| .ind A. ( . Filleys ncgotialion episode."Some Noim.itive Issues in Conilrc I M.iri.ij^emint" Cjlikirni,i 14. See [ isher and Ury, I tidnolc i.(iicnl Kewew. 1978, 21(2), 61-65) tre.tt win-win problem solvin^^ .is ,i prin- 15. See, loi example, L. L. Cumniirigs. D, I.. H.irnelt.and ( ) . J, Stevens,(ipled, I oll.ihor.itive profess. • Risk. faie. Condliaiion .ind l r u s i : An lntertiation.il Siudy o) Attitudinal 4. See S. ».i<h.ir.uh .ind I, |, L,iwlers h<wi-i .mil f(}litic>iii C>,t;.»i//.i- Diltetentes Among hxecutives," /c.((/e/)iv of M,in.iiii-iiH-nt Imiin.il 1971lioiw: Jhi- Soci.il Iw/dutltiiiy at Canlliit. (O.i/ifmris, .md Riryiiini/ij, (S.in 14,285-104.h.iruisio. CA; j()ssey-H.iss. 1%n) loi . ie(ent disi ussion ai nilxe<l-mo(ive 16. Diftereni researcheis oiler varying desc riplions ol negoti.ilionncnotr.ition situations, ph,(ses. Seel.. Putn.ims "Bar gaining as OiK.ini/.ition.ilCcimmunii.itioii," in 5. See I.. Putri.im .ind C. t, Wilsons " C o m n i u n i i ,rtive Stiatej;jes in R. I). McPhec.ind P, K. loriipkins (Ids.] (.hii.ini/.iimn.il Ciminiufiii.ttiniiOrn.itii/atii)n.il Conllii is: Reli.il)iiily .md Validity ot .i Measuiemeni St .ile," IIMIIIIOIUI Thcnit- .iml Now Oitvditins. Beverly Hills, C A: Sage Puhlic . i -in M, [iurmM)irs(Kd.) Cfininninii .iiiiyn Ve.ir/)<)ofc6,N<w!n(ivP.irk.CA: S.i^e tions,19H5, lor a sumniaiy ol ibis rese.irth. Ann tJougl.is proposed the MistPiiltlii ations, 198i.629-652. See also R, A. Cosiet and 1. t, Ruble, "Researt h three-step model in "1 be Peac elul Seitlenient ot IndusUial and lnte(^lOLl[^on Conliid-llandlinn Behaviuf: An txperimrntal Appro.uh." At.nUniv of Disputes," /oi/ifia/ til Coittliit Rv>f>lulinn. 1957, 1, fi9-61. Flowevei, ihis model .itul subsetjuent thiee-siage models do noi i orisidei the se.m h lot 6. Pdwer as the abiliiy to indui e ( ompli.iiu e is dis< iissed in ). M.irc h iheaiena.is.i(oinponenlpb.iseolanc.goti.itiori.P.(;ullivers/;(spiilcs,(ni/ H, Simons (Jr.v.ifi/AituKh (New York: Wiley. 1958) and in P. Blaus N(i.;olr.(()o/rs: A Cniw-Cultur.}! Prr^ptrtivr. New Yotk; Ac.idemic Press, uin^f .md fowvi iti Sad.il lilr (New York: Wiley, 1%4). I wo ie(ent 1979, proposes .m eigbl-stage niocJel ol ne;4oti.ilion, reniedinK thai ovet- ksdist iissin^^ power Itotn a matPrial-risuLif(epefspe(tivedie H. M i n t / - sigiii. O u i pioposed lour-()b.ise model (ondenses and draws {xtetisively Irorn Ciiitlivers w»nk,liall,198)),.inci| Ptetfers^owerin O/)^an(/jfio/is|Maisbiic-id,MA: Pitman, 17. Additionally, wcvicvi ibc ph.ises ol neHoii.iiion as l o n i eptiialK IKil). A . t a d d c n s * 7/ie Constitution of Sndrty: Oiillinv ul the Ihcnry i>l scp.ir.ile Irorn our noticjn ol negotiation episodes (see fxhibit 1), All lourSit 11, Ni/,i(iri/t (Berkeley: IJtiiversity ol Calilotnia Press, 1984) discusses power phases m.iy lake place during one episode, paitlcularlv il tbe neHcHi.itiontinrn.udtital-theoryperspec livewilhin thelieldotsociology,eni()hjsi/ir)g mvok-esa single issue ol low concern l o o n e o r anc)tbei negoliatoi. O n the-how power involves cotitrol over humati resources. otbci hand, during vc-rv coniplex ncgoii.iiions stieit hirig over a period ol 7. For (iisc ussions ol c ondic t Intensiiy and (Kirability, see I. K. Andrews niontbs, niinieious episodes may tcmsiilLile ca( b pfiase.and D. Tjosvold, "COriflid Managemenl under tJitlerent Levels ol Contlic tIntcnsily," toiinhil of Of iiip.iiiiin,il Bc/i.ivjonr, 1983, 4, 223-228 and C. t.Brown, P. Yelsma, and P. W. Keller, "COmmunir.ition-Conllict Predisposi-tion: Development ol.) 1 beory and .in Insrr u"ic>ni," / him.iiiKri.ilii ms. 19H1, H, See M , Deutschs Ihr ReNo/uf/o/( o/ Cnnlhl. Nev Hayen: Y.ileUniversity Press. 1973. tor .i disc ussion ol how spiraling (ontlids c an be bolhintl.imeci and controlled, 9, lor lurther distussions of these b.isic srr.itegies. see C. B. Dens"M.in.iging t)rg,ini/ation.ilConfltd: Collahc^iation. Bargainirig.and PoweiApproaches, Ca;//ni(iij A,f.i*i.r.L;eMie/if Rewew, 197H, 21, 76-82: lillev, f n d -iiolc- ); hisber and Liiy. h u l n o t e 3: R, Johnstons "Negoli.ition Str.i(egic-s:Dilleic>rit Strokes loi Ditterent Folks." in R. Lewie ki and ), liiterei (Tds,!,^e.i,(jf(,i()o/i: We.((/in^s, Axenises. . » K / Cases, Horriewood, U: Rii b.ird D.Irwin, 1985, pp. 1 % - l M ; D, A, Lax .md J. K. Sebenius, T/te ^/.ln.(>;c( .isNf^Dli.itor: li,iri^,iinin^ for Cr)o/>eMf(o/i .ind Cumpctitivi (...lin. New York:Ihe Free Press. 1986: .>nd D. G Piuitl s "Strategic Cboice in Negoti.itiori."AiiHrit.in Hrh.iwir,it>(ivniist. 1983, 27,167-1<M. 10, For an overview o l the contributions by ihese and otbcT c ontIk t-m.inagement researchers, see the s[>e<ial issue on "CotntJUinicitlon andCOiillict Styles in Organizations," L. L, Putnam (fd.l, M.i/i.iyefiie/ir Cnni-nniim,lionQti.irtrrly. 1968.1(3), 291-445. See also R, Blake .iiid |. Mcmtons Ibc Mlih Acliievemeni," hniriutl nf Applioii Brh.ivifir.il .Science. 1970, 6,41.t-426; ). Halls CinUlitt M.in.igvnivnt Survvv: A Stirvoyof Oiu-s Cluir.it - htii Reac tinn Kutiul H.inillint^ul Conllk ts Hetween /-/ifiise// ,nd Olhif-.( o n r o e . TX: leleonicliics, 1986; and R. H. Kilmann and K. W. Ibom.is"Interpersonal Conllic t-FHandling Bebavioi as Rellcu tions ol Kingiati Pc>r-sonality Dinic^nsions,"/sy(/)o/o,i,"iR</"»((s, 1975, 37,971-980.iturUcvel-oping a forced-Choice Measure ol Condid-H.indling Beb.ivior: TheMode- Instrumc-nt," hliu.iluuul S. Psyt/io/oi.,i(.r/^/casl/fef^e/t/, 1977, 37, I- i25. 11, Sei I nclnole 1(1 above: cspec ially see |ohnslon. 47
  12. 12. February, 1989 Grant T. SdVii^e (Ph.D.. Ohio Slate University) is an Ritch I.. Sorenson (Ph.D., Purdue University) is anassistant professor of managcmonl in ihe College of Businos associate professor of managetiient in the College of KusiAdministration at Texas Tech University and an assistant ness Adn)inistration at Texas Tech University. His resortprofessor of health organization management in the Texas interests include conflict management, leadership, atnlTech School of Medicine. Hv began his research on negotia- oriianiz.ational communication. In addition to research untion while working as <i ihird-pariy facililMor for the Qt/.i/ify amflict management and negotiation, he is currently exani-of Work Life Program in ihe City of Columbus. Ohio. With iniitii the relationship of individual leadership prntotypes toadditional research interests in health-care managemenl. orgtinizational effectiveness and the relationship of situa-interpersonal and organizational communication, and tional variables and communication to leadership. He has/(.it/frs/i/p and stiiall-group behavior, he has publishod arti- published articles in Human Communicalion Rcscirch,cles in Communication Monographs. Health Care Man- Communication Educ at ion. <j/H/Communicjiion Qu.it torly.agement Review. Hospital & Health Services Administration, An active trainer in management developmetif, conflict.jnc/(he Internationa! journal of Small Croup Research. He fv matiagement, managerial communication, and human relacurrvntly caauthnritig. with David A. Bednar. a book on tions, he has provided consultation to such organizations amanagerial communication lor Pracger Publishers. He /ids Rockwell International, Preferred Risk Insurance Companalso provided training and consultation for the New York the U.S. Air Forces Civilian Comptrollei Career Manai^City Cooperative Labor-Management Program, the U.S. Air nient Program, and the Center for Professiot)al Develop-forces Civilian Comptrollor Career Management Program. tnent at Texas Tech ilniversity.and (ho Center for Professional Developmenl at Texas TechI hiiversity. lohn D. Blair is a professor of management in theCollege of Business Administration at Texas Tech Universityartd the associate chairman of the Department of HealthOrganization Management in the Texas Tech School ofMedicine. His current research ititerests are in the turbulentenvironment facing health-care organizations and appro-priate responses, including a strategic approach to negotia-tion. He has also written about the sociology of managementas a scientific discipline. He is the coauthor of two books andauthor of numerous articles on the military organization. Hislatest book, with Myron Fottler. is Stakeholder Managementfor Health Care Organizations (}ossey-Bass). His most recentresearch appears in Hospital & Health Services Administra-tion. Ho.ilth Care Managemenl Review, f he Journal of Man-agetiient. and the National Journal of Sociology, He wasassociate editor oft he ]ouTnaoiManii^emen[ (1983-86) andfoundinii coeditor of the Yearly Review of Managtmient(1985-87).

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