QUESTION PRESENTED       Although the present case raises multiple issues our Union may discuss, Amici curiae isparticular...
within 50 to 100 feet. The task force connected that data to software that plotted the car’slocation and movement on a map...
establish Jones’ presence at the house alleged to have been the center of the drug activity. Jonesmoved to suppress the GP...
U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) is inapplicable to this case and therefore Jones had areasonable expectation of privac...
privacy in his movements from one place to another, not that such a person has no reasonableexpectation of privacy in his ...
privacy standard applies and thus Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy was violated whenthe police for twenty fours ho...
Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (2000). Information is actually exposed when an individual observes whata reasonable person expects ...
without a justifiable warrant.              1.   JONES HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WHEN HE SOUGHT TO PRESERVE           ...
is in a public place.        In Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) the defendant was a passenger on a bus that left toanoth...
for growing marijuana plants. The police could not observe anything from ground level becausea 6-foot outer fence and a 10...
Jones everywhere he went on public roads over the course of a month. The assumption of thegovernment’s argument is twofold...
would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at558. As a consequence, the...
Appeals in that                “Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed                by short-t...
Applying these principles to the facts, society is prepared to recognize Jones’ expectationof privacy in his movement over...
movements whatsoever, world without end, as the government would have it.” Jones, 615 F.3dat 557. Second, the GPS here imp...
is clear in that it did not concern itself with the question presented here. Thus the principal of lawexpounded in Knotts ...
As to the second point, if the task force were to use the beeper in Knotts here, they wouldnot get the benefit of followin...
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Writing Sample 2

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Drafting an amicus brief addressing the issues of unlawful search and seizure in the Supreme Court landmark Case U.S. v. Jones

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Writing Sample 2

  1. 1. QUESTION PRESENTED Although the present case raises multiple issues our Union may discuss, Amici curiae isparticularly concerned with the issue of whether the governments installation and use of a GPSdevice to generate and store data about Jones’ movements and locations constituted a searchunder the Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The United Civilians Freedom Riders Union (“UCFRU”) is a nationwide, nonprofit,bipartisan organization with more than 750,000 members dedicated to liberty, equality, and thisnation’s civil rights laws. On October 18, 2011, UCFRU released its statement on locationtracking, where union members urged that we must “carry forward Fourth Amendmentsafeguards into the Digital Age.” The Union concluded that the Fourth Amendment requires lawenforcement to obtain a warrant before employing GPS technology to conduct prolongedtracking of an individual’s movement, even if on public streets. The present case interestsUCFRU because it represents an opportunity to improve Fourth Amendment doctrine andmaintain that provision’s protections in the modern era. BACKGROUND In the fall of 2005, the Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets Task Force (“taskforce”) tracked the movements of Antoine Jones in order to gather evidence for an ongoingnarcotics investigation. On September 27, 2005, the task force installed a Global PositioningSystem (“GPS”) device on a motor vehicle registered to Jones’ wife (“the car”). The GPS deviceremained attached to the car until October 24, 2005. During this twenty-eight day period, the taskforce, along with the GPS device was able to pinpoint the location of the car at every instance.The GPS had an antenna that received signals from satellites. The GPS used these signals todetermine its latitude and longitude every ten seconds, accurately pinpointing its location to   1  
  2. 2. within 50 to 100 feet. The task force connected that data to software that plotted the car’slocation and movement on a map. The software also created a comprehensive record of the car’slocations. The task force, depending on the needs of the investigation, sometimes monitored the GPSdevice live and other times reviewed its stored data. The task force could track the car’sindividual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. For example, it could noterepeated visits to particular locations. Over the twenty-eight day period, the task force hadconstant access to the car’s location, except during a five-day period where the GPS device’sbatteries had expired. During this period, the task force visited the car to install new batteries.The task force would not have been able to obtain this comprehensive real-time and historicalrecord of the car’s movements without the aid of the GPS. With the GPS, the task force was ableto collect far more detailed information than it would have if they had collected the sameevidence through physical surveillance, let alone collect this information more furtively and atminimal expense. The task force obtained a warrant on September 16, 2005 to install the GPS onto the car,but its authorization expired before the GPS device was installed. Additionally, the September16th order authorized the task force to install the GPS device only within the District ofColumbia, but they installed the GPS device while the car was parked in Maryland. As aconsequence, the task force’s continuous GPS surveillance was undertaken without a validsearch warrant. The government used the GPS data as a central part of its criminal case againstJones for his alleged involvement in a drug trafficking conspiracy. In October 2005, investigatorsarrested Jones and his fellow defendants and charged them under 21 U.S.C. § 846 withconspiracy to distribute cocaine, among other crimes. The government used the GPS data to   2  
  3. 3. establish Jones’ presence at the house alleged to have been the center of the drug activity. Jonesmoved to suppress the GPS evidence prior to trial. The District Court of the District of Columbiadenied the motion, allowing the government to use the GPS data except data recorded while thecar was parked in Jones’ private garage. A jury acquitted Jones of all charges except for aconspiracy charge, which resulted in a hung jury. Jones was then retried on the conspiracycharge and convicted. He was sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the conviction, concluding thatthe government’s use of a GPS device to record the totality and pattern of defendant’s movementfrom place to place, for nearly a month intruded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy. As aconsequence, the Court of Appeals determined that the GPS tracking was a search under theFourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and also ruled that the GPS data should have beenexcluded because the government had not obtained a valid warrant or justified its failure to do sounder the well-recognized and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. The U.S.government filed for certiorari on April 15, 2011. This Court granted certiorari on June 27,2011, inter alia, to decide whether warrantless GPS surveillance constitutes a search under theFourth Amendment. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision concerning the claim that thegovernment’s installation and use of a GPS device to generate and store data about Jones’movements and locations constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. First, Katz’sexpectation of privacy standard applies and thus Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy wasviolated when the police, each day, for twenty-four hours, for a month and without a warrantfollowed every movement he made. Second, Amici also agrees with the Court of Appeals that   3  
  4. 4. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) is inapplicable to this case and therefore Jones had areasonable expectation of privacy in his movements when he was driving his car.I. Under Katz, the government engages in a Fourth Amendment search whenever it“intrudes on another’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring). A person has an expectation of privacy when he seeks to preservesomething as private. Id. at 351. Furthermore, whether an expectation of privacy is reasonabledepends in large part upon (1) whether that expectation relates to information that has beenactually or constructively exposed to the public, U.S. v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. App.2010), and (2) whether the individuals expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared torecognize as reasonable." Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000). Applying the first part of the rule, Jones sought to preserve the entirety of his movementsas private. Also, Jones’ movements in their entirety were not actually exposed to the public sincethe likelihood that Jones would expect anyone to observe all of his movements is “effectivelynil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 558. It is also highly unlikely that Jones’ movements were constructivelyexposed because the entirety of Jones’ movements plots a compilation of what his daily routineswere like and where he resided at particular times and this is an emphatic intrusion into Jones’personal life. Applying the second part of the rule, society can reasonably accept that theprolonged use of a GPS device to monitor and reveal an intimate picture of Jones’ life and hishabits violates his expectation of privacy and thus should not be allowed. To accept otherwisewould be to allow invasive, unabridged and wide-open investigations on whomever thegovernment pleases without a justifiable warrant.II. Knotts is distinguishable. First, as the Court of Appeals states, “Knotts held only that aperson traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of   4  
  5. 5. privacy in his movements from one place to another, not that such a person has no reasonableexpectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end, as the Governmentwould have it.” Id. at 557. Second, unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS here was able to trackthe car’s individual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. Third, unlike inKnotts, where the police followed the defendant for a mere 100 miles, here the defendant wasfollowed for twenty fours, every day, for twenty-eight days. The length of this investigationreveals a greater amount of information, which is far more detailed and invasive then a mere100-mile investigation. ARGUMENTI. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE GOVERNMENT’S INSTALLATION AND USE OF A GPS DEVICE TO GENERATE AND STORE DATA ABOUT JONES’ MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS CONSTITUTED A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT On September 27, 2009, the Metropolitan task force installed a GPS device onto Jones’car without his knowledge or consent and for over four weeks the task force was able to obtainsatellite generated data of every movement Jones made in his vehicle for 24 hours of every day.The device automatically communicated with orbital satellites to calculate its longitude andlatitude at ten-second increments, and transmitted this data to a remote government computer. Itultimately generated and stored over 2,000 pages of data about Jones’ movements and locationsover the four-week period. The task force would not have been able to obtain this comprehensivereal-time and historical record of the car’s movement without the aid of this GPS and itstechnology. Furthermore, the government would be incapable of proving Jones’ guilt withoutthis intrusive GPS technology. Amici agrees with the Court of Appeals that the government’s installation and use of theGPS device constituted a Fourth Amendment search for two reasons. First, Katz’s expectation of   5  
  6. 6. privacy standard applies and thus Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy was violated whenthe police for twenty fours hours every day for a month and without a warrant followed everymove he made. Second, Amici also agrees with the Court of Appeals that U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S.276 (1983) is inapplicable to this case and therefore Jones had a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in his movements. A. JONES’REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE POLICE, FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, EVERY DAY, FOR A MONTH AND WITHOUT A WARRANT FOLLOWED JONES’ EVERY MOVEMENT "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than theright of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraintor interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co.v. Botsgford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). As this court held in Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351(1967), "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and wherever an individual mayharbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," he is entitled to be free from unreasonablegovernmental intrusion. Id. at 361. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part that “the rightof the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonablesearches...shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amen. IV. Under Katz, the government engages ina Fourth Amendment search whenever they “intrude on another’s reasonable expectation ofprivacy.” Id. at 351. “A person has an expectation of privacy when he seeks to preservesomething as private.” Id. at 740. Furthermore, whether an expectation of privacy is reasonabledepends in large part upon (1) whether that expectation relates to information that has beenactually or constructively exposed to the public, Jones, 615 F.3d at 558, and (2) whether theindividuals expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."   6  
  7. 7. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (2000). Information is actually exposed when an individual observes whata reasonable person expects another might actually observe and not what that person could haveobserved. Jones, 615 F.3d at 559. Information is constructively exposed when an individualobserves in whole the privacy interests of another in no greater detail than he would in itsconstituent parts; therefore not exposing the most intimate details of that person‘s life. Id.Although there is no “talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that societyis prepared to accept as reasonable,” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (pluralityop.), this Court has in the past measured the reasonableness of privacy expectations against “theeveryday expectations of privacy that we all share,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). Applying the first part of the rule, Jones had an expectation of privacy when he sought topreserve the entirety of his movements as private. Also, it is highly unlikely that Jones’movements in their entirety, over the course of a month were actually exposed to the public sincethe likelihood that Jones would expect anyone to observe all of his movements is “effectivelynil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 558. Second, it is also highly unlikely that Jones’ movements wereconstructively exposed even though each individual move may have been exposed, because the“whole reveal[ed] more than…did the sum of its parts.” Id. at 558. Essentially, the entirety ofJones’ movements plots a compilation of what his daily routines were like, where he resided atparticular times, and this is an emphatic intrusion into Jones’ personal life. Therefore, Jonessought to preserve the entirety of his movements as private. Applying the second part of the rule, society can reasonably accept that the prolonged useof a GPS device to monitor and reveal an intimate picture of Jones’ life and his habits violateshis expectation of privacy and therefore should not be allowed. To accept otherwise would be toallow invasive, unabridged and wide-open investigations on whomever the government pleases   7  
  8. 8. without a justifiable warrant. 1. JONES HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WHEN HE SOUGHT TO PRESERVE THE ENTIRETY OF HIS MOVEMENTS AS PRIVATE At the outset, Amici readily concedes that Jones may expect his movements, on anygiven day, to be actually exposed to another, but Jones surely does not expect that the entirety ofhis movements be monitored and recorded for a month by a task force via a surreptitiouslyinstalled GPS device. The record of the sum of his movements reveals the intimacies of his life.Surely, Jones’ would not want to reveal such intimacies nor expect such events to occur. Thus,Jones sought to preserve the entirety of his movements as private. 2. THE GOVERNMENT OVERSTEPS THE BOUNDS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN THEY POSIT THAT WHATEVER A PERSON ACTUALLY EXPOSES TO THE PUBLIC COULD OPENLY BE VIEWED AND THEREFORE IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION In Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the defendant was convicted of transmittingwagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the court permittedthe government to introduce evidence of defendants telephone conversations. Theseconversations were overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening andrecording device to the outside of the public telephone booth and listened in. The Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming defendant’s conviction, rejected the contention thatthe recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was nophysical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. This Court reversed and held, that onewho occupied a telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll that permitted himto place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not bebroadcast to the world. This Court acknowledged and Amici agrees that a person’s expectation ofprivacy is violated when he does not expect another to listen in on his conversations, although he   8  
  9. 9. is in a public place. In Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) the defendant was a passenger on a bus that left toanother state. On the way, the bus arrived at a checkpoint. There, a border patrol agent boardedthe bus to check the immigration status of its passengers. After checking all the passengersaccordingly, the patrol agent squeezed the soft luggage, which passengers had placed in theoverhead storage space above the seats. The patrol agent squeezed defendant’s bag, and noticedthat the bag contained a brick-like object. When the agent opened the bag he discovered a brickof drugs. As a result, defendant was indicted for conspiracy to possess drugs, and possessionwith intent to distribute drugs in violation of a federal law. In Federal District Court, thedefendant moved to suppress the drugs and argued that the agent conducted a search of his bag inviolation of the Fourth Amendment when he squeezed his bag in the manner that he did. TheDistrict Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, and found him guilty on both counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confirmed the view that the agentsmanipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ThisCourt reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This court held that the agents physicalmanipulation of the defendants carry-on luggage violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court,inter alia, reasoned that the defendant had exhibited an actual expectation of privacy by using anopaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat and the defendants expectation ofprivacy was one that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. This court reasoned thatalthough defendant could expect that his bag would be exposed to certain kinds of touching andhandling, the defendant surely did not expect that the agents physical manipulation of hisluggage would exceed the casual contact expected by other passengers. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), police investigated defendant’s backyard   9  
  10. 10. for growing marijuana plants. The police could not observe anything from ground level becausea 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence surrounded the defendant’s yard. Shortlythereafter, the police officers secured a private plane, flew over the yard and made naked-eyeobservations, which provided the basis for a search warrant. As a result of those observations thedefendant was charged for cultivating marijuana in his backyard. Prior to trial, the defendantmade a motion to suppress the plants seized in the search. The trial court denied the defendantsmotion. As a result, the defendant pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals of California FirstAppellate District, reversed, holding that the warrantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage ofthe defendants home violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appealsreasoned that the height and existence of the fences demonstrated that the defendants reasonableexpectation of privacy was abridged because the aerial surveillance had not been the result of aroutine patrol, but had been conducted for the express purpose of observing this enclosure withinthe defendants curtilage. This Court reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment is notviolated by a warrantless naked-eye observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of ahome from an airplane operating in public airspace. This Court further reasoned that thedefendant’s reasonable expectation was not contravened because it was reasonable for peoplewho are flying by, and who cared to look down to see the defendant’s marijuana plants. Like the defendant in Katz, where he did not expect any reasonable individual to listen inon his conversations while he was in the telephone booth, here the defendant also did not expectany reasonable individual to observe the entirety of his movements, let alone the task force.Surely, defendant does not want to reveal such a intimate picture to the police. The governmentgravely misstates their claim when they advocate that Jones’ movements over the course of amonth were actually exposed to the public and therefore the police could have lawfully followed   10  
  11. 11. Jones everywhere he went on public roads over the course of a month. The assumption of thegovernment’s argument is twofold. First the government assumes that the person viewing thedefendant is the appropriate candidate to consider what is private or not. Second, the governmentassumes that whatever is left to the public eye in plain view may be considered public and notprivate. To the contrary, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has addressed, “weask not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a reasonableperson expects another might actually do.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 559. The Court of Appeals’observation expresses that the reasonable person from the defendant’s point of view is theappropriate candidate to consider whether something is private, and not the person viewing him. Like the defendant in Bond where he did not expect any reasonable person to inspect hisbag in such an exploratory manner, here the defendant again does not expect any reasonableperson to observe all of his movements. Therefore, the entirety of Jones’ movements could nothave been actually exposed to the task force. The underlying assumption of the argumentcomparing these two cases is that in Bond where the defendant considered the contents of his bagprivate, the defendant in this case considers the totality of his movements private as well.Evidently, the entirety of Jones’ movements reveals the intricate details of his life, such as wherehe eats, his habits, where he resides, and what activities he enjoys. Such an invasion of privacyviolates Jones’ expectation of privacy and thus cannot be allowed. Unlike the defendant in Ciraolo, where it was reasonable to expect individuals who areflying over and who cared to look down to observe his crops growing in his backyard, here it isunreasonable for a person in Jones’ position to expect that his every move would be observedand recorded by a task force, with a surreptitiously installed GPS device on his car, twenty fourhours, everyday for a month. As the Court of Appeals has reasoned, “the likelihood a stranger   11  
  12. 12. would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil.” Jones, 615 F.3d at558. As a consequence, the sum of Jones’ movements were not actually exposed. 3. JONES MOVEMENTS WERE NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY EXPOSED Petitioner states that U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. Nat’l Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749(1989) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) are inapplicable to this case since they donot answer whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy when he was driving on thepublic thoroughfare. The petitioner’s argument contains two errors. First, National Reporters andSmith apply, in that combined, they succinctly illustrate what the Court of Appeals cites as the“mosaic theory.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 562. Essentially, the mosaic theory illustrates the conceptthat notwithstanding the fact that although a person may observe snippets of Jones’ movements itis highly unlikely for a person to see the whole of Jones’ movement. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v.Nat’l Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (there this Court held subjects had a privacyinterest in the aggregated whole distinct from their interest in the bits of information of which itwas composed); See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (this Court explained thatdefendant could not reasonably expect privacy in the list of numbers because that list wascomposed of information that he had voluntarily conveyed to the company and that it hadfacilities for recording and was free to record). The aggregate of Jones’ movements provides thepolice with the necessary information, such as places frequently visited, to indict Jones, whereasthe snippets of Jones’ movements present isolated incidents that are not helpful because theyreveal little about him or his travels. Second, the petitioner again sidesteps the aggregate of whata full picture of Jones’ movements could paint (mosaic theory) as opposed to a single day andpleads that whatever is out in the open may be considered in free view to the public and thereforeabdicates itself from constitutional protection. In contrast, Amici agrees with the Court of   12  
  13. 13. Appeals in that “Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one‘s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person‘s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story.” Jones, 615 F.3d at 562. Amici does not contend that the use of GPS surveillance to capture criminals beabolished. In fact, Amici agrees that GPS surveillance and other technology is necessary for theaggressive pursuit of criminal justice. Rather, like the Court of Appeals, Amici illustrates that theprolonged, intrusive, unwarranted use of the GPS, in this case, to record and observe all of Jones’movements paints a picture drastically different than a snippet of its whole would. This type ofGPS surveillance is not constitutionally admissible and cannot be permitted. 4. SOCIETY CAN ACCEPT JONES’ EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AS REASONABLE To ascertain whether Jones’ expectation of privacy is reasonable requires “a source outsidethe Fourth Amendment, such as understandings that are recognized or permitted by society. U. S.v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Plainly, Jones’ expectation of privacy is measuredobjectively. All people have differing personalities and attain different experiences throughoutlife and what one may consider an invasion of privacy is different from another person’s view.Thus, it is worth mentioning again that although there is no “talisman that determines in all casesthose privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable,” Ortega, 480 U.S. at715, this Court has in the past measured the reasonableness of privacy expectations against “theeveryday expectations of privacy that we all share,” Olson, 495 U.S. at 98.   13  
  14. 14. Applying these principles to the facts, society is prepared to recognize Jones’ expectationof privacy in his movement over the course of a month as reasonable. As stated earlier, theprolonged use of a GPS device reveals an intimate picture of Jones’ life. For over four weeks, thetask force compiled 2,000 pages worth of data from the GPS device about where Jones resided.At first blush, this only reveals places, but places frequently visited reveal activities, hobbies, andpersonal places of interest. Again, Amici stresses that for the world to accept such a pervasiveaccount of an individual’s life as reasonable would be to allow invasive, unabridged and wide-open investigations on whomever the government pleases without a justifiable warrant. B. THE KNOTTS CASE IS INAPPLICABLE TO OUR CASE AND THUS JONES HAS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS The government, using only the narrow holding in Knotts argues that the GPS surveillanceof Jones’ vehicle was permissible because a person who went from place to place on publicthoroughfares had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Since he is willingly exposing hisactivities to the public, he does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. If this Courtsolely relies on this shred of reasoning as the government outlines in their argument, this Courtas Justice Breyer stated at oral argument for this issue on November 8, 2011, can come to onlyone logical conclusion, “then there [exists] nothing to prevent the police or the government frommonitoring 24 hours a day the public movement of every citizen of the United States...” U.S. v.Jones, No. 10-1259 petitioner’s original oral argument, transcript page 12, line 25 (November 8,2011). Such an intrusion on the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy cannot be allowed. Furthermore, Knotts is distinguishable and therefore does not apply to our case. First, asthe Court of Appeals correctly notes, “Knotts held only, that a person traveling in an automobileon public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from oneplace to another, not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his   14  
  15. 15. movements whatsoever, world without end, as the government would have it.” Jones, 615 F.3dat 557. Second, the GPS here implicates the privacy interests of a person greater than the beeperin Knotts does. Third, the length of the investigation here and what it revealed about Jones is instark contrast to the length of the investigation in Knotts and what it revealed about the defendantthere. 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY STATES, “KNOTTS HELD ONLY THAT A PERSON TRAVELING IN AN AUTOMOBILE ON PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES HAS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER, NOT THAT SUCH A PERSON HAS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS MOVEMENTS WHATSOEVER, WORLD WITHOUT END, AS THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE IT.” In Knotts, this Court explicitly stated, “[Defendant] does not actually quarrel with this analysis, though he expresses the generalized view that the result of the holding sought by the Government would be that "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision." Brief for [Defendant]. But the fact is that the "reality hardly suggests abuse," Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978); if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as [defendant] envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id. at 283. This Court reasoned above that unlike in Knotts, where there was a discrete journeyimplicating no expectation of privacy, a case in the future may involve a dragnet-type lawenforcement practice that may implicate an expectation of privacy. Such a dragnet-type lawenforcement practice is prevalent here. Therefore, different constitutional principles apply. ThisCourt avoided answering the question of whether prolonged twenty-four hour surveillance was asearch under the Fourth Amendment when they limited the holding in Knotts to its facts.Keeping this mind, unlike the government who uses Knotts to exemplify that any person may besubject to prolonged, unwarranted, and unfettered surveillance by the police, the Knotts holding   15  
  16. 16. is clear in that it did not concern itself with the question presented here. Thus the principal of lawexpounded in Knotts does not extend to this case. 2. THE GPS DEVICE USED HERE IMPLICATES A PERSON’S PRIVACY INTERESTS GREATER THAN A BEEPER WOULD. The GPS device used here implicates Jones’ privacy interests greater than a beeper inKnotts would have. The distinctions between the GPS and the beeper are critical to this Court’sconsideration of the broader question of constitutionality for two reasons. First, it furtheramplifies the distinction between our case and Knotts and second it explains the influence ofsuch a distinction on the constitutionality of using such an intrusive device. As to the first point, unlike the beeper in Knotts, the GPS in this case had an antenna thatreceived signals from satellites. The GPS used these signals to determine its latitude andlongitude every ten seconds, accurately pinpointing its location to within 50 to 100 feet. TheGPS was capable of transferring data to software that plotted the car’s location and movementson a map. This software also created a comprehensive record of the car’s locations. The beeperhad no associated software with such capabilities, let alone was it capable of transferring data toanother device. Unlike the beeper, the GPS did not need to be followed to keep a live signal. Thetask force merely pressed a button and learned of Jones’ whereabouts instantaneously. The GPScould be monitored live or left unattended because it stored data for the task force’s leisurereview later. Again, the beeper had none of these capabilities. Unlike the beeper, the GPS wasable to track the car’s individual trips as well as identify patterns in the car’s daily routine. Forexample, it could note repeated visits to particular locations. The distinctions between the GPShere and the beeper in Knotts are apparent when contrasted side by side, but the implications thatthe GPS has on Jones’ expectation of privacy when compared against if the task force in thiscase would follow Jones with the beeper in Knotts are disturbing.   16  
  17. 17. As to the second point, if the task force were to use the beeper in Knotts here, they wouldnot get the benefit of following Jones for twenty-eight days because that would be exhaustingand costly. Second, they would have to script their findings and create the patterns of Jones’movements themselves. This is time consuming and prone to human error, the error that the GPSsoftware does not possess. As a result, using the GPS rather than the beeper avails the police notonly of records, locations, and habits, it reveals the intimacies of Jones’ life. 3. THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION HERE AND WHAT IT REVEALED ABOUT JONES IS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE LENGTH OF THE INVESTIGATION IN KNOTTS AND WHAT IT REVEALED ABOUT THE DEFENDANT THERE The more time an individual spends investigating another, especially in a consecutivefashion, the more that person may reveal about another’s life. As the Court of Appeals correctlyarticulated that unlike in Knotts, where “the police followed the container as it was driven fromthe place of purchase…to [Knotts‘s] secluded cabin…a trip of about 100 miles,” here theinvestigation was 24 hours a day, every day, for twenty-eight days. Jones, 615 F.3d at 556. This,of course has far greater implications when combined with an intrusive GPS device as opposedto a short trip to another state with a beeper . (See Amici Heading B, Point II for a discussion ofsuch implications). The distinctions are blatant and thus Knotts does not apply to our case. CONCLUSION Therefore, this court should affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia because the government’s installation and use of a GPS device to generate and storedata about Jones’ movements and locations constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment,since when they engaged in such conduct that violates Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy.Final Exam Number- 3879Course- Organized White Collar Crime   17  

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