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With the help of both an experiment and analytical techniques, Axelrod and Hamilton [1] showedthat
cooperation can evolve in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game when pairsof individuals interact repeatedly. They
also demonstrated that, whenpairing of individual is not completely random, cooperating behaviour canevolve in a world initially dominated by defectors. This result leads usto address the following question:Since nonrandom pairing is a powerfulmechanism for the promotion of cooperation in a repeated Prisoner’sDilemma game, can this mechanism also promote the evolution of cooperationin a nonrepeated version of the game? Computer simulations areused to study the relation between nonrandom pairing and the maintenanceof cooperative behaviour under evolutionary dynamics. We concludethat nonrandom pairing can secure cooperation also when the possibilityof repeated interaction among the same pairs of individuals is ruled out.
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