REALISTIC: Effective Soil and water conservation practices have little effect on water yield, but significant effect on se...
Business case for PWS <ul><li>Grassed waterway  in Sasumua (3m width by 20 km length - approx 15 acres)   </li></ul>Benefi...
Increasing value accruing to farmers <ul><li>Alternative payment mechanisms -  Ulugurus </li></ul><ul><li>Co-investment e....
Sediment sources in Sasumua <ul><li>Low erosion rates from the forest </li></ul><ul><li>High rates on some agricultural ar...
CONDITIONALITY <ul><li>If performance will not happen without incentives  </li></ul><ul><li>Kick-started farmers are willi...
VOLUNTARY Can buyers and sellers get into mutually beneficial agreements? <ul><li>Farmers mostly willing to accept (WTA) p...
WTP: Sasumua: <ul><li>Nairobi water users - 2 o  beneficiaries </li></ul><ul><li>Willing to pay higher water tariffs  </li...
Summary Principle So far Pending REALISTIC Effectiveness  Attributing improved water quality to contour farming, terraces,...
Summary Principle So far Pending VOLUNTARY WTA – households with medium level assets Understanding opportunity costs for w...
CONCLUSIONS <ul><li>YES!  RES can contribute to rural incomes in upstream areas that provide ES if the scheme  </li></ul><...
WHAT IS THE RIGHT LANGUAGE? PAYMENT OR CO-INVESTMENT FOR ES? van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>A strict interpretat...
WHAT DOES A CO-INVESTMENT AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ENTAIL?  van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>“ co-investment ” an...
REFLECTIONS ON VALUE OF  IFAD INVESTMENTS INTO RUPES AND PRESA <ul><li>Generating evidence, often less funded by developme...
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Icraf at ifad on res rupes presa part 2

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  • Voluntary ES delivery not measured Payments tied to performance of IMPs Monitoring of IMPs shows a progression from modes of support that imply government inputs but without monitoring of adoption or environmental service provision (Types 1 and 2) through schemes that make incentive payments for adoption of IMPs (Types 3 and 4), Unlike China’s other main grassland RES scheme, the GRP, the Tibet RES scheme seeks to incentivize improved management of both degraded and undegraded grasslands. The rewards are to be made conditional on maintaining sustainable stocking levels on lands to which herders have legal use rights. Most grassland conservation projects in China would be Type 2 – investments by government in inputs to improved grassland management but without enforcing links between payments and adoption of IMPs. China’s GRP, which makes payments for households participating in the scheme in theory introduces conditionality – payments are only made to households that implement the grazing prohibitions and grazing is supposedly monitored – would fit into the Type 3 category.
  • In a landscape, the community deals with three other main groups in five major ways (see arrows in Fig. 2): Private sector entities who buy marketable commodities for further processing and trade and/or use the landscape resources for added value (e.g. through hydropower or the sale of drinking water), Governments imposing rules on the private sector and their interaction with ES Government agencies, sometimes acting to represent international conventions, regulating what the community is allowed to do, how it has to organize its administration and how it can be part of development processes prioritized at higher levels, Consumers who buy local goods and may be interested in supporting ES as well, Consumers elsewhere in the world who opt for competitively priced goods, but also have concerns about the status of poverty indicators, natural resources and human rights in the area
  • In a landscape, the community deals with three other main groups in five major ways (see arrows in Fig. 2): Private sector entities who buy marketable commodities for further processing and trade and/or use the landscape resources for added value (e.g. through hydropower or the sale of drinking water), Governments imposing rules on the private sector and their interaction with ES Government agencies, sometimes acting to represent international conventions, regulating what the community is allowed to do, how it has to organize its administration and how it can be part of development processes prioritized at higher levels, Consumers who buy local goods and may be interested in supporting ES as well, Consumers elsewhere in the world who opt for competitively priced goods, but also have concerns about the status of poverty indicators, natural resources and human rights in the area
  • In a landscape, the community deals with three other main groups in five major ways (see arrows in Fig. 2): Private sector entities who buy marketable commodities for further processing and trade and/or use the landscape resources for added value (e.g. through hydropower or the sale of drinking water), Governments imposing rules on the private sector and their interaction with ES Government agencies, sometimes acting to represent international conventions, regulating what the community is allowed to do, how it has to organize its administration and how it can be part of development processes prioritized at higher levels, Consumers who buy local goods and may be interested in supporting ES as well, Consumers elsewhere in the world who opt for competitively priced goods, but also have concerns about the status of poverty indicators, natural resources and human rights in the area
  • Icraf at ifad on res rupes presa part 2

    1. 1. REALISTIC: Effective Soil and water conservation practices have little effect on water yield, but significant effect on sediment yield Hydrological modelling results from Sasumua BMP Sediment yield reduction (%) Reduction in surface runoff (%) Increase in base flow (%) Contour farming with trees 49 16 8 Grass filter strips 38 - - Grass waterway 41 - - Terraces 85 22 10
    2. 2. Business case for PWS <ul><li>Grassed waterway in Sasumua (3m width by 20 km length - approx 15 acres) </li></ul>Benefit to Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Cooperation 20% less sediment yield into Sasumua dam: ≡ cost alum <ul><li>Cost to 500 households </li></ul><ul><li>Year 1 : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Land Annual lease </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Labour and grass </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Year 2 onwards: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Land Annual lease </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Labour maintenance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Opportunity cost (18% on investment) </li></ul></ul>Net annual saving Year 4 onwards: Net annual earning per household: 1,725,000 283,200 (Values in Kenya Shillings) 566.4 2,000,000 1,716,800
    3. 3. Increasing value accruing to farmers <ul><li>Alternative payment mechanisms - Ulugurus </li></ul><ul><li>Co-investment e.g., improvement of village infrastructure - preferred </li></ul><ul><li>Group payments – not likely to be successful </li></ul><ul><li>Exploiting other income flows from sustainable watershed management: </li></ul><ul><li>Carbon: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Albertine Rift: 17 farmers in River Mubuku watershed getting paid for 5735.88 tCO 2 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Usambaras: REDD feasibility studies </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Eco-certification of crafts and honey in Albertine Rift </li></ul><ul><li>Biodiversity: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Fouta Djallon - UNDP co-financing </li></ul></ul>Ulugurus Mts, Tanzania
    4. 4. Sediment sources in Sasumua <ul><li>Low erosion rates from the forest </li></ul><ul><li>High rates on some agricultural areas, exceeding 11.2 tons/ha per year </li></ul>Reducing costs: targeting hotspots
    5. 5. CONDITIONALITY <ul><li>If performance will not happen without incentives </li></ul><ul><li>Kick-started farmers are willing to maintain interventions (performance) even without payments </li></ul><ul><li>Ulugurus : Prototype payments, one year </li></ul><ul><li>Upper Tana: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UTZ coffee certification, 9 years </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Rainforest Alliance tea certification </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Risk of Crowding out effect - Usambaras </li></ul>If payments will not happen without performance Not yet investigated, but our theories are: Short run: Buyers are likely to pay (for effort) based on trust – CSR Long run: Buyers are more likely to pay based on rigorous proof Western Usambaras, Tanzania
    6. 6. VOLUNTARY Can buyers and sellers get into mutually beneficial agreements? <ul><li>Farmers mostly willing to accept (WTA) payments for: </li></ul><ul><li>enhancing water quality </li></ul><ul><li>Via agroforestry and other soil and water conservation actions </li></ul>Farmers may underestimate their opportunity costs (e.g., Kapingazi study): $93/ha/y compared to model estimate of $232/ha/y <ul><li>Households not WTA ( Ulugurus ): </li></ul><ul><li>male-headed </li></ul><ul><li>located in the main villages </li></ul><ul><li>With fewer members </li></ul><ul><li>with less livestock assets </li></ul>
    7. 7. WTP: Sasumua: <ul><li>Nairobi water users - 2 o beneficiaries </li></ul><ul><li>Willing to pay higher water tariffs </li></ul><ul><li>Interested in increased and regular flow </li></ul><ul><li>Nairobi Water and Sewerage Cooperation - 1 o beneficiary </li></ul><ul><li>Burdened with multiple levies </li></ul><ul><li>Not authorised to increase water tariffs </li></ul><ul><li>Governance - Inadequate management </li></ul><ul><li>Poor infrastructure </li></ul>
    8. 8. Summary Principle So far Pending REALISTIC Effectiveness Attributing improved water quality to contour farming, terraces, grass strips - GIS and hydrological modeling Field testing - Sasumua Efficiency Spatial targeting – hotspots Quantifying cost reduction and impact Affordability Business case – one site <ul><li>Replication – water prototype payments in Guinea </li></ul><ul><li>Conditions for RES business case </li></ul><ul><li>Estimate other ES values and how they can be developed - Biodiversity prototype, Guinea </li></ul><ul><li>REDD+ feasibility, Usambaras </li></ul>
    9. 9. Summary Principle So far Pending VOLUNTARY WTA – households with medium level assets Understanding opportunity costs for watershed services Conditions for reward mechanisms – CES, CIS, COS WTP - Private sector participation elusive Negotiation private and public sector Analysing RES readiness Matching demand and supply CONDITIONAL Start-up costs Performance focus Understand role of trust/proof in RES. Equity issues PROPOOR RES-tricky when dealing with very poor hh Investigating mechanisms that make RES pro-poor
    10. 10. CONCLUSIONS <ul><li>YES! RES can contribute to rural incomes in upstream areas that provide ES if the scheme </li></ul><ul><li>involves upstream providers who have low population density and /or a small area relative to downstream beneficiaries; </li></ul><ul><li>downstream beneficiaries have relatively higher income than upstream providers; high willingness and ability to pay. </li></ul><ul><li>provides highly critical and non-substitutable environmental services that are substantial and worth paying; </li></ul><ul><li>is efficient and has low opportunity and transaction costs </li></ul><ul><li>YES, RES can be pro-poor if </li></ul><ul><li>people’s perspectives on factors contributing to poverty is properly assessed  portray social, economic and institutional dimensions of poverty </li></ul><ul><li>rewards match people’s needs and expectations </li></ul><ul><li>there is recognition and respect of choice by local people </li></ul><ul><li>Human capital, social capital and physical capital (non-financial incentives) – are often the most preferred and possible types of rewards </li></ul><ul><li>Higher levels of social cohesion and trust within the community and its external linkages  lower transaction costs. </li></ul>Can P/RES schemes be pro-poor and provide additional income ? Leimona Beria
    11. 11. WHAT IS THE RIGHT LANGUAGE? PAYMENT OR CO-INVESTMENT FOR ES? van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>A strict interpretation of realistic, conditional and voluntary PES (or commoditized ES) appeared problematic in most situations. </li></ul><ul><li>Monetary incentives may be counterproductive for public pro-social activities, since it can </li></ul><ul><ul><li>undermine existing norms </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>not sufficient and/or durable enough to offset the loss of intrinsic motivation. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Replacing the “payment” concept by “co-investment” language appeals to both social and financial concepts. </li></ul>
    12. 12. WHAT DOES A CO-INVESTMENT AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ENTAIL? van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) <ul><li>“ co-investment ” and “ shared responsibility ” is </li></ul><ul><ul><li>conducive to the type of respect, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable development with </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>reference to social exchange rather than financial transactions. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>An evolutionary process …. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>After creating a basis of respect and relationships through the paradigm of CIS there may be more space for specific follow-ups in the paradigm of CES for actual delivery of ES to meet conservation objectives . </li></ul></ul>
    13. 13. REFLECTIONS ON VALUE OF IFAD INVESTMENTS INTO RUPES AND PRESA <ul><li>Generating evidence, often less funded by development donors enabled shared and greater understanding of differences in stakeholders’ knowledge, preferences and aspirations —aligned to IFAD’s multi-stakeholder approach and informed decision-making. </li></ul><ul><li>Transforming local people (with biophysical proof) from being passive recipients/beneficiaries of interventions, to providers of services, raising their profile in the playing field--- aligned to IFAD’s pro-poor objective, through recognition of, and giving voice to poor, marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples. </li></ul><ul><li>Alternative pathway for securing access to land by poor people with ‘conditional tenure’ as reward for provision of environmental services---- aligned to IFAD’s pro-poor objective through improved access to land. </li></ul><ul><li>Alternative route to community/rural development---- aligned to principles of adaptive empowerment and rural development </li></ul><ul><li>Incentivising interventions in a negotiated way, promoted ownership- ---aligned to principles of equity, shared responsibility and ownership. </li></ul><ul><li>Support to national policy process —aligned to IFAD’s relations with national programs </li></ul>

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