Cyber Attack Analysis : Part I DDoS

1,739 views

Published on

Cyber Attack Analysis : Part I DDoS

0 Comments
2 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total views
1,739
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
9
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
66
Comments
0
Likes
2
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Cyber Attack Analysis : Part I DDoS

  1. 1. Cyber-Attacks Analysis Part I : DDoS Kenny Huang, Ph.D. 黃勝雄博士 Executive Council Member, APNIC Member, Board of Directors, TWNIC huangksh@gmail.com
  2. 2. Environmental Outlook Compromised Networks Worldwide 2 NSA reportedly compromised more than 50,000 networks worldwide (NSA, 2013 Nov)
  3. 3. Potential Motivation of Cyber Attacks 3 Political Motivation Extension of politics in the 21st century Cyber-attacks are referred to as the fifth generation warfare Facet Description References 1. Mirkovic, 2004 2. Arbor Networks web 3. Jose Nazario, 2007 Social Motivation Governments are common targets as not supported by people utilize cyber-attack tools against government websites 1. Don Jackson, 2009 2. Steven Adair, 2008 Business Motivation Cyber-attacked by competing companies Steal confidential information 1. FoxNews.com, 2008 2. Eneken Tikk, 2008 Personal Motivation Curiosity Get paid 1. Jeff Carr, 2009 Risks / Benefits It’s nearly impossible to find out who are conducting cyber attacks, there are definitely reasons as to how it would benefit them.
  4. 4. Cyber War Case - Afghanistan • Two-way cyber war measures – Cyber offensive capability – Cyber dependence : • Degree to which a nation relies upon cyber-controlled systems – Cyber defensive capability • “We have the most bandwidth running though our society and are more dependent on that bandwidth. We are the most vulnerable.“ – former Admiral McConnell. • Afghanistan 2001 – US had conducted a cyber war plan, but no targets for cyber warriors, that gives Afghanistan an advantage. – If Afghanistan had any offensive cyber capability, the cyber war would have shifted in different way 4
  5. 5. Cyber War Case - China • Offense vs. defense – US has the most sophisticated offensive capability, but it can’t make up its weaknesses in defensive position. Cyber defense trainings are offensive focus. – China cyber warriors are tasked with both offense and defense in cyberspace. • China advantages in cyber war – Ownership : Internet in China is like an intranet of a company. Government is the only service provider – Censorship • Great Firewall of China provides security advantages • The technology that Chinese use to screen emails/message provide the infrastructure to stop malware • Install software on all computers to keep children from gaining access to pornography – Give China control over every desktop in the country. – Critical infra: For electric power system, US relies on automation controlled system, but China require a large degree of manual control. 5
  6. 6. Cyber War Strength 6 US Cyber Offense: 8 Cyber Dependence : 2 Cyber Defense: 1 Total : 11 Russia Cyber Offense: 7 Cyber Dependence : 5 Cyber Defense: 4 Total : 16 China Cyber Offense: 5 Cyber Dependence : 4 Cyber Defense: 6 Total : 15 Iran Cyber Offense: 4 Cyber Dependence : 5 Cyber Defense: 3 Total : 12 North Korea Cyber Offense: 2 Cyber Dependence : 9 Cyber Defense: 7 Total : 18 (Richard Clarke, 2010).
  7. 7. Cyber Defense Award US Military Training for Cyber Warfare 7 YouTube. (2013 Apr 30). Cyber Defense - Military Training for Cyber Warfare
  8. 8. DDoS: Recent Cases Highlight 8 Date/Location: Event : 2014 June 14 Hong Kong Hong Kong Voting Site Suffers Massive DDoS Attack Before Civil Referendum Date/Location: 2014 June 19 US Event : Facebook being massive DDOS attack by China
  9. 9. DDoS Cyber-Attack Scenarios 9 ssh; ping; ftp; …., etc Spoofed source IP DNS; NTP; …, etc Error 503 Service Unavailable technical compliance protocols technical compliance protocols Amplification Attack
  10. 10. False Assumptions • Attackers use specific pattern to attack – No – Attackers try all means to maximize the outcome – Uniqueness of pattern is the principle of a cyber attack • Severe cyber-attack should be driven by cyber military (cyberwarfare) – Yes and no. – Massive traffic can be easily generated in an affordable price. • Solutions are available to against attacks – Yes and no – No ready-made solution for any cyber-attack • Cyber-attack happens occasionally in the global internet – It happens all the time. Live with it 10
  11. 11. DDoS vs. Cyber War 11 Critical info infrastructure of enemy country Cyber war initiated country DDoS DMZ 1. DDoS can only attack DMZ zone. DMZ was built for that purpose. 2. DDoS attacks are compelling. The targets can be easily identified. It gives enemy an advantage of increasing defensive capability, or relaxing cyber dependence. DDoS Cyber War
  12. 12. ECO System 12 Bot Makers BotNet Builders BotNet Operators BotNet brokers BotNet Users Selling tools or give away System compromised and code distribution. Trade valuable private information. Provide cloud services (non-exclusive ownership) Matching buyers and sellers running code on BotNet platform Legal Enforcement Low Low Low Low Medium
  13. 13. Economy 13 1000 Bots in Australia 24 Hrs : $100 1000 Bots in Vietnam 24 Hrs : $5 1000 Bots in China 24 Hrs Mainland (Tier2 cities) : $13 LiaoNing : $80 GuangDong : $160 1000 Bots in Taiwan 24 Hrs : $484 Bot Applications 1 Sell private information 2 Advertisement 3 DDoS services (PC Magazine, 2009 June)
  14. 14. Math Exercise • Infected PCs (Bot) – Assume 10,000 PCs – Sending 10,000 DNS queries /PC.sec, total 100M queries/sec – Generating outbound traffic 640KBytes/PC.sec – Total Cost : USD 130 (Bot@China) for 24 hrs • Public DNS resolvers – Assume 20,000 servers (open resolvers > 60K) – Message amplification x 50 times=>3,000bytes (6 packets)/msg – Receiving 5,000 DNS queries/server.sec – Generating outbound traffic 15MBytes/server.sec (30,000 packets/server.sec) – Total cost : Free (public goods) • Target Victims – Receiving inbound traffic 300GBytes/sec. (600M packets/sec) – Total liability : considerable costly. (priceless to actors, vice versa) 14
  15. 15. Solution Zone 15 ssh; ping; ftp; …., etc Firewall/DefenseSystem Build filtering rules/policing on the fly 1 block sources 2 block protocols/ports Challenges 1 capacity and performance 2 hard to identify dynamic sources 3 design new algorithm for new patterns instantly. S1 : rules/policing
  16. 16. Continue 16 Spoofed source IP DNS; NTP; …, etc technical compliance protocols technical compliance protocols Amplification Attack Firewall/DefenseSystem S1: BIND rate limit S2: buy transit S3: rules/policing Challenges S1 : out of victim’s control S2 : port speed may not be upgradable accordingly S3 : 1 capacity and performance 2 design new algorithm for new patterns instantly (DNSSEC: destination validation)
  17. 17. Performance Impact for Increasing Rules 17 Firewall Performance Impact Router Performance Impact (TechGuard, 2012)
  18. 18. Strengthen The Defensive System Unique Algorithm for Unique Pattern 18 Analyze attack pattern Design defensive algorithm Sizing engineering #max number of sessions/connections #fit in CPU Cache #risk of saturating a CPU at a given packet rate #timeout adjustment Rapid coding and deployment On going monitoring Knowledge Intensive
  19. 19. 19

×