Migrant Labour, Citizenship, and Social Provision in Contemporary                           Welfare States             Int...
Migrant Labour, Citizenship, and Social Provision in Contemporary                           Welfare States1               ...
blocs in order to both capture and evaluate the myriad of regulatory models and theirimplications.3 With a primary, though...
wanted by native-born. Immigrants were often directed towards specific occupations, forexample, agricultural labour. Immig...
immigration to address labour market shortages, many new immigrants with professionaltraining are unable to translate thei...
employment rates for immigrants were just over 50 percent in Denmark and just over 60percent in the Netherlands (OECD 2005...
Insert Table 4 Here        While migrant labour ranges in occupational categories, and includes both highand low skill cat...
While highly influential in comparative studies of welfare states, this typology hasbeen critiqued for overlooking the cen...
promotion of emigration as a development strategy (to secure remittance income frommigrant workers) is also significant, a...
processes that may shape the ways in which migrant workers are incorporated into alabour market, indicates the centrality ...
citizens are formally restricted to a particular occupation. Migrant workers (non-citizens)constitute a form of “unfree” l...
protections of the society which appropriates their labour”. Temporary migrant workersfill this position within the U.S. l...
relation to an assumed threat to Canada as a ‘white’ nation created by immigrants ofcolour. Differential labour rights acc...
particular accumulation paths within the national economy”. Through these policies,capital gains access to ‘global reserve...
advanced alternative state typologies based upon a comparative analysis of the regulationof migration within specific stat...
situations of social exclusion? What differences and similarities can be observed acrosswelfare regimes? The policy analys...
higher skill levels, Mexico’s primary contribution is to the Seasonal Agricultural WorkersProgram. The table indicates a n...
The workers’ period of employment in Canada ranges from 6 to 40 weeks, with aminimum of 40 hours of work per week, though ...
remain in their host country following the termination of the employment contract. ManyMexican workers in the Bracero prog...
particularly in the service sectors of large urban areas, and has contributed to the furthersegmentation of the U.S. labou...
numbers of temporary workers were recruited by the major western European economiesthrough the 1960s until the early 1970s...
Canadian cases, the tendency is to ease the regulations on the entry of skilled workers,while increasing the controls that...
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new guestworker program was developed,based on similar principles, this time with wor...
further promote integration, residency permits will be accessible after five years (ratherthan seven) for those who have d...
With respect to social provision, the Netherlands provides an example of a middleground between the social democratic and ...
foreign workers.         As these cases demonstrate, occupational status plays a key role in this process.In all cases, wo...
representation in forms of low-wage, insecure employment, contribute to socialstratification between migrants and national...
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
Migrant worekrs social protection
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Migrant worekrs social protection

  1. 1. Migrant Labour, Citizenship, and Social Provision in Contemporary Welfare States International Sociological Association, Research Committee 19 Annual Conference, September 2005 Northwestern University, ChicagoABSTRACT - Migrant labour has become an increasingly significant component ofmany Western labour markets. A growing body of research indicates that migrantworkers hold a wide range of occupations, from undocumented workers in informaleconomies, to workers in heavily regulated temporary labour programs, to highly paidprofessionals. Social policy frameworks of welfare states play a key role in shaping theways in which migrant workers are incorporated into labour markets. As well, policyframeworks for social provision define the rights and entitlements various categories ofmigrants may be eligible to receive. The significance of migrant labour to contemporarylabour markets, along with the wide-ranging implications for social and labour marketpolicies within contemporary welfare states, indicates the profound and multi-facetedconnections between citizenship rights, labour rights, labour mobility, labour marketregulation, and social provision in contemporary welfare states. Taking migrant labour asits focal point, this paper argues that the regulation of citizenship rights, as constructedthrough forms of both labour market incorporation and social provision for variouscategories of migrant labourers, constitutes a definitive characteristic of contemporarywelfare states. Further, the paper argues that the nexus of citizenship and labour rightscreated through the intersection of forms of labour market incorporation and socialprovision, processes which are simultaneously gendered and racialized, constitutes acentral site through which the formation of relations of inclusion and exclusion takeplace, both within contemporary welfare states specifically, and the international politicaleconomy more generally. By identifying patterns of exclusion created through the nexusof citizenship and labour rights, the paper creates the means to explore models of socialprovision that promote social inclusion for migrant workers. FIRST DRAFT Comments Welcome. Please do not cite without permission of the author.Mark ThomasAssistant ProfessorDepartment of SociologyYork University, Toronto, Canada, M3J 1P3Tel: 416-736-2100 ext. 22558; Fax: 416-736-5916; Email: mpthomas@yorku.ca
  2. 2. Migrant Labour, Citizenship, and Social Provision in Contemporary Welfare States1 Mark Thomas York UniversityMigrant labour has become an increasingly significant component of many Westernlabour markets.2 A growing body of research indicates that migrant workers hold a widerange of occupations, from undocumented workers in informal economies, to workers inheavily regulated temporary labour programs, to highly paid professionals. Social policyframeworks of welfare states play a key role in shaping the ways in which migrantworkers are incorporated into labour markets. As well, policy frameworks for socialprovision define the rights and entitlements various categories of migrants may beeligible to receive. The significance of migrant labour to contemporary labour markets,along with the wide-ranging implications for social and labour market policies withincontemporary welfare states, indicates the profound and multi-faceted connectionsbetween citizenship rights, labour rights, labour mobility, labour market regulation, andsocial provision in contemporary welfare states. Patterns of international migration create mounting social policy challenges. Thecombined context of economic globalization and increasing migration has produced theemergence of what Hollifield (2004) terms the ‘migration state’, where the regulation ofimmigration is a central economic and political concern of liberal democracies. Risinglevels of international migration increase state-market tensions characterized by theeconomic need for labour migration and political prerogatives to construct and regulatenational boundaries (Martinello 2002). Migration processes have fuelled debates over thenature of citizenship and have produced calls for strategies to improve the economic andpolitical rights of migrants in host societies (Schuster and Solomos 2002). The goal ofcombining an open labour market to ensure economic growth with social protection forthe growing numbers of immigrant and migrant workers is a key challenge forcontemporary welfare states (Engelen 2003). Migration, and the multiple relations that shape migrant incorporation, challengeexisting typologies of welfare states (Freeman 2004), and necessitate a rethinking ofwelfare state theory. Taking migrant labour as its focal point, this paper argues that theregulation of citizenship rights, as constructed through forms of both labour marketincorporation and social provision for various categories of migrant labourers, constitutesa definitive characteristic of contemporary welfare states. Further, the paper argues thatthe nexus of citizenship and labour rights created through the intersection of forms oflabour market incorporation and social provision, processes which are simultaneouslygendered and racialized, constitutes a central site through which the formation ofrelations of inclusion and exclusion take place, both within contemporary welfare statesspecifically, and the international political economy more generally. Yet, this nexus of citizenship and labour rights is constructed in a variety of waysacross welfare states, and with varying implications for different groups and categories ofmigrant labourers. Thus, using a sample of four welfare states - Canada, Germany,Denmark, and the Netherlands - this paper constructs a comparative analysis of theregulation of migrant labour in the North American and the European Union trading 1
  3. 3. blocs in order to both capture and evaluate the myriad of regulatory models and theirimplications.3 With a primary, though not exclusive, focus on temporary labourprograms, the paper identifies the role of migrant labour, the segmented nature of theincorporation of migrant workers, and the variety of ways in which national andtransnational regulatory frameworks shape patterns of mobility, forms of incorporation,and labour rights. The analysis suggests that existing regulatory models display variationand complexity, and include social policy models that range from increased regulation bystate policies that restrict access to nationally-based labour markets to systems of labourlaw that produce highly unregulated working conditions for specific categories of migrantworkers. Through this method, the analysis reveals patterns of segmentation andinequality between groups of migrant workers within and across each of the selectedwelfare states. Further, and despite key differences in models of labour marketregulation, the lens of labour market segmentation theory, which draws attention to thegendered and racialized dimensions of labour market incorporation and social provision,identifies clear and common patterns of marginalization of migrants across the researchsample. The paper argues that segmented approaches to labour market incorporation ofmigrant workers adopted by each of the selected welfare states (though in varying ways)that attempt to resolve tensions between labour market demands for high and low-skillworkers and political resistance to immigrants. The paper is organized into three sections. The first section briefly reviewsmigration and labour market data from the North American and Western Europeeconomic regions. The second section raises the key theoretical questions that guide thepaper, and draws upon relevant sociological literature that is used to argue for a re-theorization of welfare states using a migration lens. The third section constructs casestudies of selected migration policies from each of the welfare state types. This sectionhighlights the intersection of processes of migration, the regulation of citizenship rights,and labour market marginalization. By identifying patterns of exclusion created throughthe nexus of citizenship and labour rights, the paper creates the means to explore modelsof social provision that promote social inclusion for migrant workers. GLOBALIZATION AND LABOUR MIGRATIONGlobalization is often associated with increasing levels of transnational trade andinvestment. Increased labour migration is also a central component of an integratedworld economy (Harris 1995). International migration has been increasing since the endof World War II and by the turn of the 20th century, 175 million people live outside theircountry of origin (IOM 2003). Of these, approximately 86 million are economicallyactive migrant and immigrant workers.4 There are many historical examples of large-scale migrations in response tolabour demands. In the contemporary period, large scale immigrations began after thesecond world war, in the context of dramatic economic growth in advanced capitalisteconomies. This occurred both within Europe and to North America. At that time, mostmigrants coming to North America were from Western and Eastern European origins andmany/most were manual labourers. The influx of manual labour facilitated developmentof emerging ‘white collar’ work forces as immigrant labourers took on employment not 2
  4. 4. wanted by native-born. Immigrants were often directed towards specific occupations, forexample, agricultural labour. Immigration partly facilitated the upward mobility of thenative-born, as it ensured there were workers for the various forms of manual labour. Contemporary migration patterns are connected to what the ILO terms a ‘globaljobs crisis’, whereby currently the ILO estimates that over one billion people areun/underemployed.5 In this context, South to North migration is the fastest growingmigration path, with approximately 60 per cent of migrants living in advancedindustrialized countries (Castles 2004a). From the 1970s through the 1990s, the top tenemigration countries were in the global South (IOM 2003). These patterns are connected to processes of economic and spatial re-organizationexperienced within many industrialized economies in response to the economic downturnof the early 1970s (Sassen 2002). In the context of economic globalization, there isdemand for not only high skill (for example, finance, IT) workers, but also those in low-skill occupational categories (IOM 2002). Specifically, labour migrations to Northerneconomies are driven, in part, by demand for low wage labour created by the“downgrading” of a broad range of manufacturing sectors and the “informalization” of awide range of economic activities. Growing numbers of immigrant and migrant workersperform many important but often invisible forms of labour in the major cities of theglobal economy, in both private sector services and manufacturing. OECD countries with the largest numbers and some of the highest proportions offoreign workers include the United States, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Switzerland,Austria, the United Kingdom and Canada. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of foreignand foreign-born labour in selected OECD countries in 2002. Insert Table 1 Here Economic growth in a global context creates new demands for workers, beyondthe capacity of domestic labour pools. Further, many of the jobs held by recentimmigrant and migrant workers are jobs that are not desired by native-born. In Canada, itis estimated that immigration will likely account for all net labour force growth by 2011,and total population growth by 2031. In this context, policy emphasis has been placed onprioritizing economic criteria in the immigration selection process. While this is not anew orientation in terms of Canada’s immigration policies, reforms in the mid-1990sfurther emphasized these tendencies. Those who enter Canada tend to hold strong credentials. In 1995, 41 percent ofworking-age immigrants and refugees had a post-secondary degree on landing, while57 percent had one in 1999. By comparison, 42 percent of the total working-ageCanadian population had a post-secondary degree in 1999. Nonetheless, academic andgovernment reports indicate clear disparities between the labour market experiences ofthe Canadian-born and those who enter the country in search of employment. In thecontemporary labour market, immigrant and migrant workers often fill the most ‘flexible’and insecure forms of employment (Sassen 1998). While there has been manufacturingrelocation to the South, primarily of low-skill assembly jobs, and services development inthe advanced economies, not all services are high-skill, with strong growth in forms ofnonstandard and precarious employment. Immigrant and migrant workers predominantlyfill these types of jobs. While demographic changes have increased reliance on 3
  5. 5. immigration to address labour market shortages, many new immigrants with professionaltraining are unable to translate their credentials into comparable employment andcompensation in Canada (Galabuzi 2004). This situation has translated into clear income disparities between recentimmigrants and the Canadian-born. In 2000, while the low income rate was 15.6 percentfor the Canadian population overall, the rate for immigrants in Canada six years or lesswas 35.8 percent, and for immigrants in Canada for six to 10 years was 28.3 percent.Even for immigrant workers with high skill levels, income levels declined through the1980s and 1990s, contributing to these disparities.6 This is not a uniquely Canadian experience. In the European Union-15, between1997 and 2002, third country nationals contributed to 22 percent of employment growth,accounting for 3.6 percent of total employment by 2002.7 As stated in the Commissionof the European Communities’ First Annual Report on Migration and Integration (CEC2004:3) “third countries’ labour is increasingly appearing as a major potential, which canbe tapped to respond to both the continuing demand for low skilled as well as thegrowing demand for skilled labour”. Patterns of employment of foreign workers in the E.U. are highly polarized. Themajority of migrant workers are concentrated within lower skilled segments of servicesectors, jobs that offer little in terms of incomes and mobility such as hotels, catering andcleaning, as well as low-skill construction and manufacturing (CEC 2004; EIRO 2003).8Smaller numbers are found in high skill and professional occupations (e.g., medical,academic). For example, migrants from the EU-15 to the new EU member statesconstitute a cohort of high skill, temporary workers concentrated in large urban centres.Table 2 outlines the employment of foreign workers by sector in 2001-02 in selectedOECD countries. As the table indicates, sectors that employ the largest proportions offoreign workers include mining/manufacturing/energy, construction, wholesale and retailtrade, hotel/restaurant, and other services. Health and community services is also a keysite in some countries, particularly in North Western Europe. Insert Table 2 Here These patterns of migration and employment are highly gendered. Womenconstitute approximately 49 percent of all migrants (UN 2004). However, migrantwomen are primarily employed in private service sector employment, in households asdomestic workers, and in the global sex trade, intensifying conditions of marginalizationand exploitation (Chang 2000; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; OECD 2005). Aswomen’s employment has increased in industrialized economies, women migrants havetaken on the role of paid caregiver in these households. Despite labour demands, unemployment rates of third country nationals remainedover twice that of EU-nationals during the past decade. Lack of access to employmentremains a major obstacle to social integration. This condition persists, despite labourmarket demand due to discrimination and racism, a gap between the credentials ofmigrants and recognition of these credentials in host countries, as well as languagebarriers.9 Denmark and the Netherlands have some of the largest differentials inemployment rates between foreign workers and nations. While the labour forceparticipation for the total population exceeded 75 percent in both countries in 2002-03, 4
  6. 6. employment rates for immigrants were just over 50 percent in Denmark and just over 60percent in the Netherlands (OECD 2005). Like the employment patterns of migrant workers, unemployment rates formigrants are themselves gendered. Labour force participation rates for migrant womenare much lower those of male migrants, with a greater gender gap in employment thanthat between male and female nationals (OECD 2005). Table 3 indicates thesedisparities. The labour force participation rate of migrant women is particularly low inrelation to other groups in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. As one possibleexplanation for these disparities, family responsibilities are cited as a reason forremaining outside the labour force much more frequently among foreigners thannationals in European countries surveyed by the OECD. Insert Table 3 There As nation-states attempt to manage tensions between labour market demand (forboth high and low skill workers), national community/identity construction, and socialintegration/social provision, temporary worker programs have become an increasinglycommon strategy. Even countries with longstanding permanent immigration programssuch as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand have recently begun toplace greater emphasis on increasing the numbers of workers entering on non-permanentwork visas (IOM 2002).10 Temporary worker programs facilitate the entry of workersinto a host country’s labour market generally for a specified period of time, and oftenwith restrictions and/or limitations on the economic and social rights of the migrantworkers. These programs may be regulated through regional agreements (NAFTA),national immigration policy (Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) orthrough specific multi-lateral and/or industry specific agreements (Canada-Mexico-Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program) (Aleinikoff and Chetail 2003).Temporary worker programs exist for both low-skill (seasonal agricultural) and high skill(information technology) forms of employment. Generally, those in higher skilledoccupational categories experience fewer barriers to entry and longer term residency thanthose in lower skilled categories. Those in higher skilled categories are often personnelof multinational corporations on temporary assignments or training programs. While growth in temporary employment is a common pattern in manyindustrialized labour markets, foreign workers occupy a greater percentage of temporaryjobs than do nationals in many OECD countries.11 In the EU, over 20 percent of thirdcountry nationals held fixed term contracts in 2001, as compared to 13 percent of EUnationals (EIRO 2003). In some countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, andSweden, the rate of non-EU nationals holding temporary employment contracts ascompared to EU nationals is more than double.12 Table 4 indicates the numbers of temporary workers entering selected OECDcountries in recent years, as well as their general employment categories. As the tableindicates, countries the numbers of workers entering on temporary work permits isclearly increasing in key OECD economies. While the table does not distinguish clearlybetween occupational and skill categories (a topic discussed further below), temporaryworker programs include both. Countries with the largest inflows of high skilled workersinclude the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany, in that order (IOM2003). 5
  7. 7. Insert Table 4 Here While migrant labour ranges in occupational categories, and includes both highand low skill categories of workers, workers in low-skill temporary labour programscontinue to be the majority of migrants (UN 2004). Thus, many groups of immigrant andmigrant workers continue form a racialized underclass of workers in low-wage, low-security forms of employment. The existence and growth of these forms of programsconstitutes a key challenge for contemporary welfare states. THEORIZING WELFARE STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF MIGRATIONWelfare states are generally identified with the period of postwar Fordism and areassociated with a number of advanced capitalist economies. The dominant public policyparadigm during the Fordist years (45-75) was Keynesianism and the specific state formthat developed during this period was the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS). The KWSconsisted of three general elements: a mixed economy (public and private sector) withdemand-management economic policies; universal social services; a political consensuson the desirability of the model (Peck 1996; McBride and Shields 1997). It applied theFordist model to the organization of government, ensuring the mass provision ofstandardized services and the expansion of large public sector bureaucracies. It wasbased on the general principles of collectivism, social rights through citizenship, equality,full employment, social entitlement, and social inclusion and integration. Within western welfare states, there was variation in both the extent and form ofthe implementation of these principles. The classic typology of welfare states consists ofthree different models – liberal, social democratic, conservative - as developed byEsping-Anderson (1990). The characteristics of liberal welfare states include a narrowdefinition of eligibility for social assistance, means-tested assistance, and modestuniversal transfers or modest social insurance plans. Overall, the state supports the freemarket through a minimalist approach to welfare provision, stepping in only where themarket fails to provide. Key examples of this model include Australia, Canada, UnitedStates, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Characteristics of socialdemocratic welfare states include: universal social assistance programs, whereby allcitizens are eligible (eligibility does not depend on need or employment status);comprehensive risk coverage with generous benefits; high levels of unionization. Thesocial democratic welfare state attempts to eliminate the market from the provision ofsocial security through social programs that include old-age pensions, daycare, and socialassistance, and generally promote the decommodification of labour. Key examplesinclude Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Finally, characteristics of conservativewelfare states include: a corporatist system of social policy and social assistance; theintegration of state and market, for example through a combination of state and employerplans and funds (for pensions, social security, etc.); an emphasis on familialism, orreliance on the family as primary care-giver and provider of welfare; and relatedly, strongjob protection for adult males. Overall, the state picks up where the family fails. Keyexamples include Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Japan. 6
  8. 8. While highly influential in comparative studies of welfare states, this typology hasbeen critiqued for overlooking the centrality of gender and household relations to therespective state types and for maintaining a narrow focus on policies and states, ratherthan on broader social and economic formations of which welfare states are only a part.In light of these critiques, scholars working from a feminist political economyperspective have expanded to typology to directly incorporate the ways in which differentwelfare regime types are constructed through varying relations between states, marketsand households (O’Conner et al. 1999). Clement (2001) advances the model of a ‘class-gender nexus’ to encapsulate the ways in which states and market relations in variousregime types both condition and are conditioned by relations of social reproduction. The typology of welfare states is further challenged by the aforementionedpatterns of labour migration. The centrality of labour migration, and in particulartemporary labour migration, to contemporary industrialized labour markets makes itnecessary to rethink how and on what grounds economic and political communities areconstituted. These conditions raise the following questions. What role do welfare stateshave in regulating labour migrations and in determining the incorporation of migrantworkers? Are there differences between regime types in terms of policy frameworks,migration processes, and models of social inclusion/exclusion? While the typology ofwelfare regimes is highly useful in analyzing variety between state-market-householdrelations, a dialogue between migration research and welfare state theory is essentialgiven the centrality of labour migration to the contemporary global economy. This paperdraws upon two broad bodies of sociological literature – (1) research on globalization andmigration and (2) labour market segmentation theory - to develop the theoreticalargument for the need to re-theorize welfare state analysis in relation to patterns of labourmigration.Globalization and MigrationContemporary patterns of labour migration take place in the context of economicglobalization, a processes defined by the extension of markets, the increased mobility ofcapital, and the restructuring of production. Several overarching international trendsdefine this context in relation to increased levels of international migration: a demand forlow and high-skill migrant workers from receiving countries; increased ‘push’ factorsincluding growing inequality between the North and South; intensified competition inglobal markets, largely due to the negotiation of free trade agreements; increased levelsof marginalization of migrant worker populations due to racism, discrimination inemployment, and restrictive migrant labour policies; and pressures for improvements tomigrant labour rights (see Martin 2002; Stephen 2001; Taran 2000; Wall 1994). Pellerin (1992: 91) argues that globalization has affected migration bothquantitatively, by increasing “the conditions for migration and the geographical areassubject to it”, and qualitatively, through the emergence of new migration patterns. Inmany areas of the world, globalization has led to increased ‘poverty and precariousness’,the ‘push’ factors that stimulate migration. Political conflicts have produced growingnumbers refugees and asylum seekers as well. The development of free-trade areas (EC,North America, and ASEAN countries) has promoted regionally based migrations,including the movement of low-wage labour from the periphery to the ‘centres’. The 7
  9. 9. promotion of emigration as a development strategy (to secure remittance income frommigrant workers) is also significant, as is the related labour market demand inindustrialized economies for workers for low-wage, insecure employment. In addition tothese structural processes, Castles (2004a) indicates that the establishment of migrantnetworks, whereby families and community members support and may follow initialgroups of workers to a host society, have played a key role in maintaining and furtheringthe migration process. Labour migration is a central tendency in the process of globalization. Rosewarne(2001: 72) notes that migration is often considered “one of the few avenues of hope formaterial survival” in the highly polarized international economy. However, whileglobalization facilitates increased mobility of capital, the movement of people remainshighly regulated. Thus, the current globalized context is characterized by “new forms ofinstitutionalized racism and bureaucratic abuse” for migrant populations attempting toescape political or economic hardship (73). The regulation of migration is definedprimarily in terms of the labour requirements of the advanced economies, and largelytakes place along regional lines: within the NAFTA region, the EC, and East and SouthEast Asia. Castles (2004a:211) highlights the centrality of the North-South divide –defined as “growing disparities in income, social conditions, human rights and securitylinked to globalization” - as a key factor in producing South to North migration flows.Migration policies are connected to broader North-South relations, with and hold thepotential to intensify North-South inequalities. To better understand issues surrounding labour mobility, Stasiulis (1997) arguesthe need to study ‘the political economy of migration’, a theoretical approach developedto explain why and how migrations happen that focuses on the economic, political, andcultural factors that produce inequality related to patterns of migration. Key to thisperspective is the assertion that the migration decisions and actions of individuals andfamilies are rooted in contemporary manifestations of histories of economic and politicalinequalities between sending and receiving countries. This approach places primarilyemphasis on the importance of structural factors in explaining both the determinants ofmigration and the nature in which migrants are incorporated into a destination society.This perspective suggests that in the contemporary context, while globalization is oftenassumed to promote freedom of movement, mobility is primarily experienced by capital,or only certain select categories of workers.Migration and Labour Market SegmentationThese Migration processes are directly connected to patterns of labour marketsegmentation. Labour market segmentation theory was developed to analyze thestructural divisions that exist within labour markets and to determine the sources of thesedivisions (Peck 1996). A key assumption of the theoretical approach is that labourmarkets are divided into primary and secondary markets, with the former defined by jobsof high mobility and high security, and the latter defined by low wage, low securityemployment. A more nuanced approach to understanding labour market insecurity hasbeen advanced through a model of precarious employment developed by Cranford et al.(2003), which suggests a continuum of precariousness, rather than a simple model oflabour market dualism. Labour market segmentation theory indicates the structural 8
  10. 10. processes that may shape the ways in which migrant workers are incorporated into alabour market, indicates the centrality of citizenship rights to patterns of segmentationand forms of incorporation, and highlights the need to study the role of the state in thisprocess. In relation to the contemporary patterns of migration referenced above,Rosewarne (2001) argues that two tiers of migrants have emerged: skilled, educatedprofessionals with few barriers to restrict their mobility, and lower skilled workersadmitted for limited periods of time, primarily for seasonal agriculture or service sectorindustries. In general, the entry of low-skilled workers has been highly regulated asstates have increased regulations that restrict border crossing for those who do not meetspecific labour market requirements. Despite increased regulation, forms of illegal entryhave emerged in response to increased migration restrictions. Illegal status facilitatesincreased levels of exploitation by employers, who are not subject to high levels of stateregulation, as “states have devoted comparatively few resources to regulating thepresence of these migrant workers” (74). Castles (2004a) suggests that the propensity forundocumented or ‘illegal’ immigrant workers has increased in direct relation toneoliberal labour market reforms that promote deregulation as a competitiveness strategy,with the effect of eroding regulatory institutions and promoting growth in casualemployment, where many migrants find work. The relationship between patterns of labour market segmentation and theemployment of immigrant workers is identified by Wong (1984) and confirmed in a laterstudy by Richmond (1991), who examine immigration trends in relation to structuralchanges in the Canadian economy and labour market. Both see immigration patternsreplicating patterns of labour market segmentation, with immigrants channelled intoeither skilled professional, technical and managerial positions, or unskilled, low-wage,insecure forms of employment. Both income and occupational polarization are evidentbetween immigrants from ‘traditional’ (i.e. Western European) and ‘non-traditional’source countries. Richmond also examines the temporary visa program and finds thatalmost half of the workers in the temporary visa program, once renewals are accountedfor, are single women from low-income countries employed in domestic service. Labour market segmentation theory attempts to account for the role of labourmarket institutions in the construction of patterns of segmentation. With respect to theexperiences of migrant workers, this is most directly accomplished through the role of thestate in constructing and regulating migrant worker programs and policies. A keyconcept advanced to explain this relationship is that of ‘incorporation’, the term used torefer to the manner in which migrants are inserted into the dominant relations ofproduction of the society they are entering. With reference to the use of foreign-bornlabour, Satzewich (1991) argues that there are four primary forms of incorporation offoreign-born labourers: free immigrant labour; unfree immigrant labour; free migrantlabour; and unfree migrant labour. The specifics of each form is reliant upon twoconditions: the ability of the workers to circulate in the labour market, and their potentialto attain citizenship status. The immigrant/migrant distinction is constructed in relationto citizenship, while conditions of freedom/unfreedom are defined in relation to formallabour market opportunities. For example, while those defined as free immigrant labourhold the potential for citizenship rights, and are not subject to formal restrictions onlabour market mobility, those defined as unfree migrant labour are unable to become 9
  11. 11. citizens are formally restricted to a particular occupation. Migrant workers (non-citizens)constitute a form of “unfree” labour in the global economy: they are exploitable becausetheir mobility is limited by the migrant labour contract; and because of the system ofglobal inequality that produced the conditions that forced them to migrate. Freeman(2004), however, cautions against overgeneralization, and argues that despite the broadcharacter of migration processes of course, forms and patterns of incorporation varyconsiderably across national contexts and may be shaped by a range of social processesand institutional arrangements. While low-wage and high-skilled migrants experience very different sets ofemployment rights, Peixoto (2001) suggests that highly skilled migrant workersnonetheless experience obstacles to mobility within the E.U. as well. Despite EU policiesdesigned to promote mobility, there remain significant political and legal obstacles tomobility even for highly skilled workers. These include government resistance toEuropean legislation, the denial of citizenship rights (including acquisition of nationalityand voting rights), varied requirements for professional recognition, and some resistancefrom professional groups to competition from external sources. Social and culturalbarriers, including linguistic capabilities, levels of social capital, and nationally-specificskills development, compound these formal, policy-level obstacles. . While there havebeen legislative developments favourable to increased migration within the EU of highlyskilled workers, such legislative developments have not been “directly proportional to anincrease in movements” (47) for the aforementioned reasons. Thus, the most significantincrease in highly skilled workers has taken place within the internal labour markets oftransnational corporations. Citizenship is a key variable in the existence of forms of social exclusion andmarginalization. Citizenship denotes the formal entitlement to political rights within anational community and constitutes a central means through which migrants are excludedfrom full participation within the receiving society (Baines and Sharma 2002). Part ofthat process is the acceptance of the belief that ‘foreigners’ should not have the samerights as nationals (economic, political). Citizenship rights are often both gendered andracialized, being based on male breadwinner norms (for example Canada’sUnemployment Insurance and Family Allowance programs), and racialized conceptionsof the national community. The creation of the national community is formalized andimplemented through the allocation of citizenship rights, as those who are deemed asmembers (or potential members) of the national community are those that are grantedaccess to the rights of citizenship. By controlling access to citizenship rights, the stateplays a key role in determining the nature of incorporation experienced by newly arrivingmigrants. Further, there may be many ideological and cultural factors that shape thedetermination of the ‘appropriate citizen’. Citizenship is thus connected to the creation ofgroups of “highly exploitable and socially excluded workers”, for example, farm workersand foreign domestic workers (Baines and Sharma 2002: 76). Temporary labour programs are a key example of the intersection of increasedlabour migration, labour market segmentation, and state regulation of migrant workers.Guestworker programs provide states with the means to address the need to both promoteeconomic openness and resolve political concerns over the permanent settlement ofimmigrants (Hollifield 2004). Morris (1994:138) develops the concept of ‘underclass’ todescribe “a disadvantaged group of workers with limited claims to the resources and 10
  12. 12. protections of the society which appropriates their labour”. Temporary migrant workersfill this position within the U.S. labour market, in particular Mexican migrants employedin agriculture. While they may pay both income tax and social security contributions,illegal migrants do not make claims upon public services. Temporary migrant workersalso hold highly vulnerable positions within European labour markets, characterized bylimited legal rights in their country of employment. Migrant labourers generally holdjobs that are characterized by low status, employment insecurity, that are difficult to fill,and that are highly subject to demand fluctuations. The commitment of the freemovement of people within the EU through the Single European Act (1992) is ambiguouswith respect to non-European Community nationals, as individual governments remainable to regulate external migration. Morris argues that an extremely vulnerableunderclass of migrant workers has resulted in both the European and U.S. cases throughthe intersection of two goals: first, the need to address labour demands, and second,concerns over the need to protect national resources and culture from ‘outsiders’. Thesetypes of programs have the effect of creating a form of ‘differentiated exclusion’,whereby migrants are granted access to the labour market, but not to other aspects ofsociety, for example political citizenship rights (Castles in Engelen 2003:517). Castles(2004b) argues that this process of exclusion creates a form of labour force stratificationbased on legal status. These policies are constructed directly in relation to patterns of racialization.Carter, Green and Halpern (1996) construct a comparison of U.S. and British migrantlabour policies. By examining migration policies in the U.S. from 1900 - 1925 and inBritain from 1948 - 1962, they argue that both states have developed ‘race’-based notionsof national identity that have facilitated the racialization of migration policies. Racializedpolicies legitimized a system of population ranking, whereby some groups wereconstructed as more likely to assimilate into the national population than others. Thoseidentified as non-assimilable were constructed as migrants. In both cases, the labourpower of migrant workers was restricted in the host labour market. Satzewich (1991)demonstrates that Canada’s migrant agricultural labour program displays similartendencies, as it accords temporary employment permits to migrants from Mexico and theCaribbean but prohibits these migrants from applying for citizenship. The prohibition oncitizenship stemmed, in part, from race-based concerns over the construction of the‘national community’. Sharma (2001) illustrates how, by controlling access tocitizenship rights, the Canadian state has been able to construct differential sets of rightsfor workers within its borders. Racist discourses and ideologies played a central role inthe construction of migrant labour policies - specifically the Non-immigrant EmploymentAuthorization Program, as migrant workers have been constructed as ‘problems’ forCanadian society. This discursive and ideological construction has contributed to adifferentiation of migrants from Canadian citizens within the Canadian labour force. Theexpansion of the issuance of temporary employment authorizations in 2001 is “part of along-term move that makes it more difficult for certain groups of people to enter, live andwork in Canada as permanent residents and eventually formal citizens” (416). In thecontext of increased international migration, the Canadian state has increased restrictionson how people are able to cross its borders. As part of this process, the categorization ofsome workers as ‘migrant workers’ legitimizes a differential set of rights for thoseworkers. Within immigration policies, the category of migrant worker was constructed in 11
  13. 13. relation to an assumed threat to Canada as a ‘white’ nation created by immigrants ofcolour. Differential labour rights accorded to Mexican and Caribbean workers employedin agricultural labour are legitimized through the categorization of these workers asmigrants. Migration processes are also highly segmented through gender relations.Understanding the gendered dynamics of migration requires an analysis of not only themigration patterns and experiences of men and women, but also of the ways in whichmigration processes are themselves shaped by gender relations (Pessar and Mahler 2003).Pessar and Mahler illustrate that states often play key roles in shaping the genderedcharacter of migration, for example in policies that facilitate cross-border mobility ofworkers, but restrict the mobility of families. Domestic worker programs, whichfacilitate the mobility of women from the South to work in households in North Americaand Western Europe as caregivers are another example (Chang 2000). A key componentto the gendered character of temporary worker programs is the tendency to completelyprivatize the costs of and responsibilities for social reproduction. As non-citizens,migrant workers are unable to access basic social services entitled to the citizens of thehost national community. Further, in some cases, such as the case of agricultural workersin Canada, migrant workers are prohibited from bringing family members to the hostcountry. This ensures that social reproduction is managed in the home country,minimizing or eliminating the social obligation of the host nation-state and furtherintensifying gendered care-giving norms. The incorporation/segmentation thesis has been challenged by Castles (2002),who argues that the increased mobility created through new communications andtransportations technologies facilitates a proliferation of cross-border flows andtransnational networks. Further, the overall context of globalization, according toCastles, has led to an erosion of state sovereignty and autonomy, thereby weakeningsystems of border (and migration) control. Combined, these tendencies have blurred theboundaries between categories of migrants, indicating that the immigrant/temporarymigrant dichotomy is insufficient to conceptualize the complexity of contemporarymigration processes. From this perspective, the role of the state is less significant thanthat presented through the traditional political economy lens. The German guestworkerprogram, which was designed to facilitate a pool of temporary workers actually led to thepermanent settlement of migrant workers and their families, provides a key example ofthe limited capacity of states to control the migration process in absolute terms (Castles2004a). Others present a different view. Martin (1997) argues that, in the current context,temporary worker programs have been restructured through increased restrictions on theresidency of migrant workers. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, migrant labourpolicies in Germany were designed to address macro or sectoral labour shortages.Following the termination of the program, Germany experienced large numbers ofworkers remaining in the country outside the scope of their employment contracts. In thecontemporary period, new worker programs have made it more difficult for migrantworkers to become permanent residents in order to promote a system of returningmigrants. Similarly, rather than weakened state powers, Rosewarne (2001: 79) suggeststhat the overall state regulation of migration, in particular through temporary labourprograms, “has once again become a key instrument in state endeavours to facilitate 12
  14. 14. particular accumulation paths within the national economy”. Through these policies,capital gains access to ‘global reserves’ of labour and nation states are able to relinquishresponsibility for long term investment in the social reproduction of the labour force.Re-theorizing Welfare RegimesThese research literatures demonstrate the significance of migrant labour to contemporaryindustrialized labour markets, the relationships between migration and patterns of labourmarket segmentation, and the role of states in both regulating migration and reproducingsegmentation. Migration patterns and associated social processes present severalchallenges to welfare state analysis. First, the process of migration itself creates a tension between a model of socialinclusion based on citizenship (formal political rights) and that based on territoriality(residency without citizenship). Specifically, as Freeman (2004:955) notes, the existenceof migrants receiving social benefits and social protection from the welfare state may“post a threat to the logic of the welfare state”. For example, in the EU, migrants areoften considered a strain on welfare states, due to a perceived gap between taxcontributions and dependence on social policy (CEC 2004). This is a key dilemma forcontemporary welfare states that consist of national communities of both citizens andresidents without citizenship (nonmembers), but with needs and expectations for socialprotection and inclusion within the policy framework of the welfare state. This dilemma can be resolved through either the restriction of rights to membersonly, or through a re-conceptualization and expansion of the scope and character of thewelfare state. Freeman notes, in fact, that residency has superseded citizenship in thedetermination of access to social benefits in European cases (for example, Germany, theNetherlands, France). However, the model of the temporary worker program continuesto provide a mechanism to construct a system of differential rights, for certain categoriesof migrants, whether in theory or in practice. The persistence of such programs creates apolitical dilemma – how to address the disparity in rights experienced by some temporaryresidents – and a theoretical dilemma – how too explain/understand the significance ofthis condition to contemporary welfare states. Second, the literature on globalization and migration indicates that aglobal/transnational political economy perspective is needed to study labour migration, asboth contemporary migration patterns and social policy frameworks are shaped byprocesses of globalization. As Hollifield (2004) argues, while individual nation-statesplay key roles in the regulation of migration, migration takes place in transnational (oftenregional) contexts. Similarly, while nation-states continue to exercise regulatoryauthority within a national context (despite often-made claims regarding the demise ofthe nation state in the era of globalization), national social and economic policies areoften developed both as a response to, and as a means to foster, global and/ortransnational processes. Temporary migrant labour programs, which attempt to secureand regulate transnational labour forces often as a means to promote competitiveness in aglobal economy, are a key example of the intersection of these dynamics. Welfare stateanalysis must account for the relationship between the national and the transnational. A central argument of this paper is that welfare state analysis needs to incorporatea migration lens, framed through the above insights. Migration theorists have, in fact, 13
  15. 15. advanced alternative state typologies based upon a comparative analysis of the regulationof migration within specific state types. For example Castles and Miller (2003) organizemigration destinations using an historical lens, identifying a relationship betweenmigration histories and contemporary migration policies. Traditional countries ofimmigration are claimed to promote ‘multicultralism’ – the United States, Canada,Australia – and maintain annual quotas, support permanent settlement and familyunification, and provide access to citizenship. A second set of countries, termed‘guestworker’ countries, promote ‘differential exclusion’ – Germany, Switzerland,Austria – attempt to prevent family unification, and maintain greater restrictionsregarding residency and naturalization. A third set of countries includes those withformer colonies – France, the Netherlands, Britain – and that promote ‘assimilation’.These countries create clear distinctions between migrants from the former colonies, whoare granted citizenship on entry and are permitted to bring family members, and thosewho are from other home countries and who may be treated less favourably. Freeman (2004) modifies this grouping somewhat by connecting it to traditionalwelfare state analysis. He suggests a fourfold grouping that includes: (1) liberal welfarestates with open immigration and citizenship practices, and commitments to formalmulticulturalism (U.S., Canada, Australia); (2) social democratic or corporatist welfarestates with moderately open immigration and citizenship practices, and an ‘uneasy’acceptance of multiculturalism (Sweden, the Netherlands); (3) conservative/corporatistwelfare states with open immigration policies, but with resistance to permanentsettlement and multiculturalism (Germany, Austria, Switzerland); and (4) liberal welfarestates with restrictive citizenship practices, no policy on multiculturalism, but with apractice of recruiting foreign labour (Spain, Portugal, Greece). As Freeman acknowledges, the practice of organizing such groupings risks over-generalization and compromises specificity. Like all typologies, these groupingsoverlook key differences both within the categories - for example vastly differentapproaches to multiculturalism within Canada and the United States - as well as keysimilarities across them – ‘multicultural’ countries that maintain guestworker policies.With respect to guestworker policies, for example, both Canada and the United Stateshave developed such policies, most notably in the case of agricultural labour. In theCanadian case, the program has had much greater success than that of Germany’s inpreventing permanent settlement and family unification indicating the problematic natureof the aforementioned typologies, or at least the difficulty in constructing such typologiesthrough a migration lens. Nonetheless, theorizing welfare states needs to account for migration dynamics,as the manner in which welfare states incorporate migrants is a key component of socialand economic policy in the contemporary context. This does not necessarily mean aregrouping of state types, or the construction of a new typology. Rather, it meansexpanding the criteria upon which the welfare state model is assessed to includemigration policies. Such a process will help clarify distinctions between state types, butmay also challenge the distinctiveness of state types by indicating key similarities. This paper now turns to an analysis of selected migrant labour policies in order tofurther this task. The subsequent section attempts to address the following questions.How is labour migration regulated and how can these policies be understood in relation tothe various welfare regime types? In what ways do these policy mechanisms create 14
  16. 16. situations of social exclusion? What differences and similarities can be observed acrosswelfare regimes? The policy analysis focuses on the cases of Canada, Germany,Denmark, and the Netherlands, and also takes a transnational focus by examining thedynamics between national policies and transnational processes. WELFARE REGIMES AND LABOUR MIGRATION Insert Table 5 HereCanadaLabour market needs and immigration policies have been connected throughout Canada’shistory. Recent immigration policy to Canada has increasingly re-emphasized the needfor economic priorities in determining eligibility for immigration. A 1994 report, Into the21st Century, outlined the government’s strategy for immigration reform (CIC 1994).Selection criteria were to place greater emphasis on immigrant labour market credentialsand labour market demand. This approach would expedite applications of immigrantsneeded to fill specific labour market shortages. As well, there would be streamlinedprocessing of temporary foreign workers needed by Canadian firms and expeditedprocessing of limited numbers of independent and business immigrants to meet economicor market development objectives of the provinces.13 The new plan involved a gradualreorientation of the immigration program in favour of economic criteria by increasing thenumber of immigrants under the economic component of the program in relation to thefamily component. Within this policy reforms process, particular emphasis was placedupon the need to streamline the regulation of temporary foreign workers within high skilloccupational categories (IOM 2002). In 2002 the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act replaced theImmigration Act, which was approved in 1976 and has been amended more than 30times. The Act provides the government with the flexibility to link immigration toCanadas labour market needs.14 Under the Act, applicants can be admitted to Canada aspermanent residents under three corresponding classes: Family Class - people sponsoredto come to Canada by a relative, a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partnerwho is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident of Canada.; Refugee Class;15 orEconomic Class. This third and largest class of immigrants includes two streams: skilledworkers and business immigrants.16 Those selected for this class are admitted on theirbasis to contribute to the Canadian economy. As indicated, Canada also maintains temporary worker programs. To be eligibleto work temporarily in Canada, a foreign national must have a job offer and (generally) awork permit, which is valid for a specific job and for a limited time period.17 There are anumber of restrictions placed upon temporary workers, limiting their mobility whileemployed in Canada. They may not undertake full-time studies and may not change jobsor employers unless authorized. For employers who wish to hire temporary foreignworkers, they must have job offers approved by Human Resources Development Canada(HRDC).18 Table 6 provides a more specific breakdown of entries of temporary workersinto Canada, indicating the top 10 source countries. The United States and Mexico areconsistently the two leading countries. While the United States provides workers of 15
  17. 17. higher skill levels, Mexico’s primary contribution is to the Seasonal Agricultural WorkersProgram. The table indicates a noticeable decline in migrants from countries that tend tosupply workers for higher skill categories in recent years. Some of this decline(particularly from the U.S. and the U.K.) is explained by changes in 2002 to the IRPAthat removed the requirement for temporary work permits from some of the higher skillcategories of workers from these countries, including some performing artists, seminarand commercial speakers visiting for less than five days, and service repair people.Following these change, workers in lower skilled categories (intermediate, clerical,seasonal agricultural) have become the largest single group of foreign workers inCanada.19 Insert Table 6 Here The government has also developed agreements with industry sectors facingworker shortages, enabling those industries to expedite the hiring of temporary foreignworkers. Programs in the agricultural and construction industries are key examples ofsectors that utilize this process. Historically, there has been a constant problem of labour shortages in agriculturalproduction in Ontario. The solution to the problem of continued seasonal labourshortages came in the form of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program (Basok 2002;Satzewich 1991; Thomas 1997). The program facilitates the incorporation of migrantworkers from the Caribbean and Mexico into seasonal agricultural production as unfreemigrant labour. In 1966, following intense lobbying pressure from Ontario growers, the Canadianfederal government established an agreement with the Commonwealth Caribbean toimport farm labourers to Ontario on a seasonal basis. Up to this point, there was a greatdeal of public opposition to the granting of Canadian citizenship to those applying forentry to Canada from ‘non-traditional’ (re: non-Western/European) source countries.This popular perception provided the Canadian state the means to solve the seasonallabour shortages in Ontario agriculture. Due to the perception that migrant workers fromthe Caribbean were not compatible with the Canadian culture, national identity, and evenclimate, policy makers were able to deny workers entering Canada under the SAWP theright to apply for Canadian citizenship. This then enabled the enactment of a number ofentrance restrictions under the program ensuring that the foreign workers participating inthe program remain in agricultural production and do not attempt to move to industriesoffering longer-term employment and better wages and working conditions. In its initial year, the program brought 264 Jamaican workers into Canada. In1967, Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados became participants in the program as well. Itexpanded rapidly in ensuing years, and within a decade it was incorporatingapproximately 5,000 workers. In 1974, Mexico negotiated a similar agreement with theCanadian government, to allow Mexican workers into Canada on a temporary basis. In1976, the program expanded again to facilitate entry of workers from other Caribbeannations. The program now accounts for approximately 10% of the agricultural workforcein Ontario, and currently employs approximately 15,000 workers per year - half fromMexico and half from the Caribbean. 16
  18. 18. The workers’ period of employment in Canada ranges from 6 to 40 weeks, with aminimum of 40 hours of work per week, though this can exceed 60 hours per week.Farm labourers are paid at an hourly wage of about $7.25, and are provided with healthcare coverage throughout their period of employment. Their wages and workingconditions are negotiated by government representatives on their behalf.Accommodations are provided by the employer, which generally include kitchenfacilities. As well, employers are responsible for covering transportation costs for theiremployees to and from their home country. They are currently exempt from theOccupational Health and Safety Act, from the hours of work and overtime standards ofthe Employment Standards Act, and they are not permitted to unionize.20 Seasonal migrant workers are not permitted to seek employment outside theirspecified contract and are not permitted to apply for permanent residence within Canada.Nor do they have access to the political rights granted to Canadian citizens. - Throughthese restrictions, the state is able to continually secure a labour force that is bothseasonal in nature and static in terms of upward mobility. This illustrates thecontradictory nature of the use of temporary foreign workers. Migrant workers were/areneeded in Ontario agriculture to fill persistent labour shortages. But it is because they areforeign workers, and not recognized as deserving of the political rights of Canadiancitizens, that makes the workers so desirable. Thus, the SAWP is shaped not only by theclass-dimensions of labour migration, but also race/ethnic and gender (they are male)relations that shape access to citizenship rights Denial of access to Canadian citizenship rights is a central feature of the program.According to the models of incorporation developed by Satzewich (1991), the workers inthe Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program are incorporated into agricultural productionin Canada as ‘unfree migrant labour’: they are unable to hold any other form ofemployment and they are unable to apply for Canadian citizenship. Concerns over thepotential for ‘race relations’ problems created by immigration from non-white sourcecountries provided justification for the denial of citizenship status to migrants from theCaribbean. Their condition as unfree migrant labour ensures their temporary status inthe country and provides Canadian growers with a seasonal labour force. Despite the existence of some (though limited) formal standards that cover basicrights, “serious absences exist even on the surface of the SAWP agreements, and furtherproblems exist in the gaps between theory and practice”, indicating that the rights ofoffshore workers in the program have not been ‘fully protected’ (Suen 2000: 203). Suchproblems include: a lack of overtime pay, no family reunification, and a lack of mobility(due to residency requirements). Workers vulnerability is increased due to ‘language,cultural, and geographical barriers’, and a lack of access to legal authorities and socialservices. Liaison services do not have sufficient support staff to address workercomplaints. Premature repatriation, the possibility of ‘blacklisting’, and a lack ofalternative employment constitute further disincentives to registering complaints. Race-based discrimination that was present in the construction of the original programcontinues to be present in a “systematic fashion” as it creates a “transnational dark-skinned underclass welcome to do menial work but not welcome as immigrants” (208). While there are similarities with the U.S.-Mexico Bracero program, there are keydifferences as well (Basok 2000). Policy differences and differences in programadministration have created varied impacts on the workers in terms of their ability to 17
  19. 19. remain in their host country following the termination of the employment contract. ManyMexican workers in the Bracero program remained in the U.S. illegally, while virtuallyall of the workers in the Canadian program return to Mexico at the end of theiremployment contract. The U.S. program was constructed almost solely to meet the needsof agribusiness employers, while the Canadian program takes into account concernsabout preventing ‘unwanted’ immigrants from remaining in the country and also the needto provide some protection for domestic labour. A program recruitment strategy thatprovides for continued participation in the program encourages Mexican workers inCanada to return home once their contract is complete. The small size of the Canadianprogram in relation to the U.S. program makes it easier to control the workers and ensuretheir return and the lack of support networks in rural Ontario for Mexican migrants alsodiscourages illegal residency in Canada. In recent years, the Government of Canada has explored the possibilities ofexpanding the model developed through the SAWP into other industries includingconstruction (in Toronto) and meat processing (in Manitoba) as a means to provide fortemporary entry of workers into Canada in areas of continued labour shortages.The North American Free Trade AgreementWithin the North American region, labour migration remains primarily regulated throughnational immigration policies. Nonetheless, while the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), which was implemented in 1994 to create a free trade regionbetween Canada, the United States, and Mexico, is primarily an instrument that regulatestrade, it also has several implications for labour mobility. First, NAFTA promotes the mobility of workers in high skill occupationalcategories. Specifically, Chapter 16 of the NAFTA delimits a general temporary labourpolicy within the North American region. Through this provision, citizens of Canada, theUnited States and Mexico can gain temporary entry into each of the three countries toconduct business-related activities. While Chapter 16 purports to apply equally tocitizens of the three countries, it actually only applies to four specific categories ofbusiness persons: business visitors; professionals; intra-company transferees; andpersons engaged in trade or investment activities. Chapter 16 enables each of thesecategories of business persons to enter Canada without a labour market test beingapplied.21 The specific application of NAFTA to business investors indicates the class-based dimensions to labour mobility, as NAFTA does not create a situation of freemovement for workers, as most “do not have the legal right to search out the marketswhere wages are highest in the same way that capital can seek the highest profit” (Moody1995: 55-6). Second, while it does not include a migrant labour program for low skilloccupational categories, NAFTA has produced migration such migration flows,particularly from Mexico into the U.S., due to the structural inequalities between the twocountries (Canales 2000). Within Mexico, flexible labour strategies have been pursuedthrough export-oriented production industries, particularly along the U.S. border region.In general, Mexican workers have continued to experience increased insecurity and“worsening conditions of employment” and have thus continued to migrate to the U.S.(417). In the U.S., an expansion of low-wage, low-skill, insecure forms of employment, 18
  20. 20. particularly in the service sectors of large urban areas, and has contributed to the furthersegmentation of the U.S. labour market and has created new labour demands for migrantworkers, which are met due to continued pressures on workers to migrate out of Mexico. Finally, with respect to workers in low skilled occupational categories, when itwas implemented, there was concern from labour groups that NAFTA would producehighly vulnerable work forces, as competitive pressures upon workers intensified. TheNorth American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), a side agreement toNAFTA, was negotiated in response to public concerns and pressure that free trade wouldlead to an erosion of labour standards within the North American region. The agreementincludes a commitment to the promotion of guiding principles in the area of labourstandards, subject to each signatory’s domestic laws, including providing migrantworkers in a Partys territory with the same legal protection as the Partys nationals inrespect of working conditions.22 There are many weaknesses to the regulation of labour standards through theNAALC, however, both in general and with respect to the treatment of migrant workers.The NAALC does not attempt to establish common labour standards for the NAFTAcountries, but instead encourages the NAFTA countries to comply with their ownexisting labour laws. The principles themselves are ineffective, as the Commission forLabor Cooperation has very limited power to ensure compliance.23 A review of 28NAALC cases filed between 1994 and March 2004 indicates that most cases are resolvedthrough seminars, public forums, studies and reports, and government-to-governmentmeetings, rather than actual sanctions for violations.24 In the case of several complaintsregarding the conditions of migrant workers, the U.S. and Mexican governments haveissued commitments to work to improve the rights of these workers. Overall, the currentlabour side agreement of NAFTA does not provide effective human rights protections formigrant workers (Suen 2000).The European UnionWithin the EU-15, there are approximately 19 million ‘non-nationals’, constituting justover five percent of the total population (EIRO 2003). Of these, approximately sixmillion are members of other EU states (one in which they are not currently residing) and13 million ‘third country’ (non EU) nationals. Nationals of EU member states havemobility and residency rights within the Union, as well as the ability to accessemployment and to secure family reunification. Third country nationals are not subjectto the freedom of mobility and employment rights of EU nationals. Intra-EU migration by citizens of the EU was originally regulated by the 1957Treaty of Rome, which encouraged a common market facilitated by the abolition of“obstacles to the free circulation of goods and services, persons and capital” (quoted inPeixoto 2001:35). These principles were reinforced in the European Single Act and theMaastricht Treaty. The Treaty of Rome, however, only applied to workers who weremoving between member states of the European Economic Community. Labourmigrations originating from outside the EEC were to be regulated at the national level(Castles 2004a). Migration flows from former colonies to the respective colonial powers constitutea significant proportion of contemporary migration in the E.U. (Muus 2001). Large 19
  21. 21. numbers of temporary workers were recruited by the major western European economiesthrough the 1960s until the early 1970s and incorporated into a variety of low-wage, lowskilled employment. Recruitment was halted in the mid-1970s. Other categories ofmigrants include asylum seekers, EU migrants, highly skilled migrants, and clandestinemigrants (who enter employment in informal economies). The migration of EU citizensis governed by EU regulations, which provides these individuals with the basic principleof ‘free movement’. Migration of non-EU citizens is regulated by individual nation-states, which have recently become more restrictive with respect to non-EU migration.Temporary and seasonal labour is predominant, largely in response to labour shortages inagriculture. Unemployment among non-EU citizens is much higher than EU citizens,particularly among low-skilled workers and former guestworkers. Currently, there remains a great deal of variation within EU member statesregarding migration and integration policies, including the regulation of work permits andtemporary workers (IOM 2002). As part of the ongoing project of European unification,efforts have recently been made to move towards a common immigration policy withinthe EU, particularly in the context of the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam,which came into effect in 1999. The goals of a common policy framework include: theremoval of controls on third country nationals crossing internal borders; standards andprocedures of control on persons crossing external borders; the right to free travel withinthe EU; residence permission, including family reunification; the definition of rights andconditions of residence of third country nationals. Several recent Directives – on familyreunification, long-term residents, and residence permits for victims of trafficking andsmuggling - have facilitated this push. A common directive on ‘admission of thirdcountry nationals for employment purposes’, proposed in 2002, has not yet securedagreement. However, with the expansion of the EU in 2004 to include new memberstates from central and eastern Europe, transitional arrangements were established toenable the older member states to limit the movement of workers from new memberstates for a period of up to seven years, until 2011. These arrangements were initiated toalleviate concerns over sudden inflows of migrants from new member states.25 In the EU today, there is continued demand for both high and low skilled labourand employers’ organizations in many countries advocate for the ability to employmigrant workers to counter demographic changes that will negatively affect the labourforce (EIRO 2003). Due to labour market demands, and displaying a similar approach toCanada, there has been renewed interest in orienting migration policies along the lines of‘managed migration’, or a “more selective employment-related approach” (CEC 2004 5).For example, in 2001, approximately 40 percent of all residency permits were granted foremployment purposes, as compared to approximately 30 percent for family reunification.Table 7 indicates the percentage of immigrant admissions by category (worker, familyreunification, refugee) in selected countries. The overall trend demonstrates increasedemphasis on employment-based immigration and a decline in family reunification, withFrance and Sweden as notable exceptions. Insert Table 7 Here Another commonality with the Canadian case lies in the method of regulation ofmigrants in low and high skill occupational categories. In both the European and 20
  22. 22. Canadian cases, the tendency is to ease the regulations on the entry of skilled workers,while increasing the controls that regulate those in low skill and seasonal categories.26The intensification of regulation on seasonal workers persists as these programs grow innumbers and as they move into new sectors and occupations. Temporary, migrant labour is increasingly sought in the contemporary WesternEuropean economy as an alternative to postwar migration policies that permitted orfacilitated longer-term residency for migrant workers (Fekete 1997). The shift towardstemporary status has been sought as it reduces social costs in the areas of housing, healthcare, welfare, and education. Guestworkers and seasonal workers are two of the groupsmost vulnerable to this form of exclusion. In agricultural production, migrant labour hasbecome more central to European agribusiness, as employers are able to recruit migrantworkers to do the physically demanding and low paid labour that nationals are unwillingto do. New programs are designed to ensure that the worker leaves once the contract isterminated, thereby preventing any opportunities for settlement, most notably in Germany(discussed below). Across Western Europe, shifts in migration policy have beeninfluenced by fiscal policy shifts towards reduction in public expenditures. Rather thanreduce social services generally, governments are reducing or restricting access to thebenefits available to the most vulnerable populations, including guestworkers andseasonal workers, as in the case of Denmark (discussed below).GermanyThe most widely noted European migrant worker program is Germany’s guestworkerprogram. The original guestworker program, developed in the 1950s, recruited foreignlabour for low wage employment. Permission to remain in Germany was dependent uponthe ability to work. Residency permits were limited to one year, with extension requiringan employer request. And work permits could be restricted to specific firms (Rudolph1996). The program promoted the recruitment of workers from Italy, Spain, Greece,Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia through bilateral agreements signed in the 1950s and1960s.27 While the program was premised upon temporary employment contracts, thesecontracts were often renewed as employers required labour force continuity (Fekete1997). The policy of active recruitment was ended in 1973, with the beginning of themajor economic downturn in the world economy. While the program was designed tofacilitate only temporary residency, many guestworkers became permanent residents andsecured family reunification (Hollifield 2004). In response to the labour market demands experienced across many OECDcountries, German employers’ organizations have called for measures that promote‘controlled immigration’ – a process that ensures that ensures labour supply, particularlyof skilled workers, and at the same time prevents abuse of asylum laws (EIRO 2003).Like other EU countries, Germany’s current approach to immigration maintains a verystrong connection to employment demands. In 2001, over 80 percent of residencypermits were granted for employment purposes (CEC 2004). Developments in temporaryworker programs reflect the desire to meet labour market needs, but at the same timemaintain strict controls over permanent settlement, particularly with respect to workers inlower-skill occupational categories. 21
  23. 23. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new guestworker program was developed,based on similar principles, this time with workers from Central and Eastern Europe,including Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. In 2002, 374,000 temporary work permitswere issued, the majority to Polish citizens and for agricultural employment. Theprogram is designed to facilitate labour market flexibility (i.e. to provide workers forlow-wage employment) through the recruitment of foreign workers, but with increasedrestrictions on their employment and residency (Rudolph 1996). Under the program,German workers are given priority, maximum annual quotas are placed on the foreignworkers, the initiative for recruitment must be taken by the employer, and the time periodfor residency remains short. The new guestworker program enacts stricter controls on themigrants, including: no opportunity to extend the work permit; no right to bring one’sfamily into Germany; and no opportunity to upgrade one’s legal status in the country.The new regulations were designed to ensure temporary migrant labour, for example inseasonal and construction employment. Work and residency permits range from threemonths to two years. With the expansion of the EU in 2004, members some of these sending countriesbecame members of the Union, and thus were to be granted access to the mobility rightsaccorded to EU nationals. Through a ‘transitional arrangement’, Germany has extendedthe requirement for temporary work permits until 2006 for these new EU nationals andwill conduct labour market assessments to determine the possibility for further extensionof these ‘exceptional circumstances’. EU nationals from the new EU states will notsecure full free movement into Germany until 2011.28 Reflecting the overall patterns of segmentation with respect to the recruitment ofmigrant workers, and consistent with the general pattern of promoting the entry of skilledworkers, in 2000/01 Germany introduced a ‘Green Card’ program to recruit informationtechnology specialists from non-EU countries to be employed for up to five years (IOM2002; Hollifield 2004). Spouses of those within the program are eligible to holdemployment in Germany as well, but after a waiting period of one year. Proposals for anexpanded model of the program and for entitlement to permanent residence have alsobeen considered. While the program is essentially a policy to promote the recruitment oftemporary foreign workers, the residency and reunification possibilities construct aconsiderably different model of entry into the German labour market than thatexperienced by workers in the lower skill occupational categories.DenmarkAs a welfare state with a social democratic orientation, Denmark has sought to balancedemands for high and low-skill workers with concerns over downward pressure on wagesand working conditions and the potential impacts of large influxes of migrants on welfaresystems. Specifically, labour migration policies have sought to address the former whileminimizing the later. Denmark’s approach to labour migration reflects priorities of both promotingintegration, while also restricting access. On integration, in 2002 Denmark adoptedefforts to promote the integration of migrants from non-EU member states into theDanish labour market. These included 12 month work permits for third country nationalsat an ‘introductory’ wage level and access to language training in the workplace. To 22
  24. 24. further promote integration, residency permits will be accessible after five years (ratherthan seven) for those who have demonstrated ‘good performance’ (those who have madeefforts at language acquisition and are self-supporting) (EIRO 2003). These measuresaccompanied changes to asylum regulations, which introduced a requirement for asylumseekers to work in order to receive social benefits while applying for asylum. Whilepromoting social integration, these measures were undertaken in the context of a broadereffort to reduce the provision of social benefits to immigrants and refugees.29 Denmark also joined other ‘old’ EU member states in enacting ‘transitionalarrangements’ to restrict the movement of workers from the new member states.Denmark’s model differs from that of Germany’s, in that nationals from the new EUmember states are accorded the same rights to seek work in Denmark as are nationalsfrom the old EU member states. These groups of migrants (most likely to be from Polandand the Baltic states) are not accorded full equal treatment, however. Unlike nationals ofold EU member states, once they have found employment, they must apply for a workand residency permit. Such permits will be granted only if the employment is full timeand is at conditions on par with those established by sectoral or company-level collectiveagreements. If they are unable to find work, or if they lose their job, they are required toleave the country. Denmark’s transitional arrangement also includes the ability of thegovernment to halt entry to specific sectors, depending on labour market demands. As ofMarch 2005, the majority of permits were for workers in agriculture and gardening,followed by public and personal services (health, culture, educational institutions),building and construction, industry, and trade, hotel and restaurant.30 Differential treatment for migrants from the new EU member states is alsoexperienced in relation to social provision. Specifically, consist with the shift to reduceaccess to social benefits to migrants discussed above, nationals from new member statesdo not have the rights to social (unemployment) benefits while they are searching forwork.The NetherlandsPost-World War II labour migration to the Netherlands reflected the German guestworkermodel, with workers from Italy, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, and Yugoslavia. Like inGermany, migration for family reunification continued following the end of guestworkerrecruitment in the early 1970s.31 The guestworkers of earlier decades became permanentresidents by the 1980s (Engelen 2003). Currently, there are few restrictions on employment for members of EU states.Third country nationals, however, require work permits, which are granted on atemporary basis to a maximum of three years for a permanent position, or one yearotherwise. To obtain a work permit, an employer must apply on the basis that no Dutchcitizen, legal resident or EU citizen is available. Work permits are not needed after threeyears of legal residence (IOM 2002). To promote economic integration, in the 1990s theDutch government implemented legislation requiring employers to work towardsproportional employment of migrant workers (in relation to the regional population).Reflecting the corporatist model, the legislation is implemented in conjunction withworks councils. By 2000, over 70 percent of employers were found to be operating incompliance with the legislation (EIRO 2003). 23
  25. 25. With respect to social provision, the Netherlands provides an example of a middleground between the social democratic and the conservative welfare state models,providing for a mix of universal and corporatist social and economic rights that are tied tolegal residency, rather than political citizenship (Engelen 2003). Social programs such asfamily allowance, social assistance, public pensions, basic health care are available to alllegal residents including migrant workers. Some of these programs are not dependentupon residency. Family allowances are available for children of legal residents whoremain in the sending countries and pensions are available for workers who have returnedhome after retirement. Similarly, legal residence is not tied to key programs managedthrough corporatist arrangements between employers and trade unions, includingunemployment, disability and supplementary pension benefits. The Dutch model would appear to provide migrants with a much greater level ofsocial inclusion than in the cases of Canada, Germany, and Denmark. Nonetheless, thereare clear limits to the Dutch model, as conditions of “differentiated exclusion” created bypatterns of labour market segmentation are evident within the Dutch labour market(Engelen 2003:512). Specifically, foreign workers, particularly those from Turkey,Morocco, and Surinam, are disproportionately employed in low-paid service sectoremployment and self-employment. In 2002, approximately 20 percent of migrantworkers held ‘flexible’ (temporary) employment contracts, as compared to 7 percent ofDutch nationals. Growth in low-skill, flexible forms of employment contributed todeclining rates of unemployment amongst migrant workers. But while rates ofunemployment amongst these groups of workers declined significantly through the late1990s, the unemployment rate of non-western migrants in the Netherlands was 9 percentin 2001, as compared to 3 percent for Dutch nationals.32 Despite the emphasis on residency and employment rather than citizenship todetermine access to social benefits, patterns of labour market segmentation limit theextent of social inclusion experienced by migrants within the Dutch welfare state model.Access to the corporatist elements of the social and economic rights package, beingdependent upon economic contributions, is compromised by the preponderance ofimmigrant workers in low-wage employment, which minimizes their capacity tocontribute, and hence their available benefits. While the model provides greater levels ofsocial benefits, it does not protect against the general situation of labour marketprecariousness experienced by non-citizens due to over-representation in these forms ofemployment. CONCLUSIONAs has been argued throughout this paper, welfare state analysis must take labourmigration into account as a key structural feature of contemporary labour markets. Eachof these cases illustrates the centrality of temporary foreign worker programs tocontemporary welfare states. In all four states – Canada, Germany, Denmark, theNetherlands – temporary foreign worker programs play a key role in filling labour marketdemands for both high and low skill occupational categories. As well, systems oftemporary work permits are designed by the respective states to manage tensions overimmigration and national community formation. Restrictions on access to citizenshiprights and residency rights limit the full political participation and social integration of 24
  26. 26. foreign workers. As these cases demonstrate, occupational status plays a key role in this process.In all cases, workers entering higher skill occupational categories experience far fewerrestrictions on their mobility. In the context of NAFTA, Canada’s approach has been toreduce and in some cases eliminate the regulations that govern their entry into the labourmarket. Conversely, workers in lower skill occupational categories are not includedwithin the NAFTA framework, and are instead regulated through bi-lateral agreementslike the Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program, which restricts workers’ mobilitywithin the labour market and prevents their permanent settlement. Workers in high skillcategories also have much greater potential for social integration. In the case ofGermany, family reunification is possible for IT professionals, but not for workers in thenew low-skill ‘gastarbeiter’ program. The above cases are based on different models of welfare regimes (liberal,conservative, social democratic, mixed). The migration lens provides new insight intothe character of these models, yielding some key commonalities: specifically, thesegmentation of migrant labour markets along the high skill/low skill distinction. Thisdistinction manifests itself not only in income levels and job security, as withintraditional accounts of labour market segmentation, but also in the form of mobility andresidency rights. Overall, segmented approaches to labour market incorporation resolvetensions between labour market demands for high and low-skill workers and politicalopposition to immigration. They also produce heightened relations of commodification,exploitation, and marginalization for specific groups of migrant workers. In the case of the liberal regime (Canada), temporary foreign workers in theSAWP exist within a highly commodified state, with few labour laws to regulate theirconditions of work, and limited access to social benefits. Further, the state hascompletely privatized the relations of social reproduction by prohibiting familyreunification, by repatriating the workers upon completion of their employment contracts,and by minimizing access to social benefits (for example, unemployment insurance) inbetween employment contracts. The conservative regime (Germany) bears a strikingsimilarity for workers in the low skill occupational categories. These workers are tied tospecific sectors for limited time periods within the labour market and family reunificationis prohibited. The social democratic regime (Denmark) also limits the ability fortemporary foreign workers from new EU member states to access social benefits,specifically unemployment insurance. The mixed model of social provision in theNetherlands produces a somewhat similar result, though in a distinct fashion. Socialdemocratic principles ensure access to social benefits for temporary foreign workers.However, corporatist arrangements, combined with persistent patterns of labour marketsegmentation, limit the ability of foreign workers to access social benefits on equal termsto Dutch citizens. Thus, while each of these regimes maintains key differences in the organization ofmarket relations and social reproduction with respect to members of the respectivenational community (i.e. full citizens), the marginalization of migrant workers in thelabour market, and in terms of access to social provision, cuts across regime types,including the social democratic model. In all cases, migrant workers in low skilloccupational categories experience extreme exposure to market forces, or low levels ofdecommodification, regardless of regime type. Limited access to benefits and over- 25
  27. 27. representation in forms of low-wage, insecure employment, contribute to socialstratification between migrants and nationals in each case. Women’s employmentpatterns, specifically, the much higher levels of unemployment experienced by womenmigrants, heightens gender inequality, most notably in the European cases. With respectto the treatment and integration of migrant workers, welfare state theory must take intoaccount these commonalities in regime types. That is not to say there is no distinction between regime types, however. InDenmark (social democratic), migrants from new EU member states are permitted toenter and search for employment. This not the case in Canada (liberal), where migrantsrequire a work permit attached to a specific employer before entering. While Germany’slow-skill temporary worker program bears greater resemblance to Canada’s, its historyreveals the potential for a distinct model, if new guestworkers, specifically those fromnew EU member states, are able to eventually secure greater residency rights. Thiswould open the possibility for a new wave of family reunification, along the lines of thatwhich took place in the 1970s and 1980s. The high levels of unemployment experiencedby women migrants to Germany would reinforce the conservative model of socialreproduction. The mix of corporatism and social democracy in the Netherlands’approach to social provision, while not fully effective in securing benefits for foreignworkers, nonetheless provides greater access to benefits than the other models. The question of mobility within the EU adds to the complexity of the migrationlens in relation to welfare state analysis. While enhanced labour mobility is a keyprinciple of the EU, the above case studies indicate that mobility remains largely that – aprinciple – with key exceptions in its practice. The limits on mobility experienced bynew EU members as they enter the labour markets of the EU-15 (due to transitionalarrangements) is a striking example. While this is a site for commonality, it is also a siteof difference, as Germany retains the greatest restrictions on the entry of new EUmembers of the cases considered. This provides key indication of the ways in whichnation states retain regulatory capacities in an era of transnationalism. As the examination of both NAFTA and the EU reveal, however, welfare statesmust be situated within a transnational context. The study of migration policies indicatesthat both regional arrangements (EU and NAFTA) have influence on policy arrangementswithin nation states. Labour mobility is much more advanced within the EU than it iswithin NAFTA, which only has a labour mobility provision for workers in high skilledoccupational categories. While nation states retain primary control over migrationpolicies, the development of both the EU and NAFTA have promoted, though in variedways, the increased mobility of specific groups of workers. Further, these arrangementscontribute to the entrenchment of regional migration patterns, for example, flows ofprofessionals between the U.S. and Canada, or the movement of workers from easternEurope into the EU-15. In both cases, welfare state polices and welfare regimes withinthe respective regions, cannot be abstracted from the regional, transnational context. These conditions are not simply fuel for further academic debate, as themarginalization of many groups of migrant workers presents a key political challenge forcontemporary welfare states. The Commission on European Communities has called fora ‘level playing field’ for economic migrants across the E.U., as well as stronger efforts atpromoting social integration (CEC 2004). Proposed strategies to promote socialintegration include efforts to combat unemployment, language training, involvement in 26

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