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A compact zero knowledge proof to restrict message space in homomorphic encryption

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準同型暗号の平文空間を制限するコンパクトなゼロ知識証明
SCIS2019発表資料

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A compact zero knowledge proof to restrict message space in homomorphic encryption

  1. 1. A compact zero-knowledge proof to restrict message space in homomorphic encryption SCIS2019 2019/1/23 Mitsunari Shigeo (Cybozu Labs, Inc.)
  2. 2. • Background • A protocol using homomorphic encryption (HE) which message space is restricted in malicious model • OT, privacy-preserving search/machine learning, et al. • a plaintext must be 0 or 1 • 𝑛 plaintexts must be a 1-of-𝑛 bit vector • range • Motivation • Safely reject illegal ciphertexts without knowing the value Abstract 2 / 22
  3. 3. • Propose a generic conversion to a constant-size zero-knowledge proof from a condition that multiple ciphertexts are a root of 𝑛- variable 𝑑-dimensional simultaneous polynomials based on a 𝑑-level HE. • 𝑥 ∈ {0,1} ⇔ 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑥 1 − 𝑥 = 0 • ∃𝑖 s.t. 𝑥𝑖 = 1 ; 𝑥𝑗 = 0 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ⇔ 𝑓 𝑥1, … , 𝑥 𝑛 ≔ σ𝑖 𝑥𝑖 − 1 = 0, 𝑓𝑖 𝑥1, … , 𝑥 𝑛 ≔ 𝑥𝑖 1 − 𝑥𝑖 = 0 • Construction for 2-level HE proposed ASIACCS2018 • one non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (4 𝔽 𝑝 elements) to show the above equations Results 3 / 22
  4. 4. • ℎ: 0,1 ∗ → 𝔽 𝑝 ; hash function • 𝑥 ∈ 𝔽 𝑝 𝑛 • 𝑓1(𝑥), … , 𝑓𝑡(𝑥) ; 𝑛-var. poly. of degree 𝑑 with 𝔽 𝑝 coeff. • 𝑋 ≔ ℎ 𝑥, 1 𝑓1 𝑥 + ⋯ + ℎ 𝑥, 𝑡 𝑓𝑡 𝑥 • 𝑋 = 0 ⇔ 𝑓1 𝑥 = ⋯ = 𝑓𝑡 𝑥 = 0 with negligible probability • use 𝑓1 𝑥 = ⋯ = 𝑓𝑡 𝑥 = 0 as the condition to restrict message Core idea 4 / 22
  5. 5. • ℎ: 0,1 ∗ → 𝔽 𝑝 ; hash function • 𝑓1(𝑥), … , 𝑓𝑡(𝑥) ; 𝑛-var. poly. of degree 𝑑 with 𝔽 𝑝 coeff. • 𝑔: 𝔽 𝑝 𝑛 → 0,1 ∗ ; injective • 𝑋(𝑥) ≔ ℎ(𝑔 𝑥 , 1)𝑓1 𝑥 + ⋯ + ℎ(𝑔 𝑥 , 𝑡)𝑓𝑡 𝑥 • 𝒜 ; an attacker who outputs 𝑥 ∈ 𝔽 𝑝 𝑛 s.t. 𝑋 𝑥 = 0 • 𝑆 𝑥 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑡}|𝑓𝑖 𝑥 ≠ 0} • Assume ℎ is modeled as a random oracle and that 𝒜 makes at most 𝑞 random oracle queries, 𝑃 𝑆 𝑥 ≠ ∅ ≤ 𝑞 + 1 𝑝 Theorem 5 / 22
  6. 6. • ℎ: 0,1 ∗ → 𝔽 𝑝 ; hash function, 𝐸𝑛𝑐: ℳ → 𝒞, 𝐷𝑒𝑐: 𝒞 → ℳ • 𝑓1(𝑥), … , 𝑓𝑡(𝑥) ; 𝑛-var. poly. of degree 𝑑 with 𝔽 𝑝 coeff. • 𝑋 ≔ ℎ(𝑐, 1)𝑓1 𝑐 + ⋯ + ℎ(𝑐, 𝑡)𝑓𝑡 𝑐 , • 𝒜 ; an attacker who outputs 𝑐 = 𝑐1, … , 𝑐 𝑛 ∈ 𝒞 𝑛 s.t. 𝑋 = 0 • 𝑆 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝑐) ≔ {𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑡}|𝑓𝑖 𝑐 ≠ 0}, 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐 ≔ 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐𝑖 • Assume that 𝒜 makes at most 𝑞 RO queries, 𝑃 𝑆 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐 ≠ ∅ ≤ 𝑞 + 1 𝑝 • Outline of proof • 𝑚𝑖 ≔ 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑚 ≔ (𝑚𝑖), then 𝑔 𝑚 ≔ (𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚𝑖 ) is injective 𝑋 = 0 ⇔ σ𝑖 ℎ 𝑔(𝑚), 𝑖 𝑓𝑖 𝑚 = 0. • A Compact Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Binary Range Proof for Multiple Messages based on 2-Level Homomorphic Encryption, Mitsunari, Sakai, Schuldt Computer Security Symposium 2018 6 / 22 Main result for 𝑑-Level HE
  7. 7. Introduction of 2-level HE
  8. 8. • a 2-level HE based on prime order pairings • ASIACCS’18, Attrapadung, Hanaoka, Mitsunari, et. al. • https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3196494.3196552 • Notation • 𝑒: 𝐺1 × 𝐺2 → 𝐺 𝑇 ; type-3 pairing of order 𝑝 • 𝐺𝑖 = ⟨𝑔𝑖⟩ ; multiplicative cyclic group of a generator 𝑔𝑖 • Keygen • 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ∈ 𝔽 𝑝 ; secret key, ℎ𝑖 ≔ 𝑔𝑖 𝑠 𝑖 ; public key, ℎ3 ≔ 𝑒(ℎ1, ℎ2) • L1 Enc • 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑖 𝑚 ∶= 𝑔𝑖 𝑚 ℎ𝑖 𝑟 𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝑖 2 for 𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝔽 𝑝 ; lifted ElGamal • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝐴 𝑚 ∶= 𝐸𝑛𝑐1 𝑚 , 𝐸𝑛𝑐2 𝑚 ∈ 𝐺1 2 × 𝐺2 2 AHM+ 8 / 22
  9. 9. • Mul of L1-ciphertexts • Use one of each pair • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝐴 𝑚 ⋅ 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝐴 𝑚′ = 𝑐1, 𝑐2 ⋅ 𝑐1 ′ , 𝑐2 ′ ≔ 𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑐2 ′ 𝑐2, 𝑐1′ are not used • 𝑐1 ≔ 𝑆1, 𝑇1 ∈ 𝐺1 2 , 𝑐2′ ≔ 𝑆2, 𝑇2 ∈ 𝐺2 2 𝑐1 ⋅ 𝑐2′ ≔ 𝑒 𝑆1, 𝑆2 , 𝑒 𝑆1, 𝑇2 , 𝑒 𝑇1, 𝑆2 , 𝑒 𝑇1, 𝑇2 ∈ 𝐺 𝑇 4 • Dec of L2-ciphertext • For 𝑐 ≔ 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 𝑇 4 , 𝑑𝑒𝑐 𝑀 𝑐 ≔ (𝑠𝑣 𝑠1 𝑠2)/(𝑡 𝑠2 𝑢 𝑠1) • 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑀 𝑐 ≔ 𝐷𝐿𝑃𝑔(𝑑𝑒𝑐 𝑀 𝑐 ) Multiplication and decryption 9 / 22
  10. 10. • Ciphertext space 𝒞 ≔ 𝐸𝑛𝑐1 𝑚 , 𝐸𝑛𝑐2 𝑚 |𝑚 ∈ 𝔽 𝑝 is a subset of 𝐺1 2 × 𝐺2 2 • cf. The ciphertext space of lifted ElGamal is 𝐺𝑖 2 • 𝐸𝑛𝑐1 𝑚 , 𝐸𝑛𝑐2 𝑚′ ∈ 𝐺1 2 × 𝐺2 2 is a valid ciphertext ⇔ 𝑚 = 𝑚′ • Representation of validness by equation • 𝑓𝑒𝑞,𝑖 𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 ′ ≔ 𝑚𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖′ 𝐸𝑛𝑐1 𝑚𝑖 , 𝐸𝑛𝑐2 𝑚𝑖 ′ ∈ 𝐺1 2 × 𝐺2 2 ⇔ 𝑓𝑒𝑞,𝑖 𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 ′ = 0 • Append {𝑓𝑒𝑞,𝑖} to the polynomials which restricts message space for AHM+ Remark of AHM+ 10 / 22
  11. 11. NIZKP of 𝐸𝑛𝑐(0) of AHM+
  12. 12. • Compute 𝑋 from given ciphertexts and verify 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(0) • Parameters • 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ; secret • 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 𝑇, 𝑥 ≔ 𝑔 𝑠1, 𝑦 ≔ 𝑔 𝑠2, 𝑧 ≔ 𝑔 𝑠1 𝑠2 ; public • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(0) • any 𝑋 ≔ 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 𝑇 4 can described as 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 = 𝑥 𝑤1 𝑦 𝑤2 𝑧−𝑤3 ′ , 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3 with 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, 𝑤3 ′ . • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀 0; 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3 = 𝑥 𝑤1 𝑦 𝑤2 𝑧−𝑤3, 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3 , then verify 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(0) by proving 𝑤3 ′ = 𝑤3. Equation to be verified 12 / 22
  13. 13. • 𝑠1, 𝑠2 ; secret • 𝑔, 𝑥 = 𝑔 𝑠1, 𝑦 = 𝑔 𝑠2, 𝑧 = 𝑔 𝑠1 𝑠2 ; given • For 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 ≔ (𝑦 𝑤1 𝑥 𝑤2 𝑧−𝑤3 ′ , 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3), pick 𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜌3 ← 𝔽 𝑟 and 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4 ≔ (𝑦 𝜌1 𝑥 𝜌2 𝑧−𝜌3, 𝑔 𝜌1, 𝑔 𝜌2, 𝑔 𝜌3), 𝑎 ≔ ℎ(𝑔, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4), 𝜎𝑖 ≔ 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑎𝑤𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1,2,3, output 𝜋 ≔ (𝑎, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎3). Construction of NIZKP 13 / 22
  14. 14. • For 𝜋 ≔ (𝑎, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎3), 𝑅1 ′ ≔ 𝑦 𝜎1 𝑥 𝜎2 𝑧−𝜎3 𝑠−𝑎, 𝑅2 ′ ≔ 𝑔 𝜎1 𝑡−𝑎, 𝑅3 ′ ≔ 𝑔 𝜎2 𝑢−𝑎, 𝑅4 ′ ≔ 𝑔 𝜎3 𝑣−𝑎 , 𝑎′ ≔ ℎ(𝑔, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑅1 ′ , 𝑅2 ′ , 𝑅3 ′ , 𝑅4 ′ ). • Output 1 if 𝑎 = 𝑎′ and 0, otherwise • Proof of correctness • 𝑅1 ′ = 𝑦 𝜎1−𝑎𝑤1 𝑥 𝜎2−𝑎𝑤2 𝑧−𝜎3+𝑎𝑤3 = 𝑦 𝜌1 𝑥 𝜌2 𝑧−𝜌3 = 𝑅1 • 𝑅𝑖+1 ′ = 𝑔 𝜎 𝑖−𝑎𝑤 𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖+1 • Then 𝑎′ = 𝑎. Verification 14 / 22
  15. 15. • Any 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝐺 𝑇 4 can be described as 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑢, 𝑣 = 𝑦 𝑤1 𝑥 𝑤2 𝑧−𝑤3 ′ , 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3 . • For 𝜋 = (𝑎, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎3), define 𝜌𝑖 ≔ 𝜎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑤𝑖 then 𝑅1 ′ = 𝑦 𝜌1 𝑥 𝜌2 𝑧 𝑎 𝑤3 ′−𝑤3 −𝜌3, 𝑅𝑖+1 ′ = 𝑔 𝜎 𝑖 𝑔−𝑎𝑤 𝑖 = 𝑔 𝜌 𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1,2,3. • Attacker must find 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, 𝑤3 ′ , 𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜌3 and 𝑎 s.t. 𝑎 = ℎ(𝑔, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑦 𝑤1 𝑥 𝑤2 𝑧−𝑤3 ′ , 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3, 𝑦 𝜌1 𝑥 𝜌2 𝑧 𝑎 𝑤3 ′−𝑤3 −𝜌3, 𝑔 𝜌1, 𝑔 𝜌2, 𝑔 𝜌3) • It is hard if 𝑤3 ′ ≠ 𝑤3 Proof of soundness (outline) 15 / 22
  16. 16. Application
  17. 17. • Alice queries 𝑎-th data to Bob who has 𝑛 data • Requirements • Alice does not tell 𝑎 to Bob • Bob does not tell 𝑥𝑖(𝑖 ≠ 𝑎) to Alice Oblivious Transfer Alice Bob 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 query 𝑎-th data return 𝑥 𝑎 17 / 22
  18. 18. • Alice • For 𝑎, select 𝑞 and 𝑟 s.t. 𝑎 = 𝑞𝑚 + 𝑟 (0 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑚 ≔ 𝑛 ) • Send (𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑞,0 , … , 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑞,𝑚−1 ), 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑟,0 , … , 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑟,𝑚−1 where 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 is the Kronecker delta • Bob • 𝑐 ≔ σ𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑚+𝑗 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑞,𝑖 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝛿 𝑟,𝑗 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(෍ 𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑚+𝑗 𝛿 𝑞,𝑖 𝛿 𝑟,𝑗) = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑥 𝑞𝑚+𝑟 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑥 𝑎) • Alice : 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐 = 𝑥 𝑎 • Traffic size is 2𝑚 ciphertexts= 𝑂( 𝑛) • 𝑛 = 106, 2.5sec response, iPhone with JavaScript(wasm) OT by L2HE 18 / 22
  19. 19. • Bob checks whether 𝑐𝑖 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑚𝑖) sent by Alice satisfies 𝑚𝑖 ∈ {0,1} and σ𝑚𝑖 = 1 (1-of-𝑛) without decrypting • Polynomials of Theorem • 𝑓𝑖 𝑚 ≔ 𝑚𝑖(1 − 𝑚𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 • 𝑓𝑛+1 𝑚 : = σ𝑚𝑖 − 1 • 𝑋: = σ𝑖 ℎ 𝑐, 𝑖 𝑓𝑖(𝑐) = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀 0 • 𝑚𝑖 ∈ 0,1 and σ𝑚𝑖 = 1 by NIZKP of 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(0) • Transfer size for large 𝑛 • smaller than Chou, Orlandi. The simplest protocol for oblivious transfer, LATINCRYPT 2015 • Other application for 𝑘-of-𝑛 bit vector • Take 𝑘 s.t. 0 < 𝑘 < 𝑛 and use 𝑓𝑛+1 𝑚 ≔ σ𝑚𝑖 − 𝑘, then we can verify that {𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑚𝑖)} is a encrypted 𝑘-of-𝑛 bit vector Malicious Alice 19 / 22
  20. 20. • 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑚) where 0 ≤ 𝑚 < 𝑛 • Let 𝑙 s.t. 2𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 < 2𝑙+1, 𝑅 ≔ 𝑛 − 2𝑙 • A binary expansion of 𝑚 if 𝑚 < 2𝑙 and 𝑚 − 𝑅 if 𝑚 ≥ 2𝑙 • 𝑚 = σ𝑖=0 𝑙−1 𝑚𝑖2𝑖 + 𝑚𝑙 𝑅 where 𝑚𝑖 ∈ {0,1} • Check whether 𝑚𝑖 ∈ {0,1} for 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚𝑖 by NIZKP and compute 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚 ≔ ෍ 𝑖=0 𝑙−1 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚𝑖 2𝑖 + 𝑚𝑙 𝑅 The idea when 𝑅 ≠ 0 by Nuida Koji Range of message 20 / 22
  21. 21. • 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑖𝑗) ; 𝑛-dim. matrix s.t. 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∈ 0,1 , ෍ 𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1 , ෍ 𝑗 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1 • Polynomials {𝑓𝑖𝑗 1 , 𝑓𝑖 2 , 𝑓𝑗 3 } defined as • 𝑓𝑖𝑗 1 𝐴 ≔ 𝑎𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑗) • 𝑓𝑖 2 𝐴 ≔ σ𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 1 • 𝑓𝑗 3 𝐴 ≔ σ 𝑗 𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 1 • Other application • The condition that 𝐴 is an orthogonal matrix (𝐴 𝑡 𝐴 = 𝐼) can be represented by polynomials of degree 2. Permutation matrix 21 / 22
  22. 22. • A constant-size zero-knowledge proof to give the restriction which is represented by a root of polynomials of degree 2 based on AHM+ (L2HE). • Future work • Apply the construction to the other HE (lattice-based HE, etc.) Conclusion 22 / 22
  23. 23. Appendix
  24. 24. • Add • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚1; 𝑟1 + 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚2; 𝑟2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑚1 + 𝑚2; 𝑟1 + 𝑟2) • same as lifted ElGamal • Mul • 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀 𝑚; 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3 ≔ 𝑔 𝑚+𝑠2 𝑤1+𝑠1 𝑤2−𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑤3, 𝑔 𝑤1, 𝑔 𝑤2, 𝑔 𝑤3 • 𝐸𝑛𝑐1 𝑚1; 𝑟1 × 𝐸𝑛𝑐2 𝑚2; 𝑟2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(𝑚1 𝑚2; 𝑚1 𝑟2 + 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑠1, 𝑚2 𝑟1 + 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑠2, 𝑟1 𝑟2) Formula on random numbers 24 / 22
  25. 25. • Generic 2-dim. polynomials • 𝑥 ≔ (𝑥1, … , 𝑥 𝑛), 𝑥′ ≔ 𝑥1 ′ , … , 𝑥 𝑛 ′ , 𝐸𝑛𝑐1(𝑥𝑖; 𝑟𝑖), 𝐸𝑛𝑐2(𝑥𝑖 ′ ; 𝑟𝑖 ′ ), For 𝑓 𝑥, 𝑥′ ≔ σ𝑖,𝑗 𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 ′ + σ𝑖 𝑏𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + σ𝑖 𝑐𝑖 𝑥𝑖′, 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑓 𝑥, 𝑥′ = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀(𝑓 𝑥, 𝑥′ , ҧ𝑟′ ҧ𝑥 + 1 + ҧ𝑟 + 1 𝑠1 , ҧ𝑟 ഥ𝑥′ + 1 + ҧ𝑟 + 1 𝑠2 , ҧ𝑟𝑟′) where ҧ𝑥 ≔ σ𝑖 𝑥𝑖, ҧ𝑟 ≔ σ𝑖 𝑟𝑖. • can compute 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3 of 𝑋 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑀 0; 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3 from ciphertexts 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥′ and 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟′ Evaluation of ciphertexts by polynomials 25 / 22

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