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Trusts You Might Have Missed

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Trusts You Might Have Missed

  1. 1. Trusts You Might Have Missed Will (@harmj0y) Justin (@sixdub)
  2. 2. @harmj0y ● Security researcher and red teamer for the Adaptive Threat Division of Veris Group ● Co-founder of the Veil-Framework and Veil’s PowerTools ● Cons: Shmoocon, CarolinaCon, Defcon, Derbycon, various BSides
  3. 3. @sixdub ● Pentester and red teamer for the Adaptive Threat Division of Veris Group ● Lots of interest: red team ops, reverse engineering, adversarial tactics, etc ● Developer on the Veil-Framework and co- founder of Veil’s PowerTools
  4. 4. tl;dr ● Red Team Operations ● Active Directory 101 ● Domain Trusts 101 ● So what? ● Back to the Old School ● New School Enumeration ● Visualizing Trusts ● Abusing Trusts ● Demo ● On The Horizon
  5. 5. Red Team Operations Setting the stage
  6. 6. Red Teaming ● Red teaming means different things to different people o physical ops, in-depth social engineering, custom exploit dev, pure network based operations, etc. ● Common thread of increased time frame and more permissive scope ● Red Team Operations - military concept of adversarial thinking that evolved into adversary emulation
  7. 7. “Assume Breach” Mentality ● With the rash of recent major incidents, organizations have started to realize that they’re probably already owned ● You’re not going to stop the bad guys from getting in the front door ● Companies need to implement an “assume breach” way of thinking
  8. 8. Nothing New? ● Domain trusts have existed for years, and red teams have been abusing them just as long ● While these techniques are public, they’re not as well known as they should be ● Most of what we’re going to talk about is possible through multiple means: o VBScript, PowerShell, native tools o Good to have alternative ways to accomplish the same goal
  9. 9. Active Directory 101 Let’s go back to school
  10. 10. Base Overview ● Multiple Levels o Domain - Logical group of network objects (computers, users etc) o Trees - Collection of domains o Forests - Collection of trees ● Used to authenticate and authorize users and computers on a network o Also provides security policies, centralized management, and other rich features
  11. 11. Not So Basic Overview: NTLM
  12. 12. Not So Basic Overview: Kerberos
  13. 13. Active Directory Trusts 101 ● Trusts allow separate domains to form a relationship o Allows for the possibility of access to objects between domains. Authentication linkage! o Allows you to use objects from a remote domain  aka Users from Domain A can be in groups of Domain B ● Forests can also establish trust relationships o ex. All domains in Forest A will trust domains in Forest B
  14. 14. Active Directory Trusts 201 ● Communications in the trust work via a system of referrals o If the SPN being requested resides outside of primary DC, issue a referral to the forest KDC or trusted domain KDC to receive a ticket o access is passed around with inter-realm TGTs ● Multiple configuration topographies available that will determine the behavior of the trusts o All a matter of design…
  15. 15. Trust Direction
  16. 16. Trust Types ● Trusts come in a few varieties: o One way - Only one domain trusts the other o Two way - Both domains trust each other o Transitive - Domain A trusts Domain B and Domain B trusts Domain C, so Domain A trusts Domain C ● A child domain retains an implicit trust with its parent ● Lots more information at us/library/cc773178(v=ws.10).aspx
  17. 17. So What? ● Why does this matter? ● Red teams often compromise accounts/machines in a domain that's trusted by their actual target, allowing them to exploit these existing trust relationships to achieve their end goal ● And Enterprise Admin = pwnership over everything below
  18. 18. Domain Trust Enumeration Know what you have before you start pwning
  19. 19. Old School Enumeration ● Traditional trust enumeration utilizing ntltest:
  20. 20. Old School Enumeration ● Netdom (from servers only): o netdom query trust ● Adfind to enumerate trusts in other domains:
  21. 21. New School Enumeration ● PowerShell: Microsoft’s handy “post- exploitation language” :) ● Essentially a command-line wrapper for .NET with full access to the framework ● Contains various Active Directory hooks that makes enumeration much easier and flexible than before
  22. 22. ● To enumerate all domains in the forest: o ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Fore st]::GetCurrentForest()).Domains ● To enumerate all trust relationships for the current domain: o ([System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Dom ain]::GetCurrentDomain()).GetAllTrustRelationsh ips() Trust Enumeration with PowerShell
  23. 23. Using Trusts With PowerShell ● A lot of ADSI native PowerShell AD functionality can easily operate on domains to which there's an existing trust: o finding domain controllers, querying users, enumerating domain groups, finding domain machines, etc. ● All across trust boundaries with little extra effort, using these enumerated domain contexts
  24. 24. PowerView ● Think dsquery on steroids... and cocaine ● First started because a client banned “net” commands on domain machines ● Otherwise initially inspired by Rob Fuller’s netview.exe tool o Wanted something more flexible that also didn’t drop a binary to disk
  25. 25. PowerView: Enumerating Trusts ● PowerView has several new functions that allow you to enumerate any existing domain/forest trust relationships: o Get-NetForest: information about the current domain forest o Get-NetForestTrusts: grab all forest trusts o Get-NetForestDomains: enumerate all domains in the current forest o Get-NetDomainTrusts: find all current domain trusts, á la nltest
  26. 26. PowerView: Enumerating Trusts
  27. 27. PowerView: Trust Mapping w/ LDAP! ● Sometimes the trust “enclave” is more protected, and mass enumeration across a boundary can seem strange o Also, your workstation might not be able to directly contact the DC of a trusted/ing domain ● Get-NetDomainTrustsLDAP - Utilizes LDAP queries only to enumerate trusts o Slightly less accurate… but blends better! o And these LDAP queries can be bounced through your primary DC!
  28. 28. PowerView: Using Trusts ● If a trust exists, most functions in PowerView can now accept a -Domain <name> flag to operate across a trust: o Get-NetDomainControllers, Get-NetUsers, Get- NetUser, Get-NetComputers, Get-NetGroups, Get- NetGroup, Get-NetFileServers, Get-UserProperties, Invoke-UserFieldSearch, Invoke-Netview, Invoke- UserHunter, etc.
  29. 29. PowerView: Using Trusts
  30. 30. Mapping Domain Trusts ● PowerView also have a function to map all reachable domain trusts: o Invoke-MapDomainTrusts o Invoke-MapDomainTrustsLDAP ● Finds all domain trusts for the current domain, then tries to enumerate all trusts for each domain it finds, and so on ● Can dump out a nice .csv of all current trust relationships
  31. 31. Analysis and Visualization Raw data ain’t nothin’
  32. 32. Motivations ● Many networks only have a few domains and associated trusts ● While this raw data from PowerView is useful, it can become onerous for networks with many domains o Think dozens+, all interconnected ● Data means nothing if you can’t interpret it usefully
  33. 33. Nodal Analysis ● Concept of applying network and graph theory techniques to identify relevant and useful data o Centrality o Shortest Path o Isolated Nodes ● DomainTrustExplorer! o Used to rapidly triage large networks with a spaghetti mess of trusts o
  34. 34. Nodal Analysis
  35. 35. Visualization ● Visual information processing is much easier for some people ● Seemingly random relationships might reveal important information when visualized in certain methods o Tree vs Node-Link vs Topological ● DomainTrustExplorer dumps to GraphML format
  36. 36. Abusing Domain Trusts The path to pwnership
  37. 37. Abusing Trusts ● As mentioned, knowing a trust exists can let you query information, but it doesn’t necessarily imply access o though it often does ;) ● You need to figure out if any users have cross-domain access and to what resources in other domains o trusts are rarely locked down properly, and you can often jump from one domain to another
  38. 38. Abusing Trusts with PowerView ● To enumerate users who are in groups outside of the user’s primary domain (i.e. across trusts): o Invoke-FindUserTrustGroups -Domain <domain> o Invoke-FindAllUserTrustGroups ● To enumerate users who have local admin privileges on all domain controllers in a particular domain: o Get-GetDomainControllers -Domain <domain> | Get-NetLocalGroup
  39. 39. ● To enumerate groups with users outside of the group’s primary domain: o Invoke-FindGroupTrustUsers -Domain <domain> o Invoke-FindAllGroupTrustUsers ● To find members of the administrators localgroup outside of the primary domain for all machines in a domain: o Invoke-EnumerateLocalTrustGroups -Domain <domain> Abusing Trusts with PowerView: BSides Chicago Edition
  40. 40. Abusing Trusts: A Case Study ● Say we land on a machine in the dev.testlab.local domain and work our way to the DC ● We want to compromise the testlab.local forest root o We’ll do this by abusing trust relationships with another child domain in the forest ● We’ll step through enumeration, visualization, and abuse
  41. 41. Demo
  42. 42. On The Horizon Whats next...
  43. 43. Improved Data Analysis ● Working on methods to correlate PowerView data with trust information to provide additional context o Think “this domain group has access to these cross- domain resources” ● Goal of creating an offensive dashboard for red team operations o @_tomsteele has started some of this work already
  44. 44. Trust Keys
  45. 45. Trust Keys
  46. 46. Trust Keys ● The password for a domain trust account is used to derive an inter-realm key for encrypting referral tickets* o Mimikatz can now extract these trust keys from domain controllers participating in the trust ● These keys can be used to create “gold-ish” trust tickets for the krbtgt service, with a trusting domain as the target o these in turn can be used to request TGSes for specific services on the trusting domain *
  47. 47. Trust Keys: A Domain Trust Golden Ticket This means that even if the krbtgt hash is rolled twice, you can still abuse a privileged domain trust and possibly recompromise a domain from a trusted source!
  48. 48. Questions? ● Contact us: o @harmj0y (will [at] or o @sixdub (justin [at] or ● Read more: o o ● Get the tools: o Framework/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerView o