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Three D Security


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Three D Security

  1. 1. The Military’s Growing Role in Development Dr. Reuben E. Brigety, II Center for American Progress Presentation at The Stimpson Center June 30, 2008
  2. 2. Introduction <ul><li>January 2007-January 2008, CFR IAF at USAID working on civil-military issues </li></ul><ul><li>June 2007 conducted three-country tour (Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia) </li></ul><ul><li>Over 100 interviews </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Three US Ambassadors </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Senior and field-grade US military officers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>USAID field staff </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>NGOs </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Host nation officials </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Aid beneficiaries </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Dozens of site visits </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Well digging projects, refugee camps, school projects, housing for IDPs, food distributions, agricultural and veterinary development, etc. </li></ul></ul>
  3. 3. Shidley <ul><li>“ We’ll keep drilling ‘til we run outta steel.” </li></ul><ul><li>$250,000 vs. $10,000 </li></ul><ul><li>Winning hearts and minds with an ear to the ground – </li></ul><ul><li>The new American “Way of War” </li></ul>
  4. 4. TENSIONS SUDAN ETHIOPIA YEMEN SOMALIA UGANDA KENYA TANZANIA DJIBOUTI E2 Border conflict AIAI and ONLF Al Qaida (E. Africa), AIAI, and Al-Shabab Eastern Front Al Houthi OLF Darfur (SLA, G19, JEM and Janjaweed) SPLM/A and SSDF Dispute (Somaliland/ Puntland) Religion Tribes / Clans LRA ADF Karamajo Cluster
  5. 5. Threat Analysis and Sustainable Security <ul><li>Failed and Fragile States </li></ul><ul><ul><li>NSS 2002 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>USAID Failed and Fragile States Strategy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>NMS </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Limited utility of conventional military force </li></ul><ul><li>Three-D Security Paradigm </li></ul><ul><li>Sustainable Security as alternative/addendum </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Development Assistance as instrument of national power </li></ul></ul>
  6. 6. The State Department operates U.S. Embassies and Consulates. Two main Embassy focus areas are formulating U.S. foreign policy and strengthening ties between the U.S. and the host country. - Governmental relations - Public diplomacy - Opening markets for trade To be successful, the U.S. Government implements the combined power of three main foreign policy institutions. CJTF-HOA’s Mission Prevent Conflict Promote Regional Stability Protect Coalition Interests in order to Prevail Against Extremism What Are The Three D’s? USAID is the primary U.S. developmental agency. USAID supports long-term and equitable economic growth to include agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. Successful U.S. Foreign Policy D evelopment D efense CJTF-HOA is DOD’s member of the team. Two main concerns for DOD are security and stability . Security and stability reduce the specter of conflict, war and terrorism. - Civil military operations - Military training - Foreign military sales CJTF-HOA’s Area of Operations Comoros Djibouti Ethiopia Eritrea Kenya Madagascar Seychelles Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Yemen U.S. foreign policy seeks to expand democracy , open free markets and improve lives of people around the world. The Defense Department, State Department and Agency for International Development play key roles. Each organization has different missions but all are aligned in common purpose. D iplomacy
  7. 7. Military and Development: Definitions <ul><li>Military vs. Civilian conceptions of “humanitarian” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Civilian: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Emergency, life-saving assistance immediately following a natural disaster or complex emergency </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Military </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>“ Assistance to the local populace provided by predominately U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises” </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Civilian “humanitarian” = Foreign Disaster Relief/Emergency Response </li></ul></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Military and Development: Doctrine <ul><li>Sea-change in military approach to non-kinetic instruments and missions </li></ul><ul><ul><li>DOD 3000.05 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>EUCOM “Active Security” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Navy Operating Concept </li></ul></ul><ul><li>“Organic” rather than “directed” change </li></ul>
  9. 9. Isolate the Enemy Increase Friendly Freedom of Action / Reduce Enemy Freedom of Action DOD GWOT Campaign Concept FRIENDLY FRIENDLY Critical Capability ENVIRONMENT INFLUENCING THE ENVIRONMENT Stabilize Shape Lines of Operation Increase Friendly Freedom of Action / Reduce Enemy Freedom of Action Enable Partners to Combat VEOs Deter Tacit and Active Support for VEOs Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies Isolate the Threat Strategic Aims ENEMY Global Combating Terrorism Network Indirect Approach Disrupt Violent Extremist Orgs. (VEOs) Deny access and use of WMD/E by VEOs Defeat the Isolated Threat Isolate the Threat Prevent Emergence Re- Constitution Direct Approach
  10. 10. Military and Development: Organization, Operations, Funding <ul><li>ORGANIZATION: Changes in organization reflect change in doctrine and approach </li></ul><ul><ul><li>In Washington : </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>OSD/DGP </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>USAID/OMA </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>USAID/CMM </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>S/CRS </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Regional HQs : </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>AFRICOM </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>SOUTHCOM </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>OPERATIONS: Shifts in military practice </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PRTs (Afghanistan and Iraq) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Africa Partnership Station – Gulf of Guinea </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pacific Partnership 2008 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CJTF-HOA </li></ul></ul><ul><li>FUNDING: Almost 22% of US ODA channeled through military </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Approximately $67 million for OHDACA in FY07 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Request total of $1 billion in CERP for FY 2008 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>USAID about $9.2 billion in programs in FY 2007 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Real issue is flexibility, authority, and politics of both, with local military commanders generally have more flexibility in dispersal of funds than USAID missions </li></ul></ul>
  11. 11. Analysis: Rationale for MHA <ul><li>Controversy of military involvement is mainly in Phase Zero “shaping” ops, not disaster assistance </li></ul><ul><li>Relevant question regards comparative advantage </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Security perspective” is unique adv of military </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Humanitarian paradox” is a problem </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Controversy of military involvement is mainly in Phase Zero “shaping” ops, not disaster assistance </li></ul><ul><li>Leads to “second order” problem </li></ul><ul><ul><li>How to move beyond causally linking resources to human improvement, and link human improvement to strategic success </li></ul></ul>
  12. 12. Implications <ul><li>National Development Consensus </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Must be grassroots and broad bi-partisan agreement in Congress on the role of development in national security </li></ul></ul><ul><li>National Development Strategy </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Overarching framework necessary for linking development activities to other instruments of national power </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Process is as important as the product </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Instrumental vs. Fundamental Assistance: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Threat analysis suggests strategic value of development assistance as means (instrumental) and ends (fundamental) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>US budgets and bureaucracies must protect and coordinate both missions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Appropriate congressional oversight </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Grand bargain on legislative restrictions </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Disperse development experts in NSC, OSD, and AUS/USMC deployable combat brigades </li></ul><ul><li>Assessment is vital </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Establishing causal link between development assistance and strategic objectives/outcomes is the most important aspect of this activity, and also the most difficult </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Task should be partnership of DOD, State, USAID, and academia </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Results must be transparent </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Questions