1. David J. Kilcullen Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State RAND Insurgency Board May 8, 2008 Dinosaurs versus Mammals: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq, 2007
3. 1. Diagnosing the Problem – a Vicious Circle Extremists infiltrate Sunni communities, establish base areas through intimidation Sunni extremists attack neighboring Shi’a communities Shi’a militias and “death squads” attack Sunni communities Sectarian attacks intimidate Sunni communities, which close ranks Accelerants: AQI terrorism Foreign fighters Iranian infiltration Crime & unemployment 1 2 3 4
4. 2. Breaking the Cycle – Sustainable Stability De-celerants: Political reconciliation Competent, non-sectarian governance & institutions Extremists infiltrate Sunni communities, establish base areas through intimidation Sunni extremists attack neighboring Shi’a communities Shi’a militias and vigilantes attack Sunni communities Sectarian attacks intimidate Sunni communities, which close ranks 1 2 3 4 Joint Security Stations & EPRT civil programs protect communities, render them resistant to infiltration Joint Security Stations protect people in their homes Market and district hardening programs, and Joint Security Stations protect public places against terrorism Domination of “belts” and control of access to Baghdad prevents “commuter insurgents” and infiltration Access controls prevent Sunni extremists entering Shi’a areas Gated communities prevent Sunni extremists infiltrating Sunni areas Gated communities prevent Shi’a extremists entering Sunni areas
5. Lines of Operation (generic) April 2007 Developing Security Forces Support Government Insurgent Neutral or Passive Support Government Insurgent Neutral or Passive Attitude of Populace Security Operations Develop Security Forces Better Governance Essential Services Economic Development Information Operations Starting Conditions End State
6. Lines of Operation (JSAT) Campaign Goal Near Term - End to large scale sectarian violence, improved population security, and substantial progress on political accommodation Intermediate Term - The establishment of a negotiated political agreement that leads to sustainable security Long Term - Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists. COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT COMMUNICATION & ENGAGEMENT POLITICAL SECURITY ECONOMIC DIPLOMATIC LOO Goal – Political accommodation agreement leading to a sustainable security situation, marked by a significant reduction in aggregate political violence LOO Goal - End large scale violence; defeat irreconcilables; develop leverage to bring reconcilables to the table; reform ISF; reduce destabilizing external influences LOO Goal - Progress in key sectors of the Iraqi economy supports and reflects movement towards sustainable stabilization and political accommodation LOO Goal - Negative influences from neighbors reduced. Increased Iraqi outreach to region, more acceptance of Iraqi government by region
7. Campaign Concept 2007-8 (JSAT, Mar 07) Coalition Force Level CRITICAL FACTORS: Time, Leverage, US political will, GOI performance MNF-I applies increased force levels, intimate cooperation with ISF and a focus on population security, to improve security situation between now and February 2008. USM-I exploits improved security, to force key actors toward GOI reform, confidence building measures (‘07) & political accommodation (‘08) resulting in sustainable stability . MNF-I progressively reduces force levels through 2008, aiming for steady state early ‘09 . MAIN EFFORT: Political & diplomatic lines of operation translate security progress into sustainable political stability. window of opportunity Now Feb 08 July 07 Dec 08
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12. Tentative theoretical model for Insurgent & Counterinsurgent Learning The “Metz Threshold” Time Performance “ Acceptability Gradient” (politically defined) Counterinsurgent Performance Insurgent Performance Counterinsurgent starts behind acceptability gradient 1 Insurgent starts ahead of acceptability gradient 2 Counterinsurgent’s adaptation prompts evolution in insurgent 4 Rising expectations invoke “red queen effect” for counterinsurgent 6 Insurgent and counterinsurgent performance converge through co-evolution 7 Counterinsurgent failure to meet rising expectations may prompt insurgent “take-off” 8 Counterinsurgent adapts to environment and improves 3 Counterinsurgent must achieve acceptable performance before Metz threshold reached 5
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15. Example adaptations Institutional Adaptation Institutional Evolution Operational Evolution Operational Adaptation New TTPs New personnel systems New collective training New individual training New In-theater organizations New permanent units Budget changes Supplemental funding Permanence Scope
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19. Iraq – Sunni insurgent Networks UNCLASSIFIED Derived from OSINT DJ Kilcullen / JSAT / March 07 Mujahideen Central Command Coordination Department of the Jihad Brigades Jeish al-Ta'eifa al-Mansoura Victorious Army Group Jama’a al Murabitin Jaish al Sunna wa’l Jama’a Ansar al Tawhid Brigades Islamic Jihad Brigades Tanzim Qa’idat fil Balad ar Rafidayn Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia Strangers’ Brigades Horror Brigades 1920s Revolutionary Brigades Islamic Iraqi Resistance Front Ja’ami Jaish al Mujahidin Islamic Army in Iraq Ansar al Sunna Blended org, FREs + jihadists, formerly Ansar al Islam Kurdish Shia & Sunni Leaders, long-standing personal links to AMZ, home ground advantage in KRG area (Ba’athists / Former Regime Elements) Muslim Ulema Council (former Ba’athist Society of Islamic Scholars ) Green Brigades Jaish Muhammad Mujahidin Shura Council (ISI may have taken over) Abdullah Janabi friends with Izzat al-Duri & Harith al-Dari (all three Baathists, sufis, fedayeen, IIS – Not Salafists, sufis [tarekat links] Kamis al-Sirhan Muhammad Yunis Ahmad al Hamdani (al Duri’s deputy in Mil Bureau – Saddam’s network for religious-based organization of insurgency, kept eye on tribes, mosques & security orgs – old boy network ) Larger in numbers Iraqi Turkmen Front (Turkish govt links?)
20. Insurgent Organizational Evolution – Jaish al Mahdi Political Leadership Propaganda wing Social Services / Charity Militia / Local insurgents Special Groups Criminal elements JAM 2005-6 Political leadership divided Propaganda efforts weak Social services growing JAM 2007 Crafting a “Hizb’allah model” Propaganda and social services strengthened, Criminal elements starting to be eliminated Political Leadership Propaganda wing Social Services / Charity Militia / Local insurgents Special Groups
24. 28 MAY 07 - DOWNED OH-58 - TIMELINE AS OF 29 0630D MAY 07 LEGEND LOCATION WHO: MND-N WHAT: DOWNED OH-58 WHEN: 281816D MAY 07 WHERE: 38S MC 7696 5353 28 MAY 1816D- 0H-58 (SB 56) DOWNED 38S MC 7696 5353, 16KM W. OF MUQDADIYAH. SWT RECEIVED SAFIRE FROM SINGLE POO. SB 56 CONDUCTED ATTACK RUN RESULTING IN CATASTROPHIC DAM TO SB 56. B26 EVADED ENEMY FIRE. 1820D- 3-1 CAV RECEIVED MAYDAY CALL FROM DOWNED OH-58. QRF ALERTED. ANOTHER AWT RESPONDED TO CRASH SITE AND ASSISTS SB26 IN SECURING SITE. 1842D- CAS (2X F-16) OVERHEAD. 1848D- A UH-60 TEAM (LIGHTNING 06) IVO CRASH SITE LANDED AND PICKED UP OH-58 CREW. AWT PROVIDED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE – 2X CF (US) KIA . UH-60 CASEVACED CAS TO FOB WARHORSE. 1940D- AWT (REDWOLF 06) ENGAGED 3X AIF AT CRASH SITE – 2X AIF KIA. 2006D- GROUND QRF IN ROUTE (3-1 CAV QRF – 4X M1114, 2X M2, 24X PAX) 2024D- 5W’s SENT TO COMMAND GROUP FROM MNFI CHOPS (OIC). 2034D- DART INBOUND TO DO PHO. 2035D- QRF HIT IED ENROUTE TO CRASH SITE, 5X CF (US) KIA, 3X CF (US) WIA AND 1X M2 BFV DAMAGED. 2048D- A10 HAD EYES ON DOWNED A/C CRASH SITE. 2051D- AASLT QRF LANDED AND SECURED THE CRASH SITE. TEAM INCLUDED EOD AND MAINT TECH. 2200D- A/C TI CONDUCTED – A/C TOTAL LOSS. 2309D- EOD DESTROYED A/C. 29 MAY 290265D DURING RECOVERY OF THE M2 BFV FROM IED STRIKE, A SECOND IED EXPLODED UNDER THE M2 BFV, 1X CF (US) KIA BDA: 8X CF (US) KIA, 3X CF (US) WIA, 2X AIF KILLED, 1X OH-58 DESTROYED, 1X BFV DAMAGED 2048D - QRF HIT IED SAF/HMG POO 1816D - OH-58 CRASH SITE
27. 29 MAY 07, TF 2-15 ICW 4/6 IA OPSUM, EAGLE RAZOR SOUTH II DETAINEES: 13 X LN DETAINED INJURIES: 1 X US WIA BR# SM0998; MEDEVAC, GS WOUND TO LEG, TREATED AND RTD STATUS Cache Found : 1. MB 241 444 2. MB 242 442 3. MB 241 442 4. MB 238 441 5. MB 257 421 6 X BAGS UBE 4 X CANS 30MM 1 X SPARE BARREL AA 2000 X PROPAGANDA CD’S 1800 X BLANK CD’S 1 X CD WRITER 2 X GRNADE FUSES 1 X AK-47 WITH MAGAZINE 300 X CASSETTES 1 X WASHINE MACHINE TIMER COPPER WIRE
39. New Tactics 1 -- Urban Oilspot HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE Reconstruction Zone Initial focus of ops. Selected where pop most supports CF. PRT main effort. Permanently garrisoned. Must protect population 24/7. No kinetic ops in here without PRT clearance. No expansion until fully secure. 1 Security & Influence Zone BCT main effort. Mission is to protect RZ from enemy infil. Pop in this area are denied benefits of RZ, kept under intrusive control. Joint Influence Teams work here, using progress in RZ as ”object lesson” to convince community leaders to “sign on”. Pop must meet criteria (control youth, report en acty, no anti-CF activity etc.) to be eligible for PRT benefits. Once criteria met, RZ expands into this zone. 2 Disruption Zone Remainder of AOR. Focus of intel and SOF activity. Aim to disrupt enemy, keep off balance, select next oilspot location. 3
40. New Tactics 2 – IED counter-ambush A B Chokepoint – likely IED site somewhere in here Of all key locations, the actual IED site is least important. Look for early warning OPs, firing and assembly points, infil/exfil routes. Use friendly convoy movement as bait to trigger en action. Pre-position sigint and recon assets to identify teams moving into position, listen for the calls between OP and firing team. Use tank, atk helo or snipers for point engagement of firing team, with ground patrol follow up. Capture OP teams and exploit cellphone data. Spring elements to capture and exploit observation teams, kill or capture firing team, trace back to assembly point, local and district caches. This will require detainee exploitation and THT ops as well as physical exploitation of the firing point. Occupy the assembly point until done. Early warning zone Early warning zone OP OP Firing Point IED site Assembly Point cache Local cache District cache Sponsor
48. Albu Mahal NW Anbar, Nineveh First to turn against AQI Vines, McMaster The Iraqi revolt -- tribal ladder Revolt takes off Albu Isa Anbar, Ramadi Split btw AQI & tribal allegiance Albu Risha Minor tribe of Dulaim qabila Sitar Abu Risha Killed with 2 sons Sheikh Abd el Sittar ar Rishawi (youngest) survives Zobai Anbar, Zaytun, Baghdad Abu Abed (tribal military leader) (links to 1920s Bde and Moderate imams in Baghdad) Anbar People’s Council Anbar/Tigris Valley Smashed brutally by AQI Jan-Feb 2006 Sahawa al-Anbar (“The Awakening”) Abna al-Anbar / al ‘Iraq (sons of Anbar/Iraq) Battle of Ameriya 2-7 June 07 Ameriya Freedom Fighters Ghazaliya Guardians Concerned Local Citizens etc etc Allen, MacFarland L’Etoile, Burton Abu Abed Kuehl
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51. The logic of local partnerships Option 1 – insert 50 000 U.S. troops into theater FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking: 30 000 Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model: 20,000 Force actually out on the ground at any time (ie net effect): 7-10,000 Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base: NIL NET EFFECT: 7-10,000 pax improvement in force ratio Option 2 – win over 50 000 Iraqis into LSFs FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking: NIL Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model: 50,000 Force actually out on the ground at any time (ie net effect): 40,000 Coalition forces required for partnering, mentoring and supervision: 5,000 Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base: -50,000+ NET EFFECT: 80-95,000 pax improvement in force ratio (ie 8 to 12 times the value of inserting CF)
