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Click and Dragger: Denial and Deception on Android mobile

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G
grugq

A presentation on OPSEC for mobile phones, covering the design and reasoning behind the CryptogenMod ROM and the DarkMatter app. Source for DarkMatter: https://github.com/grugq/darkmatter

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CLICK AND DRAGGER Denial and Deception on Android - the grugq [ @thegrugq ]
AGENDA • OPSEC Refresher • Phones Suck • Threat Model • Some Solutions • Conclusion
ABOUT ME
OPERATIONAL SECURITY The ShortVersion
–Quellcrist Falconer “If you want to lose a fight, talk about it first”
DENIAL & DECEPTION
DENIAL Prevent the adversary from gaining useful information
DECEPTION Feed the adversary false information
• Cover • Cover for action • Cover for status • Concealment • Compartmentation
–James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence “People must communicate.They will make mistakes and we will exploit them.”
PHONES SUCK
–Allen Dulles, Former Director of Central Intelligence “The greatest material curse to the profession, despite all its advantages, is undoubtedly the telephone.”
NO MOBILE ANONYMITY
MOBILE IDENTIFIERS
LOCATION • Specific location, e.g. home, work, etc. • Mobility pattern, from home, via commute, to work • Mirroring, two (or more) devices traveling together
NETWORK • Numbers dialed, (who you call) • Calls received, (who calls you) • Calling pattern, (number dialed, for how long, when, how frequently)
PHYSICAL • IMEI, mobile device ID (the serial number) • IMSI, mobile subscriber ID (the phone number)
CONTENT • Identifiers, e.g. names, locations • Voice fingerprinting • Keywords
SMARTPHONES • Ad network analytics • GPS • Apps scrape and upload content • Mothership pings • Android ID • MAC address
SMARTPHONES CONT. • IP address • WiFi beacons • Cameras • Gait analysis (via sensors)
THREAT MODEL
LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
• Reporters are searched and interrogated • AJ reporters arrested for “spy equipment” • Mobile 3G access point • Militia members thought it looked “suspicious”
NOT NSA
USERS
SECURITY IS HARD WORK
SECURITYTAKES DISCIPLINE
USERS ARE LAZY
so are we
EASYTO USE
SECURE BY DEFAULT
REASONABLY SECURE
BURNER PHONES
WHAT ARETHEY GOOD FOR? • Threat actors without nation state level capabilities • Your mom • Building a non-operational legend • Flesh out a persona that doesn’t need protection
DEFINITELY NOT NSA
BURNER GUIDELINES • Dumber the better • Learn to disable completely (battery + SIM out) • Disable around locations linked to you (home!) • Never put in real information • Feel free to load with fake data https://b3rn3d.herokuapp.com/blog/2014/01/22/burner-phone-best-practices/
BURNER GUIDELINES, CONT. • Call non-operational numbers to chaff the analysis • Keep it short • Keep it simple • Get rid of it as soon as possible
BURNER GUIDE CONT. • Purchase using cash from smaller stores • Time delay before activation (months) • Dispose of with extreme prejudice
CLANDESTINE CALLS
–Allen Dulles “Never dial [the] number before having thought about your conversation. Do not improvise even the dummy part of it. But do not be too elaborate.The great rule…is to be natural.”
• Keep it short, simple and natural • Prefer signalling over operational data • signalling > open codes > plain talk • Enter your conversation with a plan
–Allen Dulles, Former Director of Central Intelligence “Even if you do not use [the phone] carelessly yourself, the other fellow, very often will, so in any case, warn him.”
FORTRESS PHONE
NSA GUIDELINES • Two forms of encryption • Belts and braces • Data at rest • FDE + app encryption • Data in motion • VPN + app encryption
YOU CANNOT HAVE A SECURE ANDROID PHONE
BECAUSE IT IS A PHONE
BECAUSE IT IS ANDROID
LEO’S LOVE ANDROID
YOU CAN'T BOLT ON SECURITY Android cannot be secured by adding apps
BUT WHAT IF I… No. Seriously, just no.
• Blackphone • For people with money • Samsung KNOX • For people who don’t want a secure phone
• GuardianROM • For people who like to reboot • CryptogenMod* • For DIY hackers * name subject to change
IS IT NSA-PROOF?
CRYPTOGENMOD Hardened Android ROM
FEATURES • Lots of crypto • Robust against physical access • Resilient against network attacks • Impact containment
• Derived from CyanogenMod 11 • Stripped down (no browser, no analytics) • Advanced privacy patches • OpenPDroid + PDroid Manager • Secure application replacements
• Kernel hardening tweaks • A lot more work to be done here • Hardened userland • A lot more work to be done here
PROTECTION
• Local physical access • Remote hacking • Baseband hacking • Network monitoring • GSM monitoring
PHYSICAL • Forensic analysis • Encryption • Security Ratchet
REMOTE • Reduce attack surface dramatically • No browser, services, or email • No app store
BASEBAND • Nothing I can do • Except PORTAL • But it’s not the end of the world • BB exploits are finicky • BB design is everything (segmentation FTW)
NETWORK MONITORING • VPN direct to a secure backend • Limited information is exposed • Provides dual layer encryption
OPSEC STILL CRITICAL Secure phones can’t cure stupid.
DARKMATTER This App Kills Forensic Analysis
SECURE APP CONTAINERS + SECURE OPERATIONAL ENV
CRYPTED APP CONTAINERS
MOBILETRUECRYPT • Runs apps withinTrueCrypt containers • Automagically kills sensitive apps, then • mount -o bind … /data/data/$app
MOBILETRUECRYPT • tc-play https://github.com/bwalex/tc-play • Uses theTrueCrypt volume format • Supports outer and hidden volumes • Backend is dm-crypt not FUSE
MOBILETRUECRYPT • Why not use native /data encryption? • AES-256-XTS > AES-128-CBC • Use both
WIN STATES
CLOSED CRYPTED CONTAINERS
SHUTDOWN/REBOOT COUNTS
HOW DO WE GETTHERE?
EVENT BASED HARDENING
CHANGE SECURITY POSTURE BASED ON OBSERVATIONS OFTHE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
• Observe the operational environment • Monitor for SecurityEvents • Harden the security posture • Trigger SecurityActions
INDICATORS OF A NEGATIVE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
• Failed login • Timer • Temperature drop • Radio silence • Debugger attach • Receive alert • SIM removed
HARDEN SECURITY POSTURE
• Kill sensitive applications • Unmount file systems • Wipe files • Wipe ram • Reboot phone
DURESS CODES • Explicit duress codes don’t work • “of these two codes, only use this one when you’re under extreme stress. ps don’t forget” • “if you use the wrong code, you are severely punished”
CryptogenMod + DarkMatter =
http://github.com/grugq/darkmatter
RAISE NSA PRICE 2 PWN* * probably
THEY’LL ADAPT
THANKS!
QUESTIONS?
THANKYOU @thegrugq the.grugq@gmail.com

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Click and Dragger: Denial and Deception on Android mobile