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Alan Greenberg ICANN Accountability and the Transition of IANA Stewardship

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Session 2: ICANN Accountability and the Transition of IANA Stewardship

This session will examine the work that is currently being done to make ICANN more accountable to its stakeholders and to transition the IANA function stewardship away from the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”) and why these issues matter to everyone. The session will start with a description of the structure and functions performed by ICANN, including the IANA function. The role of ICANN in the Internet multi-stakeholder governance model will be discussed, and the involvement of governments in Internet governance will be addressed. This background will then be used as the launching point for a discussion of how the evolution of ICANN and the transition of the IANA function can affect the openness, security, stability and resiliency of the Internet.

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Alan Greenberg ICANN Accountability and the Transition of IANA Stewardship

  1. 1. Internet Society Canada Chapter: First Canadian Internet Symposium ICANN Accountability and the Transition of IANA Stewardship Alan Greenberg 24 September 2015
  2. 2. About me • Nearly 50 years, experience in computer and data communications technologies • 20 years involvement with ISOC • ISOC Board of Trustees (2001-2004) • Supported use of technologies in developing countries • Involved in ICANN, At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) since 2006 • ALAC Chair 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 2
  3. 3. The Essence of Multistakeholderism • Stakeholders come from all parts of the Internet community • They have different perspectives • Many are passionate about beliefs • Some have long memories and “axes to grind” • Some have territory to defend • Many have large financial investments involved and therefore a strong interest in certain outcomes 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 3
  4. 4. CWG-IANA Transition • Cross-Community Working Group, including stakeholders outside of ICANN – Members + Participants • Responsible to developing transition plan for the DNS stewardship on behalf of the Names Community • Difficult process for all the reasons mentioned • Resulting proposal submitted to the ICG is reasonable24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 4
  5. 5. CCWG-Accountability • Cross-Community Working Group of ICANN stakeholders, but includes many Participants external to ICANN • Charged with ensuring that ICANN is accountable to the community (without fully defining accountability or community). 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 5
  6. 6. Current ICANN Structure Very simplified… • Support Organization (SOs) responsible for recommending policy for gTLDs, ccTLDs, Addressing • Advisory Committees responsible for advising on issues that cross policy areas (Governmental, At-Large, Security and Stability, Root-Server System) • Board, selected by SOs, ALAC and Nominating24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 6
  7. 7. So, What is the Problem? 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 7
  8. 8. Before Appointment to ICANN Board 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 8
  9. 9. After Appointment to ICANN Board 24 August 2015 9ISCC First Symposium - Alan
  10. 10. Issues (Personal Perspective) • Board not trusted – Despite being selected BY the ICANN community, once selected, they can no longer be trusted. • Perceived as being more concerned with corporation than stakeholders • Some merit to concerns 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 10
  11. 11. Proposed Solution • Transform ICANN into a Membership Organization • Sole Member are the SOs and ACs – or some subset of them. – Various weightings being considered • Strengthened Mission and Core Values • Strengthened Independent Review Panel • Strengthened Board Reconsideration Process 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 11
  12. 12. Member Powers • Reconsider/Veto Budget and Strategic Plan • Reconsider/Veto Bylaw changes • Approve “Fundamental Bylaws” • Remove individual Directors • Recall the entire Board 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 12
  13. 13. At-Large Concerns • Complexity – many very significant changes • Possible lack of participation by SO/ACs – Potential for capture • Budget veto problematic • Mission and Core Values seem to remove some aspects of “public Interest” We need better accountability and direct input24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 13
  14. 14. Thank you. 24 August 2015 ISCC First Symposium - Alan 14

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