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Enabling Science with Trust and Security – Guest Keynote

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This presentation was given at the 2019 GlobusWorld Conference in Chicago, IL by Tom Barton from University of Chicago and Internet2.

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Enabling Science with Trust and Security – Guest Keynote

  1. 1. Enabling Science with Trust and Security Tom Barton Sr Consultant for Cybersecurity & Data Privacy UChicago & Internet2 GlobusWorld 2019
  2. 2. What I’ll tell you • Security is all about enabling the mission by reducing risk to it • There are security programs designed to reduce risk to research • Trust frameworks reduce risk across complex cyberinfrastructure (CI) ecosystems • Trust frameworks & security enable scientific CI by reducing risk to it • Some practical ways to engage with these 2
  3. 3. The simplest case Human subjects research is perhaps the simplest example of security enabling science. Not that it’s easy! 3
  4. 4. 4 Rigorous scientific methods help civic partners achieve the greatest social good per dollar
  5. 5. Liability incurred by contracts and regulation • Sensitive data provided under contract by external agencies • Variety of security obligations in Data Use Agreements • HIPAA Business Associate Agreements • Government contracts with DFARS flow down requirements • Federal security standards, focused on data confidentiality • Also subject to state regulations protecting personal information • Worst case: existential threat to associated research programs 5
  6. 6. Institutional strategy for secure research data • Research Computing, Research Administration, Legal, IT partnership to reduce risk to affected research • Provide security as a service to PIs so they don’t have to figure it out • Elements • Risk assessment in grants & contracts processes • Secure research computing service • Dean and VP Research level policy governance • Broad-based operational governance • Federal security standards: NIST SP 800-53/800-171/CUI • UChicago and many others have one or are moving in that direction 6
  7. 7. UChicago Secure Computing Environment 7
  8. 8. Benefits and dividends • On-going close coordination between research computing and central IT • Identity & access management • Security operations, incident response and risk assessment • Network engineering • Storage/recovery • Systems administration • Central IT learned how to support other sensitive computing needs • Re-usable building blocks of secure computing technologies and procedures • Total institutional cost is reduced with each re-use 8
  9. 9. Can CISOs and Research Computing Directors get along? • Yes! • "Enabling Trustworthy Campus Cyberinfrastructure for Science“ • Workshop by TrustedCI and InCommon, funded by NSF, September 2018 • Chief Information Security Officer and Research Computing Director teams from ~15 universities • Secure research computing needs drive successful partnerships among CISOs, RC Directors, Legal Counsel, Research Administration • Regardless of where RC Director and CISO report, large or small institution, centralized or decentralized 9
  10. 10. Review of the simplest case The scientific CI is in one organization, which makes feasible: • Close, on-going operational collaboration between research computing, central IT, information security • Implementation of Federal/NIST security standards Enables human subjects research programs by providing the help needed to address onerous security obligations 10
  11. 11. Security and risk Must it always be about complying with Federal/NIST security standards? 11
  12. 12. Security Defined by Merriam Webster 1: freedom from danger (safety), freedom from fear or anxiety 4: measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/security We should emphasize definition #1, but security practice is traditionally focused on #4 12 slide credit: Von Welch
  13. 13. Data lost System unavailable Data altered Private data exposed Enforced shutdown Ransomware Cyber espionage Weaponization Hactivism Identity theft Mal intent Protective and responsive measures Prevent negative impact Extended disruption Cybersecurity – traditional view 13 CI system in designed state
  14. 14. Protective and responsive measures Data lost System unavailable Data altered Private data exposed Enforced shutdown Ransomware Cyber espionage Weaponization Misconfiguration Flaw in 3rd party component system Overlooked ancillary functions remain active System restored to unplanned state Uncaught data transport error Inadequate incident response capability Lack of operational coordination leaves system in unplanned stateHactivism Identity theft Mal intent Deltas to CI system design state Negative impact Extended disruption Cyber Risk – it’s not just about bad actors 14
  15. 15. Federal security standards address some IT risks 15 IT risk Federal security controls? Misconfiguration Yes Flaw in 3rd party component system Yes Overlooked ancillary functions remain active Yes System restored to unplanned state Yes Lack of operational coordination leaves system in unplanned state No Uncaught data transport error No Inadequate incident response capability Yes
  16. 16. Will Federal security frameworks assimilate all US scientific CI? Yes Appropriate, probably unavoidable, for some secure research Some aspects well suited to both open science and secure research No Needs common executive management, hence hard to apply across organizations Some critical IT risks aren’t addressed TrustedCI is developing alternatives for open science • Open Science Cyber Risk Profile • Guide to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science and Engineering Projects 16
  17. 17. Lack of operational coordination leaves system in unplanned state Please hold this thought in mind for a few minutes…. 17
  18. 18. A complex case Trust Frameworks and Federation reduce risk in complex, multi- organizational circumstances 18
  19. 19. 19 Since 2015, thirteen ESFRI Research Infrastructures from the field of BioMedical Science (BMS RI) joined their scientific capabilities and services to transform the understanding of biological mechanisms and accelerate its translation into medical care. • biobanking & biomolecular resources •curated databases •marine model organisms •systems biology •translational research •functional genomics •screening & medicinal chemistry •microorganisms •clinical trials •structural biology •biological/medical imaging•plant phenotyping •highly pathogenic microorganisms Slide credit: Mikael Linden
  20. 20. Increasing complexity of scientific CI • Bigger data & bigger teams need bigger CI • Beyond the scale a single organization can achieve on its own • Not-bigger funding motivates the concentration of CI investments • Federating or centralizing HPC centers, cloud • Size brings complexity • Federated user access, federated resources • Access management • Data, cache, and network management 20 As scientific CIs integrate more components and organizations, it’s harder to manage, debug, and ascertain the state of the entire system
  21. 21. Federated user access – a global infrastucture faculty, students, staff data sets intellectual property specialized instruments specialized computing 68 countries (March 2019) > 16,700 entities (25% InCommon) > 10,000,000 users connected by global research networks and federation 21
  22. 22. 22 Get collaboration ready Release “Research & Scholarship” attributes Basic security for Identity Provider Accurate & complete metdata for good user experience Standard MFA request/response Identity assurance info Enable basic collaboration Support high value resources Protect collaboration resources Reduce risk Identity Providers implement Academic Service Providers implement Each item in the bottom two tiers is associated with a trust framework, as is the federation itself
  23. 23. InCommon progress on metadata (user experience) 23
  24. 24. 24 InCommon’s Baseline Expectations program Dimensions ❏ Security ❏ Privacy ❏ Transparency/Accountability ❏ User Experience Participation Agreement requires everyone to adhere to Baseline Expectations Processes ❏ Community Consensus ❏ Community Dispute Resolution Mostly, it consists of tons of communication and help
  25. 25. Baseline Roadmap (under development) 25 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 2Q19 3Q19 4Q19 1Q20 2Q20 3Q20 4Q20 1Q21 2Q21 3Q21 4Q21 Create BE processes, redo contracts, metadata quality. errorURL. SIRTFI all entities. R&S and REFEDS MFA for academic OS IdPs. IdPs must use collaboration- ready software/services.
  26. 26. Research & Scholarship attribute release • Name, email, affiliation, persistent identifier • Common need for “research and scholarship” services • Those service providers are “tagged” by their national federation operators as “R&S” • Identity Providers automatically release the R&S attributes to R&S tagged services • Such Identity Providers are also tagged as “R&S” so that services can elect to require R&S attributes in order to provide service • The R&S program contributes to good privacy practice under the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [ 26 ]
  27. 27. SIRTFI - security incident response trust framework for federated identity 27 Be willing to collaborate in responding to a federated security incident. Apply basic operational security protections to your federated entities in line with your organization’s priorities. Self-assert SIRTFI “tag” so that others will know to trust this about you.
  28. 28. REFEDS Assurance Framework 28 Identity Assurance Authentication Strength Authentication Single-factor authentication (SFA) Multi-factor authentication (MFA) Attributes Affiliation freshness 1 day Affiliation freshness 1 month ID Proofing Medium (eg postal credential delivery) Low (self-asserted) High (eg F2F) Identifiers ID is unique, personal and traceable ePPN is unique, personal and traceable Defines a standard means for service providers to receive information about identity assurance practice and request and receive information about strength of credentials
  29. 29. Review of the complex case & trust frameworks A trust framework is • A standard of behavior that applies to participants and/or components in large, complex, even global systems • Developed in response to identified needs of research and scholarly activities We trust that trust framework adopters reasonably observe the standard of behavior because of our shared mission in Research & Education Federations and other organizations enable and monitor trust framework participation and may operate processes to verify or compel adoption 29
  30. 30. Lack of operational coordination leaves system in unplanned state Systems that integrate components across many organizations can use trust frameworks to reduce the risk posed by intrinsic inability to coordinate operationally 30
  31. 31. Reducing risk to scientific CI Some services and programs you can take advantage of. Some things you might think about doing. 31
  32. 32. ResearchSOC ResearchSOC helps make scientific computing resilient to cyberattacks and capable of supporting trustworthy, productive research. • NSF funded center • Indiana University, Duke University, Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, University of California San Diego • Security Operations Center • Vulnerability scanning and threat intelligence sharing • Training information security professionals to address challenges of securing research 32
  33. 33. TrustedCI and Internet2 • Direct engagements or partnerships to review or solve problems • Security programs for NSF funded activities • Facility/Site Identity & Access Management • Federated user access • Cloud use • Campus Champions / CaRRC • Science Gateways Community Institute • Hope to translate experience with user federation into resource federation space 33
  34. 34. Globus Connect/High Assurance • Enhanced Connect Server/Personal to meet the security needs of protected environments for secure research • Only authorized identities • Audit trails • Session timeouts • More… • Enhanced Transfer & Auth services backend in AWS • Meets Federal/NIST security standards • Suited to HIPAA and other sensitive research data 34
  35. 35. You – campus research computing staff • Add federated user access tooling to your environment • CILogon, Globus Auth, COmanage, Grouper, others • Help your CISO become your partner • Support Federal security standards for high risk projects, sensible security for low (eg, Open Science Cyber Risk Profile) • Stay abreast of prototype resource federation efforts • Help TrustedCI/Internet2 understand your researchers’ problems and give guidance on good solutions 35
  36. 36. You – platform & gateway developers • Use federated user access tooling • Deep water, don’t roll your own user management!! • Help your information security people to help you • Bake sensible security into your dev and operational processes • Provide sensible security functionality to deployers • Your platforms are sometime implemented in very exposed Science DMZs – focus on securing system integrity, make it hard for bad guys to re-purposed as weapons 36
  37. 37. You - PIs • Involve research computing staff as early as possible in grant formulation process to optimize proposed data processing workflow • If sensitive research data is involved, early engagement will minimize hurdles & hoops, ensure satisfactory proposed data security plan • Demand sensible security – make the IT and security powers that be know that it matters and you need them for it 37
  38. 38. 38 Thank you! Questions? tbarton@uchicago.edu

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