Enrique Betancourt, World Bank & Chemonics International

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"Applying Lessons from Operation Ceasefire in Latin America"
Regional Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development
Antigua, Guatemala | 28-30 April 2014

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Enrique Betancourt, World Bank & Chemonics International

  1. 1. Enrique  Betancourt  G.   twi$er:  @betancourt_e     La  An3gua,  Guatemala   Apr  29th,  2014   Intervenciones   focalizadas  para   reducción  y  prevención   de  violencia  
  2. 2. Legi3midad  del  Estado   y   Contrato  Social  
  3. 3. 3  cosas  que  sabemos  sobre   la  violencia  armada  en  la   región.  
  4. 4. 1.  Es  urbana.     90%  sucede   fuera  de   contextos  de   conflicto   armado.  
  5. 5. 2.  Se  concentra   geográficamente.   Asociada  a  otros   indicadores  de   vulnerabilidad   social.  
  6. 6. 3.  Vic3mas  y   perpetradores:     •  Varones  Jóvenes.   •  Operando  en  grupos.   •  Ejecutada  por  menos   del  5%  de  los   jóvenes  de  alto   riesgo  en  el  barrio  .  
  7. 7. Homicidios  por  grupos  de  edad  y  género,  INEGI,  2010.  
  8. 8. 3  conceptos  para  su   atención.     (lecciones  sobre  casos  de   implementación)  
  9. 9. focalización  Focalización   •  Territorial   •  Demográfica   •  Temporal   •  Delic3va  y  de  comportamiento  social  
  10. 10. Teoría  de  Cambio   Teoría de Cambio ResultadosPre-condicionesEnfoques y Herramientas programas Premisas 12345
  11. 11. Impacto  Colec3vo   •  Gerencia  Centralizada   •  Agenda  Común   •  Sistema  de  Evaluación  compar3do   •  Ac3vidades  mutuamente  reforzantes  
  12. 12. Center  for  Crime  Preven3on  and  Control  |  John  Jay  College  of  Criminal  Jus3ce  |  524  West  59th  Street  Suite  600,  New  York,  NY  10019   Ceasefire  University   GROUP  VIOLENCE  INTERVENTION     AN  OVERVIEW  
  13. 13. Groups  drive  a  huge  share  of  the  ac3on   §  Around  0.5%  of  overall  popula3on   §  Regularly  associated  with  75%  of  serious  violence  in  a  city   §  Doesn’t  ma$er  if  they’re  “gangs,”  and  most  aren’t   In  most  dangerous  neighborhoods   §  About  5%  of  high-­‐risk  male  age  group   §  Only  about  10-­‐20%  of  those  are  impact  players       16   Core  offenders  are  group  involved,  small  in  number,   and  iden3fiable  
  14. 14. 17   Street  group  members  face  extremely  high  risk   na3onal  homicide:  4  in  100,000   homicides  for  core  group-­‐involved  network:  1,500-­‐3,000  in   100,000   for  those  close  to  vic3ms  of  homicide  and  shoo3ng,  the  risk  increases  by  up  to  900%  
  15. 15. 18   Connec3on  between  violence  &  groups   The  most  important  finding  here  is  simple:  there  is  a  profound  and  so  far  invariant   connec3on  between  serious  violence,  and  highly  ac3ve  criminal  groups.   Representa3on  in  popula3on   Representa3on  in  homicides   0.5%   50-­‐75%  
  16. 16. Framework   19   Direct,  sustained  engagement  with  core  offenders  by  a   partnership  standing  and  ac3ng  together:     Community  leaders     Social  service  providers   Law  enforcement   Explicit  focus  on  homicide  and  serious  violence   Core  elements:   Moral  engagement   Offer  of  help   Swis,  certain,  legi3mate  consequences   An  approach,  not  a  program  
  17. 17. STRATEGIC  INTERVENTION  
  18. 18. Framework   21   Direct,  sustained  engagement  with  core  offenders  by  a   partnership  standing  and  ac3ng  together:     Community  leaders     Social  service  providers   Law  enforcement   Explicit  focus  on  homicide  and  serious  violence   Core  elements:   Moral  engagement   Offer  of  help   Swis,  certain,  legi3mate  consequences   An  approach,  not  a  program  
  19. 19. 1  Focused  law  enforcement   22   Group  accountability  for  group  violence  by  any  legal  means:   “Pulling  levers”   Specifying  Enforcement  Trigger   “First  group/worst  group”  promise   First  homicide  aser  call-­‐in   Most  violent  group   Aser  each  call-­‐in,  if  no  group  wants  to  be  first  or  worst,   everybody  stops   Formal  no3ce  of  legal  exposure   Formal  no3ce  of  law  enforcement  intent  
  20. 20. Deterrence   23   We  want  compliance,  not  arrests  and  sentences   Actual  enforcement  is  (mostly)  a  sign  of  failure   When  something  dras3c  is  about  to  happen,  it’s  in   everyone’s  interest  to  avoid  it   Goal:  make  consequences  so  clear  and  certain    that  nobody   wants  them   Keep  offenders  and  communi3es  safe   Provide  “honorable  exit”   not  enforcement  
  21. 21. 2  Moral  engagement  with  offenders   24   Offenders  can  and  will  choose,  should  be  treated  as   responsible  human  beings   Challenge  the  street  code   There’s  right,  there’s  wrong:  no  gray  area   Ac3vates  agency:  offender  is  now  in  control   Treats  offender  with  respect:  procedural  jus3ce   Enhances  law  enforcement  legi3macy   Mobilizes  community  partners  
  22. 22. Community  moral  voice   25   Clear,  direct  community  stand  from  respected  local  figures,   parents,  ministers,  mothers,  ac3vists:   “We  need  you  alive  and  out  of  prison.”   “You’re  be$er  than  this.”   “We  hate  the  violence.”   Offenders  and  ex-­‐offenders:   “Who  helped  your  mother  last  3me  you  were  locked  up?   “How  long  before  one  of  your  boys  sleeps  with  your  girlfriend?”   “Who  thinks  it’s  okay  for  li$le  kids  to  get  killed?”   Outreach  workers  are  among  the  very  best  at  all  of  this  
  23. 23. Outreach  workers   26   Have  more  respect  on  the  street  than  just  about  anybody  else   Have  unques3onable  authen3city   Can  reach  the  core  group  popula3on   Can  say  things  that  nobody  else  can  say   Can  help  replace  the  toxic  street  code  with  something   alterna3ve  and  affirma3ve   Can  work  closely  with  other  partners  to  broker  help,  convey   law  enforcement  warnings,  defuse  disputes,  control  rumors,   help  save  face  
  24. 24. 3  Help  as  a  moral  and  prac3cal  obliga3on     27   “We  are  here  to  keep  you  alive  and  out  of  prison.”   “You  have  been  targeted  –  to  be  saved.”   Address  trauma   Protect  from  enemies   Offer  “big  small  stuff”  –  crucial  real-­‐3me  needs   Save  havens   New  rela3onships  and  “sponsors”   New  ideas  to  replace  “street  code”   Links  to  tradi3onal  social  services  –  educa3on,  work,  etc.   Street  outreach  an  important  way  to  do  all  this    
  25. 25. 28   Law  enforcement,  communi3es,  and  the   streets  all  want…   §  the  community  to  be  safe   §  the  most  dangerous  offenders  controlled     §  chao3c  crime  to  stop  (including  many  offenders)   §  ineffec3ve  enforcement  to  stop   §  community  standards  to  take  over   §  help  for  those  who  want  it   §  a  close,  respeczul  rela3onship  between  law   enforcement,  communi3es,  and  offenders   Common  ground  
  26. 26. 29   Results   Group  Violence  Interven:on   A  recent  Campbell  Collabora:on   Systema:c  Review  of  the   strategies,  and  others  related  to   them,  concluded  that  there  is  now   “strong  empirical  evidence”  for   their  crime  preven3on   effec3veness.   63%   reduc3on  in  youth  homicide   Boston  (MA)  Opera0on  Ceasefire   42%   reduc3on  in  gun  homicide   Stockton  (CA)  Opera0on  Peacekeeper   37%   reduc3on  in  homicide   Chicago  (IL)  Project  Safe  Neighborhoods   44%   reduc3on  in  gun  assaults   Lowell  (MA)  Project  Safe   Neighborhoods   34%   reduc3on  in  homicide   Indianapolis  (IN)  Violence  Reduc0on   Partnership   41%   reduc3on  in  gang  member-­‐involved  homicide   Cincinna0  (OH)  Ini0a0ve  to  Reduce  Violence   Drug  Market  Interven:on   41-­‐56%   reduc3on  in  part  1  UCR  crime  in  3  out   of  4  DMI  neighborhoods;  4-­‐74%   reduc3on  in  drug  offenses  in  all  4   neighborhoods   High  Point  (NC)  DMIs   55%   reduc3on  in  drug  offenses   Nashville  (TN)  DMI   22%   reduc3on  in  non-­‐violent  offenses   Rockford  (IL)  DMI   26%     reduc3on  in  recidivism   Hawaii  Opportunity  Proba0on   with  Enforcement  (HOPE)   Related  

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