Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

Using patent fees to improve the patent system

253 views

Published on

This presentation explain how patent fees can be used as a tool to improve the functioning of the patent system. It was prepared for the PhD workshop of the 2017 EPIP conference (European Policy for Intellectual Property) in Bordeaux, France.

Published in: Education
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

Using patent fees to improve the patent system

  1. 1. EPIP 2017 PhD Workshop Using patent fees to improve the patent system Ga´etan de Rassenfosse ´Ecole polytechnique f´ed´erale de Lausanne @gderasse September 4, 2017 G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 1 / 42
  2. 2. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 2 / 42
  3. 3. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 3 / 42
  4. 4. Reasons for tweaking the patent system In the traditional view, the patent system improves welfare by providing an incentive to innovate (expectation of monopoly profits) and ensuring knowledge diffusion through disclosure of the invention. Poor implementation may well decrease welfare—some authors have argued that the patent system has turned from a source of net subsidy to R&D to a net tax [Bessen and Meurer, 2008, p.145]. Like any policy tool, there is a large number of adjustment parameters: which inventions deserve patent protection, for how long, and under what conditions? For example, experts have been debating about patent quality (and providing solutions) for a long time. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 4 / 42
  5. 5. Many mechanisms exist to fine-tune the patent system Adjusting the size of the inventive step, that is, how difficult it is to get a patent. Adjusting the strength of patent protection by adjusting parameters such as, e.g., patent scope, patentable subject matter, lifetime, examination quality. Adjusting the time required to obtain a patent, e.g., by implementing fast-track options or allowing deferred examination. Implementing ways to challenge a granted patent (e.g., opposition proceeding). G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 5 / 42
  6. 6. Many mechanisms exist to fine-tune the patent system Adjusting the size of the inventive step, that is, how difficult it is to get a patent. Adjusting the strength of patent protection by adjusting parameters such as, e.g., patent scope, patentable subject matter, lifetime, examination quality. Adjusting the time required to obtain a patent, e.g., by implementing fast-track options or allowing deferred examination. Implementing ways to challenge a granted patent (e.g., opposition proceeding). One tool that has received little (but more and more) attention is the schedule of fees. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 5 / 42
  7. 7. Fees affect various aspects of the patent system As we will see, there is a variety of fees, due at various points in time and for various features of the patent application process. One can wonder whether patent offices can use fees to fine-tune the patent system. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 6 / 42
  8. 8. Fees affect various aspects of the patent system As we will see, there is a variety of fees, due at various points in time and for various features of the patent application process. One can wonder whether patent offices can use fees to fine-tune the patent system. For instance, one can set fees for patent documents that contain more than a set number of pages or a set number of claims. This will induce applicant to file narrower patents, thereby affecting patent scope. Fees can also be used to limit patent life through the use of renewal fees. Patent fees may even affect patent quality directly. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 6 / 42
  9. 9. Fees affect various aspects of the patent system As we will see, there is a variety of fees, due at various points in time and for various features of the patent application process. One can wonder whether patent offices can use fees to fine-tune the patent system. For instance, one can set fees for patent documents that contain more than a set number of pages or a set number of claims. This will induce applicant to file narrower patents, thereby affecting patent scope. Fees can also be used to limit patent life through the use of renewal fees. Patent fees may even affect patent quality directly. More on all these aspects later. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 6 / 42
  10. 10. Fees are an attractive mechanism Fees are a general-purpose tool (because they affect many dimensions of the patent system). It is a mechanism that is quick, transparent and easy to implement. It is a ‘deterministic’ mechanism: fees are known with certainty (unlike, e.g., inventive step)—altough the reaction of applicants is not known with certainty. Fees may even be an optimal mechanism in light of asymmetric information between patentees and the patent office. Scotchmer [1999] and Cornelli and Schankerman [1999] explain that renewal fees act as a ‘direct revelation mechanism’ that determines optimal patent life. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 7 / 42
  11. 11. Fees are an attractive mechanism Fees are a general-purpose tool (because they affect many dimensions of the patent system). It is a mechanism that is quick, transparent and easy to implement. It is a ‘deterministic’ mechanism: fees are known with certainty (unlike, e.g., inventive step)—altough the reaction of applicants is not known with certainty. Fees may even be an optimal mechanism in light of asymmetric information between patentees and the patent office. Scotchmer [1999] and Cornelli and Schankerman [1999] explain that renewal fees act as a ‘direct revelation mechanism’ that determines optimal patent life. However, the fee policy is subject to the budget constraint of the patent office. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 7 / 42
  12. 12. Some more considerations about fees for patent offices Patent offices are usually self-funded and have the requirement to balance budget. Fees are therefore traditionally seen as budgeting tool. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 8 / 42
  13. 13. Some more considerations about fees for patent offices Patent offices are usually self-funded and have the requirement to balance budget. Fees are therefore traditionally seen as budgeting tool. If surpluses are too large, patent offices may decide to reduce fees—with little consideration paid to the broader impact of such changes. A priori, reducing fees seems a good idea: it increases the number of patent applications (“make patenting available to a greater number of inventors”), which is often seen as desirable by policy makers. But an excessive number of patents increases the likelihood of patent thickets, overlapping rights, inadvertent infringement, etc. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 8 / 42
  14. 14. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 9 / 42
  15. 15. Overview In broad terms, fees are associated with key events in the life of a patent: 1. At time time of filing (e.g., filing fee). 2. During the patent prosecution process (e.g., examination fee). 3. At the time of grant (e.g., issuance fee, validation fee). 4. During the life of the patent (e.g., renewal fee). 5. At other key moments such as opposition, amendments, transfer, etc. 6. Other administrative aspects (e.g., surcharge for late payment). G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 10 / 42
  16. 16. Overview In broad terms, fees are associated with key events in the life of a patent: 1. At time time of filing (e.g., filing fee). 2. During the patent prosecution process (e.g., examination fee). 3. At the time of grant (e.g., issuance fee, validation fee). 4. During the life of the patent (e.g., renewal fee). 5. At other key moments such as opposition, amendments, transfer, etc. 6. Other administrative aspects (e.g., surcharge for late payment). How many different fees do you think there are at the EPO? G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 10 / 42
  17. 17. Frequently paid fees at the EPO (among 119 types) G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 11 / 42
  18. 18. Some key differences between EPO and USPTO fee schedule Besides differences induced by the fact that the EPO is a regional office, other notable differences exist: The USPTO has reduced fees for small entities (50%) and micro entities (75%). At the USPTO, filing+search+examination fees are paid at the time of filing whereas they are staged at the EPO. Renewal fees at the EPO must be paid (also) for pending patents and are due yearly (3rd year onward). Whereas they must be paid only for granted patents at the USPTO and are due at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 12 / 42
  19. 19. Some key differences between EPO and USPTO fee schedule Besides differences induced by the fact that the EPO is a regional office, other notable differences exist: The USPTO has reduced fees for small entities (50%) and micro entities (75%). At the USPTO, filing+search+examination fees are paid at the time of filing whereas they are staged at the EPO. Renewal fees at the EPO must be paid (also) for pending patents and are due yearly (3rd year onward). Whereas they must be paid only for granted patents at the USPTO and are due at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years. Two things become clear: i) there is so much scope for intervention that it may be possible to affect applicants’ behavior; and ii) comparing fees across offices can be a challenging task. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 12 / 42
  20. 20. Patents have never been so affordable (USPTO evidence) Long-term evolution of fees (up to grant) at the USPTO. Source: de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2013]. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 13 / 42
  21. 21. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 14 / 42
  22. 22. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 15 / 42
  23. 23. Estimating the fee elasticity of demand for patents The most obvious aspect to look at for an economist is the fee sensitivity (‘price elasticity’) of patent filings. We define the price elasticity of demand Ed as: Ed = δQ/Q δP/P . G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 16 / 42
  24. 24. Estimating the fee elasticity of demand for patents The most obvious aspect to look at for an economist is the fee sensitivity (‘price elasticity’) of patent filings. We define the price elasticity of demand Ed as: Ed = δQ/Q δP/P . As far as I know, de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2007] is the first paper to study the question. We adopt a very simple approach: We compute patent fees for a representative patent at 29 patent offices at one point in time. We then use this variable as a regressor in a patent production function. Cross-section evidence but we assume that the setting of fees is exogenous to patent numbers. This paper is also the first published paper to make use of the PATSTAT database. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 16 / 42
  25. 25. OLS estimates of a patent production function (N=29). Source: de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2007].
  26. 26. A more sophisticated approach The previous study is not fully satisfactory because we cannot test whether fees are indeed exogenous to demand size. We improve the analysis in de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2012] by estimating the fee-elasticity in an error correction (panel data) model. This approach allows us: To test the exogeneity assumption using a Granger causality test. To estimate both short-run and long-run elasticities. We compute fees for a representative patents for the period 1980–2007 for the USPTO, EPO and JPO. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 18 / 42
  27. 27. Source: de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2012].
  28. 28. Final thoughts on the fee elasticity of filings Note: Estimates of long-term elasticities in de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2012]. The long-term elasticity is about -0.30: a 10-per cent increase in fees leads to a 3-per cent reduction in applications. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 20 / 42
  29. 29. Final thoughts on the fee elasticity of filings Note: Estimates of long-term elasticities in de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2012]. The long-term elasticity is about -0.30: a 10-per cent increase in fees leads to a 3-per cent reduction in applications. The demand for patents in inelastic (in a similar range to rice in Asian countries and cigarettes). This implies that an increase in feels leads to a reduction in filing numbers but an increase in total revenues! G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 20 / 42
  30. 30. Final thoughts on the fee elasticity of filings Note: Estimates of long-term elasticities in de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [2012]. The long-term elasticity is about -0.30: a 10-per cent increase in fees leads to a 3-per cent reduction in applications. The demand for patents in inelastic (in a similar range to rice in Asian countries and cigarettes). This implies that an increase in feels leads to a reduction in filing numbers but an increase in total revenues! The fee elasticity of trademark is also in a similar range as shown, e.g., by Herz and Mejer [2016] and de Rassenfosse [2015]. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 20 / 42
  31. 31. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 21 / 42
  32. 32. Fees affect more than just the number of applications There are two generic questions: 1. How do filing fees affect the type of inventions submitted to the patent system? So far, we have used a benchmark fee to stimate the price elasticity. Does such benchmark fee also affect other dimensions, e.g., the quality of inventions submitted for patent protection? G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 22 / 42
  33. 33. Fees affect more than just the number of applications There are two generic questions: 1. How do filing fees affect the type of inventions submitted to the patent system? So far, we have used a benchmark fee to stimate the price elasticity. Does such benchmark fee also affect other dimensions, e.g., the quality of inventions submitted for patent protection? 2. How do fees affect specific features of patents? We have seen that fees target some specific features of the patent system. How do these features react to such fees? Let us start by looking at question 2. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 22 / 42
  34. 34. The telling example of claim-based fees Claims are the substance of a patent. They codify the description of the invention and constitute the scope of protection in case of grant. Thus, by charging claim-based fees, patent offices may directly affect patent scope. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 23 / 42
  35. 35. The telling example of claim-based fees Claims are the substance of a patent. They codify the description of the invention and constitute the scope of protection in case of grant. Thus, by charging claim-based fees, patent offices may directly affect patent scope. Many offices charge claim-based fees: EPO: e235 per claim > 15 and e585 per claim > 50 USPTO: $420 per independent claim > 3 and $20 per claim > 20 JPO: 4,000 per claim (renewal fees are claim-dependent!) G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 23 / 42
  36. 36. The telling example of claim-based fees Claims are the substance of a patent. They codify the description of the invention and constitute the scope of protection in case of grant. Thus, by charging claim-based fees, patent offices may directly affect patent scope. Many offices charge claim-based fees: EPO: e235 per claim > 15 and e585 per claim > 50 USPTO: $420 per independent claim > 3 and $20 per claim > 20 JPO: 4,000 per claim (renewal fees are claim-dependent!) An interesting experiment took place at the USPTO... and also had repercussions at the EPO. In 2004, the fee for each independent claim over three increased to $200 from $88, and the fee for each claim in total over twenty increased to $50 from $18. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 23 / 42
  37. 37. Average number of claims in published U.S. applications of U.S. origin and EP second filings originating from the U.S. by year of filing at the USPTO. Source: van Zeebroeck et al. [2008].
  38. 38. Filing fees and type of inventions: effect on quality It is theoretically likely that both low-quality and low-value inventions would be disproportionately reduced by an increase in fees. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 25 / 42
  39. 39. Filing fees and type of inventions: effect on quality It is theoretically likely that both low-quality and low-value inventions would be disproportionately reduced by an increase in fees. Let’s consider that an inventor applies for a patent when the expected benefit from patent protection (probability of grant times economic value of receiving patent protection) exceeds the patenting cost. When fees are increased, the marginal applications deterred by a fee increase could be marginal for different reasons: The chance of grant is low, that is, they are low quality. The value of the patent, even if granted, is not very high—and this could be true in some cases despite the quality of the invention being high. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 25 / 42
  40. 40. Filing fees and type of inventions: effect on quality It is theoretically likely that both low-quality and low-value inventions would be disproportionately reduced by an increase in fees. Let’s consider that an inventor applies for a patent when the expected benefit from patent protection (probability of grant times economic value of receiving patent protection) exceeds the patenting cost. When fees are increased, the marginal applications deterred by a fee increase could be marginal for different reasons: The chance of grant is low, that is, they are low quality. The value of the patent, even if granted, is not very high—and this could be true in some cases despite the quality of the invention being high. It is theoretically expected that a fee increase would screen out both low-quality and low-value inventions, but the relative empirical significance of the two is unclear. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 25 / 42
  41. 41. This brings an empirical challenge How to disentangle invention quality from patent value? G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 26 / 42
  42. 42. This brings an empirical challenge How to disentangle invention quality from patent value? In de Rassenfosse and Jaffe [forthcoming], we extent the linear factor model of Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] to a non-linear two-factor model. We rely on commonly-used value/quality metrics in order to compute two latent variables that best explain the variance in the data. This compution takes into account identification restrictions on specific metrics. The four metrics are: number citations, number of indepent claims, geographic family size (∗), and patent lifetime (∗); and (∗) indicates identification restrictions. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 26 / 42
  43. 43. This brings an empirical challenge Density estimates of the latent variables. Source: de Rassenfosse and Jaffe [forthcoming]. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 27 / 42
  44. 44. This brings an empirical challenge Density estimates of the latent variables. Source: de Rassenfosse and Jaffe [forthcoming]. We can now investigate the effect of fees on both the quality and the value dimensions. But we need to identify a large fee change to maximize our chance of observing an effect. Fee increase that followed the U.S. Patent Law Amendment Act of 1982 (from $239 to $3200). G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 27 / 42
  45. 45. As expected, large impact on filing numbers Number of utility patents granted by the USPTO, by application month (1981–1984). Source: de Rassenfosse and Jaffe [forthcoming]. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 28 / 42
  46. 46. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 30 / 42
  47. 47. Can patent fees inform about ‘bigger’ questions? Remember the purpose of the patent system to encourage innovation. Fees can be use to study the incentive effect of the patent system. Consider the following: At the limit, if patents are impossible to get it is unlikely that they will encourage innovation. At the other extreme, if patents are automatically granted the downside of having too many patents dominates. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 31 / 42
  48. 48. Can patent fees inform about ‘bigger’ questions? Remember the purpose of the patent system to encourage innovation. Fees can be use to study the incentive effect of the patent system. Consider the following: At the limit, if patents are impossible to get it is unlikely that they will encourage innovation. At the other extreme, if patents are automatically granted the downside of having too many patents dominates. Thus, there might be a sweet spot somewhere in the middle where innovation incentives are maximised. Variations in the ‘ease’ of obtaining patents should induce variations in innovation incentives. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 31 / 42
  49. 49. Can patent fees inform about ‘bigger’ questions? Remember the purpose of the patent system to encourage innovation. Fees can be use to study the incentive effect of the patent system. Consider the following: At the limit, if patents are impossible to get it is unlikely that they will encourage innovation. At the other extreme, if patents are automatically granted the downside of having too many patents dominates. Thus, there might be a sweet spot somewhere in the middle where innovation incentives are maximised. Variations in the ‘ease’ of obtaining patents should induce variations in innovation incentives. (Very) large changes in fees may provide such variations. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 31 / 42
  50. 50. Patent fees and innovation incentives Nicholas [2011] implement such an approach. He studies the effect of the 1883 Patents Act in Britain, which led to a reduction in filing fees by 84 per cent. He observes that patenting in Britain increased 2.5 fold after the reform. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 32 / 42
  51. 51. Patent fees and innovation incentives Nicholas [2011] implement such an approach. He studies the effect of the 1883 Patents Act in Britain, which led to a reduction in filing fees by 84 per cent. He observes that patenting in Britain increased 2.5 fold after the reform. He measures ‘innovation’ with changes in the distribution of high and low-value patents and citations to English inventor patents in the United States. He finds no effect of the fee increase on innovation—but absence of evidence is not evidence of absence! G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 32 / 42
  52. 52. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 33 / 42
  53. 53. 1. Understanding the direct effects of fees As illustrated, patent offices have been very creative in the creation of fees. We have only scratched the surface by looking at the most obvious types. More research is needed to understand the effect of all types of fees. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 34 / 42
  54. 54. 1. Understanding the direct effects of fees As illustrated, patent offices have been very creative in the creation of fees. We have only scratched the surface by looking at the most obvious types. More research is needed to understand the effect of all types of fees. More research is needed to understand how the various fees interact with one another. For instance, a decrease in pre-grant fees will have repercussions in the renewal rate. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 34 / 42
  55. 55. 1. Understanding the direct effects of fees As illustrated, patent offices have been very creative in the creation of fees. We have only scratched the surface by looking at the most obvious types. More research is needed to understand the effect of all types of fees. More research is needed to understand how the various fees interact with one another. For instance, a decrease in pre-grant fees will have repercussions in the renewal rate. Lots of research opportunities. There are many offices around the world, with many different schedules of fees, and data are easy to collect. One can exploit both variations across offices and temporal variations within office. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 34 / 42
  56. 56. 2. Using changes in fees as exogenous shocks Some of the biggest questions related to the patent system concern innovation incentives and the effect of patents on follow-on inventions. Fees provide a source of exogenous variation that affects the incentives to apply for patents as well as the characteristics of the inventions submitted to the patent system. Opportunities for using large variations in fees as shocks (or significant change in the structure of fees, such as the introduction of small-entity fees and renewal fees). G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 35 / 42
  57. 57. 3. The big fee question One of the most obvious question for an economist is: “What is the optimal level of fees”? This question is surprisingly difficult to answer. A model should probably start by considering a very simple fee structure (e.g., application fee alone) and define optimality is a simple way (e.g., first-order effect on innovation incentives alone). And then gradually relax assumptions. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 36 / 42
  58. 58. Table of contents 1 Background 2 Schedule of fees 3 Known effects Filing numbers Patent characteristics Innovation incentives 4 Three research opportunities 5 Some more references 6 References G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 37 / 42
  59. 59. Additional literature The presentation given at the EPIP PhD Workshop was scheduled for 45 minutes so I could not cover all the literature. The following papers are also worth discussing (and I plan to do so when I next revise the slides): Schankerman and Schuett [2016], Frakes and Wasserman [2014], Gans et al. [2004], Harhoff et al. [2009], Martin and Stahn [2011]. Drop me a note if I have forgotten a paper! G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 38 / 42
  60. 60. References I J. Bessen and M. Meurer. Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk. Princeton University Press, 2008. S. Scotchmer. On the optimality of the patent renewal system. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 181–196, 1999. F. Cornelli and M. Schankerman. Patent renewals and r&d incentives. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 197–213, 1999. G. de Rassenfosse and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. The role of fees in patent systems: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(4):696–716, 2013. G. de Rassenfosse and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. Per un pugno di dollari: A first look at the price elasticity of patents. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(4):588–604, 2007. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 39 / 42
  61. 61. References II G. de Rassenfosse and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. On the price elasticity of demand for patents. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74(1):58–77, 2012. B. Herz and M. Mejer. On the fee elasticity of the demand for trademarks in europe. Oxford Economic Papers, 68(4):1039–1061, 2016. G. de Rassenfosse. On the price elasticity of demand for trademarks. SSRN Working Paper 2628646, 2015. N. van Zeebroeck, N. Stevnsborg, B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, D. Guellec, and E. Archontopoulos. Patent inflation in europe. World Patent Information, 30(1):43–52, 2008. G. de Rassenfosse and A. Jaffe. Are patent fees effective at weeding out low-quality patents? Journal of economics & Management Strategy, forthcoming. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 40 / 42
  62. 62. References III J. Lanjouw and M. Schankerman. Patent quality and research productivity: Measuring innovation with multiple indicators. The Economic Journal, 114(495):441–465, 2004. T. Nicholas. Cheaper patents. Research Policy, 40(2):325–339, 2011. M. Schankerman and F. Schuett. Screening for patent quality: Examination, fees, and the courts. TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-036, 2016. M. Frakes and M. Wasserman. The failed promise of user fees: Empirical evidence from the us patent and trademark office. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 11(4):602–636, 2014. J. Gans, S. King, and R. Lampe. Patent renewal fees and self-funding patent offices. Topics in Theoretical Economics, 4(1), 2004. D. Harhoff, K. Hoisl, B. Reichl, and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. Patent validation at the country level—the role of fees and translation costs. Research Policy, 38(9):1423–1437, 2009. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 41 / 42
  63. 63. References IV E. Martin and H. Stahn. Should we reallocate patent fees to the universities? Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 20(7): 681–700, 2011. G. de Rassenfosse, EPFL EPIP 2017 September 4, 2017 42 / 42

×