Flifgt Safety Middle East 2010 Presentation


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Aviation Safety: Implementation, Regulation,Training

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  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • SEASR is the European initiative for a single Sky in Europe.
  • The growth plan of the operators in the region, Emirates, Qatar and Etihad put massive stress on the airspace and the related service providers. Already nowadays, considering that we are not even halfway to the projected growth path, we can see operational restrictions, which force us to decelerate. One example is the lateral separation within the region, which is different from FIR to FIR. Over BAH and UAE airspace the lateral separation is 5 NM. Coming to MCT airspace is is 20 NM and once reaching BOM FIR, airplanes are flying 80 NM apart from each other. This puts a lot of limitations on the airline operation.Restrictions in flow rate for departures from Abu Dhabi via LABRI already cause significant delays to our operator during the evening and morning peak departure periods.
  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • SEASR is the European initiative for a single Sky in Europe.
  • ATCOs – Air Traffic ControllersLack of Communication & Surveillance example is the empty Quarter
  • DC 3I would like to start the presentation with a short interactive quiz, can you identify this aircraft?
  • Caravelle (circa 1975)
  • Lineage 1000
  • B 737
  • Airbus A 319 CJ
  • This same automation and avionics systems has brought training issues where the pilots may have difficulties staying “in the loop” when automation behaves in an unexpected way Modern aircraft are highly sophisticated, high levels of computerization, autopilots, avionics. Why do we still train using the requirement of 1945? 
  • For decades, the content of flight crew training programs has remained unchanged according to regulation whilst aircraft design and reliability have evolved dramatically.Within the JAR world boxes have to be ticked on the generic check form without really considering the specific requirements of the aircraft being flown.(I understand the FAA world is essentially the same) Certainly for recurrent training this severely limits the time available to look at not regulatory training.
  • Improve effectiveness of qualification schemes by developing and introducing - Evidencebased trainingA team lead by IATA has been tasked to examine the whole spectrum of training and report back. The team initially limited the research to aircraft with a min of 40 seats.
  • Today, as part of the Evidence Based Training program, a very large group of operators and training providers are sharing flight safety data with a view to determine what is relevant to training generally and for individual aircraft types. The aim is to determine where we should focus training to achieve maximum benefit.Modern aircraft have the capability to record huge amounts of data, in the case of the new Airbus A 320 family aircraft up to 7000 parameters can be recorded every one or two 2 seconds depending on the FDR standard. This recording can be used to analyze flights after the event for safety analysis.  Many other sources of data are available to analyze aircraft operations and help define training requirements.If the new training procedures are adopted they will most probably be applied to all aircraft types.
  • In 2005, ICAO adopted an international standard for the collection and analysis of flightdata. Today, the industry has a wealth of safety related evidence at its disposal, fromaccident and incident reports, LOSA, safety auditing and Flight Data Monitoringprogrammes. By analyzing this data, we have an opportunity to gather evidence for flight crew training, by weighing risks and looking at those situations, which are more likely to happen.In this presentation data comes from many different aircraft types, data is systematically de-identified and the actual operator or aircraft type is not known to this presenter.
  • I would like to look at 2 examples where evidence is beginning to call into question our established views. One significant training issue which has been identified as a major risk factor in modern aircraft is the go-around. This issue have been chosen because it is representative of most modern aircraft rather than being related to any specific type. We all know that a stabilized approach is better than an unstable approach and there is certainly no suggestion of changing this basic training philosophy. However after analyzing 1,000,000+ flights the data shows that the probability of a heavy landing or runway overrun is not significantly improved by making a stable approach.
  • From the LOSA data base.Pilots are not executing go-arounds from unstable approachesWhen a go-around is executed it is invariably flown poorly, with all engines operating and from a height above D/H
  • The unexpected go around Of the unstable approaches analyzed a very small percentage resulted in a go around, of the go-around’s performed many were considered to be worse than the potential landing had it been allowed to continue. If all pilots fly stable approaches from now we will not stop heavy landings or runway overruns.  This is not the expected result.It would seem that pilots are quite good at salvaging a landing from an unstable approach but not very good at performing a go-around which we thought we had been training for.We must use this information very carefully as the subsequent events after a stable and unstable approach are different. We need to look further at what and how we do thing to establish why this should be.
  • We generally train for an approach to limits with a go-around, many training captains feel that a go-around significantly above minimums can be more challenging, yet we have a time constraint in training this in favor of the check item requirement.
  • Airbus recommends the use of auto pilot for engine out and NPA’s, allowing pilots maximum opportunity to monitor the flight path.The check requirement is a manual approach to D/H with an engine out followed by a manual go-around.
  • “A threat connected to poor visibility on take off, where I have to intervene for a safe outcome, may happen every 3-5 years. Safety would be compromised if I would not been trained. Training for this event has an significant effect.”
  • Flifgt Safety Middle East 2010 Presentation

    1. 1.
    2. 2. André AuerChairman of the Conference<br />
    3. 3. Michael ConstantinidesDeputy Chairman of FSF/SE.Europe-M.East-Cyprus<br />
    4. 4. William VossCEO of Flight Safety Foundation<br />
    5. 5. CatalinRaduPresident of ECAC<br />
    6. 6. Mr. Raymond BenjaminSecretary General of ICAO<br />
    7. 7. Christos PetrouConference Coordinator and CEO of FSF/SE.Europe-M.East-Cyprus<br />
    8. 8.
    9. 9.
    10. 10. What are the different models in regulating safety?<br />1st SESSION<br />Chair: William Voss, CEO of FSFSupport: I. Papadopoulos<br />
    11. 11. Patrick GoudouExecutive Director of EASA<br />EASAs approach to regulate safety<br />
    12. 12. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "Aviation Safety: Implementation, Regulation, Training"<br />EASA perspective<br />Flight Safety Cyprus, Middle East, S.E Europe <br />Nicosia HILTON- Cyprus27-28 April 2011<br />
    13. 13. Cyprus 2011<br />13<br />What are the different models in regulating safety ?<br /><ul><li> Introduction
    14. 14. Systematic safety
    15. 15. Compliance based / Prescriptive regulation
    16. 16. Objective based regulation
    17. 17. Performance based regulation
    18. 18. The way forward
    19. 19. The EASP</li></li></ul><li>The EU/EASA system<br /><ul><li>EASA is supporting the EU Commission in its legislative and monitoring roles
    20. 20. EASA exercises independent executive role as certifying authority for certain tasks
    21. 21. EASA+ National Aviation Authorities together are covering all certification needs for the whole EU/EASA civil aviation system
    22. 22. A clear separation of certification tasks between EASA and National Aviation Authorities has been defined </li></ul>3<br />Cyprus 2011<br />
    23. 23. The EU/EASA system<br /><ul><li>Fundamental pillar of the system is the mutual immediate recognition in all Member States of any certificate issued either by EASA or by a National Aviation Authority
    24. 24. The system includes nowadays all 27 EU Member States + 4 EFTA States (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland)
    25. 25. 7 Western Balkan countries are in the process of joining the system </li></ul>15<br />Cyprus 2011<br />
    26. 26. Cyprus 2011<br />16<br />Advantages of an Agency<br />Legally binding rules<br />Higher common safety standards<br />“level playing field” <br />Type-certificates valid across EU<br />One European Counterpart to the FAA<br />
    27. 27. Cyprus 2011<br />17<br />Systematic safety<br />Total system approach is based on the fact that the aviation system components – products, operators, crews, aerodromes, ATM, ANS, on the ground or in the air - are part of a single network<br />
    28. 28. Cyprus 2011<br />18<br />Compliance based / Prescriptive regulation<br />Binding standards set. Inspections check. <br />Pro – easy to understand<br />Con – absolute and inflexible<br />Example: EU OPS 1.125<br />Documents to be carried<br />(a) An operator shall ensure that the following documents or copies thereof are carried on each flight:…<br />
    29. 29. 09/05/2011<br />Cyprus 2011<br />19<br />Objective based regulation<br />Objective, goal or target is set. Advisory material provided. Demonstrations needed.<br />Pro – greater flexibility<br />Con – continued achievement not guaranteed<br />Example: CS 25.1309 <br />(b) The aeroplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that -<br />(1) Any catastrophic failure condition<br />(i) is extremely improbable; ……………<br />
    30. 30. 09/05/2011<br />Cyprus 2011<br />20<br />Performance based regulation<br />A measurable level of performance is regularly reviewed. Performance is established, maintained or improved. <br />Pro – continuous monitoring and more transparency<br />Con - requires intelligent definition and application<br />Example: Commission Regulation (EU) 691/2010 on the performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions defines safety key performance indicators<br />
    31. 31. Cyprus 2011<br />21<br />The way forward<br />Need for change<br />Growth<br />Dynamic industry<br />Complexity and interconnection<br />Lessons learned from safety data analysis<br />Some prescription will remain<br />Objectives good for design requirements<br />
    32. 32. Cyprus 2011<br />22<br />The way forward<br />Safety Management implementation means:<br />Identifying hazards<br />Managing risks <br />Performance goals and indicators<br />Continuous monitoring<br />Meeting the challenges of the future<br />
    33. 33. 24-25/03/2011<br />ICAO-COPAC International Safety Seminar<br />23<br />Definitions<br />Strategy<br />The European Safety Strategy is a set of policies and objectives which are laid down by the European Commission<br />Programme<br />The European Aviation Safety Programme is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety<br />Plan<br />The European Aviation Safety Plan is a high level safety issues assessment and related action plan<br />The Plan is a key element of the EASP<br />
    34. 34. ICAO-COPAC International Safety Seminar<br />24<br />European Aviation Safety Advisory Committee (EASAC)<br />Operational since October 2009<br />Advisory role<br />Main objectives:<br />Contribute to the development of the Strategy (with EC)<br />Propose a Safety Programme<br />Propose and update a Safety Plan<br />Comprised of Commission, NAAs, Industry and Agency representatives<br />
    35. 35. Cyprus 2011<br />25<br />The EASP manual<br />Describes the EU Aviation Safety System and Safety Management System<br />Describes how to build a European Aviation Safety Plan<br />Three complementary functions:<br />Rulemaking<br />Oversight<br />Safety assurance and promotion<br />
    36. 36. Cyprus 2011<br />26<br />The European Aviation Safety Plan<br />Deals with high level and European wide safety concerns<br />Bottom-up approach<br />Proposes organisational and technical actions<br />Coordinated with MS SSP<br />Updated every year<br />
    37. 37.
    38. 38. Vince GalottiDeputy Director Air Navigation Bureau of ICAO<br />The ICAO way to regulate safety<br />
    39. 39. ICAO’s Safety Framework and future activities related to “Regulation”<br />Vince GalottiDeputy Director, Safety Standardization & Infrastructure<br />Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO<br />Nicosia, 27 and 28 April 2011<br />
    40. 40. 30<br />Introduction<br />Standards<br />ICAO Safety Framework<br />Specific operational safety targets by ICAO<br />Targeting our safety resources<br />Summary<br />
    41. 41. Chicago Convention<br />Article 37 – Adoption of international Standards and Procedures<br />Each Contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, Standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation.<br />
    42. 42. Annexes to the Convention<br />Standards and Recommended Practices<br />Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary/desirable for the safety or regularity of international air navigation.<br />The case of Annexes 1, 2 and 8<br />
    43. 43. Annexes to the Convention<br />
    44. 44. A More Strategic Approach<br /><ul><li>ICAO Safety Framework</li></ul>Policy & Standardization<br /><ul><li>GASP Update</li></ul>Safety Monitoring<br /><ul><li>CMA</li></ul>Safety Analysis<br /><ul><li>Today’s discussion</li></ul>Implementation<br /><ul><li>Annual Safety Report</li></ul>34<br />
    45. 45. Priorities<br /><ul><li>ICAO’s Safety Analysis Methodology</li></ul>Leading to Prioritization of Resources<br />Leading to Tailored Action Plans<br />Leading to Measurable Results<br />35<br />
    46. 46. Applying the fundamentalsof Safety Management<br />#1:LEI and Accident rates are highly correlated<br />#2:The Traffic is a factor of Risk<br />#3:The Traffic growth is a factor of Risk<br />The number of Accidents is not included in the Safety index process as an direct input<br />For a given LEI, the higher the Traffic, the higher the Risk<br />For a given LEI, the higher the Traffic growth, the higher the Risk<br />36<br />
    47. 47. Worldwide distribution<br />< 7 000 departures<br />> 300 000 departures<br />7 000 – 50 000<br />50 000 – 300 000<br />< 7 000 departures<br />7 000 – 50 000<br />50 000 – 300 000<br />> 300 000 departures<br />LEI<br />2009 Departures per States <br />37<br />
    48. 48. Tailoring Each State’s Action Plan<br /> Short-List<br />WHO<br />Prioritize the needs of each State<br />according to its “profile”<br /> Strategic resolution of safety deficiencies <br />HOW<br />Decrease the LEI<br />WHAT<br />38<br />
    49. 49. Where is the Risk? Import / Export<br />Distribution for the Worldwide Short List<br />Importers<br />AGA/ANS<br />Mix<br />Exporters<br />OPS/AIR/PEL<br />39<br />
    50. 50. 40<br />Action Plan<br />Tailored Action Plan<br />Prioritization of Resources<br />Tailored Action Plans<br />Improve LEIs and safety oversight<br />Infrastructure<br />Air Navigation Deficiencies<br />Training<br />Leading to Measurable Results<br />
    51. 51. 41<br />Extended Diversion Time Operations<br />Safety Benefits:<br />Current operators and new entrants will operate at same level of safety<br />Amendment developed based on Industry Best Practices<br />Outlines new EDTO requirements to include requirements for aeroplanes with more than 2 turbine engines<br />Requirements for twin engine aeroplanes remain the same<br />No change for the vast majority of current long-range operators<br />Status:<br />Consultation with States and Int. Organizations in progress<br />Applicability for Standards anticipated - Nov 2012<br />
    52. 52. 42<br />Fuel Carriage Requirements<br />Benefits:<br />Improve efficiency and reduce emissions safely<br />New and updated provisions to address:<br />Fuel planning and alternate aerodrome criteria<br />Clearly define prescriptive requirements<br />Introduce performance based alternatives<br />Fuel advisory and emergency broadcasts<br />Comprehensive guidance material in “Fuel Planning” Manual<br />Status:<br />Undergoing ANC preliminary review<br />Consultation with States and Int. Organizations early April 2011<br />Applicability for Standards anticipated - Nov 2012<br />
    53. 53. 43<br />Fuel Contamination<br />Accident recommendation for ICAO to consider developing global standards and/or procedures on aviation fuel quality control<br />Operators already have requirements to ensure fuel is delivered in accordance with acceptable quality control procedures <br />Annex 6<br />Doc 8335, Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance<br />ICAO airport-related manuals address aircraft fuel from perspectives of safety & design of fuel facilities<br />Aviation fuel quality control not specifically covered in guidance material<br />Procedures would apply to one of many services available at aerodrome<br />New guidance material<br />IATA to develop procedures for airport operators and fuel services<br />ICAO wants to work in partnership with IATA on issue<br />
    54. 54. PBN Partnership Programme (2 Year)<br />Work area 1 – ATM Operational Implementation: Direct technical assistance to States, service provider, regulators and airlines:<br />Airspace concept workshops (5)<br />Provide Airspace expertise to PBN Go-teams (6)<br />Implementation of Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) Workshops (6)<br />Work area 2 – Development of ICAO documentation: Supporting implementation:<br />Assist development and maintenance of PBN navigation specifications<br />Assist Development of new performance based approach classification,<br />Development and execution of PBN operational approval courses (including train the trainers)<br />Expectations:<br />Enable States to carry out their PBN implementation efforts<br />This implementation will potentially save 108 million tonnes of CO2 over the next 2 years, through 22 RNAV routes, 54 SID/STAR RNP approaches and 25 CDOs<br />Focus on removing roadblocks to operational deployment, concentrated on Operational Approval Process, Airspace Concept Development and Training<br />44<br />
    55. 55. PBN Manual Amendment<br />Final draft expected to be available on ICAONET by October 2011<br />Currently includes: <br />Improved implementation guidance (incl. Ops approval guidance)<br />RF turn capability for all RNP operations<br />Nav. spec for GPS-equipped GA community that currently cannot get approval under existing nav specs<br />RNP 0.3 for helicopter operations<br />User input & airline support remains critically important<br />45<br />
    56. 56. 46<br />AOC Database Rollout<br />Develop on-line registry of AOC & Ops-Specs<br />Benefit international commercial aviation<br />Data collected to conform to content required by Annex 6<br />Collaborative effort between ICAO, IATA and CAUC<br />Improve on-line information available to States<br />Provide transparency as to the validity and currency of AOCs<br />
    57. 57. 47<br />AOC Database Rollout<br />Letter of Intent signed in May 2010<br />Prototype delivered by CAUC in July 2010<br />Complete development in China (CAUC) by 09/2011<br />Transfer, load and test application in ICAO by 10/2011<br />Send SL notifying States of the availability of the registry 11/2011<br />
    58. 58. 48<br />International Volcanic Ash Task Force<br />Objective:<br />Develop a global safety risk management framework that will make it possible to determine the safe levels of operation in airspace contaminated by volcanic ash<br />Further develop the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) through SARPs and guidance<br />Test the effectiveness of regional ATM volcanic ash contingency plans<br />Current activity:<br />International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF)<br />International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group (IAVWOPSG)<br />Regional Volcanic Ash Exercises Steering Groups (e.g. EUR/NAT)<br />Next steps:<br />EUR/NAT Exercise VOLCEX11/01 – 13 & 14 April 2011<br />IVATF/2, Montreal – 11 to 15 July 2011<br />IAVWOPSG/6, Dakar – 19 to 23 September 2011<br />Establishment of Challenge Team – Fall 2011 <br />
    59. 59. 49<br />Sharing of Safety Information<br />Global Safety Information Exchange (GSIE): <br />To establish procedures for sharing aviation safety information among key players in civil aviation community<br />MOU on GSIE signed on 28 Sep 2010 between: <br />
    60. 60. 50<br />Sharing of Safety Information<br />MOU mandated establishment of steering group involving all participants<br />First steering group meeting - Dec 2010<br />Next meeting on 27 May 11 to:<br />Establish terms of reference for GSIE<br />Establish mechanisms for information sharing<br />Discuss inclusion of additional partners<br />
    61. 61. 51<br />Fatigue Risk Management Systems<br />Fatigue Management SARPs to include:<br />Mandatory FTL regulations (as current)<br />Optional FRMS regulations (proposed)<br />Effective FRMS standards anticipated (Oct 2011)<br />Detailed guidance material for operators & regulators (Mar 2011)<br />FRMS Symposium & Forum (30 Aug – 2 Sept, 2011)<br />Thanks to IATA for collaboration and partnership on this issue<br />
    62. 62. Upper Age Limits for Pilots<br />Current Standard requires that if the Pilot-In-Command is 60-64 years, other pilot must be under 60<br />Restriction probably has little impact on flight safety… necessary to get change agreed by Council in 2006: 27 voted in favour – 24 required<br />ICAO proposes review but data to support change is not available<br />Timeline for review:<br />Feb 2011: Letter to IATA requesting research documenting performance levels in different age groups, including comparison of 60-64 year olds and younger pilots<br />Dec 2011: SL requesting views of States/Organizations<br />In response to SL, IATA refers to research results<br />June 2012: Initial Review by ANC of new proposal <br />Sept 2012: Final Review by ANC<br />March 2013: Adoption by Council<br />Nov 2013: Applicability date<br />52<br />
    63. 63. 53<br />Next Generation of Aviation Professionals<br />ICAO launched NGAP initiatives in 2010:<br />Established NGAP Task Force<br />Held 1st NGAP Symposium (March 2010)<br />HLSC and A/37 recommended that States should support work of the NGAP initiatives <br />One of NGAP main task is outreach <br />ICAO will hold regional conferences<br />
    64. 64. 54<br />
    65. 65.
    66. 66. H. ChaoukDirector General of Lebanese CAA<br />Safety Regulation  in the Middle East <br />Need of interoperability with Europe?<br />
    67. 67. Aviation Challenges and recommendations<br />Safety Regulation  in the Middle East Interoperability with Europe <br />Dr. Hamdi ChaoukDirector General of Civil AviationLebanon<br />
    68. 68.
    69. 69. Passenger Traffic Growths (2008-2010)<br />
    70. 70. World Hull Loss / million sectorsWestern built jet hull losses<br />
    71. 71. Jet Hull Loss Rates (2005-2010)<br />
    72. 72. World jet Hull Loss Rate (1998-2010)<br />
    73. 73. Regional Problems<br />Africa <br />high accident rate – labor problems – infrastructure<br /> problems - liberalization and privatization difficulties.<br />Middle East<br />Lack of growth management – Inefficiency – poor<br />vision for the planned US$38 billion investment.<br />Russia and CIS <br />Safety concerns – business practice not in line with Global standards.<br />
    74. 74. Regional Problems<br />Europe <br />Lack of delivery – micro-management – congestion.<br />United States<br />Adverse effects due to domestic politics – Weak leadership.<br />Asia Pacific<br />Lack of harmonization – Lack of regional aviation<br /> organization. Lack of managing huge growth. <br />
    75. 75. Aviation Challenges in the Middle East<br /><ul><li>Lack of clear vision & cooperation (regulators, operators).
    76. 76. Inefficient Governments Aviation Systems (autonomy, monopoly..)
    77. 77. Lack of Harmonized Laws, Decrees, Regulations and Policies.
    78. 78. Lack of compatibility in Agreements (bilateral, multilateral, </li></ul> plulateral ..Onelateral ?).<br /><ul><li> Market forces & competition (regular, charter, low cost, alliance, ...).
    79. 79. Regulators (vs.) Airlines & Airport Authorities relationships.
    80. 80. Political instability, security concerns, military conflicts.</li></li></ul><li>. Quality Management Deficiencies in safety and<br /> security. . Airline Diversifications and lack of regional<br /> coordination.. Lack of cooperation between regional Safety<br /> organizations.<br />. Unjustified and uncoordinated aviation taxes and<br /> surcharges.<br />. Unfair government subsidies and dumping of prices.<br />Aviation Challenges in the Middle East<br />
    81. 81. Improved Regulation via Efficient Restructuring<br />ROADMAP for RESTRUCTURING<br />
    82. 82. Aviation Strategy<br />
    83. 83. Efficient Regulation Via Efficient Restructuring<br />
    84. 84. Efficient Regulation Via Efficient Restructuring<br />
    85. 85. Lebanon Experience in LiberalizationThe turnaround after 2001<br />
    86. 86. BRHI Airport and MEA Growths<br />
    87. 87. Interoperability with Europe<br />* Euro-Med Program<br />* EMAC<br />* Common Aviation Area<br />* Largest Percentage of traffic flow<br />* Largest number of airlines crossing borders<br />* Fully mature and stable regulatory structure<br />* The EU and EASA status <br />* The status of the Arab League and ACAC <br />
    88. 88. Interoperability with Europe<br />* Cost Efficiency in safety and security<br />* Harmonization of regulations and standards<br />* Eurocontrol and Arab Control <br />* Enhanced security system <br />* Reduction in congestion over Europe<br />* Common Trainings and Standards<br />* Better environmental conditions<br />
    89. 89. THE END<br />Thank you<br />
    90. 90.
    91. 91. FAA’s view on regulating aviation safety:<br />The need for closer regional cooperation<br />Roy D.BarnettSenior FAA Representative,ME. Office,US,Embassy, Abu Dhabi,UAE<br />
    92. 92. 78<br />Federal Aviation<br />Administration<br />FAA Safety Oversight & Rulemaking Overview<br />Cyprus Safety Conference Nicosia<br />April 2011<br />Roy D. Barnett<br />Senior FAA Representative, Middle East<br />Office of Policy, International and Environment<br />
    93. 93. Overview<br /><ul><li>FAA’s international profile.
    94. 94. Regulating aviation safety: FAA international oversight </li></ul> responsibilities.<br /><ul><li>Foreign carrier inspection programs.
    95. 95. Requirements for foreign aircraft flying into US airspace.
    96. 96. An overview of FAA rulemaking responsibilities.
    97. 97. Challenges ahead: Need for closer regional cooperation</li></li></ul><li>FAA’s International Program<br />FAA Senior Representative Offices: Abu Dhabi, Moscow, Dakar, Brussels, London, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo, New Delhi, Beijing, Panama City, Brasilia, Miami and Washington, D.C.<br />Flight Standards-- International Field Offices (IFOs)-- International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program<br />Aircraft Certification <br /> -- Overseas offices: Brussels, Singapore, Beijing<br />Air Traffic: Brussels, Singapore<br />Extensive Collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)-- US Mission <br />
    98. 98. Flight Standards’ International Field OfficesGeographic Areas of Responsibility<br />Anchorage IFO – Russia, CIS States and Northwest Canada<br />San Francisco IFO – Asia/Pacific & Australia (129 Issuance) & Repair Station audits in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Pacific Islands<br />Miami IFO – South America and the Caribbean<br />Dallas IFO – Mexico and Central America<br />Singapore IFO - Repair Station Audits in Asia/Pacific (except those <br /> noted above)<br />Frankfurt IFO - Africa, Europe & Middle East<br />New York IFU- (Canada, Part 129 Issuance, issuance of Ops Specs etc.) <br />Website: http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/ifo/<br />
    99. 99. FAA Safety Oversight Responsibilities<br /><ul><li>Review the ability of a carrier’s civil aviation authority to meet international safety standards under Flight Standards’ International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA).
    100. 100. Support and participate in the continued safety review programs of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the development of related TRAINAIR program materials.
    101. 101. Perform ramp inspections of non-U.S. air carriers that conduct scheduled operations to the United States.
    102. 102. Take immediate action to resolve safety issues that arise during foreign air carrier ramp inspection activity, or that take place only on a limited basis in most countries.</li></li></ul><li>FAA Foreign Carrier Inspection Program<br /><ul><li>The primary purpose for surveillance of non-U.S. air carriers is to ensure that the carrier is operating safely and in accordance with its operations specifications.
    103. 103. Air carriers must adhere to all parts of their operations specifications, applicable Federal Aviation Regulations, and applicable ICAO Annexes.
    104. 104. (Over 440,000 Part 129 foreign carrier flights conducted each year in the United States.)</li></li></ul><li>Foreign Air Carrier Responsibilities<br /><ul><li>The foreign air carrier is responsible for providing manuals or written instructions, training, supervision or oversight, and auditing of all contracted operations. Primary areas include (but are not limited to):
    105. 105. Cargo Build Up / Cargo Loading
    106. 106. Deicing
    107. 107. Ground Handling / Ground Servicing
    108. 108. Fueling
    109. 109. Aircraft Maintenance</li></li></ul><li>Air Carrier Ramp Inspections<br /><ul><li>Aviation safety inspectors conduct surveillance of each foreign air carrier and its aircraft and operations.
    110. 110. Surveillance of a foreign air carrier is conducted at any time on U.S. soil, and inspections are conducted on a routine or recurring basis.
    111. 111. If a foreign air carrier experiences a series of accidents, incidents, violations, or complaints (that relate to safety), the district office holding the foreign air carrier’s operations specifications shall initiate surveillance as necessary to resolve any safety deficiencies. (Article 16 - Chicago Convention)</li></li></ul><li> John F. Kennedy International Airport <br />Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport <br />Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport<br /> Logan International Airport<br />Philadelphia International Airport<br />.<br />.<br />.<br />.<br />.<br />.<br />.<br /> O’Hare International Airport<br />.<br />.<br /> San Francisco International Airport <br /> Denver International Airport<br />.<br /> Newark Liberty International Airport <br />.<br /> McCarran International Airport<br />.<br />HonoluluInternational Airport<br />Charlotte-Douglas International Airport<br />.<br /> Washington Dulles International Airport <br />.<br />.<br /> Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport<br />.<br /> Los Angeles International Airport<br />Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport<br />.<br />.<br />George Bush Intercontinental Airport<br />Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood<br />International Airport<br /> Orlando International Airport<br />.<br />.<br /> Miami International Airport<br />86<br />
    112. 112. Air Carrier Ramp Inspections<br /><ul><li>Issues identified are raised first with the subject carrier
    113. 113. Results are shared with the FAA office that is responsible for the oversight of the foreign carriers operations specifications
    114. 114. Repeated instances of non-compliance may warrant additional surveillance</li></li></ul><li>Air Carrier Ramp Inspections<br /><ul><li>Results of the ramp inspection are recorded in the FAA monitoring/tracking system
    115. 115. International standards are the primary elements for the inspection activity
    116. 116. Repeated issues with several carriers of the same State may indicate a lack of oversight by the civil aviation authority
    117. 117. Such indications may result in an assessment</li></li></ul><li>Safety Oversight<br />Required Surveillance Work Programs<br />Work programs and goals are assigned to each FAA region, <br />and to individual inspectors. These inspections may include:<br /><ul><li>Ramp and Cargo Inspection
    118. 118. Crew License Verification
    119. 119. Aircraft Records Review
    120. 120. Deicing Surveillance</li></li></ul><li>Safety Oversight<br />Compliance and Enforcement<br />Investigation - serious safety issues or unresolved problems may <br />lead to a formal investigation and could result in legal <br />enforcement action being taken against an individual and/or the <br />air carrier. Ten days are allowed for a response from the receipt of the<br />letter to respond to the allegation.<br /><ul><li>Types of Enforcement Action Include:
    121. 121. No Action
    122. 122. Letter of Correction (company)
    123. 123. Letter of Warning (individual)
    124. 124. Civil Penalty
    125. 125. Suspension/Revocation of Operations Specifications, in part or in whole </li></li></ul><li>Aircraft flying into US Airspace<br />The following safety prerequisites must be met:<br /><ul><li>A successful International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) audit of the carrier’s civil aviation authority.
    126. 126. The foreign air carrier must have an air operating certificate (AOC) issued by the State of the Operator.
    127. 127. The foreign air carrier must have approval from the State of the Operator to provide flights to the United States.</li></li></ul><li>Approval to Fly to the United StatesU.S. Government Agencies Involved<br />Department of Transportation (DOT): issues economic authority (after air services agreement fully completed with carrier’s government by U.S. State Department)<br />Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): safety oversight (issuance of operations specifications, surveillance, and the IASA Program)<br />Transportation Security Administration (TSA): conducts airport security review (if needed), and works with carrier on security requirements<br />Customs & Border Protection (CBP): establishes passenger data program with carrier, allowing for transportation of people into the United States. <br />
    128. 128. International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA)<br />The FAA established the IASA program through public policy and legislative action in August 1992. <br />The assessment program focuses on the ability of the civil aviation authority (not the individual air carrier’s ability) to adhere to international standards.<br />
    129. 129. FAA *IASA Oversight Critical Elements<br />Necessary sequence of oversight elements:<br />1 - National Law<br />2 - National Regulations<br />3 - CAA Structure<br />4 - Inspector guidance<br />5 - Qualified personnel<br />6 - Certification activities<br />7 - On-going surveillance/validation<br />8 - Resolution of Safety Issues<br /><ul><li>*International Aviation Safety Assessment Program</li></li></ul><li>IASA Periodic Validation<br /><ul><li>The FAA may re-evaluate any country with carriers having authority to codeshare or operate to the U.S. when there is reason to question whether a country is in compliance and is discharging its international aviation safety obligations.
    130. 130. Currently, a risk assessment tool is used to assess when a country should be reassessed under the IASA program.</li></li></ul><li>Positive Change<br /><ul><li>As a result of the IASA Program, there has been a tangible improvement in the level of aviation safety oversight in many countries.
    131. 131. These improvements will normally result in changes to both a country’s foreign and domestic aviation operations.
    132. 132. FAA continues to support the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety programs and related activities.</li></li></ul><li>FAA’s Rulemaking Process<br />Goal: Improve development of FAA regulations by involving interested members of the public early in process.<br />The FAA’s Office of Rulemaking manages the agency’s rulemaking program, in partnership with the Office of the Chief Counsel and the Office of Aviation Policy and Plans.<br />The goals and performance targets for rulemaking projects are based on the FAA’s Flight Plan.<br />
    133. 133. Rulemaking Drivers<br /><ul><li>The decision to conduct rulemaking can originate from:</li></ul>Legislative mandates<br />NTSB recommendations<br />Changes to international standards [ICAO]<br />Internal analyses resulting from inspections, audits, accident/ incident investigations, research, etc.<br />Desire to leverage safety/capacity benefits of new aviation/avionics technologies <br />Agreement to harmonize internationally [e.g., EASA, Canada];<br />Changing Administrations<br />Environmental factors <br />Petitions for rulemaking or for exemption; or<br />World events.<br />
    134. 134. How are Priorities Set?<br /><ul><li>The Rulemaking Steering Committee establishes the FAA’s rulemaking priorities.
    135. 135. The Rulemaking Steering Committee is composed of: </li></ul>The Associate and Assistant Administrators with rulemaking responsibility.<br />Representatives of the Office of General Counsel’s Regulations Division and the Office of Aviation Policy and Plan’s Regulatory Analysis Division.<br />A representative of the Department of Transportation’s Office of General Counsel.<br />Meets semi-annually.<br />Sets the regulatory strategic vision for the FAA.<br />
    136. 136. How are Priorities Managed?<br /><ul><li>The FAA Rulemaking Management Council manages the FAA’s rulemaking priorities.
    137. 137. The Council is composed of: </li></ul>The Director of the Office of Rulemaking<br />The Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division<br />The Director of the Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, and<br />Directors from all program offices are engaged in rulemaking. <br /><ul><li>The Council: </li></ul>Meets six times a year.<br />Ensures that rulemaking projects are aligned with FAA priorities.<br />Approves rulemaking projects for further action.<br />Assigns rulemaking priorities.<br />Designates rulemaking teams.<br />Approves rulemaking schedules.<br />Reports to the Rulemaking Steering Committee.<br />
    138. 138. Challenges: Need for closer regional cooperation<br />Need to do more sharing data: PTRS,VIS,IASDEX.<br />Joint analysis and discussion of pre-cursors of what actions needed to address potential risks. RASG, Regional Aviation Safety Roadmaps.<br />Requirement for transparency of safety data, coupled with adequate protection.<br />Need for establishment of a “just safety culture”.<br />Move toward predictive rather than reactive data.<br />Challenge of assisting States to bring safety levels up. <br />
    139. 139. Conclusion<br />FAA’s Active International Presence Includes:<br />Senior Representatives based outside the United States <br />Extensive Safety Oversight of non-U.S. Air Carriers<br />International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program<br />Aircraft Certification<br />Air Traffic Coordination<br />Collaboration with ICAO<br />
    140. 140. Questions?<br />
    141. 141.
    142. 142. EugenyShaposhnikovChairman of Flight Safety International-Russia<br />Safety Regulation in Russia:<br />Challenges and opportunities<br />
    143. 143. The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI input into flightsafety in<br /> the Russian Federation:<br /> history, challenges and <br />achievements<br />Cyprus, Nicosia<br />April 27-28, 2011<br />
    144. 144. 107<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The Flight Safety Foundation Internationalis one of the seniorpublic organizations in Russia establishedin Mach, 1989 at the time of the Soviet Union<br />It means that presently we are 22 years old<br />
    145. 145. 108<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI Management:<br />Eugeny Shaposhnikov BoG Chairman<br />Ivan Mashkivsky BoG Honorary Chairman<br />John Enders Honorary President<br />
    146. 146. 109<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />Presently, the FSFI Corporate Members represent civil and military aviation from Russia and other countries, including:<br /><ul><li>Design Bureau
    147. 147. Manufactures
    148. 148. Airlines
    149. 149. Training Centers
    150. 150. R & D Institutions
    151. 151. Individuals</li></li></ul><li>110<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI purposes and goals:<br />Flight safety enhancement in the Russianaviation community is the prime goal of our Organization<br />FSFI actively participatesin the Industry committeesand working groupsof the State Duma (Parliament), Interagency Civil AviationCommittee, Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), Transport Ministry of the Russian Federation, closely cooperates with other public organizations in Russia and international organizationsin order todevelop and implementboth national and international best practices in the field of flight safety.<br />The proposals put forward by the FSFIhave been taken into account in the process of drafting Air Code of the Russian Federation, Rules and Regulations pertaining to flight Safety.<br />
    152. 152. 111<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />An example of lawmaking process:<br />In order to introduce changes into the Air Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 27 and 29 pertaining to State Oversightin Civil Aviation) it was necessary to change 4 Government Regulationsandsome Ordersof Transport Ministry – altogether to tackle 9 hurdles.<br />
    153. 153. 112<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />Aviation Rulemaking Hierarhy in the Russian Federation<br />Laws<br />Constitution<br />Federal Constitutional Laws<br />Federal Laws<br />Codes of the Russian Federation<br />Laws of Constituent Territories of the Russian Federation<br />By-Laws<br />President Orders<br />Local Normative Acts<br />Government Regulations<br />Acts of Federal Government Powers<br />
    154. 154. 113<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI activities:<br />Promotion of national and international best practices<br />Twice a month the FSFI disseminates between the Corporate Members on-line information (more than 500 issues over these years)on accidents and incidentsin Russia and the CIS Member States;<br />We regularly translate into Russiantopical informationon flight safety from western periodicals(USA, including the FSF documents,UK,Canada, European Union, as well as materials provided by Boeing and Airbus).<br />
    155. 155. 114<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI activities:<br />Promotion of national and international best practices<br />Another important instrument in this area:<br />Every year in close cooperation with international organizations and in order to implement new safety requirements into Russian airlines and other organizations practice (including SMS requirements and Global Aviation Safety Roadmap provisions) we are holdingat least 1 international workshop on flight safety problems which are of great concern at ICAO, international aviation community and Russian aviation stakeholders.<br />With reference to these events we would like you to pay attention to the following:<br />
    156. 156. 115<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI Workshops<br />Russia, Moscow, April 8-9, 2010<br />International Workshop Safety Culture and Reporting SystemRussia, Moscow, April 14-15, 2009<br />International Workshop Global Aviation Safety Roadmap and RussiaRussia, Moscow, April 10-11, 2008 International Workshop SMS in Civil Aviation and Preparation for USOAPAzerbaijan, Baku, September 12 – 13, 2007 International Workshop ALAR Tool KitRussia, Moscow May 31 – June 1, 2007International Workshop ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements: Progress Report?Russia, Moscow, June 1-2, 2006<br />International Workshop ICAO Language Proficiency Requirements: Are you Ready?Russia, Moscow, November 7-10, 200558th FSF International Air Safety Seminar (IASS)<br />
    157. 157. 116<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI Workshops<br />Russia, Moscow, June 9-10, 2005International Workshop Air Navigation Information Today and TomorrowRussia, Moscow, June 9-10, 2004International Workshop Accident Prevention: Learning from Each OtherRussia, Moscow, July 29-30,2003International Workshop Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR Tool Kit)Russia, Magadan, July 24-25, 2002<br />CNS/ATM, Russia, ХХI CenturyRussia, Tyumen,2001International Workshop Civil Aviation Flight Safety Strategy in XXI Century<br />On May, 12-13, 2011 in Moscow we are planning to hold International Workshop Flight Safety: Machine – Human – Environment, 2011<br />
    158. 158. 117<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />The FSFI Awards:<br />1. Outstanding Achievements in the Field of Flight Safety Award <br />2. Outstanding Contribution to Enhancement of Flight Safety after the Name of M. P. Simonov, Sukhoi General Designer Award<br />3. Outstanding Achievements in the Field of Air Traffic Management Safety Award<br />4. Heroism, Courage and Resourcefulness Award<br />5. Contributions to Appreciation of Flight Safety’s Importance by Journalists Award.<br />6. Flight Safety Foundation International Certificate of Achievements<br />
    159. 159. 118<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />
    160. 160. 119<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />Thus, Flight Safety Foundation International making the most of above mentioned resources, closely cooperating with Russian Federation regulators and international organizations, is striving to achieve acceptable level of safety stipulated by the ICAO documents.<br /> Some of these results may be seen on the following slides:<br />
    161. 161. 120<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />ICAO Regulations Non-Compliance Worldwide<br />
    162. 162. 121<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />Accident Rate: Present and Forecast per 100 000 hours of flight time<br />
    163. 163. 122<br />Civil Aviation Risk Rate According toSAFA<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />
    164. 164. 123<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />FSFI has been closely cooperating with Russian aviation authorities for more than 20 years in many areas, including development of aviation safety regulations.<br />While tackling problems related to ICAO regulations compliance, the FSFI strives for taking into accountlong-term problems; the most pressing of themis to turn Russia into acompetentand active member of the International Aviation Community.<br />Our participation in this Conference – isanotherstep in this direction.<br />
    165. 165. 124<br />The Flight Safety Foundation International (FSFI)<br />Thank you<br />
    166. 166.
    167. 167.
    168. 168. Challenges in implementing safety regulations<br />2nd SESSION<br />Chair:Mr. Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Secretary General <br /> of the Association of European Airlines ( AEA)Support: A. Georgiou – Head of Safety, Cyprus Airways<br />
    169. 169. C. RaduPresident of ECAC and Director General of Romanian CAA<br />The experience of Romania<br />
    170. 170. Challenges in implementing safety regulationsSSP -The experience of Romania<br />Catalin RADU – Director General of Civil Aviation - ROMANIA<br />129<br />
    171. 171. Framework regulations<br /><ul><li>International level (ICAO SARPs):
    172. 172. The establishment of a State Safety Programme (SSP):</li></ul>for Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14; <br /><ul><li>European regulations requirements:
    173. 173. The establishment of a State Management System (SMS):</li></ul>(EU OPS: implementation by the AOC holders, EC 2096:<br />implementation by the ATS);<br /><ul><li>Regional level:
    174. 174. The European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP) build a </li></ul>bridge at regional level to the ICAO’s requirements for SSPs<br />130<br />
    175. 175. Framework regulations - Challenges<br /><ul><li> National regulations framework need to be implemented and harmonised with the regional requirements;
    176. 176. The Gap analysis is a very useful tool when starts the implementation.</li></ul>131<br />
    177. 177. Setting the scene<br /><ul><li>Identifying the managing bodies within the national organisational context (two main separate bodies involved: the National CAA and the Investigation Body);
    178. 178. Establish the placeholder of the SSP (the National CAA);
    179. 179. Nominating the Accountable manager ;
    180. 180. Establish SSP Safety Board and SSP Safety Committee;
    181. 181. Start the training for personnel involved in the implementation at very early stages.</li></ul>132<br />
    182. 182. Setting the scene - Challenges<br /><ul><li>The Accountable manager need to have full authority on human resources and on major financial issues;
    183. 183. Allocation of resources need to be planned well in advance and is based of the commitement and awarness of the accountable manager.</li></ul>133<br />
    184. 184. Sharing safety information<br /><ul><li>Aerodrome operators, air navigation service providers, design organisations, manufacturers, maintenance organisations, air operators, training providers, and aviation personnel need to report on daily basis through the activities they carry out;
    185. 185. Where possible, automated systems need to be implemented to monitor daily operational activities ;
    186. 186. Automated systems of safety data collection and processing need to be installed.</li></ul>134<br />
    187. 187. Sharing safety informations - Challenges<br /><ul><li>Effective hazard reporting and communication system – non blaiming culture;
    188. 188. The establishment of provisions for the protection of safety data collection and processing systems.</li></ul>135<br />
    189. 189. Effective implementation<br /><ul><li>Establish performance based KPIs in agreement with the stakeholders capabilities and operations;
    190. 190. Establish ALoS at national level;
    191. 191. Establish the enforcement policy with the conditions and circumstances under which to deal with safety deviations .</li></ul>136<br />
    192. 192. Effective implementation - Challenges<br /><ul><li>Different KPIs based on the different nature of the operations for the same type of stakeholders (Comercial vs. Aerial work operators, ANSP vs. AFIS operators);
    193. 193. Shifting from reactive system to performance based analysis;
    194. 194. Computing capabilities and automated tools are needed.</li></ul>137<br />
    195. 195. SSP Implementation - Romanian experience<br />High level Conference held in Bucharest initiated the activities on the implementation of SSP<br />In co-operation with ICAO, RoCAA provided training courses (SSP and SMS implementation course) for their own personnel and for aviation staff working in various domains (february and march 2009);<br />First working group for the SSP implementations was established (Decision of the RoCAA Director no. D226 / 18.03.2009);<br />First draft of the draft gap analysis and preliminary SSP implementation planning (july 2009);<br />Nomination of the RoCAA General Director as SSP National Coordinator (july 2009);<br />RoCAA starting discution with MTI/DGAC and with accident investigation agency for SSPSafety Board and SSPSafety Committee componence;<br />An SSP implementation training course was delivered to members of the SSP Safety Board and SSP Safety Committee in co-operation with ICAO;<br />138<br />
    196. 196. SSP Implementation - Romanian experience<br /> The “Romanian SSP gap analysis” was revised, finalised and approved;<br />In order to gain experience and share information several aviation specialists participated to “SSP/SMS implementation” workshop for CERG States held in Bratislava (organised in cooperation with ICAO);<br />The “Romanian State Safety Programme”currently in draft under internal revision;<br />The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure order will be developed to approve The “Romanian State Safety Programme”; <br />139<br />
    197. 197. Thank you !<br />140<br />
    198. 198.
    199. 199. Erik Merckxformer Deputy Director of Safety,EUROCONTROL<br />Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation<br />
    200. 200. Pioneers on European ATM Safety Regulation Dr.Erik MerckxNicosia, Cyprus27 April 2011<br />
    201. 201. Contents<br /><ul><li>History of ATM Safety Legislation
    202. 202. European Regulation on Accident and Incident reporting
    203. 203. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs
    204. 204. ESARRs transposed in European Community Law
    205. 205. Community Regulation in 2010 and beyond</li></li></ul><li><ul><li>Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing
    206. 206. Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services
    207. 207. Annex 13 – Accident/incident Investigation
    208. 208. PANS-ATM – Doc 4444
    209. 209. SES 1 and 2
    210. 210. Separation</li></ul> Service Provision / Regulation<br /><ul><li>Transposition of ESSARs</li></ul> in EU Law<br /><ul><li>EC 2096/2005
    211. 211. EC 1315/2007
    212. 212. Extension</li></ul> of competencies <br /> to:<br /><ul><li> ANS
    213. 213. Airports</li></ul>History of ATM Safety Regulation<br />European Commission<br />EUROCONTROL<br />ICAO<br />EASA<br /><ul><li>ESARR 2
    214. 214. ESARR 3
    215. 215. ESARR 5
    216. 216. ESARR 4
    217. 217. ESARR 6
    218. 218. ESARR 1</li></ul>1947<br />2000<br />2004<br />2009<br />
    219. 219. <ul><li>Transposition of ICAO SARPS into European Law
    220. 220. Aim: Harmonization
    221. 221. ESARR 2
    222. 222. Collect ECAC Data
    223. 223. Severity
    224. 224. Trend analysis
    225. 225. Initially focus on Accident Investigation
    226. 226. Mandatory Incident Reporting
    227. 227. ADREP Database
    228. 228. Just Culture
    229. 229. Voluntary Incident reporting
    230. 230. EC 1321/2007:
    231. 231. Practical </li></ul> implementation of<br /> central database<br /><ul><li>EC 1330/2007
    232. 232. Dissemination of</li></ul> information<br /><ul><li>EC 2003/42
    233. 233. Mandatory reporting of incidents
    234. 234. EC collects the data in a central database (ECCAIRS)
    235. 235. States and International bodies have access</li></ul>European Regulation on Accident / Incident Reporting<br />European Commission<br />European Commission<br />EUROCONTROL<br />European Commission<br />ICAO<br />1947<br />1994<br />2000<br />2003<br />2007<br />
    236. 236. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs<br />Risk Assessment New Systems<br />Recruitment/<br />Selection<br />Procedures Operational Processes<br />Incident Reporting<br />Safety Surveys and Follow-up<br />Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures<br />Training<br />Incident Investigation<br />Interfaces ATS and CNS<br />Competency<br />Checks<br />Lessons Learnt<br />CNS Maintenance Procedures<br />Risk Assessment Airspace Changes<br />Refresher/<br />Advanced Training<br />Risk Assessment Software Changes<br />Emergency Procedures<br />ESARR 3<br />All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded <br />
    237. 237. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs<br />Risk Assessment New Systems<br />Recruitment/<br />Selection<br />Procedures Operational Processes<br />Incident Reporting<br />Safety Surveys and Follow-up<br />Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures<br />Training<br />Incident Investigation<br />Interfaces ATS and CNS<br />Competency<br />Checks<br />Lessons Learnt<br />CNS Maintenance Procedures<br />Risk Assessment Airspace Changes<br />Refresher/<br />Advanced Training<br />Risk Assessment Software Changes<br />Emergency Procedures<br />ESARR 5<br />All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded <br />
    238. 238. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs<br />Risk Assessment New Systems<br />Recruitment/<br />Selection<br />Procedures Operational Processes<br />Incident Reporting<br />Safety Surveys and Follow-up<br />Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures<br />Training<br />Incident Investigation<br />Interfaces ATS and CNS<br />Competency<br />Checks<br />Lessons Learnt<br />CNS Maintenance Procedures<br />Risk Assessment Airspace Changes<br />Refresher/<br />Advanced Training<br />Risk Assessment Software Changes<br />Emergency Procedures<br />ESARR 4<br />All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded <br />
    239. 239. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs<br />Risk Assessment New Systems<br />Recruitment/<br />Selection<br />Procedures Operational Processes<br />Incident Reporting<br />Safety Surveys and Follow-up<br />Risk Assessment New ATC Procedures<br />Training<br />Incident Investigation<br />Interfaces ATS and CNS<br />Competency<br />Checks<br />Lessons Learnt<br />CNS Maintenance Procedures<br />Risk Assessment Airspace Changes<br />Refresher/<br />Advanced Training<br />Risk Assessment Software Changes<br />Emergency Procedures<br />ESARR 2<br />All elements of the SMS described in policies, well documented, communicated, updated, data recorded <br />
    240. 240. Pioneers on ATM Safety Regulation: ESARRs<br />ESARR 1<br />Safety Oversight by the National Supervisory Authority of the ANSP<br />
    241. 241. Transposition of ESARRs in European Community Law<br />
    242. 242. Community Legislation in 2010 and beyond (1)<br /><ul><li>SES II puts emphasis on Safety in 3 areas:</li></ul>As part of the new European Performance Framework (EC 691/2010)<br />The Network Management Function<br />The extended role of EASA<br />
    243. 243. Community Legislation in 2010 and beyond (2)<br /><ul><li>Safety as a Key Performance Indicator in the Implementing Rule on the Performance Framework (EC 691/2010):</li></ul>The effectiveness of safety management as measured by a “safety maturity” indicator<br />The application of a uniform measurement of the severity of incidents by means of the Risk Analysis Tool<br />Evidence that Just Culture is being applied <br />
    244. 244. 95 % of<br />IFR traffic<br />Safety Maturity in Air Traffic Management<br />
    245. 245. Future: Consolidation of Regulations<br />SMS - Airports<br />?<br />SMS - Military<br />?<br />?<br />SMS - ANSPs<br />?<br />?<br />SMS - Airlines<br />?<br />SMS - Suppliers<br />Aircraft<br />Avionics<br />Ground Equipm.<br />
    246. 246.
    247. 247. Fred Van der Meer CEO of HERMES Airports<br />Is there a need to regulate Airport Safety? <br />
    248. 248. AVIATION SAFETY CONFERENCENicosia, 27 – 28 April 2011 Is there a need to regulateAIRPORT SAFETY ?<br />Questions by Fred van der Meer<br />CEO of Hermes Airports Ltd<br />
    249. 249. Could you accept the following DEFINITIONS?<br />Regulate is to control and/or supervise an activity by means of rules and regulations<br />An airport is a location where aircraft take off and land<br />Safety is the perception of being safe from harm or danger <br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    250. 250. Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />Who is the AUDIENCE?<br />European Union<br />Politicians / Public<br />Government / Government Agencies<br />Airlines and Airline Organisations<br />Air traffic Control and ATC organisations<br />Airport Organisations<br />Airport Operators<br />
    251. 251. Is there a common UNDERSTANDING?<br />Airport activities / facilities<br />What safety / security are we talking about<br />Objective – preventive, harm mitigation, identification of liability<br />Type and level of regulations<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    252. 252. What do we HAVE and what are we <br />CURRENTLY DOING?<br />FAA<br />ICAO<br />EU directives<br />National laws and regulations<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    253. 253. Alternative QUESTIONS<br />Are we happy with what we have and what we<br />are doing? <br />IF NOT<br />Is there a need for more regulations<br />or for less regulations?<br />or do we need different regulations ?<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    254. 254. Before we START shouldn’t we AGREE on<br />Organisational level to issue regulations?<br />Activities and facilities to be regulated?<br />Risk appetite?<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    255. 255. Critical Question:<br />Are we as professionals able to be<br />innovative enough to improve on<br />what we have or should we get OUTSIDE help?<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    256. 256. .......perhaps .......<br />let’s think about it and remember that<br />the benefit to some must be larger than the cost to others<br />Need to Regulate Airport Safety?<br />
    257. 257.
    258. 258. Richard HillCEO  ETIHAD Airlines<br />The view of an airline / ETIHAD’s <br />Challenges to safety regulation<br />
    259. 259.
    260. 260. Implementing Safety Regulations<br /> the Operator’s perspective<br />Captain Richard Hill, Chief Operations Officer<br />
    261. 261. The starting point<br />Understanding and accepting the need for change: <br />Clearly communicated<br />Risk based<br />Demonstrable safety benefit<br />Realistic timescale<br />Applicable to all (level playing field)<br />
    262. 262. Harmonisation<br />ICAO SARPs<br />IATA IOSA<br />EASA EU OPS<br />LOCAL REGULATION<br />
    263. 263. Consultation<br />NPA, NPRM, RIA<br />Notice period<br />Opportunity to influence outcome<br />Commercial impact<br />Cost vs benefit<br />
    264. 264. Education<br />Risk assessment <br />Safety case<br />Additional Means of Compliance<br />Clearly written background material<br />Point of contact within the regulator with experience<br />
    265. 265. Implementation<br />Timescale<br />Interpretation<br />Consistency between regulators<br />Consistency between FOIs<br />
    266. 266. Etihad case study: <br />Implementing a Safety Management System<br />The challenges:<br />Time<br />Regulation<br />Guidance<br />Resources<br />Experience<br />Requirement for an EHSMS regulated by a different Authority <br />
    267. 267. Issues to resolve<br />Culture<br />Resources<br />Commitment of ALL levels of management and employees<br />Defining Safety Performance Indicators and Goals<br />
    268. 268. What worked for us?<br />Taskforce<br />
    269. 269. What worked for us?<br />Facilitators / Safety Business Partners<br />
    270. 270. What worked for us?<br />Training Concept:<br />1 day<br />Higher Management<br />3 days<br />Management and Key Staff<br />2 – 4 hours<br />Operational Staff<br />1 hour<br />All Staff (ESMS)<br />
    271. 271. What worked for us?<br />Enhanced Meeting Culture – Internal:<br />Safety Action Groups<br />Postholder Meeting<br />Safety & Quality Review Board<br />
    272. 272. What worked for us?<br />Enhanced Meeting Culture – External:<br /><ul><li>Meetings with Authorities
    273. 273. Progress
    274. 274. Plans / Intentions
    275. 275. Expectations
    276. 276. Concerns
    277. 277. Clarification</li></li></ul><li>Achievements<br />SMS Manual accepted by regulator without findings<br />SAGs as ‘Centers of Gravity’ for Safety Issues<br />Improved Safety Reporting: Increase in numbers and quality<br />Decrease in severity of occurrences across the board<br />Safety Promotion / Events<br />
    278. 278. The outcome<br />Successful SMS implementation<br />Improved safety communication<br />Greater safety awareness<br />Lower risk – greater efficiency<br />Continued safe flight operations<br />
    279. 279. Lessons learnt<br />Communication<br />Regulatory expertise<br />Regulators set the standard<br />Consultation <br />Consistency<br />
    280. 280. ευχαριστώ πολύ!<br />Thank you!<br />
    281. 281.
    282. 282. Nicolas LyrakidesFormer Executive Vice-President for Europe of IFATCA<br />Regulating  ATM Safety / The view of ATCOs<br />
    283. 283. FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION/ SOUTH EAST EUROPE- M. EAST – CYPRUSAVIATION SAFETY: REGULATING, IMPLEMENTING, TRAININGNicosia, 27-28 April 2011 <br />“Regulating ATM Safety/ <br />The view of ATCOs" <br />Nicolas Y. LYRAKIDES<br />-Supervisor Air Traffic Controller<br />-Transport & Communications Counsellor of Cyprus in EU<br />-IFATCA ex-EVP EUROPE, 2002-2006<br />190<br />
    284. 284. Aviation Safety Statements<br />Air transport is one of the safest modes of travel. It is also the fastest growing. <br />(4.1 accidents/million departures)<br />Safety -cannot be compromised and must be enhanced with increased traffic levels.<br />Aviation accidents rarely result from a single failure but rather from a combination of events.<br />Safety can never be taken for granted - constant effort is needed to maintain its high level in the changing operational and economic context of the global air transport industry.<br />The main purpose of ATM services is to ensure that airplanes depart, fly and land safely, at a reasonable cost.<br />
    285. 285. OVERVIEW<br />Introduction /Aviation Safety Statements<br />Global ATM Safety Regulation- Current situation/ IFATCA Policy<br />Safety Regulation Approaches<br />General View- Trends inAir Traffic Management <br />Major Aviation Stakeholders<br />European ATM Regulation/ATCOs perspective<br />Think Performance Regulation in ATM- Case Study: EUROPE<br />1st pillar- Regulating performance<br />SES Safety PIs- ATCOS views, suggestions<br />Safety Culture/Just Culture<br />Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011<br />4th pillar- Human factor <br />Concluding remarks<br />192<br />
    286. 286. Global ATM Safety Regulation- Current situation<br />3 basic layers of safety regulation:<br />1. International (Global) regulatory arrangements and <br />requirements, established and promulgated by ICAO<br /> (SARPS, Safety Management, USOAP)<br />2. Regional regulatory arrangements and requirements<br /> (EU, EASA, SES II)<br />3. National regulatory arrangements and requirements<br />(flexibility,inconsistency)<br />193<br />ICAO<br />ATCOS (IFATCA) believe that: safety standards must be<br />clearly defined at an international level (ICAO) and must<br />be adopted on a regional basis.<br />
    287. 287. Global ATM Safety Regulation-IFATCA POLICY <br />194<br />IFATCA supports the ultimate objective of achieving global harmonization in safety regulation.<br />IFATCA believes that sufficient resources should be directed towards establishing robust and independent safety regulation at national, regional and global levels to encompass ATM equipment, procedures and personnel.<br />
    288. 288. Safety Regulation Approaches<br />195<br />Objective<br />eg. ICAO requirements for Safety Management<br />Prescriptive<br />Technical systems (eg. data link)<br />Flexible solutions but inconsistency in implementation<br />
    289. 289. General View- Trends inAir Traffic Management <br />196<br />move from:<br />Government managed public service <br />Commercialized- privatized environment<br />ATCOS believe that :Safety is the absolute priority and that it takes precedence over<br />every aspect of the current and future ATM system.<br />
    290. 290. 197<br />MAJOR AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS<br />AERONAUTICS<br />INDUSTRY<br />REGULATORS/<br />AUTHORITIES<br />ICAO<br />EC/EASA<br />EUROCONTROL<br />AIRCRAFT<br />OPERATORS<br />ANSPs<br />MILITARY<br />AVIATION<br />STAKEHOLDERS<br />AIRPORTS<br />safety is the top priority for all aviation actors worldwide<br />STAFF<br />ATCOS<br />PILOTS<br />ELECTRONIC<br />OTHERS<br />+IFATCA<br />CIVIL AIRSPACE <br />USERS<br />PASSENGERS<br />MEDIA<br />EDUCATION <br />WORLD<br />ENVIRONMENTALISTS<br />
    291. 291. IFATCA is a major stakeholder in the ATM system and is committed to the inclusion of the controllers' viewpoint in all future developments of the ATM system. IFATCA also recognizes the importance of all parties working together to achieve the common objective of increasing capacity without compromising safety standards.<br />198<br />MAJOR AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS<br />
    292. 292. European ATM Regulation<br />ATM safety regulation has been developed considerably in the last 10 years.<br />EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements<br />(ESARRS) ………framework for ATM SAFETY<br />EC Single European Sky legislation<br />..aiming at harmonizing the arrangements across Europe and requiring the establishment of national safety regulatory bodies:<br /> National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs)<br />199<br />
    293. 293. Think Performance Regulation in ATM- Case Study: EUROPESES II- Single European Sky – 5 pillarsRegulation (EC) No 1070/2009 – Improvement of the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system <br />200<br />improving safety by a factor of 10<br />691/2010<br />
    294. 294. SES II- Single EuropeanSky-ATCOs’ perspective<br />The view of IFATCA and the ATCOS family, is that the extension of EASA competency to ANS and Airports will reinforce the regulation, oversight and monitoring of ANS safety, and has a central role in the proposed approach to safety performance under the performance scheme.<br />IFATCA has embraced the work EASA is carrying out and wishes to have robust and relevant rulemaking and regulation, which should be less influenced by political interest, but be more respectful of the EU rules and regulations for EASA .<br />ATCOS believe that the technology pillar, SESAR, will definitely give new advanced tools to ATCOs, that will provide the new generation of ATM technologies and procedures. The new SESAR operational concept aims at moving from today's airspace based trajectories to the time based operations ("4-D trajectories").<br />201<br />
    295. 295. Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 – Improvement of the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system <br />The Member States, acting in accordance with their national legislation, shall establish consultation mechanisms for appropriate involvement of stakeholders, including professional staff representative bodies, in the implementation of the single European sky.<br />Major principle: The human factor plays a key role in ensuring the change process<br />202<br />
    296. 296. 1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme <br />Main features:<br />Definition of Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- (safety, capacity, environment, cost-efficiency)<br />Definition of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)<br />Defn of pan-european targets associated with the KPIs<br />Requirement to produce national (or FAB) Performance Plans (PP) – NSAs obligation<br />Adoption of binding PP by MS and acceptance by EC<br />Introduction of reference periods (RPS) to assess and review results<br />Setting up of alert thresholds and <br />Sanctions if targets are not met<br />203<br />RP1:2012-14<br />RP2:2015-19<br />
    297. 297. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme <br />Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety<br />204<br />
    298. 298. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme <br />Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety<br />17 out of 29 states participating in the SES Regulation (27 EU MS plus Norway, Switzerland), have indicated that they will participate to the Safety KPA by setting some national targets. <br />The so-called E3 (Eurocontrol, European Union and EASA) have worked to publish some metrics for KPIs for Safety. The future IR will take the form of an amendment of Regulation 691/2010. <br />The ICAO State Safety Programme and SMS framework will be used to draft the proposal. <br />205<br />
    299. 299. …../…1st pillar- Regulating performance Scheme <br />……./…Key Performance Areas (KPAs)- Safety<br />The SMS will be complemented by Management Objectives of ICAO.<br />The EC distinguish between the Service Provision Level and the State Management Level. The State’s level assessment will be verified by EASA standardisation inspections. <br />Occurrence Severity Classification: Just Culture will be measured (including the lack of Just Culture).<br />Concept document will be presented in a stakeholder workshop for NSAs on 13 May and wider stakeholder workshop on 17 June. <br />Adoption in SSC 44 on 28 September 2011.<br />206<br />
    300. 300. SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views<br />IFATCA does understand the necessity for government to act as a control mechanism of commercialized ANSPs.<br />But are these PIs a true measurement of the ATM system from the ATCO's perspective? Arguably not. <br />Many factors beyond the control of any individual ATCO, or ATC Centre, that will influence the outcome of these measurements:<br />equipment capability, <br />capacity and serviceability, <br />military activity, <br />traffic priorities,<br /> resourcing, training, <br />airspace design, and <br />over-demand etc. <br />Different results if measured at a system level, national level, district level or unit / facility level. <br />ATCOs must be extremely careful where these results are broken down further to sector, console or individual ATCO level.<br />207<br />
    301. 301. …/..SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views<br />"quantitative" rather than "qualitative“ PIs <br />"Safety" PIs tend to measure:<br />rates of occurrences per distance flown or <br />numbers of flights per volume etc. <br />They measure "reported events" after the fact. <br />But : <br />do they measure "preventative" actions by the ATCO's? <br />Can they measure professionalism, caution and separation assurance? <br />Whilst the PIs may "infer" the success of these factors by low occurrence rates, <br />are these successes then reflected "negatively" in the "efficiency", "accessibility "and "cost effectiveness" PIs?<br />208<br />
    302. 302. SES Safety Performance Indicators – ATCOS’ views/ suggestions<br />IFATCA concludes that PIs should not be read as being totally indicative of ATC performance from an individual, sector or unit perspective. Indeed most of the PIs as currently used have little direct relevance to the operational ATCO.<br />So far, IFATCA is not aware of PIs that accurately measure<br />the operational performance of an ANSP, although such PIs<br />have been suggested for development.<br />Concerning safety issues, these could include: <br />number of occurrence reports received vs. investigated;<br />number of recommendations from investigations made/accepted/implemented; etc.<br />209<br />
    303. 303. SES Safety Performance Indicators – IFATCA policy<br />Global metrics for the performance of the ATM System be developed through ICAO processes as soon as possible.<br /> Controller expertise must be used:<br />in the establishment and settings of metrics that measure the performance of the ATM System <br /> in establishing and reviewing models used for determining performance of the ATM System to ensure that the models accurately reflect how the ATM system functions.<br /> in the interpretation of data used to assess the performance of the Air Traffic Management System to ensure that data is not misleading because it is incomplete or incorrectly applied.<br />Important that Member Association’s of IFATCA:<br />can understand the logic, the targets and the possible impact of these new features in their daily operational work. <br />should get involved in the consultation process with regard to the target setting process which is currently ongoing. <br />210<br />
    304. 304. The “Just culture” concept<br />One of the objectives of a “just culture” environment is to institutionalise the improved collaboration between aviation safety and judicial authorities. <br />The following description of “just culture” has been developed in Europe: <br />A culture in which front line operators or others (pilots, <br />air traffic controllers, electronic engineers, etc.) are not <br />punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by <br />them that are commensurate with their experience and <br />training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations <br />and destructive acts are not tolerated”<br />“Just Culture” is supported by ICAO (Safety Culture), EUROCONTROL, EU, STAFF ORGANISATIONS, etc.<br />DO NOT SHOOT THE MESSENGER<br />211<br />
    305. 305. Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor<br />VP S Kallas: “ATM needs to go beyond just the control of aircraft… the social dialogue is being modernized through the establishment by the Cion of a dedicated group of experts to bring the “human factor” to life!!!! …..Here is one idea to start off the reflection: is it possible that we think already of setting up some ad hoc arrangements to improve mobility of controllers?<br />P Griffiths-PRB: “Human factor pillar must address social dialogue, which is expressing discontent and a break down in service. Change management cannot be done at the expense of a vital section of the community. However, I will make this clear from the start, it does not mean paying these sections that hold the community to ransom more it means making sure that they are involved and buy into the change management programmes” <br />212<br />
    306. 306. Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor<br />Many view the voiced concerns of controllers as being <br />barriers to progress. This view point is unfounded as <br />controllers accept the fact that the advanced technologies <br />can bring benefits to the way that they control air traffic <br />and they are positive in change management programs, <br />as long as <br />these advances take place in a co-operative manner <br />in the form of consultation with the end users who have <br />the operational knowledge with which to turn these <br />capabilities of technology into a service.<br />213<br />
    307. 307. …../…Budapest Conference- 3-4 March 2011 Implementing SES- The Human Factor<br />P Goudou-EASA: “…Human Factor is a key element of the safety of the European system. We have to raise safety awareness and make sure that the European pilots and Controllers are properly and regularly trained to avoid any mistakes having a possible fatal outcome.<br />D McMillan- EUROCONTROL: Regulation should not be a system of restrictions….but rather it should be the heart of driving forward improvements-making them happen. It should be a help, not a hindrance. It needs to be fit for purpose.<br />214<br />ATCOS:<br />WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT<br />
    308. 308. 4th pillar SES II- Human factor <br />The Human factor plays a KEY ROLE in ensuring the change process in ATM<br />Human role<br />-Crucial<br />-Core<br />-Training<br />-Investment<br />Mobility<br /> -no force mobility<br /> -No social dumping<br />Just culture<br />Social dialogue and expert group<br />215<br />Need for all ACTORS to work together in a holistic approach, in order to achieve tangible, effective and realistic results for the benefit of Air Transport Industry around the world<br />
    309. 309. Concluding remarks<br />Human factor: to be integrated everywhere<br />Cooperation is the way forward<br />Keep the human in the core of the system<br />Social dialogue is the pivotal tool<br />SES implementation needs the staff support<br />Safety & just culture: <br /> work in progress<br />216<br />Cion revision of Dir. 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting- end 2011<br />Flash 1<br />
    310. 310. TRUE STATEMENTS ON ATCOS……few of many more!!!<br />217<br />-We hold more lives in our hands in one average shift than a medical doctor does in his whole career<br />-We can’t imagine doing any other work<br />-Everything we say is recorded <br />-We aren't allowed to make mistakes <br />-We are always in control <br />-We control everything in our environment <br />-Our spouses will never understand us or understand what we do <br />-We all have crash dreams, rather nightmares<br />-We will control traffic even in our sleep<br />-No, you can not imagine the stress we have when on the board<br />-We work in the middle of the night and on Christmas, on Easter and on weekends and on birthday anniversaries of our beloved ones<br />Despite all these, we take extreme pride in the quality of our work and we are all VERY PROUD of the profession we serve with loyalty and care for the utmost SAFETY!<br />
    311. 311. Thank you <br />for your attention!<br /> Nicolas Y. LYRAKIDES<br />-Supervisor Air Traffic Controller<br />-Transport & Communications Counsellor of Cyprus in EU<br />-IFATCA ex-EVP EUROPE, 2002-2006<br />nlyrakides@mfa.gov.cy<br />zxnlyr@cytanet.com.cy<br />218<br />
    312. 312.
    313. 313. Thursday, 28 April 2011<br />3rd Session<br />How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?<br />Chair: Erik Merckx, former Deputy Director <br />for Safety, EUROCONTROLSupport:SarantisPoulimenakos-ICAO Expert<br />
    314. 314. Vince GalottiDeputy Director Air Navigation Bureau of ICAO<br />The new ICAO Training Policy<br />
    315. 315. ICAO CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING POLICY AND PROGRAMMESVince Galotti Deputy Director Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO<br />Nicosia, 28 April 2011<br />
    316. 316. Outline<br />Current situation<br />ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy<br />ICAO Training Programmes<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />Endorsement Programme<br />223<br />
    317. 317. Current situation<br />224<br />
    318. 318. Current situation<br />States need assistance to identify where to go for training<br />Training plans not established<br />Tasks and functions not clearly identified and established<br />Training provided does not necessarily relate to the skills development<br />Abuse of ICAO logo and name<br />225<br />
    319. 319. Current situation<br />ICAO solution<br />ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy<br />ICAO Training Programmes<br />226<br />
    320. 320. ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy<br />Published to all States Electronic Bulletin:<br />EB 40/2010<br />Defines ICAO role in the provision of aviation safety training<br />Addresses both safety and security related training<br />Requires formal endorsement<br />TRAINRO/2<br />227<br />
    321. 321. ICAO Civil Aviation Training Policy<br />Scope:<br />applicable to all training provided by ICAO Bureaus, Regional Offices and training organizations issuing a certificate of completion or a certificate of achievement with an ICAO logo. <br />TRAINRO/2<br />228<br />
    322. 322. ICAO Training Programmes<br />ICAO role:<br />Establish a global quality training system ensuring that training prepared and provided are competency based and comply with ICAO provisions<br />ICAO is not looking to compete with training providers<br />It is recognized that some training can only be developed and conducted by ICAO (Ex: roll-out plans) <br />TRAINRO/2<br />229<br />
    323. 323. ICAO Training Programmes<br />3 main programmes:<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />Endorsement of training courses and programmes<br />Assistance to States and industry by developing specific safety-related courses<br />TRAINRO/2<br />230<br />
    324. 324. 231<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />Support NGAP initiatives<br />Requires a prior assessment of the training centre<br />Allow sharing of training materials between members<br />Require training materials to be developed with the same standard:<br />All Standards Training Packages (STPS) are competency-based<br />
    325. 325. 232<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />EB 45/2010<br />Redefine the programme:<br />Self-sustained<br />Categories of members<br />Revised assessment methodology<br />Revised requirements for members (development of STPs, fees, exchange of STPs)<br />
    326. 326. 233<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />
    327. 327. 234<br />TRAINAIR PLUS<br />With respect to training associated to the TRAINAIR PLUS Programme, ICAO launched a comprehensive training programme addressing the main posts:<br />Course Developers (the 1st course started on 25 April in Incheon, Republic of Korea, we have an other one in May in cooperation with JAA TO, and others later this year).<br />Instructors; and <br />Training Managers.<br />
    328. 328. Endorsement Programme<br />Procedures being finalized by ICAO;<br />ICAO will endorse at request of training organizations:<br />Courses developed by ICAO and conducted by training organizations;<br />Courses developed by training organizations.<br />Not exclusively for The TRAINAIR PLUSMembers or Associate<br />
    329. 329. ICAO Training courses<br />In order to assist States in areas not addressed by training institutions ICAO is also developing and conducting some limited training courses:<br />Dangerous Goods and use of Technical Instructions; <br />SMS and SSP;<br />USOAP audit courses for prospective auditors, subject mater experts, States employees (e-Learning);<br />Courses related to roll-out plans;<br />Seminar/workshops.<br />
    330. 330. Thank you<br />
    331. 331.
    332. 332. Mike HoldomCEO Olympic Air<br />Training needs of an Airline<br />
    333. 333. How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?<br />Captain Mike HoltomFRAeS Olympic Air<br />Flight Safety Foundation Conference April 2011<br />240<br />
    334. 334. 241<br />
    335. 335. 242<br />
    336. 336. 243<br />
    337. 337. 244<br />Code-shares<br />
    338. 338. 245<br />Domestic Network<br />Skiathos<br />●<br />● Ikaria<br />●Leros<br />Naxos<br />●<br />●<br />Paros<br />●Kalymnos<br />●Astypalea<br />Kithira ●<br />Kastelorizo >><br />● Karpathos<br />Kasos●<br />●Sitia<br />
    339. 339. 246<br />Start-up Challenges<br /><ul><li> Timeframe
    340. 340. Scale
    341. 341. Availability of crew
    342. 342. Diversity of destinations
    343. 343. Historical obstacles
    344. 344. Compliance</li></li></ul><li>247<br />Operational Challenges – Mt Eyjafjallajökull<br />15th April<br />
    345. 345. 248<br />Operational Challenges – Winter 2010<br />
    346. 346. 249<br />Operational Challenges<br />D0101/11 NOTAMR D0047/11 <br />Q) LGGG/QFWAS/IV/M /A /000/999/3657N02656E005 <br />A) LGKY B) 1103311425 C) 1104302359 <br />E) LGKY:ANEMOMETER RWY10 OUT OF SERVICE. <br />CREATED: 31 Mar 2011 14:26:00 SOURCE: LGGGYNYX<br />800 feet<br />
    347. 347. 250<br />Operational Challenges<br /><ul><li> R/W dimensions: 800 m x 25 m
    348. 348. 1.77° downhill slope</li></ul>D0084/11 NOTAMR D0083/11 Q) LGGG/QFMLT/IV/BO /A /000/999/3700N02507E005 <br />LGPA B) 1103251530 C) 1104252359 <br />E) ANEMOMETER RWY 17 OUT OF SERVICE. <br />CREATED: 24 Mar 2011 07:06:00 SOURCE: LGGGYNYX<br />
    349. 349. 251<br />Operational Challenges<br /><ul><li> 35 foot engine-out obstacle clearance is a reality
    350. 350. Relevant at 5 points climbing up the valley
    351. 351. Performance ignores downdrafts
    352. 352. Regulations allow LPC/OPC on the aircraft – but no engine cut.
    353. 353. Solution: a simulator is now used.
    354. 354. No-one is adequately trained to clear obstacles by 35 feet.
    355. 355. Solution: This runway is no longer used for take-off by OA.</li></li></ul><li>252<br />Operational Challenges<br />Consider left engine failure at V1<br />and a wind from the right.<br /><ul><li>Regulations allow LPC/OPC on the aircraft – but no engine cut.
    356. 356. Solution: a simulator is now used; captain-only take-off.</li></li></ul><li>253<br />Other Challenges – Merger on/off/maybe<br />
    357. 357. 254<br />Compensations <br /><ul><li>Helpful regulator
    358. 358. No pilot union
    359. 359. Breadth of management experience
    360. 360. Brand loyalty</li></li></ul><li><ul><li> Safety, Security & Quality Board met every week for 1st year
    361. 361. Risk Assessment of all Cat C airfields (mostly DHC-8-100 operations)
    362. 362. FDM for all a/c including those below 27,000 kg
    363. 363. FDM rigorously applied – feedback to training
    364. 364. IOSA 2 months after starting operations
    365. 365. LOSA commenced 6 months after starting operations
    366. 366. External CRMI training course
    367. 367. 2 standby a/c for increased dispatch reliability
    368. 368. FlyBe contract (4 a/c for 14 mths) plus ongoing contracted pilots
    369. 369. Accessible Accountable Manager
    370. 370. Full-time safety office presence
    371. 371. Sound Operating Philosophy
    372. 372. Hard-line risk assessments and investigations
    373. 373. Good prioritisation (resources appropriate to risk)
    374. 374. Kenyon International full service (Platinum) </li></ul>255<br />Proactive Measures<br />
    375. 375. 256<br />Proactive Measures – Rigorous FDM<br />Every monthly report requires responses from chief pilots and training post-holder:<br />What actions are being taken to reduce the rates further?<br />Responses are scrutinised by the Accountable Manager.<br />
    376. 376. 257<br />SMS Safety Training<br />9.2.1 An Operator-Organization shall, as part of its safety promotion activities, develop and maintain a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform the SMS duties.<br />9.2.2 The scope of the safety training shall be appropriate to the individual’s involvement in the SMS.<br />9.2.3 The Accountable Executive shall receive safety awareness training regarding:<br /> Safety policy and objectives;<br /> SMS roles and responsibilities;<br /> SMS standards; and<br /> Safety assurance.<br />
    377. 377. 258<br />Training Needs Analysis<br />For illustrative purposes only<br />
    378. 378. 259<br />Training Needs Analysis<br />For illustrative purposes only<br />
    379. 379. 260<br />Training Needs Analysis<br />For illustrative purposes only<br />
    380. 380. 261<br />Conclusions<br />It is unwise to assume that managers (in all aspects of aviation) have the required management and organisation skills to implement safety regulations.<br />The skill-set should be defined and a level of competency should be trained and checked periodically, in the same way that pilots have to demonstrate their skills.<br />Only the Accountable Manager and Post-holders have to be acceptable to the national CAA, and that is through a subjective assessment.<br />The more senior the position and the greater the power and influence, the more important the requirement for training and control.<br />
    381. 381. 262<br />How can training assist in implementing safety regulations?<br />In-house training is preferable (whether private enterprise, national, international) to keep it focused on relevant issues, e.g. assessments of actual risks.<br />Training and competency checks for management skills (again, whether private enterprise, national, international) , i.e. for organisational management skills as well as safety management.<br />Gradual evolution from the top down, that embraces appropriate industry expertise, rather than quick-fix or commercially-driven approaches.<br />262<br />
    382. 382. Training Needs of an Airline<br />Thank you<br />Captain Mike HoltomFRAeS<br />Olympic Air<br />263<br />
    383. 383.
    384. 384. J. Jonker Director of the JAA Training Organisation<br />How JAA TO  is supporting safety initiatives<br />
    385. 385.
    386. 386.
    387. 387.
    388. 388.
    389. 389.
    390. 390.
    391. 391.
    392. 392.
    393. 393.
    394. 394.
    395. 395.
    396. 396.
    397. 397.
    398. 398.
    399. 399.
    400. 400.
    401. 401.
    402. 402.
    403. 403. Robin PurseyAirbus <br />Evidence Based Training<br />
    404. 404. Evidence Based Training<br />FSF Nicosia April 2011<br />Flight Safety Foundation April 2011<br />Presented by<br />Name Captain Robin Pursey<br />JobTitle Chief Pilot Airbus Corporate Jets <br />
    405. 405. DC 3<br />
    406. 406. Caravelle<br />
    407. 407. Lineage 1000<br />
    408. 408. Boeing 737<br />
    409. 409. Airbus A 319 CJ<br />
    410. 410. What do these aircraft have in common?<br />Only the pilot training program<br />Are we really training pilots to fly modern aircraft? <br />
    411. 411. Training by regulation<br /><ul><li>By regulation, flight crew training and checking is based on events, which may be highly improbable in modern aeroplanes.
    412. 412. Training programmes are consequently saturated with items that may not necessarily mitigate the real risks or enhance safety in modern air transport operations.</li></li></ul><li>Training by regulation<br /><ul><li>By regulation, flight crew training and checking is based on events, which may be highly improbable in modern aeroplanes.
    413. 413. Training programmes are consequently saturated with items that may not necessarily mitigate the real risks or enhance safety in modern air transport operations.
    414. 414. Is it more appropriate to train effective and efficient use of modern avionics in place of handling exercises which may be benign on some modern aircraft types?</li></li></ul><li>Training by regulation<br /><ul><li>Engine
    415. 415. Pressurisation
    416. 416. Pitot-static
    417. 417. Fuel
    418. 418. Electrical
    419. 419. Hydrualic
    420. 420. Flight controls
    421. 421. Anti ice
    422. 422. Autopilot/flight director
    423. 423. Stall warning system
    424. 424. GPWS
    425. 425. Radio navigation</li></li></ul><li>Page 295<br />Hull Loss rate – 4Q 2010<br />4th generation:<br />1st generation:<br />2nd generation:<br />3rd generation:<br />Early jet<br />2nd jet generation<br />Glass-cockpit<br />Nav display<br />FMS<br />FBW<br />Flight Envelope<br />Protection<br />Hull Loss<br />per million departures<br />1st generation<br />All aircraft<br />2nd generation<br />4th generation<br />3rd generation<br />Years Of Operation <br />Sources: Ascend, Airbus<br />
    426. 426. 26/09/08<br />EASA Briefing - Training For Safety<br />296<br />Relative Importance of contributing factors in fatal accidents(Source: Civil Aviation Safety Data, 1989-2003)<br />
    427. 427. 2008 ITQI Training and Qualification Initiative<br />Use menu "View - Header & Footer" for Presentation title - Siglum - Reference <br />Page 297<br /><ul><li>Safety initiative to enhance andharmonize airline training standards.
    428. 428. Developed by industry stakeholdersunder the umbrella of IATA.
    429. 429. Three main elements:
    430. 430. Pilot Selection
    431. 431. Evidence Based Training
    432. 432. Simulator Standards</li></li></ul><li>23/09/10<br />298<br />ITQI – IATA Training and Qualification Initiative<br />The Working Group<br />
    433. 433. Collection of evidence<br />DATA<br />Data Sources:<br /><ul><li>LOSA(Line Operation Safety Audit)- provide direction and focus for the entire study.</li></ul>(University of Texas program)<br /><ul><li>AQP (Advanced Qualification Program) ATQP
    434. 434. CAST(Commercial Aviation Safety Team)– US cooperative government-industry initiative</li></ul> <br /><ul><li>FDM (Flight Data Monitoring) (FOQA, FDA, FODA etc.)
    435. 435. STEADES (Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis & Data Exchange System) - IATA accident survey data base</li></li></ul><li>Example:<br />The <br />Go-Around<br />Paradox<br />300<br />EBT<br />
    436. 436. LOSA: Line Operation Safety Audit<br />4% of all approaches were unstable<br />97% of unstable approaches are continued to landing<br />10% result in abnormal landings<br />Only 3% of unstable approaches lead to a Go-Around<br />When a GA occurs – it is almost always poorly performed<br />Usually a surprise to the crew<br />Very rarely occurs at (the briefed) missed approach height.<br />ITQI<br />slide301<br />
    437. 437. Flight data study:<br />Over 1 million flights analyzed<br />3.5% of approaches are unstable (35,000)<br />Only 1.4% of them lead to a Go-Around (490)<br />ITQI<br /> slide 302<br /><ul><li>Looked for Landings with High Risk events
    438. 438. Unstable 8.0% (80,000)
    439. 439. Stable 6.2% (62,000)
    440. 440. This was not the expected result</li></li></ul><li>Sample size > 300 go-arounds<br />EBT<br />303<br />Industry study on Go-Arounds<br />
    441. 441. AQP data:<br />An AQP data study shows that almost twice as many pilot failed to reach the company standard in missed approach maneuver as opposed to the V1 cut. <br />ITQI<br /> slide 304<br />
    442. 442. Example II:<br />Flight Deck<br />Automation<br />305<br />EBT<br />
    443. 443. Automation<br />Automation – probably the most important change in the cockpit in the last 30 years.<br />Improvement<br />E.g. Recent study by a large airline showed better performance when using automation for maneuvers such as go-around’s, single-engine flight and NPAs<br />ITQI<br />slide306<br />
    444. 444. Automation challenges<br />LOSA<br />28% of flights have an Automation error<br />Little to no dialogue between the pilots during most of the errors  Monitoring/Cross-Checking<br />There are often misunderstandings of autopilot modes.<br />Automation skills erode faster than manual handling skills<br />Flight Crews are becoming more reluctant to revert to manual flying when automation is inappropriate or fails [IATA Accident study, 2009]<br />ITQI<br />slide307<br />
    445. 445. 26/09/08<br />EASA Briefing - Training For Safety<br />308<br />Conclusions<br />Risk of doing nothing<br />Complacency with reliable technology<br />Devalued and ineffective training programmes<br />No impact on Accident rates<br />Benefits of Evidence Based Training<br />Evidence based programmes adapted by fleet and operation<br />Greater focus on normal operations<br />Greater emphasis on human performance<br />Encourage “out of the box” thinking with developed methodologies to manage risk<br />
    446. 446. Conclusions<br />This type of analytical approach will allow non technical skills to be trained in a more appropriate environment, not necessarily the Level D FFS.<br />
    447. 447. 310<br />Gaining the Evidence – Intuitive Risk Analysis<br />
    448. 448. Conclusions<br />Contacts<br />Captain Michael Varney Project Leader - Evidence Based TrainingIATA Training and Qualification Initiative<br />mvarneyebt@gmail.com<br />Phil Barriball from FSI represents business aircraft operators in Europe<br />Phil.Barriball@FlightSafety.com<br />Intuitive Risk Analysis<br />Captain Christian Norden<br />christian.norden@airbus.com<br />
    449. 449. Thank you<br />Questions<br />
    450. 450.
    451. 451. Training in the field of Air Navigation Services<br />A. Skoniezki Head of EUROCONTROL Institute of Air Navigation Services<br />
    452. 452. EUROCONTROLTraining in the field of Air Navigation ServicesSafety Conference 27 – 28 April 2011Nicosia, Cyprus<br />Alexander Skoniezki <br />Head of Institute of Air Navigation Services & Training Division, EUROCONTROL Directorate Network Management <br />
    453. 453. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />316<br />How can training assist in implementing safety regulations in European ATM?<br />Presentation items<br />Institute’s Mission<br />Safety Management Training<br />Safety Regulatory Training<br />Future Safety Training<br />Summary<br />
    454. 454. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />317<br />Institute Mission<br />To provide education, transfer of knowledge, awareness and communication to ATS Organisations and ATM Regulators in Member States of EUROCONTROL based on expressed stakeholder needs. <br />To support the implementation of the Single European Sky, SESAR and ATM Regulation as required.<br />To work in partnership with stakeholders to improve ATM Training in Europe.<br />The Institute is an integral part of the Agency’s Directorate Network Management (DNM) as its Training Division and a recognised Centre of Excellence for the development, delivery and improvement of ATM Training expertise in Europe.<br />
    455. 455. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />318<br />DNM Training Division at IANS in Luxemburg <br />is an important element <br />to keep Pan-European ATM Network operations<br />safe, efficient and highly competent<br />For ANSPs and FABs<br />ensure knowledge and competence <br />to meet <br />ATM performance targets <br />through common training products<br />For Regulators and States<br />ensure knowledge and competence <br />to regulate and oversee<br /> ATM through common training products<br />
    456. 456. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />319<br />ATM TrainingWork Programme 2011<br />Network Operations Training Programme<br />Flight Efficiency Training Programme<br />CNS and ATC Deployment Coordination Training support<br />Safety Management Training Programme<br />Regulatory Training Programme<br />
    457. 457. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />320<br />Safety Management Training Portfolio<br />Awareness courses<br />E-Learning - Introduction to Safety Management Systems<br /> Describes the principles of Safety Management<br />Safety Management System in ATM<br /> Practical implementation of an SMS to improve awareness of safety roles and responsibilities<br />Safety Assessment Methodology<br /> Principal stages undertaken during a system safety assessment and the connection with a SMS <br />Average duration of each course: 4.5 days. <br />
    458. 458. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />321<br />Safety Management Training Portfolio<br />Specialist Courses<br /> Human Factors for Safety Actors<br /> Fundamentals of HF - designed for a wide audience <br />ATM Occurrence Investigation<br /> Gathering of facts, analysis, conclusions and recommendations<br />Investigation Tools<br /> TOKAI - Tool kit to support the complete investigation process <br /> Safety Survey<br /> The role of surveys: survey model, process, methods and techniques<br /> Safety Assessment for Practitioners<br /> Practical exercises to understand how to demonstrate the safety of changes and services complemented by a Software Safety and Safety Case Course.<br />Average duration of each course: 4.5 days.<br />
    459. 459. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />322<br />SMS E-LEARNING<br />Intro-Module<br />Safety Assessment<br />(Level 1) <br />SMS<br />Human<br />Factors<br />Survey<br />Safety Assessment<br />(Level 2)<br />AOI<br />Tools<br />Safety<br />Case<br />Software<br />Safety Management Training 2011<br />Awareness Courses<br />Specialist Courses<br />
    460. 460. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />323<br />Course Delivery Format<br />COACHING<br />ON-SITE<br />CLASSROOM / REGIONAL<br />Tailor-made Courses<br />On-Request Courses<br />Public Courses<br />
    461. 461. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />324<br />Safety Management Training - Statistics<br />Safety Management Training delivered by the Institute since 1998 <br />Safety Management Training portfolio responds to user needs expressed by EUROCONTROL Safety Team complementary to the Safety Programmes (ESP and ESP+) and in support to safety regulatory requirements for ANSPs.<br />Currently about 45 Safety Management courses delivered per year<br />More than 700 requests for safety management course participation per year<br />Safety Training currently represents about 35% of the entire Institute training portfolio <br />
    462. 462. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />325<br />Safety Regulatory Training - NSA Training Initiative<br />Directed to the National Supervisory Authorities / Competent Authorities<br />In support to Safety Regulation (SRC, EASA)<br />Specialist training package to support the Member states’ requirement to “ensure specific training for those involved in safety oversight activities within their structure”(Article 11b Commission Regulation (EC) 1315/2007).<br />
    463. 463. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />326<br />NSA Training Initiative<br />Core NSA Tasks (mandatory)<br />Introduction to Single European Sky<br />The Role of the NSA<br />Audit Techniques And Practice<br />Specialist Function Courses (mandatory 3 out of 4 modules)<br />Oversight of Occurrence Reporting and Investigation Arrangements<br />Oversight of Safety Management Arrangements<br />Oversight of Competence Arrangements for ATM Staff<br />Oversight of Safety-related Changes to ATM Systems<br />Time to complete 6 modules with work commitments – approx 2.5 years<br />
    464. 464. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />327<br />NSA Training Initiative<br />Introduction to<br /> Single European Sky<br /><ul><li>2.5 year program
    465. 465. Modular courses
    466. 466. Examined
    467. 467. Endorsed by the Safety Regulation Commission
    468. 468. In support of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1315/2007</li></ul>Role of the NSA<br />NSA Audit Techniques<br />And Practice<br />NSA Oversight ofOccurrence Reporting andInvestigation Arrangements<br />NSA Oversight ofCompetence Arrangementsfor ATM Staff<br />NSA Oversight ofSafety ManagementArrangements<br />NSA Oversight ofSafety-related Changesto an ATM System<br />Average duration of each course module: 4.5 days<br />
    469. 469. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />328<br />NSA Training Initiative - Statistics<br />NSA Training Initiative launched in January 2009<br />Currently more than 500 requests for NSA course participation per year…<br />... of which 150+ participants enrolled for the complete NSA TI 6 course module programme<br />So far 11 participants graduated (certificate of achievement received)- this number will now increase rapidly<br />
    470. 470. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />329<br />Future Safety Training Courses (2012+)<br />Safety Management<br />Investigation Techniques and Tools (EC Regulation 996/2010)<br />Just Culture (new)<br />Safety Performance Indicators (new)<br />Safety Regulation<br />Interoperability (EC Regulation 552/2004) (new)<br />Safety Performance Monitoring (new)<br />
    471. 471. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />330<br />Summary<br />About 35% of the Institute’s Training activities focus on ATM Safety (SMS and Safety Regulation) <br />Ca. 1100+ participants apply for safety training courses per year<br />Training audience: ANSP staff and Regulators (NSAs) <br />Institute sets Training standards for safety related tasks in ATM:<br />Common Core Content Training exists for ATCOs and ATSEPs<br />Common Core Content Training for Regulatory Oversight (NEW?)<br />
    472. 472. Safety Conference Nicosia , 27-28 April 2011<br />331<br />More Information on Safety Training at the Institute<br />EUROCONTROL Website:<br />http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/training-institute-ians<br />Or at:<br />Course Reservation Office<br />EUROCONTROL Institute of Air Navigation Services<br />12, rue Antoine de Saint-Exupery<br />L-1432 Luxembourg<br />LUXEMBOURG<br />ians.reservation@eurocontrol.int<br />Tel. +352<br />