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Atom Bombs Were They Justified?

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Atom Bombs Were They Justified?

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Atom Bombs Were They Justified?

  1. 1. Atomic Bombs – Were they Morally & Militarily Justified to end WW2 ? By Dr. Peter Hammond
  2. 2. On 6 August 1945, an American B-29 bomber dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. In a split second, 100,000 people lost their lives...
  3. 3. A man looks over the expanse of ruins left by the explosion of the atomic bomb on in Hiroshima,
  4. 4. Survivors of the first atomic bomb. Awaiting emergency medical treatment, on August 6, 1945. Hiroshima, Japan
  5. 5. Atomic_cloud_over_Nagasaki _from_Koyagi-jima
  6. 6. A View of ground zero in Hiroshima in the autumn of 1945, showing total destruction resulting from dropping of the first atomic bomb.
  7. 7. Shiroyama National School in Nagasaki
  8. 8. Twisted iron girders are all that remain of this theatre building located about 800 meters from ground zero
  9. 9. Ruins of an Orthodox Cathedral in Nagasaki
  10. 10. Nagarekawa Methodist Church of Christ lies completely shattered on Hiroshima plain after atomic attack
  11. 11. The largest church on Kyushu Island, Urakami Cathedral, completed in 1925 after 30 years of work
  12. 12. Urakami Cathedral before bombing.
  13. 13. Remains of the Urakami Cathedral in Nagasaki, Japan, late 1945,
  14. 14. Remains of the Urakami Catholic cathedral in Nagasaki, Japan, late 1945,
  15. 15. Remains of the Urakami Cathedral in Nagasaki, Japan, late 1945,
  16. 16. Urakami Cathedral in ruins.
  17. 17. Urakami Cathedral, 7 January 1946
  18. 18. View of the surrender ceremonies, looking forward from USS Missouri's superstructure
  19. 19. Did the Atom Bombs Actually Save Lives?
  20. 20. I was taught that the U.S. dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima And Nagasaki in order to end WWII and save both American and Japanese lives.
  21. 21. But most of the top American military officials at the time said otherwise.
  22. 22. Atomic Weapons Were Not Needed to End the War or to Save Lives
  23. 23. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group, assigned by President Truman to study the air attacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that concluded (52-56):
  24. 24. Paul Nitze - Vice Chairman US Stategic Bombing Survey reported:
  25. 25. “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved,
  26. 26. it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945,
  27. 27. Japan would have surrendered - even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”
  28. 28. Atomic Weapons Were Not Needed to End the War or to Save Lives
  29. 29. General (and later president) Dwight Eisenhower – then Supreme Commander of all Allied Forces, and the officer who created most of America’s WWII military plans for Europe and Japan – said:
  30. 30. “The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”
  31. 31. “In [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. Newsweek, 11/11/63, on Ike Eisenhower also noted (pg. 380):
  32. 32. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …
  33. 33. the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
  34. 34. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings,
  35. 35. first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary,
  36. 36. and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.
  37. 37. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude….”
  38. 38. Unnecessary and Unethical
  39. 39. Admiral William Leahy – the highest ranking member of the U.S. military from 1942 until retiring in 1949, was the first de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and who was at the center of all major American military decisions in World War II – wrote:
  40. 40. “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.
  41. 41. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.
  42. 42. The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that, in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.
  43. 43. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children”.
  44. 44. No Military Justification
  45. 45. General Douglas MacArthur maintained that there was No Military Justification for the Atom Bombs:
  46. 46. MacArthur’s views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed ….
  47. 47. When asked about the decision to drop the bomb, General MacArthur reported that he had not even been consulted.
  48. 48. MacArthur confirmed that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb.
  49. 49. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.
  50. 50. The Potsdam Threat
  51. 51. Opening of the Potsdam Conference.
  52. 52. When the Potsdam Declaration in July, demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally or face ‘prompt and utter destruction,’ MacArthur was appalled.
  53. 53. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless the emperor ordered it.
  54. 54. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign.
  55. 55. 1945_Japanese_Listen_to_Hirohito_Radio_Message
  56. 56. Japanese Prisoners of War at Guam, stand with bowed heads after hearing the announcement of Emperor Hirohito, that Japan would unconditionally surrender.
  57. 57. Had the General’s advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been unnecessary.
  58. 58. Missed Opportunity
  59. 59. Assistant Secretary of War John McLoy noted: “I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945],
  60. 60. we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted.
  61. 61. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favourable consideration.
  62. 62. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented.
  63. 63. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs.”
  64. 64. The War was Already Won
  65. 65. “I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Swiss. Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bird said:
  66. 66. In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb.
  67. 67. Thus, it wouldn’t have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear capability and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb”.
  68. 68. War Was Really Won Before We Used A-Bomb, U.S. News and World Report, 8/15/60, pg. 73-75. He also noted
  69. 69. It definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn’t get any imports and they couldn’t export anything.
  70. 70. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favour it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace,
  71. 71. which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in”.
  72. 72. It Had Nothing to do with Ending the War
  73. 73. General Curtis LeMay, the tough cigar-smoking Army Air Force “Hawk,” stated publicly shortly before the nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan:
  74. 74. “The war would have been over in two weeks. . . . The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”
  75. 75. Downtown Tokyo after the US incendiary raids
  76. 76. No Invasion Was Necessary
  77. 77. The Vice Chairman of the U.S. Bombing Survey Paul Nitze wrote (pg. 36-37, 44-45):
  78. 78. [I] concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945.
  79. 79. Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary.”
  80. 80. Opening Up Asia For Communism
  81. 81. Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias wrote:
  82. 82. “Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
  83. 83. On 6 August 1945, an American B-29 bomber dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. In a split second, 100,000 people ceased to exist ...
  84. 84. “I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds”.
  85. 85. Ellis Zacharias, How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender, Look, 6/6/50, pg. 19-21.
  86. 86. Immoral and Unnecessary
  87. 87. Brigadier General Carter Clarke – the military intelligence officer in charge of preparing summaries of intercepted Japanese cables for President Truman and his advisors – said (pg. 359):
  88. 88. “When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.
  89. 89. The commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated that the naval blockade and prior bombing of Japan in March of 1945, had rendered the Japanese helpless and that the use of the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and immoral.
  90. 90. A Double Crime
  91. 91. Also, the opinion of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was reported to have said in a press conference on September 22, 1945, that
  92. 92. “The Admiral took the opportunity of adding his voice to those insisting that Japan had been defeated before the atomic bombing and Russia’s entry into the war.”
  93. 93. In a subsequent speech at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945, Admiral Nimitz stated
  94. 94. “The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war.”
  95. 95. Why Were Bombs Dropped on Populated Cities Without Military Value?
  96. 96. Eisenhower’s assessment was “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing . . . to use the atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize civilians, without even attempting [negotiations], was a double crime.”
  97. 97. “ the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”
  98. 98. Revulsion
  99. 99. Even military officers who favored use of nuclear weapons mainly favored using them on unpopulated areas or Japanese military targets … not cities.
  100. 100. Demonstration Proposed
  101. 101. For example, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss proposed to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that a non-lethal demonstration of atomic weapons would be enough to convince the Japanese to surrender … and the Navy Secretary agreed (pg. 145, 325):
  102. 102. I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used.
  103. 103. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate…
  104. 104. My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese observers and where its effects would be dramatic.
  105. 105. I remember suggesting that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo.
  106. 106. The cryptomeria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood… I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest…
  107. 107. would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center.
  108. 108. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will… Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation…
  109. 109. It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world…
  110. 110. Warning Should Have Been Given First
  111. 111. General George Marshall agreed:
  112. 112. Contemporary documents show that Marshall felt “these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation…
  113. 113. Targeting Civilians
  114. 114. Historians Agree that the Bomb Wasn’t Needed
  115. 115. Historians agree that nuclear weapons did not need to be used to stop the war or save lives.
  116. 116. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission historian J. Samuel Walker has studied the history of research on the decision to use nuclear weapons on Japan. As historian Doug Long notes:
  117. 117. In his conclusion he writes, “The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time.
  118. 118. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisors knew it.” (J. Samuel Walker, The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update, Diplomatic History, Winter 1990, pg. 110).
  119. 119. Politicians Agreed that Atomic Bombs Were Not Needed
  120. 120. Many high-level politicians agreed. For example, ex-US President Herbert Hoover said:
  121. 121. The Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945… up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; …if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs.
  122. 122. Douglas MacArthur and Hoover in Tokyo, Japan, May 7 1946
  123. 123. The Japanese Wanted to End the War
  124. 124. War flag of the Imperial Japanese Army.
  125. 125. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew noted (pg. 29-32):
  126. 126. In the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945,
  127. 127. the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clear-cut decision.
  128. 128. If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer.
  129. 129. Why Then Were Atom Bombs Dropped on Japan?
  130. 130. If dropping nuclear bombs was unnecessary to end the war or to save lives, why was the decision to drop them made? Especially over the objections of so many top military and political figures?
  131. 131. Scientists Like to Test Their Toys
  132. 132. One theory is that scientists like to play with their toys:
  133. 133. Fat Man preparations on Tinian, Los Alamos National Laboratory. Preparing the final weapon, sealing the ballistic case joints with red Pliobond and blue Glyptol
  134. 134. On September 9, 1945, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet,
  135. 135. was publicly quoted extensively as stating that the atomic bomb was used because the scientists had a “toy and they wanted to try it out ….”
  136. 136. He further stated, “The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment . . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it.”
  137. 137. Even Scientists Opposed Using the Atom Bomb
  138. 138. However, most of the Manhattan Project scientists who developed the atom bomb were opposed to using it on Japan.
  139. 139. June_26__1945_memo_ demonstrating_worry_among_ Manhattan_Project_scientists_ about_what_they_have_ created
  140. 140. Albert Einstein – an important catalyst for the development of the atom bomb (but not directly connected with the Manhattan Project) – said differently:
  141. 141. Precipitating An Atomic Arms Race
  142. 142. “A great majority of scientists were opposed to the sudden employment of the atom bomb.”
  143. 143. In Einstein’s judgment, the dropping of the bomb was a political – diplomatic decision rather than a military or scientific decision.
  144. 144. Indeed, some of the Manhattan Project scientists wrote directly to the secretary of defence in 1945 to try to dissuade him from dropping the bomb:
  145. 145. We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable.
  146. 146. If the United States would be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world,
  147. 147. precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.
  148. 148. Political and Social Problems, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 76, National Archives (also contained in: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 323-333).
  149. 149. The scientists questioned the ability of destroying Japanese cities with atomic bombs to bring surrender when destroying Japanese cities with conventional bombs had not done so, and –
  150. 150. like some of the military officers quoted above – recommended a demonstration of the atomic bomb for Japan in an unpopulated area.
  151. 151. Launching The Cold War
  152. 152. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill (before being replaced by Clement Attlee) ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima.
  153. 153. The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was meant to kick-start the Cold War rather than end the Second World War, according to two nuclear historians who say they have new evidence backing the controversial theory. New Scientist reported in 2005:
  154. 154. Causing a fission reaction in several kilograms of uranium and plutonium and killing over 200,000 people 60 years ago was done more to impress the Soviet Union than to cow Japan, they say.
  155. 155. And the US President who took the decision, Harry Truman, was culpable, they add.
  156. 156. “He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species,” says Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington DC, US. “It was not just a war crime; it was a crime against humanity.”
  157. 157. [The conventional explanation of using the bombs to end the war and save lives] is disputed by Kuznick and Mark Selden, a historian from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, US.
  158. 158. Japan Was Searching For Peace
  159. 159. According to an account by Walter Brown, assistant to then- US secretary of state James Byrnes, Truman agreed at a meeting three days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima that Japan was “looking for peace ”.
  160. 160. Truman was told by his army generals, Douglas Macarthur and Dwight Eisenhower, and his naval chief of staff, William Leahy, that there was no military need to use the bomb.
  161. 161. “Impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan,” says Selden.
  162. 162. The US secretary of war, Henry Stimson, told President Truman he was “fearful” that the US air force would have Japan so “bombed out” that the new weapon would not be able “to show its strength”. John Pilger points out:
  163. 163. He later admitted that “no effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb”.
  164. 164. General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project that made the bomb, testified: “There was never any illusion on my part that Russia was our enemy, and that the project was conducted on that basis.”
  165. 165. The day after Hiroshima was obliterated, President Truman voiced his satisfaction with the “overwhelming success” of “the experiment”.
  166. 166. Conservatives Opposed the Atom Bomb As Immoral
  167. 167. Though most Americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against Japan in 1945. We’ll give the last word to University of Maryland professor of political economy – and former Legislative Director in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and Special Assistant in the Department of State – Gar Alperovitz:
  168. 168. Moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top American military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: Army, Navy and Army Air Force.
  169. 169. Nor was this the judgment of “liberals,” as is sometimes thought today.
  170. 170. In fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than American liberals in the years following World War II.
  171. 171. Serving the Cause of Communism in Asia
  172. 172. Instead [of allowing other options to end the war, such as letting the Soviets attack Japan with ground forces],
  173. 173. the United States rushed to use two atomic bombs at almost exactly the time that an August 8 Soviet attack had originally been scheduled: Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The timing itself has obviously raised questions among many historians.
  174. 174. The available evidence, though not conclusive, strongly suggests that the atomic bombs may well have been used in part because American leaders “preferred” —as Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it —to end the war with the bombs rather than the Soviet attack.
  175. 175. Impressing the Soviets during the early diplomatic sparring that ultimately became the Cold War also appears likely to have been a significant factor.
  176. 176. Unnecessary
  177. 177. The most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top World War II American military leaders.
  178. 178. The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that … most Americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue:
  179. 179. Not only did most top U.S. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of Japanese cities and what were essentially noncombat populations.
  180. 180. Moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly.
  181. 181. A Political Decision
  182. 182. Shortly before his death General George C. Marshall quietly defended the decision, but for the most part he is on record as repeatedly saying that it was not a military decision, but rather a political one.
  183. 183. Official Protest
  184. 184. On 11 August 1945, the Japanese government filed an official protest over the atomic bombing to the U.S. State Department through the Swiss Legation in Tokyo, observing:
  185. 185. “Combatant and non-combatant men and women, old and young, are massacred without discrimination by the atmospheric pressure of the explosion, as well as by the radiating heat which result therefrom.
  186. 186. Consequently there is involved a bomb having the most cruel effects humanity has ever known …
  187. 187. The bombs in question, used by the Americans, by their cruelty and by their terrorizing effects, surpass by far gas or any other arm, the use of which is prohibited.
  188. 188. Japanese protests against U.S. desecration of international principles of war paired the use of the atomic bomb with the earlier firebombing, which massacred old people, women and children,
  189. 189. destroying and burning down Shinto and Buddhist temples, schools, hospitals, living quarters, etc...
  190. 190. They now use this new bomb, having an uncontrollable and cruel effect much greater than any other arms or projectiles ever used to date.
  191. 191. This constitutes a new crime against humanity and civilization.”
  192. 192. Survivors of the first atomic bomb. Awaiting emergency medical treatment, on August 6, 1945. Hiroshima, Japan
  193. 193. Judicial Review
  194. 194. In 1963, the bombings were the subject of a judicial review.
  195. 195. The District Court of Tokyo found, "the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate suffering that they did violate the most basic legal principles governing the conduct of war."
  196. 196. The Hague Conventions
  197. 197. In the opinion of the court, the act of dropping an atomic bomb on cities was at the time governed by international law found in the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923 and was therefore illegal.
  198. 198. War Crime
  199. 199. In the documentary The Fog of War, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recalls General Curtis LeMay, who relayed the Presidential order to drop nuclear bombs on Japan, said:
  200. 200. "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." And I think he's right. He, and I'd say I, were behaving as war criminals.
  201. 201. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?
  202. 202. Detail from a U.S. Air Force map of Hiroshima, pre-bombing, circles drawn at 1,000 foot intervals radiating out from ground zero, the site directly under the explosion
  203. 203. Indiscriminate Mass Murder
  204. 204. Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima
  205. 205. Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima, said in a hearing to The Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ):
  206. 206. "It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves effects on survivors for decades, is a violation of international law".
  207. 207. Iccho Itoh, the mayor of Nagasaki, declared in the same hearing:
  208. 208. “It is said that the descendants of the atomic bomb survivors will have to be monitored for several generations to clarify the genetic impact, which means that the descendants will live in anxiety for [decades] to come...
  209. 209. with their colossal power and capacity for slaughter and destruction, nuclear weapons make no distinction between combatants and non- combatants or between military installations and civilian communities...
  210. 210. The use of nuclear weapons... therefore is a manifest infraction of international law.”
  211. 211. Genocide
  212. 212. damage in Hiroshima in March of 1946
  213. 213. University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings states there is a consensus among historians "the Nagasaki bomb was gratuitous at best and genocidal at worst."
  214. 214. Democide
  215. 215. Professor R. J. Rummel’s definition of democide includes not only genocide, but also an excessive killing of civilians in war, to the extent this is against the agreed rules for warfare;
  216. 216. he argues the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were war crimes, and thus democide.
  217. 217. Rummel quotes among others an official protest from the US government in 1938 to Japan, for its bombing of Chinese cities:
  218. 218. "The bombing of non-combatant populations violated international and humanitarian laws."
  219. 219. He also considers excess deaths of civilians in conflagrations caused by conventional means, such as in Tokyo, as acts of democide.
  220. 220. Terrorism
  221. 221. In 1967, Noam Chomsky described the atomic bombings as "among the most unspeakable crimes in history".
  222. 222. Chomsky pointed to the complicity of the American people in the bombings.
  223. 223. The definition of terrorism is "the targeting of innocent civilians to achieve a political goal".
  224. 224. Unnecessary Suffering and Destruction
  225. 225. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 set rules in place regarding the attack of civilian populations.
  226. 226. The Hague Convention of 1907
  227. 227. The Hague Conventions stated that religious buildings, art and science centres, charities, hospitals, and historic monuments,
  228. 228. were to be spared as far as possible in a bombardment, unless they were being used for military purposes.
  229. 229. The bomb exploded approximately 1900 feet directly above this hospital, emitting heat greater than 5,000°F.
  230. 230. Torii of Sanno Shrine in Nagasaki after the atomic bomb was dropped on August 9, 1945. It was the only thing that withstood the explosion in the area.
  231. 231. The Hague Conventions also prohibited the employment of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering".
  232. 232. Indiscriminate bombing was internationally outlawed. The Washington Treaty of 1922 expressly forbade the use of bombing against civilian populations.
  233. 233. United States government propaganda films condemned the Japanese Empire for bombing of cities, such as Shanghai.
  234. 234. Yet upon America’s entry into the war, US General, H. H. Arnold, advocated the policy of strategic bombing of cities as the only way that Germany could be beaten.
  235. 235. Winston Churchill commented: The air opened paths along which death and terror could be carried far behind the lines of the actual enemy; to women, children, the aged, the sick, who in earlier struggles would perforce have been left untouched.
  236. 236. As he faces the Atomic Bomb Dome in Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito waves his hat as he looks out over the crowd during a visit to the city on Dec. 7, 1947
  237. 237. Hiroshima today – with the memorial dome on the left
  238. 238. A-Bomb dome as it stands today
  239. 239. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial, known as the 'Atomic Bomb Dome.'
  240. 240. Hiroshima today - detail from a panoramic view of Hiroshima Peace Memorial
  241. 241. Memorials inline with the epicenter of the bomb
  242. 242. Hiroshima Ground Zero Memorial
  243. 243. The Peace Flame has burned for the atomic bomb victims at the Memorial Cenotaph at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima,
  244. 244. The Memorial Mound, Hiroshima
  245. 245. Gold Peace Dove - Peace Park, Nagasaki, Japan
  246. 246. Peace monument at Nagasaki's atomic bomb ground zero
  247. 247. Nagasaki
  248. 248. Nagasaki Ground Zero
  249. 249. nagasaki-atomic-bomb-epicenter-ground-level
  250. 250. Atomic Bomb Museum,Nagasaki
  251. 251. A Madonna scarred by the bombing serves as a powerful symbol in Nagasaki
  252. 252. Nagasaki Ground Zero
  253. 253. 1959 - Urakami Cathedral, Urakami, Nagasaki (Japan). Largest Church in East Asia when completed in 1914. At ground zero of the atomic bomb.
  254. 254. The reconstructed Urakami Cathedral.
  255. 255. Urakami Cathedral rebuilt
  256. 256. Urakami Cathedral
  257. 257. Replica of the Western style bell from Urakami Cathedral
  258. 258. The New Zealand memorial sculpture 'Cloak of Peace' dedicated to the victims of the Atomic Bomb in Nagasaki
  259. 259. Nagasaki-Peace-Park-Monument
  260. 260. People at Peace monument at Nagasaki's atomic bomb ground zero
  261. 261. Nagasaki, monument showing where atomic bomb exploded
  262. 262. Paper cranes (Senbazuru) at Hiroshima and Nagasaki peace memorial in Ueno Park, Tokyo
  263. 263. MITSUO FUCHIDA From Pearl Harbour to Calvary By Dr. Peter Hammond
  264. 264. MITSUO FUCHIDA From Pearl Harbour to Calvary
  265. 265. Mitsuo Fuchida (1902-1976) is best known for leading the devastating air attack on Pearl Harbour, 7 December 1941.
  266. 266. After the war, Fuchida became a Christian Evangelist, who conducted Evangelistic outreaches throughout Japan, the United States and Europe.
  267. 267. Fuchida was the son of the Master of the Primary School in Kashihara. His grandfather was a Samurai. Japanese Naval Aviator
  268. 268. Mitsuo Fuchida entered the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1921, graduated as a mid-shipman in 1924, was promoted to Ensign in 1925, and sub-Lieutenant in 1927.
  269. 269. He specialised in horizontal bombing and gained combat experience during the Sino-Japanese War, when he was assigned to the aircraft carrier, Kaga, in 1929.
  270. 270. Promoted to Lieutenant Commander in 1936, he was accepted into the Naval Staff College and joined the aircraft carrier Akagi in 1939, as Commander of the Air Group.
  271. 271. In October 1941, Fuchida was made Commander. Under the command of Vice Admiral Nagumo, with 6 aircraft carriers, and 423 aircraft, Commander Fuchida was responsible for the co- ordination of the aerial attack on the US Pacific Fleet. Attack on Pearl Harbour
  272. 272. He was in the first wave of 183 dive-bombers, torpedo-bombers, level- bombers and fighters, which took off from carriers 370 km North of Oahu and targeted the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour.
  273. 273. At 07:40 (Hawaiian Standard Time), Fuchida ordered "Tenkai!" ("Take attack position!"), slid back the canopy of his Nakajima Kate torpedo bomber and fired a green flare to signal attack.
  274. 274. He then instructed his radio operator to send the coded signal "To, to, to" ("strike!").
  275. 275. At 7:53, Fuchida sent the code words "Tora! Tora! Tora!" back to the carrier Akagi, the flagship, to report that complete surprise had been achieved. Tora! Tora! Tora!
  276. 276. Tora was the acronym for Tosugeki Raigeki (torpedo attack) and in Japanese Tora means Tiger.
  277. 277. When the attack on Pearl Harbour hit, at 7:55am, many American sailors, or soldiers, were on leave, or sleeping late. Attack at Dawn
  278. 278. 7 Battleships were lined up on battleship row.
  279. 279. The Oklahoma capsized. The West Virginia and California was sunk. The Nevada was damaged and beached near the mouth of Pearl Harbour.
  280. 280. Tennessee, Maryland and Pennsylvania were damaged. 10 Other ships were sunk or seriously damaged.
  281. 281. The Arizona sank with over 1,000 sailors on board, after a stupendous explosion of its forward magazine.
  282. 282. (Just 8 days earlier, the American's had published a picture of the Arizona with the words: "It is significant that despite the claims of air enthusiasts, no battleship has yet been sunk by bombs." )
  283. 283. Pride goes before a fall.
  284. 284. As the first wave returned to the carriers, Fuchida remained over the target to access damage and to observe the second wave attack.
  285. 285. He returned to his carrier only after the second wave had completed its mission.
  286. 286. 21 large flack holes were found in his aircraft, the main control wires were barely holding together and it is incredible that he survived so many hits to his aircraft.
  287. 287. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft in the attack on Pearl Harbour. The US Pacific Fleet lost 21 ships – including almost every battleship - 188 aircraft destroyed, another 159 damaged and 2,403 lives lost.
  288. 288. In Fuchida's Memoirs, he remarks being upset by the Admiral's cancelling of the third wave attack, which would have destroyed Pearl Harbour's fuel tanks and dry dock facilities. "I was upset and thought, 'What stupidity!' But the decision belonged to the Commander. It would not do any good if I complained.".
  289. 289. Years later, Fuchida said that while he mourned those who died aboard the USS Arizona and other ships, he did not regret his role in the Pearl Harbour attack.
  290. 290. It was war, he said. After the successful Pearl Harbour attack, Fuchida was granted an audience with the Emperor.
  291. 291. On 19 February 1942, Fuchida led the first of two waves of 188 aircraft in an air raid on Darwin, Australia. On 5 April, he led another series of air attacks against the Royal Navy bases in Ceylon. Wounded at Midway
  292. 292. In June 1942, Fuchida was recovering from an emergency shipboard appendectomy, when he was wounded at the Battle of Midway.
  293. 293. He was on the ship's bridge during the morning attacks by US aircraft. As Akagi was hit, a chain reaction from the burning fuel and live bombs began the destruction of the ship.
  294. 294. An explosion threw him to the deck and he broke his ankle.
  295. 295. After recuperation Fuchida spent the rest of the war as a staff officer. Two weeks before the American invasion of Guam, Fuchida was ordered to Tokyo. A Hand of Protection
  296. 296. When the Japanese failed to repel the invasion, Vice Admiral Kakuta and his staff chose Seppuku, the Samurai suicide ritual of disembowelment. "Again the sword of death had missed me only by inches." Fuchida declared. "What did it mean?"
  297. 297. The day before the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, he was in that city to attend a conference. A long distance call from naval headquarters required him to return to Tokyo. Hiroshima Bombing
  298. 298. As he ate breakfast in Yamato, 200km away, Fuchida learned that everyone he had been working with in Hiroshima had perished in the atomic explosion.
  299. 299. The day after the atomic bombing, he returned to Hiroshima to access the damage. All of the members of Fuchida's party died of radiation poisoning, but Fuchida exhibited no symptoms.
  300. 300. Each of the Officers who had accompanied Fuchida, to investigate the devastation in Hiroshima, showed strange signs of illness. One by one they died through radiation poisoning.
  301. 301. As Fuchida returned to Kashirhara, to help his wife raise their children, he was depressed: "Life had no taste, or meaning… I had missed death so many times and for what. What did it all mean?"
  302. 302. After the war, Fuchida was called to testify at the trials of Japanese military leaders. War Crimes Trials
  303. 303. When General Douglas McArthur summoned Fuchida to testify in the Tokyo War Crimes trials, Captain Fuchida was disgusted and declared that everyone should know that "War was war" and that cruel acts occurred on both sides.
  304. 304. The petty vindictiveness of the Allies infuriated him and he denounced the "victor's justice."
  305. 305. In 1947, he met his former flight engineer, Kazuo Kanegasaki, who he thought had died in the Battle of Midway. Love For One’s Enemies
  306. 306. However Kanegasaki reported that a young Christian woman, Peggy Covell, had cared for them, in the prison camps, despite her Missionary parents having been killed by Japanese soldiers on the Island of Panay, in the Philippines.
  307. 307. Peggy Covell's parents were Missionary teachers in Japan until 1939. They then relocated to the Philippines. The Japanese conquered the Philippines in 1941. They beheaded both of Peggy's parents on Sunday morning, 19 December 1943.
  308. 308. To Fuchida, this love for one's enemies was inexplicable as the Bushido code required revenge against the murder of one's parents to restore honour. He became obsessed with trying to understand why anyone would treat their enemies with kindness and forgiveness.
  309. 309. The extraordinary example of Peggy Covell and Jacob De Shazer inspired Fuchida to know more about the God of the Christians. Inspiring Example
  310. 310. When Japanese Prisoners of War asked the young 18-year old Peggy Covell why she volunteered to help them, her reply was: "Because Japanese soldiers killed my parents."
  311. 311. When Peggy considered her parent's sacrificial service for the Kingdom of God, and their love for the Japanese people, she was convinced that she must continue their Mission, reaching Japanese for Christ.
  312. 312. As Fuchida researched from every source in the Philippines that knew the Covells, he learned that they had been forced to their knees by their captives and they had prayed together as they were about to be beheaded. They had prayed for the Japanese!
  313. 313. In 1948, as Fuchida was passing by the bronze statue of Hachiko at the Shibuya station, he was handed a pamphlet about the life of Jacob De Shazer, a member of the Doolittle Raid, who was captured when his B-25 bomber ran out of fuel in occupied China. Literature Evangelism
  314. 314. In the pamphlet: "I was a Prisoner of Japan", De Shazer, a former US Army Air Force staff sergeant and bombardier, related his testimony of imprisonment, torture and awakening to God.
  315. 315. Jacob De Shazer was the bombardier of B-25 No.16. After taking off from USS Hornet and dropping bombs on Nagoya, Japan, they flew to China, but ran out of fuel over Japanese controlled China. Doolittle Raid Bombers
  316. 316. They were captured after parachuting to the ground. De Shazer was imprisoned for 40 months, 34 of these months in solitary confinement. He was beaten, malnourished and 3 of his crew were executed by firing squad.
  317. 317. The fourth member, Lt. Bob Meder died of starvation. After 25 months of hating his captives, a Bible came into his hands, for only three weeks, but it changed his life completely.
  318. 318. He began to learn Japanese and to treat his captives with respect. He resolved to bring the Message of Christ to Japan. After returning to the USA, De Shazer attended Seattle Pacific College and returned to Japan to preach the Gospel.
  319. 319. After 40 months as captives, three of the four surviving American prisoners — noticeably emaciated — arrived at Chungking, China, in late August 1945. From left - Jake DeShazer, Bob Hite and Chase Nielsen.
  320. 320. DeShazer-missionary-meeting-japan
  321. 321. He established a church in Nagoya, the very city he had bombed years before. Fuchida became intrigued with the Christian Faith.
  322. 322. The shocking examples of Christians able to forgive their enemies staggered Fuchida. "That’s when I met Jesus. Looking back I can see now that the Lord had laid His hand upon me so that I might serve Him."
  323. 323. Fuchida read the tract on the spot and on the train he saw an advertisement for a book with the same title. When he disembarked, he headed for a book store and purchased it. The Power of the Printed Page
  324. 324. De Shazer's story engrossed Fuchida. Determined to understand what had motivated De Shazer, Fuchida bought a Bible from a Japanese man on the street.
  325. 325. When he read "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing." (Luke 23:24), Fuchida realised that this was what the Covells had been praying before their execution.
  326. 326. In 1949, Fuchida purchased a Bible at the same Shibuyu station where he had received a pamphlet. Faith Comes From Hearing the Word of God
  327. 327. As he read the Gospels he came to understand the reason for the life of forgiveness and mercy that motivated Peggy and Jacob.
  328. 328. It was the crucifixion of Jesus and His Words in the Gospel: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing." On 14th April 1950, he surrendered to Jesus Christ as his Lord and Saviour.
  329. 329. By the time he had completed reading the Gospel of Luke, Fuchida had become a Christian. He knew no Christians, but now he began to declare himself to be a Christian. The Power of God
  330. 330. As Christianity was considered the "occupation religion" in Japan, this brought him much reproach from his former friends and family.
  331. 331. Pietsch and Glenn Wagner, of the Pocket Testament League of Japan met with Fuchida and encouraged him to join them in open air outreach.
  332. 332. In the business section of Osaka, as the Americans stood to speak, fewer than 40 Japanese would stop to listen. Open Air Preaching
  333. 333. But when Fuchida, Hero of Pearl Harbour, was introduced, the crowd swelled rapidly. Rush hour traffic stopped. Hundreds gathered, even the police listened in.
  334. 334. This was the beginning of Fuchida's new career as an Evangelist. Soon he filled an auditorium in Osaka, 500 Japanese came forward at that rally. Japan for Christ
  335. 335. Almost every newspaper in Japan reported on it: He described his conversion as "It was like having the sun rise." He preached against Japanese- egocentrism and xenophobia.
  336. 336. Like Paul on Mars Hill (Acts 17:16-34), he used Japanese cultural examples to communicate the Gospel of Christ.
  337. 337. Captain Fuchida went from being a vital part of Japan's military attack on the United States, to being a vital part of God's Missionary offensive into the hearts, minds and souls of Japanese, and later Americans and Europeans too.
  338. 338. In May 1950, Fuchida and De Shazer met for the first time. Fuchida and De Shazer
  339. 339. In May he visited De Shazer, knocked on his door and said: "I have desired to meet you, Mr De Shazer. My name is Mitsuo Fuchida." De Shazer recognised the name and said: "Come in! Come in!" The former enemies embraced as brothers in Christ.
  340. 340. In 1951, Fuchida published an account of the Battle of Midway War Author
  341. 341. and in 1952 he toured the United States as a member of the Worldwide Christian Missionary Army of Sky Pilots.
  342. 342. In February 1954, Readers Digest published Fuchida's story of the attack on Pearl Harbour.
  343. 343. Fuchida wrote - From Pearl Harbour to Golgotha (later renamed - From Pearl Harbour to Calvary
  344. 344. and a 1955 expansion of his book: Midway – The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy Story.
  345. 345. His autobiography - For That One Day, The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbour, was published in Japan 2007 and translated into English and published in 2011.
  346. 346. In Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, Fuchida wrote: "Five minutes! Who would have believed that the tide of battle would shift in that brief interval of time? The Turning Point
  347. 347. ...We have been caught flat-footed in the most vulnerable position possible, decks loaded with planes armed and fuelled for attack."
  348. 348. Fuchida turned down an offer from the Japanese government to organise their new Air Force, he faced down an angry pilot who pulled a knife and threatened to kill him. This man later came to Christ. Courage and Self-Sacrifice
  349. 349. Mitsuo Fuchida, at Pearl Harbor in 1966, points to where he led Japanese planes
  350. 350. Fuchida ministered in prisons and led people to Christ, even in the cells of condemned murderers. He formed Calvary Clubs in prisons.
  351. 351. Mitsuo Fuchida related the testimony of Peggy Covell and her brave parents all over Japan. The Blood of the Martyrs
  352. 352. He quoted her testimony: "But the Holy Spirit has washed away my hatred and has replaced it with love."
  353. 353. The Covells had gone to their death singing hymns joyfully and praying for the conversion of their enemies. The Blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. Mitsuo Fuchida was one of the fruit of their Faith.
  354. 354. Fuchida spent the rest of his life as an Evangelist, taking the Gospel of Christ throughout Japan, the United States of America and Europe.
  355. 355. PRAY FOR JAPAN
  356. 356. This month, 50,000 Scouts worldwide will be gathering in Japan for the 23rd World Scout Jamboree. Jamboree In Japan
  357. 357. This has been scheduled to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6 & 9 August).
  358. 358. Special Remembrance services will be held, with Scouts participating, at the sites where the devastating atom bombs were dropped.
  359. 359. Japan is recognised as the world's third largest economy, yet it has been rocked by recessions and economic stagnation in recent years. Economic Superpower
  360. 360. Despite a lack of natural resources and oil, Japan has one of the world's most powerful exporting orientated economies.
  361. 361. Unlike most economies, Japan has a high savings and enormous trade surplus.
  362. 362. However, the low birth rate and ageing population presents major societal and economic concerns for the future.
  363. 363. The Japanese have a strong work ethic and are polite, yet materialism dominates the ambitions of these very busy people, so they give little thought to God and Eternity.
  364. 364. Tokyo/Yokohama with 36 Million people, is one of the largest cities in the world. Over 66% of the population of Japan are urbanised. Life expectancy is 82 years. Urbanised Mission Field
  365. 365. The multiple religious loyalties of the Japanese can be seen in that 85% describe themselves as Buddhist and 90% Shinto!
  366. 366. Japan is an extremely materialistic culture. Its own leaders call Japan: "A superpower without a moral compass."
  367. 367. Japan has one of the highest suicide rates in the world – over 30,000 a year. Bullying and teenage prostitution are major social problems.
  368. 368. Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy. Missionary Challenge
  369. 369. Of the 126 Million people in Japan, 85% claim to be Buddhist
  370. 370. and only 1.5% members of a Christian church.
  371. 371. Of the 2 Million Christians, barely 600,000 would identify themselves as Evangelical. Only 10% of the Japanese population believe in the existence of a personal God.
  372. 372. The concept of a Creator-God is foreign to most.
  373. 373. Strong pressure to conform to the social norms and the shame/honour mentality held by many Japanese, makes conversion to Christ very difficult.
  374. 374. A pervasive nationalistic Shintoism makes Missionary work extremely difficult in Japan. Japan is the largest unevangelised Missionfield that is completely open to Missionaries.
  375. 375. There are 15,575 congregations in Japan, consisting of 1,291,021 church members and 2 Million adherents. 3% of Japanese would identify themselves as Christians. Christians in Japan
  376. 376. Christians are a small minority in a society where consensus and conformity are important. House Churches have been effective in reaching Japanese.
  377. 377. 70% of all churches in Japan have an average attendance of less than 30. On average, woman attenders outnumber men, 7 to 1.
  378. 378. Yet there are approximately 300 Japanese Missionaries serving in 34 countries.
  379. 379. Japan has a 100% literacy rate. This highly literate, reading, commuting society offers an excellent market for publishing and distributing high quality Christian literature. Strategic Literature Ministry
  380. 380. Yet, there are only 100 Christian book stores in the whole country.
  381. 381. Pray for the impact of the Japanese Church on the nation. The churches in Japan desperately need Biblical Reformation and Spiritual Revival. Reformation and Revival
  382. 382. They need to turn from their insular bunker mentality to engage with the society and effectively Evangelise their nation.
  383. 383. "For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God to Salvation for everyone who believes." Romans 1:16
  384. 384. PRAY FOR JAPAN
  385. 385. REFORMATION SOCIETY Dr. Peter Hammond PO Box 74 Newlands, 7725 Cape Town South Africa E-mail: info@ReformationSA.org Web: www.ReformationSA.org

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