3. The Case for Limited Proliferation
A. Nuclear weapons and the Cold War peace
B. The logic of peace through nuclear
deterrence: increased potential costs of war,
reduced likelihood of war
C. Requirements of stable deterrence
1. Invulnerable second-strike capability
4. The Case for Limited Proliferation
2. Many weapons in different (secure) basing
modes
3. Do aspiring nuclear powers have resources to
build stable deterrents?
D. Nuclear deterrence works, but it is difficult
5. The Case for Widespread Proliferation
A. Agree with previous point about nuclear
weapons and the Cold War peace
B. Agree with the logic of peace through
nuclear deterrence
C. Agree with the importance of invulnerable
second-strike capability
D. Disagree on what this requires: need only a
handful of weapons that opponents cannot
find and target
E. Nuclear deterrence works and it is easy to
achieve
6. The Case against Proliferation
A. Did nuclear weapons really keep the Cold
War peace?
B. The gamble of proliferation
C. The dangers of likely new nuclear powers
1. Small arsenals
2. Leaders may convince themselves that wars can
be “won”
3. The delicate balance of terror: crisis stability
7. Nonstate Actors
A. Agreement on the undesirability of
proliferation to nonstate actors
B. The problem of deterring nonstate actors
C. Proliferation opponents stress possible link
between proliferation to states and nonstate
actors
D. Proliferation opponents stress possible link
between proliferation to states and nonstate
actors