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Security with VA Smalltalk

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Tue, August 23, 12:00pm – 12:30pm
Youtube: https://youtu.be/RCjS2SuiGZM


First Name: Seth
Last Name: Berman
Email: sberman@instantiations.com
Title: Security with VA Smalltalk
Type: Talk

Abstract: In response to customer demand, Instantiations has continued to enhance the SSL/TLS and Cryptographic libraries for the next release of VA
Smalltalk.
In this talk, I will provide a brief overview of the design of these libraries, as well as the tools they provide to help our customers build modern
secure software.
We have added support for the latest OpenSSL 1.1.0 and with it, some great new features which I will cover, as well.

Bio: Before joining Instantiations in May of 2011, Seth spent 10 years developing software for the U.S. government.
During this time he worked in a variety of domains to include stochastic simulation, operations research, grid computing and link analysis.
Seth is currently the Vice President of Engineering at Instantiations focusing on product development of VA Smalltalk.
He has a B.S. in Computer Science and an M.S. in Software Engineering.

Published in: Technology
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Security with VA Smalltalk

  1. 1. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. 24th ESUG Conference Prague, Czech Republic August 23, 2016 Security with VA Smalltalk Seth Berman Vice President of Engineering Instantiations, Inc.
  2. 2. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Agenda •  Security Overview •  Architectural Goals •  OpenSSL 1.1 Compatibility •  Cryptography Library •  SSL/TLS Library
  3. 3. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Security Overview Understanding the Value •  Secure communications is hard •  Even Cryptographers get it wrong •  Protocol Breakage: SSL, PPTP •  Implementation Breakage: Heartbleed •  Correct Protocol/Implementations can still be vulnerable •  Side channel attacks
  4. 4. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Security Overview Understanding the Value •  Demand for Secure Communications •  Is only going one way…UP! •  Our customers are receiving increasing pressure to provide higher security applications •  The demands extend beyond just SSL/TLS connections
  5. 5. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Security Overview Looking Back… •  Before VA Smalltalk 8.6.2 •  Dated bindings to the OpenSSL SSL/TLS library •  No Cryptographic primitives exposed •  Minimal help with native memory management •  Minimal Test Cases
  6. 6. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Security Overview Currently… •  VA Smalltalk 8.6.2 •  Official Support for 1.0.x •  Native Memory Management •  Introduction of the Cryptographic Library •  Enhanced SSL/TLS APIs •  Test Cases (with official test vectors) for all exposed Cryptographic Algorithms •  Story-driven code examples describing common Cryptographic Algorithm usage
  7. 7. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Security Overview Coming Soon… •  VA Smalltalk 8.6.3 •  Added Support for OpenSSL 1.1.0 •  Continued support for OpenSSL 1.0.x •  Many new Cryptographic algorithms available •  Authenticated Encryption •  Key Derivation •  Secure Memory Module •  Helps protect In-Memory keys on long-running servers
  8. 8. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Architectural Goals •  Compatibility •  New Crypto layer will slide underneath SSL/TLS support •  SSL/TLS API compatibility must be maintained •  SSL/TLS and Crypto libraries must handle all OpenSSL versions we support •  Currently: OpenSSL 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2 •  Next Release: Adding OpenSSL 1.1.0 •  Differences between various OpenSSL versions should be transparent to the user (except algorithm availability) •  Separation of Concerns •  Performance •  Safety
  9. 9. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Architectural Goals •  Compatibility •  Separation of Concerns •  API Objects •  Users should only interact with these •  Dispatching Engine •  Performs threaded calls •  Error Detection and Notification •  Native Memory Management •  Various mechanisms to make working with native memory safer and prevent certain classes of errors. •  Performance •  Safety
  10. 10. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Architectural Goals •  Compatibility •  Separation of Concerns •  Performance •  Calls to OpenSSL are made on native threads •  Asynchronous callouts which block only the calling ST process •  Our thread-locking implementation plugs into OpenSSL to manage concurrency issues •  This allows for the usage of multiple cores for higher throughput •  Safety
  11. 11. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Architectural Goals •  Compatibility •  Separation of Concerns •  Performance •  Safety •  Uses a Native Memory Manager •  Uses a Smalltalk GC Notifier to help make sure the object’s native memory was freed •  Various OpenSSL APIs may answer •  Static memory (this should never be freed) •  Reference counted memory (OpenSSL’s memory manager) •  Unmanaged memory that the user must free •  The Native Memory Manager keeps track of memory ownership and reference counts
  12. 12. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. OpenSSL 1.1 Overview •  Major revamp of the OpenSSL codebase •  Post-Heartbleed: It’s getting the attention it deserves now •  More resources applied, both internal and external •  FIPS 140-2 Accreditation is now sponsored •  At this time: OpenSSL 1.1.0 Beta7 •  With the good comes the bad…API breakageL
  13. 13. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. OpenSSL 1.1 Hiding the API Breakage •  Version-adapting memory layout •  All bindings to structures reconfigure their layout to meet the OpenSSL version layout specification •  OpenSSL 1.1 uses opaque structures •  So…we configure to those too and provide the various OpenSSL getter/setter APIs
  14. 14. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. OpenSSL 1.1 Hiding the API Breakage •  Version fallback logic •  General OpenSSL 1.1 APIs we added implement fallback code for lower version levels •  This was done by implementing the OpenSSL logic in Smalltalk •  We don’t do this for algorithms as this could lead to side-channel attacks •  Our implementation may be correct. •  But perhaps observable cpu or caching behavior leaks information •  Or semantics of basic primitive operations were not considered •  i.e. trialKey = storedKey L (not constant-time equality)
  15. 15. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Overview •  Secure Memory •  Streaming API •  Message Digests •  Message Authentication Code (MAC) •  Symmetric Ciphers •  Public/Private Key •  Key Derivation •  Secure Random Number Generator •  X509 •  ASN1
  16. 16. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Secure Memory •  Mechanisms to secure in-memory storage •  Intended for long running servers •  Lots of sensitive data in memory •  This sensitive data is long-lived •  More aggressive thread-model •  Our Secure Objects also override common APIs to expose as little as possible in case it gets logged
  17. 17. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Secure Memory on Linux/Unix •  Strategy •  Attempt to prevent paging sensitive data to disk •  Should not show up in a core-dump •  Special heap should be page-guarded to protect against buffer overrun/underrun •  Uses OpenSSL 1.1 Secure Arenas •  Implements the strategy above
  18. 18. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Secure Memory on Windows •  Strategy •  Limit the time window that sensitive data could be observed in decrypted form •  Assume paging to disk or being core-dumped is unavoidable •  Should not require a special section of the heap
  19. 19. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Secure Memory on Windows •  Uses In-Memory Encryption (Microsoft CryptoAPI) •  Encryption Key is per-user and generated on boot •  Encryption Key is stored in nonpaged kernel memory •  By default, only the VAST Smalltalk process can decrypt •  OpenSSL Dispatcher has been enhanced to •  Decrypt incoming arguments intended for OpenSSL functions •  Immediately call the OpenSSL function •  After the call, re-encrypt the required incoming arguments
  20. 20. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Streaming API •  Powerful set of High-Performance OpenSSL Streams •  Two types •  Source/Sink •  Socket, File, Memory •  Filters •  Digest, Cipher, Base64, Buffer •  Chain them together to create cryptographic pipelines •  Example chain to •  Perform buffered writes of base64-encoded encrypted data to a file •  Compute the sha512 hash of the plaint-text bufferBio | sha512Bio | aes256Bio | base64Bio | fileBio
  21. 21. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Message Digests •  Secure one-way hash functions •  Algorithms •  MD5, RIPEMD160 •  SHA1, SHA2 Family (224, 256, 384, 512) •  Whirpool •  Blake2 (OpenSSL 1.1) •  Example: OSSslDigest sha512 printableDigest: ‘Hello World’. à 958D09788F3C907B1C89A945F478D58C
  22. 22. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Message Authentication Code (MAC) •  Keyed hash function •  Provides both data integrity and authenticity •  Algorithms •  HMAC •  CMAC (OpenSSL 1.1) •  Example: OSSslDigest sha1 hmacPrintableDigest: 'Hello Smalltalk‘ key: 'secretKey‘. à 4510149C9D6216D4460571E16B290312…
  23. 23. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Symmetric Ciphers •  Encryption for confidentiality •  Shared secret key •  Block Ciphers •  AES, Blowfish, Camellia, Cast5, DES, Triple-DES •  Unauthenticated Modes: CBC, CFB, CTR, OFB, XTS •  Authenticated Modes: GCM, CCM, OCB •  Stream Ciphers •  Unauthenticated: ChaCha20 •  Authenticated: ChaCha20-Poly1305
  24. 24. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Symmetric Ciphers •  Encrypt Example "Encrypt“ cipher := OSSslCipher aes_256_ocb. cData := cipher cipherDataFor: 'Hello Smalltalk'. cipherText := cipher encrypt: cData key: key iv: iv. authTag := cData tagData. "Decrypt“ cData := cipher cipherDataFor: cipherText. cData tagData: authTag. plainText := cipher decrypt: cData key: key iv: iv
  25. 25. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Public/Private Key •  Algorithms using Key Pairs (public and private) •  Use Cases •  Key Exchange (i.e. agree on a shared key) •  Non-Interactive Encryption •  i.e. Encrypted Email •  Digital Signatures •  Algorithms •  RSA •  DSA •  Diffie-Hellman
  26. 26. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Key Derivation •  Derives one or more keys from an initial key material •  Algorithms •  HKDF •  PBKDF2 •  Scrypt (OpenSSL 1.1)
  27. 27. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Key Derivation •  Password Hashing Example “Derive crypto key from a password“ scrypt := OSSslKDF scrypt keyLength: 16. pHash := scrypt derive: ‘password’. “Algorithm Params to store with the hash” pSalt := scrypt salt. pCost := scrypt cost. pBlkSz := scrypt blockSize. pPara := scrypt parallelization. pMaxMem := scrypt maxMemory.
  28. 28. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Cryptographic Library Key Derivation •  Password Hashing Example “Verify supplied password with stored hash“ scrypt := OSSslKDF scrypt keyLength: 16 salt: pSalt cost: pCost parallelization: pPara blockSize: bBlkSz maxMemory: bMaxMem. (scrypt verify: ‘password’ with: pHash) ifTrue: [^’Password is correct’].
  29. 29. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. SSL/TLS Library •  VA Smalltalk’s existing SSL/TLS support is now built on the new crypto library. •  Inherits the safer memory management features •  More options exposed for SSL/TLS connections •  Gained TLSv1.2 support •  More options for X509 certs •  OpenSSL 1.1 compatible
  30. 30. Copyright © 2016 Instantiations, Inc. Thank you for your attention Questions?

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