Implementing large scale food security programmes in rural                         Ethiopia:   Insights from the Productiv...
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme•   In 2005, the Government of Ethiopia replaced its ad hoc responses to food  ...
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme•   The PSNP reaches around 1.2 million households or about seven million peopl...
Structure of presentation•   We assess the development of capacity to implement such a large scale food    security interv...
Data•   Longitudinal, quantitative household survey covering approximately 3,700    households. Three rounds fielded (2006...
Operational findings: Highlights•   There are a number of important, positive operational aspects of the program:     – Im...
Payment processes•   In our 2010 study, a major complaint of PSNP beneficiaries is that payments are    not made in a time...
The payment process:                                 Cash payments•   Kebeles maintain public works attendance sheets and ...
The payment process: Cash payments in 20107060                                                                            ...
Payment processes: Why do delays occur?•   Staff shortages, difficulties with the PASS system and electricity interruption...
Appeals and grievances•   An important component of the PSNP is the existence of a formal system through    which benefici...
Appeals and grievancesRegion       Perceived that       Perceived selection    Perceived selection          selection was ...
Appeals Processes, cont’dWe perceive several reasons why relatively few households use the appeals process.We note two her...
Summary•   The Ethiopian experience shows that it is possible to implement large scale social    protection interventions ...
Implementing large scale food security programmes in rural ethiopia insights from the productive safety net programme
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Implementing large scale food security programmes in rural ethiopia insights from the productive safety net programme

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International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) seminar series: October 18-19, 2012

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  • To explain this graph, start by explaining that we first take all woredas making cash payments and divide them into three tertiles based on how long it takes them to process payments (slowest, middle, fastest). The triangles, squares and diamonds show how quickly the median woreda within each group took to complete these different steps. Next, take the middle tertile (with the red line) and explain what information the graph contains. It shows that for the median woreda in the middle tertile , it takes 11 takes from the receipt of the first attendance sheet to completing the payroll data entry and sending this to WOFED. They can go to the bank on the same day and within five days, they are out making the first payments. For this median woredas, it takes 16 days to make all payments and so it takes 34 days in total from the start to the day when the final payment is made.The problem lies with the slowest tertile of woredas (the green line). Within this group, it takes them much longer, 17 days, to enter all payroll information and another 17 days before the funds are available for withdrawal from the bank. It takes another 11 days to makes sure they have sufficient funds and arrange transport to before they start making payments which take another days. This means that 55 days, nearly two months elapses, between PSNP participants completing a month’s work and getting paid. Note that we could not get comparable information to create similar graphs for food payments
  • We noted earlier that the targeting of the PSNP is good in that those included have characteristics consistent with those laid out in the program implementation manual (ie low inclusion error). The first column of this table tells us that many hh perceive that they were unfairly excluded (ie exclusion error) across all regions. The second column tells us that even though lots of hh feel they have been unfairly excluded, relatively few lodge a complaint. For the presentation, you can convert these numbers as follows. In Amhara, for example, 13.1 perceive that selection was unfair and lodged a complaint and that 30.4 percent thought selection was unfair. This means that 13.1 out of 30.4 lodged a complaint or that only 43% of those who thought selection was unfair actually lodged a complaint. And less than half of those households (6.0/13.1) who lodge a complaint get a response. We similar patterns in other regions too.
  • Implementing large scale food security programmes in rural ethiopia insights from the productive safety net programme

    1. 1. Implementing large scale food security programmes in rural Ethiopia: Insights from the Productive Safety Net Programme Guush Berhane, IFPRI October 19-20, 2012(John Hoddinott, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Guush Berhane, Mulugeta Handino, Neha Kumar, Jeremy Lind, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, Mulugeta Tefera)
    2. 2. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme• In 2005, the Government of Ethiopia replaced its ad hoc responses to food emergencies with a social protection programme, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).• The objective of the PSNP “provides transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level”. It also seeks to stimulate market development and rehabilitate the natural environment• It is a multi-year program so as to provide recipients with predictable and reliable transfers. Beneficiaries are supposed to receive at least three years of continuous transfers• It focused initially on the Highland regions but has since expanded to include rural areas of all regions including pastoral regions
    3. 3. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme• The PSNP reaches around 1.2 million households or about seven million people at an annual cost of around $275 million per year• Most do Public Works, a small number of beneficiaries receive unconditional transfers called Direct Support• Program is supported financially by a consortium of donors who coordinate their funding and interaction with the Government of Ethiopia. The program – one of the largest social protection interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, is operated by the GoE
    4. 4. Structure of presentation• We assess the development of capacity to implement such a large scale food security intervention with the goal of understanding their implications for future large scale interventions in Ethiopia and elsewhere.• In this presentation, we summarize our findings on two topics: – The payments process; and – The mechanisms that exist for appeals and complaints.
    5. 5. Data• Longitudinal, quantitative household survey covering approximately 3,700 households. Three rounds fielded (2006, 2008, 2010) with fourth recently fielded• Household survey is complemented by: – Community survey (infrastructure, resources, prices) – In 2010, a woreda (county) capacity survey – In 2010, a qualitative study that included focus group and key informant discussions – In 2010, survey and qualitative work extended to pastoral regions• Data collected can be divided into three broad types: – Outcomes specifically listed in program documentation – Operational, how well was the program working from the perspectives of beneficiaries and implementers – Contextual data needed to estimate impacts and to enrich understanding of “why” impacts were observed or not
    6. 6. Operational findings: Highlights• There are a number of important, positive operational aspects of the program: – Implementation requires the construction of a considerable amount of operational structures such as those needed to make payments, task forces to communicate program goals and implementation modalities, plan public works, and target beneficiaries. These largely exist and generally their performance has improved over time – Targeting remains good in the sense that the profile of beneficiaries matches that specified in the program implementation manual – There is exclusion error but this is largely the result of insufficient program resources to include all eligible households – There is an impressive degree of beneficiary participation in the selection of public works (>20% and rising over time)• But there have been a number of operational challenges
    7. 7. Payment processes• In our 2010 study, a major complaint of PSNP beneficiaries is that payments are not made in a timely fashion – For example, 78 percent of beneficiaries in Oromiya disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “I receive my payments in a timely fashion” – Participants in focus group discussions said, “We are paid every 2-3 months. The payment time is not predictable and timely information not given. “• Payment delays undercut a central premise of the PSNP, namely that payments are received in a regular and predictable fashion• This limits the PSNP’s ability to improve household food security• Here we explore why payments are delayed using detailed information we collected on how cash payments are processed in 2010
    8. 8. The payment process: Cash payments• Kebeles maintain public works attendance sheets and lists of individuals eligible for Direct Support.• Each month these are taken to the woreda where they reviewed and entered into a payroll software system called PASS.• Once complete, this information is given to the WOFED who liaise with the regional Bureau Office of Finance and Economic Development (BOFED).• BOFED tells WOFED when funds have been transferred to the branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia from which the woreda can withdraw funds.• Once funds are withdrawn, arrangements are made to pay beneficiaries.
    9. 9. The payment process: Cash payments in 20107060 58 5550 4540 fastest 34 34 32 middle30 slowest20 21 21 17 16 1310 11 11 7 1.5 10 to start of data entry to submission to to first trip to bank to first payment trip to final payment trip to end of processing WOFED
    10. 10. Payment processes: Why do delays occur?• Staff shortages, difficulties with the PASS system and electricity interruptions all play a role in lengthening the time it takes to process the payroll• Delays in getting funds from BOFED increase the amount of time it takes between completing the payroll and being able to withdraw funds from the bank. This is a particular problem for some woredas in Oromiya and SNNPR• Lack of transport increases the amount of time it takes to make payments. This is a major problem in Oromiya• There are obvious ways of addressing these problems. The data we are currently collecting will tell us if they have been remedied.Page 11
    11. 11. Appeals and grievances• An important component of the PSNP is the existence of a formal system through which beneficiaries as well as those excluded from the program can appeal decisions made regarding their inclusion or exclusion from the program as well as the management of public works, timeliness and completeness of transfers and any other perceived abuses of the PSNP.• In each kebele, a Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC) is established. Its main role is “to hear and resolve appeals regarding Safety Net matters in a timely manner”. At least one member of the KAC should be a woman.• These KAC’s were found in most, but not all, surveyed localities and usually, but not always, had both male and female members• Exclusion from the PSNP was the principal reason for making an appeal. Incomplete payments or deductions were also reasons why beneficiaries made appealsPage 12
    12. 12. Appeals and grievancesRegion Perceived that Perceived selection Perceived selection selection was unfair was unfair and lodged was unfair, lodged a a complaint complaint, and received a response Percent Tigray 26.2 11.4 5.3Amhara 30.4 13.1 6.0Oromiya 33.9 9.4 2.1SNNPR 30.4 9.9 3.1
    13. 13. Appeals Processes, cont’dWe perceive several reasons why relatively few households use the appeals process.We note two here(1) They perceive that they are not likely to be successful. A women’s focus group in Tigray stated “…when we go to KAC with complaints, they tell us that it is because of the shortage in beneficiary quota allocated to the kebele and sub-kebele. Otherwise, you could have been included among the beneficiaries”(2) Lack of confidence in the KAC. A focus group of Direct Support beneficiaries in Tigray noted “It is not hard to complain, but as far as we know these people are not important in solving the problem, so we prefer keeping quiet rather than shouting endlessly.”Page 14
    14. 14. Summary• The Ethiopian experience shows that it is possible to implement large scale social protection interventions in very poor settings.• Since its inception, there have been improvements in delivery, design and administrative capacity of the structures related to the PSNP since its inception. Overall, this is a positive story that highlights the importance of investments in programme inputs and institutional structure.• But there remains room for improvement. In this presentation, we have highlighted two: – Timely payments to beneficiaries – Absence of confidence in the appeals process• We have fielded these survey instruments again in 2012 and will be looking to see if there have been improvements in these, and other, areas

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