Vermelding onderdeel organisatie
April 23, 2014
1
Nanotech, Innovation, and Security
The case for openness
SPT 2011, Dento...
April 23, 2014 2
Threats from emerging technologies
• States have sought to balance need for open inquiry
with fears of pr...
April 23, 2014 3
Threats from emerging technologies
• Science does require openness, but
• do deadly technologies threaten...
April 23, 2014 4
Threats from emerging technologies
• Current strategies of containment are built on cold-war
reaction to ...
Containment is immoral
• States holding WMD demand other states comply with
non-proliferation
• This is a form of blackmai...
Containment is immoral
• Containment assumes that those in possession of
weapons are ethically privileged
• Containment ma...
Containment is ineffective
• States seeking WMD do best to pursue their research
in secret, and then emerge with a functio...
April 23, 2014 8
Cold War MAD strategy
• Assumes: A first strike must not be capable of
preventing a retaliatory second st...
April 23, 2014 9
Cold War MAD strategy
• To avoid this, countries may design their nuclear forces
to make decapitation str...
April 23, 2014 10
Cold War MAD strategy
• This assumption leads to a bi-polar, multi-strategy arms
race (in bi-polar world...
April 23, 2014 11
Containment is also risky…
• Isn’t it risky to allow proliferation beyond a few,
responsible states?
• G...
April 23, 2014 12
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• an N-person noncooperative game with countries as
players, d...
April 23, 2014 13
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• Structure of the objective function for player i :
• - profi...
April 23, 2014 14
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• profit from attacking
- increasing with
- zero for
- concave...
April 23, 2014 15
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• costs to develop and use the weapons
- increasing with
- zer...
April 23, 2014 16
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• “punishment”
- zero if no attack takes place, increasing wit...
April 23, 2014 17
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
The profit for i is then
To simplify the analysis, we assume:
...
April 23, 2014 18
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
Then it can be shown that if
, (1)
i.e., if the punishment str...
April 23, 2014 19
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
Lemma
If , resp.
(normalized version) for each , then
constitu...
Game-theoretic formulation of the
problem
• If the red curve is above
the green curve player i
will attack
• Occurrence of...
conclusions
• It is in fact less risky to allow proliferation because the
costs of a first strike increase monotonically w...
conclusions
• This does nothing to prevent terrorism, but we assume
that terrorism will occur anyway.
• Non-proliferation ...
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Spt2011

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Spt2011

  1. 1. Vermelding onderdeel organisatie April 23, 2014 1 Nanotech, Innovation, and Security The case for openness SPT 2011, Denton, TX David Koepsell, Kateřina Staňková Delft University of Technology
  2. 2. April 23, 2014 2 Threats from emerging technologies • States have sought to balance need for open inquiry with fears of proliferating “dual use” technologies • Two underlying, uncontroversial assumptions: • Science requires openness, • but deadly technologies threaten peace and must be contained
  3. 3. April 23, 2014 3 Threats from emerging technologies • Science does require openness, but • do deadly technologies threaten peace and must they be contained? • Must we accept the assumption that containment is • Moral, and • Effective?
  4. 4. April 23, 2014 4 Threats from emerging technologies • Current strategies of containment are built on cold-war reaction to spread of nuclear technologies • The US, having perfected, used and then failing to contain the technology then seeks international sturctures to criminalize its materials and development by non-nuclear states
  5. 5. Containment is immoral • States holding WMD demand other states comply with non-proliferation • This is a form of blackmail, essentially, as the WMD possessors, while promising to reduce their weapons over time have never promised to eliminate their stores. • Possessory states lack the moral authority to demand compliance with non-proliferation regimes April 23, 2014 5
  6. 6. Containment is immoral • Containment assumes that those in possession of weapons are ethically privileged • Containment may also impede or hinder legitimate research by erecting barriers that make that research costly or impractical. • Privileged nations holding potentially dangerous technology write the rules. This raises issues of distributive justice. April 23, 2014 6
  7. 7. Containment is ineffective • States seeking WMD do best to pursue their research in secret, and then emerge with a functioning program only to blackmail other nations on the promise of abandoning their weapons program in exchange for aid, or other reward • New WMD will be even easier to conceal, and verification protocols and success will become even harder April 23, 2014 7
  8. 8. April 23, 2014 8 Cold War MAD strategy • Assumes: A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike; or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second- strike capability with a first strike (i.e., decapitation strike).
  9. 9. April 23, 2014 9 Cold War MAD strategy • To avoid this, countries may design their nuclear forces to make decapitation strikes almost impossible, by dispersing launchers over wide areas and using a combination of sea-based, air-based, underground, and mobile land-based launchers. • Also resulted in mixed strategy (destabilizing) like MIRVs and ABMs
  10. 10. April 23, 2014 10 Cold War MAD strategy • This assumption leads to a bi-polar, multi-strategy arms race (in bi-polar world). This assumption also makes N- player (N>2) games more stable. • Retaliatory strikes by N-players decrease potential for effective first strikes with dispersal of weapons among states. • Nash equilibrium of cold-war (essentially 2-player) standoff is demonstrably less stable than N-player standoff
  11. 11. April 23, 2014 11 Containment is also risky… • Isn’t it risky to allow proliferation beyond a few, responsible states? • Game-theoretic approach to the problem. • Cold War strategies were devised through applying game theory, but it was a two-player game • N-person games show that 2-person game is more risky…
  12. 12. April 23, 2014 12 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • an N-person noncooperative game with countries as players, defined by: • set of players • decision variable for each player • represents “to not attack” • represents “to attack with full force” • objective function for each player (to be maximized) , dependent on expected decisions of the others:
  13. 13. April 23, 2014 13 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • Structure of the objective function for player i : • - profit from attacking • - costs to develop and use weapons • - costs that country $i$ expects to pay for attacking ("punishment'')
  14. 14. April 23, 2014 14 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • profit from attacking - increasing with - zero for - concave with (“risk averse”) - impact factor of the attack
  15. 15. April 23, 2014 15 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • costs to develop and use the weapons - increasing with - zero for - importance factor of the attack costs
  16. 16. April 23, 2014 16 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • “punishment” - zero if no attack takes place, increasing with attack force - expected risk-aversion of other players - expected strength of the punishment from j
  17. 17. April 23, 2014 17 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem The profit for i is then To simplify the analysis, we assume: Player i does not distinguish between other players. Therefore, the expected punishment action does not differ for individual countries.
  18. 18. April 23, 2014 18 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem Then it can be shown that if , (1) i.e., if the punishment strength is bigger than the surplus of player i from attacking (defined as a difference between impact factor of the attack minus costs of the attack), player i will choose , i.e. to not attack. Normalized version of (1) with respect to the number of weapons is
  19. 19. April 23, 2014 19 Game-theoretic formulation of the problem Lemma If , resp. (normalized version) for each , then constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. Please note that higher the number N is, higher chance that holds, as all other parameters are fixed a priori.
  20. 20. Game-theoretic formulation of the problem • If the red curve is above the green curve player i will attack • Occurrence of such event decreases with increasing N, also for a nontrivial situation
  21. 21. conclusions • It is in fact less risky to allow proliferation because the costs of a first strike increase monotonically with respect to the number of states with weapons. • Multi-polar strategies become more limited. As opposed to cold-war stalemate,which actually resulted in arms-race and mixed-strategies, a free market in weapons, and unlimited number of states with weapons, results in greater stability.
  22. 22. conclusions • This does nothing to prevent terrorism, but we assume that terrorism will occur anyway. • Non-proliferation regimes apply mostly to states, as nothing except good intelligence work can locate and try to prevent terrorist use of WMD • Free, open, and hopefully transparent work on development of next-generation WMD will be consistent with ethos of science, and ultimately less risky than attempts to stifle proliferation.

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