9 password security

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9 password security

  1. 1. CHAPTER 9 Password SecuritySlides adapted from "Foundations of Security: What Every ProgrammerNeeds To Know" by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and Anita Kesavan(ISBN 1590597842; http://www.foundationsofsecurity.com). Except asotherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under theCreative Commons 3.0 License.
  2. 2. Agenda Password systems ubiquitous, vulnerable Early password security studies (1979) - Morris, Thompson: 86% of passwords can be cracked Threats: Online & Offline Dictionary Attacks Solutions: Hashing & Salting
  3. 3. 9.1. A Strawman Proposal Basic password system: file w/ username, password records (colon delimiter) john:automobile mary:balloon joe:wepntkas Simple to implement, but risky  All users compromised if hacker gets the passwd file  Done in Java: MiniPasswordManager
  4. 4. 9.1. MiniPasswordManagerpublic class MiniPasswordManager { /** dUserMap is a Hashtable keyed by username */ private static Hashtable dUserMap; /** location of the password file on disk */ private static String dPwdFile; public static void add(String username, String password) throws Exception { dUserMap.put(username, password); } public static boolean checkPassword(String username, String password) { try { String t = (String)dUserMap.get(username); return (t == null) ? false : t.equals(password); } catch (Exception e) {} return false; } ...}
  5. 5. 9.1. MPM: File Managementpublic class MiniPasswordManager { ... /* Password file management operations follow */ public static void init (String pwdFile) throws Exception { dUserMap = MiniPasswordFile.load(pwdFile); dPwdFile = pwdFile; } public static void flush() throws Exception { MiniPasswordFile.store (dPwdFile, dUserMap); } ... // main()}
  6. 6. 9.1. MPM: main()public static void main(String argv[]) { String pwdFile = null; String userName = null; try { pwdFile = argv[0]; userName = argv[1]; init(pwdFile); System.out.print("Enter new password for " + userName + ": "); BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader(System.in)); String password = br.readLine(); add(userName, password); flush(); } catch (Exception e) { if ((pwdFile != null) && (userName != null)) { System.err.println("Error: Could not read or write " + pwdFile); } else { System.err.println("Usage: java MiniPasswordManager" + " <pwdfile> <username>"); } }}
  7. 7. 9.1. MPM Analysis Two key functions: username, password args  add()– add entry to dUserMap hashtable  checkPassword() – lookup in dUserMap Read/Write dUserMap from/to disk using init()/flush() MiniPasswordFile helper class exposes store() and load() methods for these tasks More to do to make secure…
  8. 8. 9.2. Hashing Encrypt passwords, don’t store “in the clear”  Could decrypt (e.g. DES) to check, key storage?  Even better: “one-way encryption”, no way to decrypt  If file stolen, passwords not compromised  Use one-way hash function, h: preimage resistant  Ex: SHA-1 hashes stored in file, not plaintext passwd john:9Mfsk4EQh+XD2lBcCAvputrIuVbWKqbxPgKla7u67oo= mary:AEd62KRDHUXW6tp+XazwhTLSUlADWXrinUPbxQEfnsI= joe:J3mhF7Mv4pnfjcnoHZ1ZrUELjSBJFOo1r6D6fx8tfwU=
  9. 9. 9.2. Hashing Example “What is your username & password?” Does My name is john. My password is automobile. h(automobile) = 9Mfsk4EQ… ??? Hash: “One-way encryption”  No need to (can’t) decrypt  Just compare hashes  Plaintext password not in file, not “in the clear”
  10. 10. 9.2. Hashing MPM Modificationspublic static void add(String username, String password) throws Exception { dUserMap.put(username,computeSHA(password));}public static boolean checkPassword(String username, String password) { try { String t = (String)dUserMap.get(username); return (t == null) ? false : t.equals(computeSHA(password)); } catch (Exception e) {} return false;}private static String computeSHA (String preimage) throws Exception { MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256"); md.update(preimage.getBytes("UTF-8")); byte raw[] = md.digest(); return (new sun.misc.BASE64Encoder().encode(raw));}
  11. 11. 9.3. Off-line Dictionary Attacks Attacker Obtains  Offline: attacker steals file and Password File: tries combos joe 9Mfsk4EQ...  Online: try combos against live mary AEd62KRD... john J3mhF7Mv... system Attacker computes possible password hashes mary has (using words from dictionary) password h(automobile) = 9Mfsk4EQ... balloon! h(aardvark) = z5wcuJWE...Attacker h(balloon) = AEd62KRD... h(doughnut) = tvj/d6R4
  12. 12. 9.4. Salting Salting – include additional info in hash Add third field to file storing random # (salt) Example Entry: john with password automobile john:ScF5GDhWeHr2q5m7mSDuGPVasV2NHz4kuu5n5eyuMbo=:1515 Hash of password concatenated with salt: h(automobile|1515) = ScF5GDhW...
  13. 13. 9.4. Salting Functionspublic static int chooseNewSalt() throws NoSuchAlgorithmException { return getSecureRandom((int)Math.pow(2,12));}/* Returns a cryptographically random number in the range [0,max) */private static int getSecureRandom(int max) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException { SecureRandom sr = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG"); return Math.abs(sr.nextInt()) % max;}public static String getSaltedHash(String pwd, int salt) throws Exception { return computeSHA(pwd + "|" + salt);}
  14. 14. 9.4. Salting in MPM (1)/* Chooses a salt for the user, computes the salted hash of theusers password, and adds a new entry into the userMap hashtable forthe user. */public static void add(String username, String password) throws Exception { int salt = chooseNewSalt(); HashedPasswordTuple ur = new HashedPasswordTuple(getSaltedHash(password,salt),salt); dUserMap.put(username,ur);}public static boolean checkPassword(String username, String password) { try { HashedPasswordTuple t = (HashedPasswordTuple)dUserMap.get(username); return (t == null) ? false : t.getHashedPassword().equals (getSaltedHash(password,t.getSalt())); } catch (Exception e) {} return false;}
  15. 15. 9.4. Salting in MPM (2) dUserMap stores HashedPasswordTuple, hashed password and salt To add(), we chooseNewSalt() to getSecureRandom() number in [0, 4096) getSaltedHash() to compute h(passwd|salt) checkPassword() by comparing hash on file w/ salted hash of input password and salt on file
  16. 16. 9.4. Salting: Good News Dictionary attack against arbitrary user is harder  Before Salts: hash word & compare with password file  After Salts: hash combos of word & possible salts n-word dictionary, k-bit salts, v distinct salts:  Attacker must hash n*min(v, 2k) strings vs. n (no salt)  If many users (>> 2k, all salts used), 2k harder attack!  Approx. same amount of work for password system
  17. 17. 9.4. Off-line Dictionary AttackFoiled! h(automobile2975) = KNVXKOHBDEBKOURX h(automobile1487) = ZNBXLPOEWNVDEJOG h(automobile2764) = ZMCXOSJNFKOFJHKDF h(automobile4012) = DJKOINSLOKDKOLJUS h(automobile3912) = CNVIUDONSOUIEPQN …Etc… h(aardvark2975) = DKOUOXKOUDJWOIQ h(aardvark1487) = PODNJUIHDJSHYEJNU …Etc… Too many /etc/passwd: combinations!!! john LPINSFRABXJYWONF 2975 Attack is mary DOIIDBQBZIDRWNKG 1487 Foiled! joe LDHNSUNELDUALKDY 2764
  18. 18. 9.4. Salting: Bad News Ineffective against chosen-victim attack  Attackerwants to compromise particular account  Just hash dictionary words with victim’s salt Attacker’s job harder, not impossible  Easy for attacker to compute 2kn hashes?  Then offline dictionary attack still a threat.
  19. 19. 9.4. BasicAuthWebServer(BAWS) Adapt (and rename) SimpleWebServer from Ch. 2 to use MiniPasswordManager  Used to implement HTTP authorization  Only authenticated clients can access documents from our server First, create a password file:$ java MiniPasswordManager pwdfile hectorWarning: Could not load password file. #pwdfile doesnt exist yetEnter new password for hector: lotsadiserts$ java com.learnsecurity.MiniPasswordManager pwdfile danEnter new password for dan: cryptguru$ cat pwdfile #now it exists (after hector is added)dan:O70FKijze89PDJtQHM8muKC+aXbUJIM/j8T4viT62rM=:3831hector:laX1pk2KoZy1ze64gUD6rc/pqMuAVmWcKbgdQLL0d7w=:1466
  20. 20. 9.4. HTTP Authorization Client makes request: GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Server requests authentication: HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="BasicAuthWebServer" Client replies with base-64 encoded username/password combo: GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Basic aGVjdG9yOmxvdHNhZGlzZXJ0cw==  Only encoded, not encrypted in basic HTTP auth  Eavesdropper can sniff: HTTP digest authorization and/or SSL can help
  21. 21. 9.4. BAWS Explanation BAWS = BasicAuthWebServer During processRequest(), use getAuthorization() to check Credentials object (stores username and password) Then checkPassword() to determine whether to serveFile() main() method modified to accept password filename from command line
  22. 22. 9.4. BAWS: processRequest()public void processRequest(Socket s) throws Exception { //... some code excluded... if (command.equals("GET")) { // handle GET request Credentials c = getAuthorization(br); if ((c != null) && (MiniPasswordManager.checkPassword(c.getUsername(), c.getPassword()))) { serveFile(osw, pathname); } else { osw.write ("HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized"); osw.write ("WWW-Authenticate: Basic"+ "realm=BasicAuthWebServer"); } } else { //... some code excluded ...}}
  23. 23. 9.4. BAWS: getAuthorization()private Credentials getAuthorization (BufferedReader br) { try { String header = null; while (!(header = br.readLine()).equals("")) { if (header.startsWith("Authorization:")) { StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(header, " "); st.nextToken(); // skip "Authorization" st.nextToken(); // skip "Basic" return new Credentials(st.nextToken()); } } } catch (Exception e) {} return null;}
  24. 24. 9.4. BAWS: main()public static void main (String argv[]) throws Exception { if (argv.length == 1) {// Initialize MiniPasswordManager MiniPasswordManager.init(argv[0]); /* Create a BasicAuthWebServer object, and run it */ BasicAuthWebServer baws = new BasicAuthWebServer(); baws.run(); } else { System.err.println ("Usage: java BasicAuthWebServer"+ "<pwdfile>"); }}
  25. 25. 9.5. Online Dictionary Attacks Attacker actively tries combos on live system Can monitor attacks  Watch for lots of failed attempts  Mark or block suspicious IPs Avoid server verification: sees password in clear  Vulnerableto phishing: impersonator steals password  Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), zero- knowledge proofs avoid sending password  PAKE & zero-knowledge not yet efficient, commercial
  26. 26. 9.6. Additional PasswordSecurity Techniques Several other techniques to help securely manage passwords: Mix and match ones that make sense for particular app Strong Passwords  Limiting Logins “Honeypots”  Artificial Delays Filtering  Last Login Aging  Image Authentication  One-Time Passwords Pronounceable
  27. 27. 9.6.1. Strong Passwords Not concatenation of 1 or more dictionary words Long as possible: letters, numbers, special chars Can create from long phrases:  Ex: “Nothing is really work unless you would rather be doing something else” -> n!rWuUwrbds3  Use 1st letter of each word, transform some chars into visually or phonetically similar ones Protect password file, limit access to admin  UNIX used to store in /etc/passwd (readable by all) 
  28. 28. 9.6.2. “Honeypot” Passwords Simple username/password (guest/guest) combos as “honey” to attract attackers Bait attackers into trying simple combos Alert admin when “booby-trap” triggered Could be indication of attack ID the IP and track to see what they’re up to
  29. 29. 9.6.3. Password Filtering Let user choose password  Within certain restrictions to guarantee stronger password  Ex: if in the dictionary or easy to guess May require mixed case, numbers, special chars  Can specify set of secure passwords through regular expressions  Also set a particular min length
  30. 30. 9.6.4. Aging Passwords Encourage/require users to change passwords every so often  Every time user enters password, potential for attacker to eavesdrop  Changing frequently makes any compromised password of limited-time use to attacker Could “age” passwords by only accepting it a certain number of times But if require change too often, then users will workaround, more insecure
  31. 31. 9.6.5. PronounceablePasswords Users want to choose dictionary words because they’re easy to remember Pronounceable Passwords  Non-dictionary words, but also easy to recall  Syllables & vowels connected together  Gpw package generates examples  e.g. ahrosios, chireckl, harciefy
  32. 32. 9.6.6. Limited Login Attempts Allow just 3-4 logins, then disable or lock account  Attacker only gets fixed number of guesses  Inconvenient to users if they’re forgetful  Legitimate user would have to ask sys admin to unlock or reset their password  Potential for DoS attacks if usernames compromised and attacker guesses randomly for all, locking up large percentage of users of system
  33. 33. 9.6.7 Artificial Delays Artificial delay when user tries login over network Wait 2n seconds after nth failure from particular IP address  Only minor inconvenience to users (it should only take them a couple of tries, 10 seconds delay at most)  But makes attacker’s guesses more costly, decreases number of guesses they can try in fixed time interval HTTP Proxies can be problematic  One user mistyping password may delay another user  Need more sophisticated way to delay
  34. 34. 9.6.8. Last Login Notify user of last login date, time, location each time they login  Educate them to pay attention  Tell user to report any inconsistencies Discrepancies = indications of attacks Catch attacks that may not have been noticed  Ex: Alice usually logs in monthly from CA  Last login was 2 weeks ago in Russia  Alice knows something’s wrong, reports it
  35. 35. 9.6.9. Image Authentication Combat phishing: images as second-factor Ask users to pick image during account creation  Display at login after username is entered  Phisher can’t spoof the image  Educate user to not enter password if he doesn’t see the image he picked Recently deployed by PassMark, used on www.bofa.com and other financial institutions
  36. 36. 9.6.10. One-Time Passwords Multiple uses of password gives attacker multiple opportunities to steal it OTP: login in with different password each time Devices generate passwords to be used each time user logs in  Device uses seed to generate stream of passwords  Server knows seed, current time, can verify password OTP devices integrated into PDAs, cell-phones
  37. 37. Summary Hashing passwords: don’t store in clear Dictionary Attacks: try hashes of common words Salting: add a random #, then hash  Dictionaryattack harder against arbitrary user  But doesn’t help attack against particular victim Other Approaches:  Image Authentication  One-time Passwords  ...

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