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SCONE
Secure CONtainer Environment
Christof Fetzer, TU Dresden, Germany
CC0
1
MOTIVATION
application
serviceprovider
client client
Prevent unauthorized access 2
hardware
old days
firewall
data center
OBJECTIVE: PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY & INTEGRITY
application
serviceprovider
client client
Prevent unauthorized access
3
har...
ONLY ACADEMIC ISSUE?
https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-1050...
GENERAL APPROACH
➤ „Firewall“ around the
application
➤ application-oriented
security
➤ Cloud-Native Applications
➤ set of ...
APPROACH: APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY
µservice … µservice µservice … µservice…
(cloud native) application
serviceprovide...
DEFENDER’S DILEMMA
➤ Attackers:
➤ success by exploiting a
single vulnerability
➤ Defender:
➤ must protect against every
vu...
CLOUD SOFTWARE STACK
➤ Applications run on top of
software stack
➤ millions of lines of code
➤ Cloud stack consists of
➤ V...
VULNERABILITIES
➤ Coverity reports:
➤ 1 defect per 1700 lines of code
➤ Kernel self protection project:
➤ 500 security bug...
APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY
µservice µservice µservice … µservice
cloud-native application
trusted
client client
host
Op...
APPLICATION PROTECTION
➤ Intel SGX protects
application’s
➤ confidentiality
➤ integrity
➤ by preventing accesses to
➤ appli...
SGX PERFORMANCE
CPU
core core
core core
cache
plain text
Extended Page

Cache (EPC)
encrypted
90 MB
cache line cache line
...
SAME PROBLEM: BUGS!
➤ SGX:
➤ prevent accesses via
privileged / other software
➤ Smart adversary:
➤ will exploit bugs insid...
USE OF MICROSERVICES
14
µservice µservice
µservice µservice
µservice µservice
µservice µservice
µservice µservice
TEE
serv...
PROTECTING MICROSERVICE APIS
µservice
external API
+type-safe programming languages
+ extra protection against attacks
sec...
SCONE-BASED CLOUD-NATIVE APPLICATIONS
16
µ-service
closed membership
µ-service
cloud-native application
µ-service µ-servic...
HYBRID APPLICATIONS
17
µ-service
closed membership
µ-service
cloud-native application
µ-service µ-service
TLS
client clien...
CONTAINER WORKFLOW
- ease of use! -
CC0
18
CONTAINER WORKFLOW
19
service provider
extended

Dockerfile
custom
microservice
image
build
secure container
image
CONTAINER WORKFLOW
➤ SCONE cross compilers:
➤ C, C++
➤ Rust
➤ GO
➤ (Fortran)
➤ Docker
➤ to build, ship and deploy images
s...
CONTAINER WORKFLOW
microservice,
libraries
config files
build
curated
microservice
image
image curator
build
service provi...
DOCKER HUB
22
hub.docker.com/explore
…
SCONE CURATED IMAGES (WORK IN PROGRESS)
23
nginx SCONE image
hub.docker.com/explore
…
redis SCONE image
mysql SCONE image
...
CONTAINER WORKFLOW
microservice,
libraries
config files
build
curated
microservice
image
image curator
24
service provider...
SERVICE PROVIDER VS CLOUD PROVIDER
25
Operating system
µ-service
SGX
microservices deployed inside of secure containers
ho...
COMPOSE EXAMPLE
26
HOW TO DISTRIBUTE SECRETS?
➤ State of the art:
➤ put passwords in stack /
compose file
➤ Problem:
➤ Docker engine is not
tr...
EXAMPLE: MYSQL
mysql-master:
environment:
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass
MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger
MYSQL_USER: messenger
MY...
SCONE: SPLIT STACK / COMPOSE FILE
container
containersecure
container
service
stack file
deploy
==
29
split
secure config
...
PROBLEMS?
➤ Stack file
➤ secrets are in the clear
➤ Problems:
➤ service administrators
might leave company
➤ access to secr...
APPROACH: RETRIEVE SECRETS FROM VAULT
container
containersecure
container
service
stack file
deploy
==
31
split
secure con...
EXAMPLE: INTEGRATION WITH VAULTmysql-master:
environment:
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: $mysql_root_pw
MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger
MY...
PERFORMANCE
SGX impact
CC0
33
SCONE
➤ Performance optimisations:
➤ asynchronous interface: minimise enclave exits
➤ syscalls executed by external thread...
Memcached Throughput
35
Latency(milliseconds)
0
0,75
1,5
2,25
3
Throughput (operations / second)
0 75000 150000 225000 300...
Memcached CPU
36
CPUUtilization(%)
0
200
400
600
800
Throughput (operations / second)
0 75000 150000 225000 300000
glibc +...
Redis Throughput
37
Latency(milliseconds)
0
1
2
3
4
Throughput (operations / second)
0 50000 100000 150000 200000
glibc + ...
Performance Overview
38
Application Throughput w.r.t. native
async (%) sync (%)
Memcached 120 113
Apache 80 70
NGINX 80 36...
Performance Improvement
39
Application Throughput w.r.t. native
async (%) sync (%)
Memcached 120 113
Apache 80 70
NGINX 80...
SCONE SUMMARY
➤ ease of use:
➤ look and feel like Docker
➤ security:
➤ based on Intel SGX
➤ compiler extensions (bounds ch...
ADVERTISEMENT
➤ If you want to evaluate SCONE:
➤ now: SCONE cross compilers
➤ June: extended Docker compose
➤ I’m looking
...
CC0
docker	pull	sconecuratedimages/sconedocu	
docker	run	-d	-p	8080:80		sconecuratedimages/sconedocu	
open	http://127.0.0....
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DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 1 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 2 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 3 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 4 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 5 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 6 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 7 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 8 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 9 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 10 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 11 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 12 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 13 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 14 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 15 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 16 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 17 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 18 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 19 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 20 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 21 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 22 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 23 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 24 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 25 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 26 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 27 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 28 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 29 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 30 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 31 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 32 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 33 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 34 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 35 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 36 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 37 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 38 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 39 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 40 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 41 DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX Slide 42
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DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX

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In multi-tenant environments, Linux containers managed by Docker or Kubernetes have a lower resource footprint, faster startup times, and higher I/O performance compared to virtual machines (VMs) on hypervisors. Yet their weaker isolation guarantees, enforced through software kernel mechanisms, make it easier for attackers to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of application data within containers.

We describe SCONE, a secure container mechanism for Docker that uses the SGX trusted execution support of Intel CPUs to protect container processes from outside attacks. The design of SCONE leads to (i) a small trusted computing base (TCB) and (ii) a low performance overhead: SCONE offers a secure C standard library interface that transparently encrypts/decrypts I/O data; to reduce the performance impact of thread synchronization and system calls within SGX enclaves, SCONE supports user-level threading and asynchronous system calls. Our evaluation shows that it protects unmodified applications with SGX, achieving 0.6x - 1.2x of native throughput.

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DevDay 2017: Christof Fetzer - SCONE: Secure Linux Container Environments with Intel SGX

  1. 1. SCONE Secure CONtainer Environment Christof Fetzer, TU Dresden, Germany CC0 1
  2. 2. MOTIVATION application serviceprovider client client Prevent unauthorized access 2 hardware old days firewall data center
  3. 3. OBJECTIVE: PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY & INTEGRITY application serviceprovider client client Prevent unauthorized access 3 hardware today application cloud client client data center
  4. 4. ONLY ACADEMIC ISSUE? https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/ windows
 VMWare
 hypervisor bug in Windows 10 bug in VMware
 Workstation 2017 hacking contest application Linux
 4
  5. 5. GENERAL APPROACH ➤ „Firewall“ around the application ➤ application-oriented security ➤ Cloud-Native Applications ➤ set of microservices 5
  6. 6. APPROACH: APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY µservice … µservice µservice … µservice… (cloud native) application serviceprovider client client ➤ Protect application ➤ integrity ➤ confidentiality 6 External API
  7. 7. DEFENDER’S DILEMMA ➤ Attackers: ➤ success by exploiting a single vulnerability ➤ Defender: ➤ must protect against every vulnerability ➤ not only in application ➤ millions of lines of source code CC0 cloud software stack Hypervisor Operating system Application CloudStack System libraries Application libraries MaaS node … 7
  8. 8. CLOUD SOFTWARE STACK ➤ Applications run on top of software stack ➤ millions of lines of code ➤ Cloud stack consists of ➤ VM/container engine ➤ operating system ➤ hypervisor ➤ node management service Linux: > 20 millions line StefanPohl, CC0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=41549243 https://www.openhub.net/p/openstack/analyses/latest/languages_summary OpenStack 8
  9. 9. VULNERABILITIES ➤ Coverity reports: ➤ 1 defect per 1700 lines of code ➤ Kernel self protection project: ➤ 500 security bugs fixed in Linux during the last 5 years ➤ each bug stayed about 5 years inside kernel ➤ Coverity: ➤ quality of closed source software is not better than open source software [Coverity] Open Source Report 2014 - Coverity, go.coverity.com/rs/157-LQW.../2014-Coverity-Scan-Report.pdf [KSPP] Kees Cook, The State of Kernel Self Protection Project, Linux Security Summit (LSS), 2016 9
  10. 10. APPLICATION-ORIENTED SECURITY µservice µservice µservice … µservice cloud-native application trusted client client host Operating system Container Engine Hypervisor 10 external API internal API µservice host … untrusted
  11. 11. APPLICATION PROTECTION ➤ Intel SGX protects application’s ➤ confidentiality ➤ integrity ➤ by preventing accesses to ➤ application state ➤ encrypting main memory Application System libraries Application libraries Intel SGX enclave ContainerEngine SGX protects application from accesses
 from outside host Operating system Container Engine Hypervisor 11
  12. 12. SGX PERFORMANCE CPU core core core core cache plain text Extended Page
 Cache (EPC) encrypted 90 MB cache line cache line page main memory encrypted page 8MB native speed slower slow! paging load encrypted 12
  13. 13. SAME PROBLEM: BUGS! ➤ SGX: ➤ prevent accesses via privileged / other software ➤ Smart adversary: ➤ will exploit bugs inside application code TEE application secret external API same address space 13
  14. 14. USE OF MICROSERVICES 14 µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice µservice TEE service secretsecret access only through internal API external API external API same address space separate address spaces
  15. 15. PROTECTING MICROSERVICE APIS µservice external API +type-safe programming languages + extra protection against attacks secret µservice secret internal API +no access to internal APIs + intrusion detection by monitoring internal and external APIs 15
  16. 16. SCONE-BASED CLOUD-NATIVE APPLICATIONS 16 µ-service closed membership µ-service cloud-native application µ-service µ-service TLS client client encrypted file encrypted file encrypted file encrypted file TLS encrypted
 files TLS external API internal API client client TLS
  17. 17. HYBRID APPLICATIONS 17 µ-service closed membership µ-service cloud-native application µ-service µ-service TLS client client encrypted file encrypted file encrypted file encrypted file TLS encrypted
 files TLS external API internal API client client TLS not all microservices are critical standard container secure container
  18. 18. CONTAINER WORKFLOW - ease of use! - CC0 18
  19. 19. CONTAINER WORKFLOW 19 service provider extended
 Dockerfile custom microservice image build secure container image
  20. 20. CONTAINER WORKFLOW ➤ SCONE cross compilers: ➤ C, C++ ➤ Rust ➤ GO ➤ (Fortran) ➤ Docker ➤ to build, ship and deploy images service provider extended
 Dockerfile custom microservice image build SCONE cross compiler image uses secure container image 20
  21. 21. CONTAINER WORKFLOW microservice, libraries config files build curated microservice image image curator build service provider extended
 Dockerfile custom microservice image 21
  22. 22. DOCKER HUB 22 hub.docker.com/explore …
  23. 23. SCONE CURATED IMAGES (WORK IN PROGRESS) 23 nginx SCONE image hub.docker.com/explore … redis SCONE image mysql SCONE image mongo SCONE image SCONE images are shielded and tuned for SGX
  24. 24. CONTAINER WORKFLOW microservice, libraries config files build curated microservice image image curator 24 service provider extended
 Dockerfile custom microservice image container container container container containersecure container application service provider stack file deploy == customize build development operations
  25. 25. SERVICE PROVIDER VS CLOUD PROVIDER 25 Operating system µ-service SGX microservices deployed inside of secure containers host/VM Operating system host/VM Operating system host/VM … … MaaS/ 
 IaaS CaaS Container Engine Container Engine Container Engine … Container Swarm untrusted cloudproviderserviceprovider untrusted µ-service SGX cloud-native applicationintegrity & confidentiality µ-service SGX … µ-service SGX availability
  26. 26. COMPOSE EXAMPLE 26
  27. 27. HOW TO DISTRIBUTE SECRETS? ➤ State of the art: ➤ put passwords in stack / compose file ➤ Problem: ➤ Docker engine is not trusted mysql-master: environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger tty: true tty-key: mysecret image: mysql MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: topsecret stdin_open: true Bad practice to put secrets in compose file! 27
  28. 28. EXAMPLE: MYSQL mysql-master: environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger tty: true tty-key: mysecret image: mysql MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: topsecret stdin_open: true mysql-master: environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger tty-key: mysecret MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: topsecret mysql-master: environment: APPID: 012345 tty: true image: mysql stdin_open: true secrets no-secrets split DOCKER SCONE
  29. 29. SCONE: SPLIT STACK / COMPOSE FILE container containersecure container service stack file deploy == 29 split secure config stack file secrets no secrets get(sig_CPU) CAS Configuration & Attestation Service configurationTLS
  30. 30. PROBLEMS? ➤ Stack file ➤ secrets are in the clear ➤ Problems: ➤ service administrators might leave company ➤ access to secrets by root ➤ Approach: ➤ delegate keys to key store like vault mysql-master: environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpass MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: messenger tty: true tty-key: mysecret image: mysql MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: topsecret stdin_open: true 30
  31. 31. APPROACH: RETRIEVE SECRETS FROM VAULT container containersecure container service stack file deploy == 31 split secure config stack file secrets no secrets pull CAS pull Vault HashiCorp’s enclaved enclaved
  32. 32. EXAMPLE: INTEGRATION WITH VAULTmysql-master: environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: $mysql_root_pw MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: $messenger_pw tty: true tty-key: $tty_key image: mysql MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: $fspfkey secrets: mysql_root_pw: vault: ascii messenger_pw: vault: ascii tty_key: vault: AES256 fspfkey: vault: AES256 mysql-master: environment: APPID: 012345 tty: true image: mysql no secrets no-secrets environment: MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: xU0932hd… MYSQL_DATABASE: messenger MYSQL_USER: messenger MYSQL_PASSWORD: 9S3jDh1… tty-key: 0AF1B… MRENCLAVE: 0x3394940494 FSPFKEY: 3HDJejh… secrets split extended stack file config file DOCKER
  33. 33. PERFORMANCE SGX impact CC0 33
  34. 34. SCONE ➤ Performance optimisations: ➤ asynchronous interface: minimise enclave exits ➤ syscalls executed by external threads ➤ TLS extensions (new) ➤ support pre-encrypted memory blocks ➤ Autotuner (new) ➤ find „optimal“ values for tuning parameters 34
  35. 35. Memcached Throughput 35 Latency(milliseconds) 0 0,75 1,5 2,25 3 Throughput (operations / second) 0 75000 150000 225000 300000 glibc + stunnel async sync inline encryption has less overhead than TLS proxy 1.2× •YCSB workload A (50/50) •Data fits into EPC TLS API
  36. 36. Memcached CPU 36 CPUUtilization(%) 0 200 400 600 800 Throughput (operations / second) 0 75000 150000 225000 300000 glibc + stunnel async sync TLS API
  37. 37. Redis Throughput 37 Latency(milliseconds) 0 1 2 3 4 Throughput (operations / second) 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 glibc + stunnel async sync 0.2× 0.6× TLS API
  38. 38. Performance Overview 38 Application Throughput w.r.t. native async (%) sync (%) Memcached 120 113 Apache 80 70 NGINX 80 36 Redis 60 20 inline encryption has less overhead inline encryption hurts performance with single thread
  39. 39. Performance Improvement 39 Application Throughput w.r.t. native async (%) sync (%) Memcached 120 113 Apache 80 70 NGINX 80 36 Redis >80? 20 current work: TLS offloading
  40. 40. SCONE SUMMARY ➤ ease of use: ➤ look and feel like Docker ➤ security: ➤ based on Intel SGX ➤ compiler extensions (bounds checker, limit accesses) ➤ performance reasonable (as long as microservice fits in EPC) ➤ combine with horizontal scaling if needed ➤ practical approach ➤ note: Intel SGX EPC will increase next year… 40
  41. 41. ADVERTISEMENT ➤ If you want to evaluate SCONE: ➤ now: SCONE cross compilers ➤ June: extended Docker compose ➤ I’m looking ➤ for PhD students and PostDocs ➤ for developers who want to join a SCONE startup ➤ Check out the SCONE documentation 41 ➤ christof.fetzer@gmail.com docker pull sconecuratedimages/sconedocu docker run -d -p 8080:80 sconecuratedimages/sconedocu open http://127.0.0.1:8080
  42. 42. CC0 docker pull sconecuratedimages/sconedocu docker run -d -p 8080:80 sconecuratedimages/sconedocu open http://127.0.0.1:8080 42
  • zedoul

    Aug. 29, 2019

In multi-tenant environments, Linux containers managed by Docker or Kubernetes have a lower resource footprint, faster startup times, and higher I/O performance compared to virtual machines (VMs) on hypervisors. Yet their weaker isolation guarantees, enforced through software kernel mechanisms, make it easier for attackers to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of application data within containers. We describe SCONE, a secure container mechanism for Docker that uses the SGX trusted execution support of Intel CPUs to protect container processes from outside attacks. The design of SCONE leads to (i) a small trusted computing base (TCB) and (ii) a low performance overhead: SCONE offers a secure C standard library interface that transparently encrypts/decrypts I/O data; to reduce the performance impact of thread synchronization and system calls within SGX enclaves, SCONE supports user-level threading and asynchronous system calls. Our evaluation shows that it protects unmodified applications with SGX, achieving 0.6x - 1.2x of native throughput.

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