OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESSMilitary and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2013Office of the Secretary of DefensePreparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal Years 2012-2013.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaAnnual Report to Congress:Military and Security Developments Involvingthe People’s Republic of China 2013A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 2000Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amendsthe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides thatthe Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military andsecurity developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current andprobable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenetsand probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizationsand operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also addressU.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,including through U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement andcooperation in the future.”
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaExecutive Summary
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaiTHE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)continues to pursue a long-term,comprehensive military modernizationprogram designed to improve the capacity ofits armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional militaryconflict. Preparing for potential conflict in theTaiwan Strait appears to remain the principalfocus and primary driver of China’s militaryinvestment. However, as China’s interestshave grown and as it has gained greaterinfluence in the international system, itsmilitary modernization has also becomeincreasingly focused on investments in militarycapabilities to conduct a wider range ofmissions beyond its immediate territorialconcerns, including counter-piracy,peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disasterrelief, and regional military operations. Someof these missions and capabilities can addressinternational security challenges, while otherscould serve more narrowly-defined PRCinterests and objectives, including advancingterritorial claims and building influence abroad.To support the Chinese People’s LiberationArmy’s (PLA) expanding set of roles andmissions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustainedinvestment in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspacecapabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (whatPLA strategists refer to as “counter-intervention operations”). The PLA alsocontinued to improve capabilities in nucleardeterrence and long-range conventional strike;advanced fighter aircraft; limited regionalpower projection, with the commissioning ofChina’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning;integrated air defenses; undersea warfare;improved command and control; and moresophisticated training and exercises acrossChina’s air, naval, and land forces.During their January 2011 summit, U.S.President Barack Obama and then-PRCPresident Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a“healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-militaryrelationship is an essential part of [their] sharedvision for a positive, cooperative, andcomprehensive U.S.-China relationship.”Within that framework, the U.S. Departmentof Defense seeks to build a military-to-militaryrelationship with China that is sustained andsubstantive, while encouraging China tocooperate with the United States, our allies andpartners, and the greater internationalcommunity in the delivery of public goods. Asthe United States builds a stronger foundationfor a military-to-military relationship withChina, it also will continue to monitor China’sevolving military strategy, doctrine, and forcedevelopment and encourage China to be moretransparent about its military modernizationprogram. In concert with its allies and partners,the United States will continue adapting itsforces, posture, and operational concepts tomaintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacificsecurity environment.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaContents
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaExecutive Summary iChapter 1: Annual Update 1Chapter 2: Understanding China’s Strategy 15Chapter 3: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 29Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization 45Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 55Chapter 6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 61Special Topic: Space-Based Imaging and Remote Sensing 65Special Topic: China’s First Aircraft Carrier 65Special Topic: PLA Air Force Stealth Aircraft 66Special Topic: PLA Integrated Air Defenses 67Appendix I: Military-to-Military Exchanges 69Appendix II: China and Taiwan Forces Data 75Appendix III: Additional Maps and Chart 79
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China1ANNUAL UPDATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China1DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’SBILATERAL OR MULTILATERALRELATIONSHIPSChina’s military engagement with othercountries seeks to enhance China’sinternational presence and influence byimproving relationships with foreign militaries,bolstering China’s international and regionalimage, and assuaging other countries’concerns about China’s rise. The People’sLiberation Army’s (PLA) engagementactivities assist its modernization through theacquisition of advanced weapons systems andtechnologies, increased operational experienceboth throughout and beyond Asia, and accessto foreign military practices, operationaldoctrine, and training methods.In January 2013, China’s Ministry of NationalDefense released information about the PLA’s2012 military diplomacy, which it stated hadstood severe tests under a difficultinternational and regional situationthroughout the year. In 2012, senior militaryofficials from at least 25 countries visitedChina, including officials from Australia,Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Senior PLAofficials visited at least 33 countries, includingIndia, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. ThePLA participated in UN peacekeepingoperations (PKO), carried out humanitarianassistance and disaster relief work in Pakistanand conducted the second global goodwillvoyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG HEtraining vessel. PLA leaders participated invarious multilateral meetings, including theDefense Ministers’ Meeting of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) and theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum Security PolicyConference.Combined Exercises. PLA participation inbilateral and multilateral exercises isincreasing. The PLA derives political benefitthrough increased influence and enhanced tieswith partner states and organizations. Suchexercises provide the PLA opportunities toimprove capabilities and gain operationalinsights by observing tactics, commanddecision-making, and equipment used bymore advanced militaries.In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21 jointexercise and training events with foreignmilitaries, compared to 32 during the entire11thFive-Year Plan period (2006-2010). Theseactivities included military exercises with SCOmembers, naval exercises, ground forcestraining, peacekeeping, and search and rescueoperations/missions. China also conductedjoint training for operations other than war,including the 2011 COOPERATION SPIRIThumanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR) exercise with Australia. Chinaobserved KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeepingexercise in Mongolia – the first time it haddone so. The PLA Navy conducted maritimeexercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand
and counter-piracy exercises with France andthe United States.The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conductedunprecedented bilateral training during 2011,including its first bilateral air exercise withPakistan and training with air forces in Belarusand Venezuela. In contrast, the PLA AirForce participated in only one bilateralexercise in 2012 – an airborne trainingexercise with Belarus in November. PEACEMISSION 2012, conducted under theauspices of the SCO, did not include PLA AirForce participation as in the past, and insteadfocused on what SCO nations called“counterterrorism” training, which moreclosely resembles training to suppress armedopposition within a member country.Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Overthe past ten years, China has increased itscommitment to UN PKO by approximatelyten fold, building to its current level ofapproximately 2,000 personnel in 11operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa andthe Middle East. This level of support hasbeen steadily maintained since 2008 and is thehighest among the permanent members of theUN Security Council. In total, China hasdeployed more than 21,000 troops to 30 UNmissions and bears 3.93 percent of the UN’scurrent peacekeeping budget of $7.23 billion.PKO participation can serve variousobjectives, including improving China’sinternational image, obtaining operationalexperience, providing opportunities to gatherintelligence, and advancing the PLA’s “NewHistoric Missions” by taking on roles andgenerating capabilities for operations farbeyond China’s borders. China is currentlytaking steps to meet these objectives bycommitting civilian police, military observers,engineers, logistics support, and medicaltroops to UN missions while abstaining frommissions that might result in regime change orlack host country consent.In 2012, China for the first time deployedinfantry to a UN PKO. This “guard unit,” asChinese media described it, is tasked withsecurity for the PLA engineering and medicalformed military units in its contingentdeployed to the United Nations Mission inthe Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).These forces, likely no more than 50personnel from the 162ndMotorized InfantryDivision, are equipped with armored vehicles,enabling them to provide fixed-site securityand convoy escorts.Chinese Arms Sales. From 2007 to 2011,Chinese arms sales totaled approximately $11billion. As of this report’s publication, datafor 2012 arms sales was not yet available.China primarily conducts arms sales inconjunction with economic aid anddevelopment assistance to support broaderforeign-policy goals such as securing access tonatural resources and export markets,promoting its increasing political influenceamong host-country elites, and building
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China3support in international forums. Arms sales,however, also can reflect the profit-seekingactivities of individual arms trading companiesand efforts to offset defense-related researchand development costs. For example, Chinacontinues to develop and market unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012,unveiled a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long,which will likely be marketed to developingcountries.From the perspective of China’s armscustomers (most of whom are developingcountries), Chinese arms are less expensivethan those offered by the top internationalarms suppliers, although they are alsogenerally of lower quality and reliability.Chinese arms also come with fewer politicalstrings attached, which is attractive to thosecustomers who may not have access to othersources of arms for political or economicreasons. China also offers relatively generousterms and flexible payment options to somecustomers.Counter-Piracy Efforts. China continues tosupport counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf ofAden, a commitment which began inDecember 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navydeployed its 12th escort formation, whichincluded two guided missile frigates and oneoiler. Operational highlights for thisformation included the retrieval of 26 crewmembers of the fishing vessel Xufu-1 fromSomalia following their release by pirates inJuly 2012 (an operation that was recognizedby China’s Central Military Commission); andthe first combined counter-piracy exercisewith the U.S. Navy. After its departure fromthe Gulf of Aden, the 11thescort formationvisited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the firsttime for the PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgariaand Israel. Ships engaged in counter-piracyalso conducted port calls in Australia,Mozambique, and Thailand during 2012.Territorial Disputes. Senior Chinese officialshave identified protecting China’s sovereigntyand territorial integrity as a “core interest” andall officials repeatedly state China’s oppositionto and willingness to respond to actions itperceives as challenging this core interest. In2012, this was demonstrated by Chineseactions at Scarborough Reef in the SouthChina Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the EastChina Sea.The Chinese government maintains that itsmaritime rights extend to virtually the entireSouth China Sea and often illustrates thisclaim using a “nine-dash line” thatencompasses much of the South China Seaarea. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguousabout the precise meaning of the nine-dashline; to date, China has not clarified themeaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis.In April 2012, Chinese maritime lawenforcement vessels and Philippine coastguard vessels engaged in a protracted standoffat Scarborough Reef, after the PhilippineNavy attempted to conduct a fishingenforcement action against Chinese fishermen.
Although overt tensions between China andthe Philippines subsided by year’s end, bothsides continue to claim jurisdiction over thereef. Chinese law enforcement vessels havemaintained an almost continuous presenceever since.In November 2012, China also added a mapwhich contained the nine-dash line to all of itsnew passports. This action elicited negativeresponses from other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s increased reference inofficial government materials to the nine-dashline is a source of concern to its neighborsand other nations because, at a minimum, itcreates an impression that China is not merelyclaiming all the land features within the nine-dash line, but it may also be claiming a specialsovereign status of all the water and the sea-bed contained therein.China claims sovereignty over the SenkakuIslands (what the Chinese refer to as theDiaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea,territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan.In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyoannounced plans to purchase three of the fiveislets from private Japanese owners. Inresponse, in September 2012, theGovernment of Japan purchased the threeislands. China protested the move and sincethat time has regularly sent maritime lawenforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) topatrol near the Senkakus to protect its claims;this has included regular Chinese maritimeoperations within 12nm of the islands. OnSeptember 25, China published a white paperentitled, “Diaoyu Dao, an ’Inherent Territory’of China.” In addition, in September 2012,China began using improperly drawn straightbaseline claims around the Senkaku Islands,adding to its network of maritime claimsinconsistent with international law. InDecember 2012, China submitted informationto the U.N. Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf regarding China’s extendedcontinental shelf in the East China Sea thatincludes the disputed islands.THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THETAIWAN STRAITDealing with a potential contingency in theTaiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primarymission despite decreasing tensions there - atrend which continued following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou inJanuary 2012. In this context, shoulddeterrence fail, the PLA could be called uponto compel Taiwan to abandon independenceor to re-unify with the mainland by force ofarms while defeating any third-partyintervention on Taiwan’s behalf.Cross-Strait Stability. China and Taiwanhave reached 18 agreements for cross-Straitcooperation on economic, cultural, andfunctional issues, but Taiwan authorities andthe broader Taiwan public do not supportnegotiation on issues directly related tosovereignty.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China5China and Taiwan have also undertaken somecombined security and police operations, andheld a combined maritime rescue exercise inAugust 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sidesequally represented. Also in August, Chineseand Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects ina human-trafficking and prostitution ring – afirst collaborative effort to combat humantrafficking.During a mid-October 2011 speech, PresidentMa stated that a cross-Strait peace agreementwith China might be attainable in 10 years, butbacked down immediately in the face ofwidespread negative public reaction and Maspecified the conditions under which hewould pursue such an agreement. Despiteoccasional signs of impatience, China appearscontent to respect Taiwan’s current approachto cross-Strait relations. In November 2012,Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected generalsecretary of the CCP Central Committee senta message to President Ma (in the latter’scapacity as chairman of the rulingKuomintang Party), emphasizing the need tocontinue promoting the peaceful developmentof cross-Strait relations. This early messagesuggests that China under Xi Jinping may bewilling to follow President Hu Jintao’s multi-pronged strategy for developing cross-Straitrelations rather than compelling unificationthrough the use of force. President Hu in hisreport to the 18thParty Congress inNovember 2012 used language that promotedpeaceful reunification and called for bothsides to explore political relations and makereasonable arrangements to discuss thecreation of a military confidence-buildingmechanism.CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THEPEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMYSecond Artillery. The Second Artillerycontrols China’s nuclear and conventionalballistic missiles. It is developing and testingseveral new classes and variants of offensivemissiles, forming additional missile units,upgrading older missile systems, anddeveloping methods to counter ballisticmissile defenses.By December 2012, the Second Artillery’sinventory of short-range ballistic missiles(SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwanstood at more than 1,100. This numberreflects the delivery of additional missiles andthe fielding of new systems. To improve thelethality of this force, the PLA is alsointroducing new SRBM variants withimproved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.China is fielding a limited but growingnumber of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21Danti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)and gives the PLA the capability to attacklarge ships, including aircraft carriers, in the
western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has arange exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with amaneuverable warhead.The Second Artillery continues to modernizeits nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) andadding more survivable mobile deliverysystems. In recent years, the road-mobile,solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service.The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of11,200 km, can reach most locations withinthe continental United States. China may alsobe developing a new road-mobile ICBM,possibly capable of carrying a multipleindependently targetable re-entry vehicle(MIRV).PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLA Navy has thelargest force of major combatants,submarines, and amphibious warfare ships inAsia. China’s naval forces include some 79principal surface combatants, more than 55submarines, 55 medium and large amphibiousships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped smallcombatants.In the most publicized PLA Navymodernization event of 2012, after a year ofextensive sea trials, China commissioned itsfirst aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September2012. The PLA Navy successfully conductedits first launch and recovery of the carrier-capable J-15 fighter on November 26, 2012.The Liaoning will continue integration testingand training with the aircraft during the nextseveral years, but it is not expected to embarkan operational air wing until 2015 or later.China also continues to pursue an indigenousaircraft carrier program (the Liaoning is arefurbished vessel, purchased from Ukraine in1998), and will likely build multiple aircraftcarriers over the next decade. The firstChinese-built carrier will likely be operationalsometime in the second half of this decade.The PLA Navy places a high priority on themodernization of its submarine force. Chinacontinues the production of JIN-classnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines(SSBN). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094)are currently operational, and up to five mayenter service before China proceeds to its nextgeneration SSBN (Type 096) over the nextdecade. The JIN-class SSBN will carry thenew JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missilewith an estimated range of more than 4,000nm. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give thePLA Navy its first credible sea-based nucleardeterrent.China also has expanded its force of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). TwoSHANG-class SSNs (Type 093) are already inservice, and China is building four improvedvariants of the SHANG-class SSN, which willreplace the aging HAN-class SSNs (Type091). In the next decade, China will likelyconstruct the Type 095 guided-missile attacksubmarine (SSGN), which may enable a
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China7submarine-based land-attack capability. Inaddition to likely incorporating better quietingtechnologies, the Type 095 will fulfilltraditional anti-ship roles with theincorporation of torpedoes and anti-shipcruise missiles (ASCMs).The current mainstay of the Chinesesubmarine force is modern diesel poweredattack submarines (SS). In addition to 12KILO-class submarines acquired from Russiain the 1990s and 2000s (eight of which areequipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM), the PLANavy possesses 13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)and eight YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). TheYUAN-class SSP is armed similarly to theSONG-class SS, but also includes an air-independent power system. China may planto construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.Since 2008, the PLA Navy has embarked on arobust surface combatant constructionprogram of various classes of ships, includingguided missile destroyers (DDG) and guidedmissile frigates (FFG). During 2012, Chinacontinued series production of several classes,including construction of a new generation ofDDG. Construction of the LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued, with oneship entering service in 2012, and anadditional three ships under various stages ofconstruction and sea trials, bringing the totalnumber of ships of this class to six by the endof 2013. Additionally, China launched thelead ship in a follow-on class, the LUYANGIII- class DDG (Type 052D), which will likelyenter service in 2014. The LUYANG IIIincorporates the PLA Navy’s firstmultipurpose vertical launch system, likelycapable of launching ASCM, land attack cruisemissiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles(SAM), and anti-submarine rockets. China isprojected to build more than a dozen of theseships to replace its aging LUDA-classdestroyers (DD). China has continued theconstruction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A), with 12 shipscurrently in the fleet and six or more invarious stages of construction, and yet moreexpected. These new DDGs and FFGsprovide a significant upgrade to the PLANavy’s area air defense capability, which willbe critical as it expands operations into“distant seas” beyond the range of shore-based air defense.Augmenting the PLA Navy’s littoral warfarecapabilities, especially in the South China Seaand East China Sea, is a new class of smallcombatant. At least six of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056) werelaunched in 2012. The first of these shipsentered service on February 25, 2013; Chinamay build 20 to 30 of this class. These FFLsaugment the 60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercingcatamaran missile patrol boats (PTG) (Type022), each capable of carrying eight YJ-83ASCMs, for operations in littoral waters.The PLA Navy also increased its amphibiousforce in 2012. Two YUZHAO-classamphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type
071) were accepted into service during theyear bringing the total of YUZHAO LPDs tothree.PLA Air Force (PLAAF). China basesapproximately 500 combat aircraft withinunrefueled operational range of Taiwan andhas the airfield capacity to expand thatnumber by hundreds. China continues tofield increasingly modern 4thgenerationaircraft, but the force still consists mostly ofolder 2ndand 3rdgeneration aircraft, orupgraded variants of those aircraft.Within two years of the J-20 stealth fighter’sfirst flight in January 2011, China tested asecond next generation fighter prototype.The prototype, referred to as the “J-31,” issimilar in size to a U.S. F-35 fighter andappears to incorporate design characteristicssimilar to the J-20. It conducted its first flighton October 31, 2012.China continues upgrading its H-6 bomberfleet (originally adapted from the late 1950sSoviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant thatpossesses greater range and will be armedwith a long-range cruise missile. China alsouses a modified version of the H-6 aircraft toconduct aerial refueling operations for manyof its indigenous aircraft, increasing theircombat range.The PLA Air Force possesses one of thelargest forces of advanced SAM systems in theworld, consisting of a combination ofRussian-sourced SA-20 battalions anddomestically produced HQ-9 battalions.China’s aviation industry is developing a largetransport aircraft (likely referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s small fleet ofstrategic airlift assets, which currently consistsof a limited number of Russian-made IL-76aircraft. These heavy lift transports areneeded to support airborne command andcontrol (C2), logistics, paradrop, aerialrefueling, and reconnaissance operations, aswell as humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief missions.Developments in China’s commercial andmilitary aviation industry indicate improvedaircraft manufacturing, associated technology,and systems development capabilities. Someof these advances have been made possible bybusiness partnerships with Western aviationand aerospace firms (including cleared U.S.defense contractors), which provide overallbenefit to China’s military aerospace industry.China will continue to seek advancement inaerospace technology, capability, andproficiency to rival Western capabilities.PLA Ground Force. The PLA is investingheavily in modernizing its ground force,emphasizing the ability to deploy campaign-level forces across long distances quickly. Thismodernization is playing out with wide-scalerestructuring of PLA ground forces thatincludes a more rapid, flexible specialoperations force equipped with advanced
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China9technology; improved army aviation unitsutilizing ultra-low altitude mobility helicoptersarmed with precision-guided munitions; andcommand and control (C2) capabilities withimproved networks providing real-time datatransmissions within and between units. Inaddition, the PLA has focused itsmodernization efforts on transforming from amotorized to a mechanized force, as well asimproving the ground force’s armored, airdefense, aviation, ground-air coordination,and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. PLAground forces have benefited from increasedproduction of new equipment, including theZ-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. New airdefense equipment includes the PLA groundforce’s first medium-range SAM, the CSA-16,as well as domestically-produced CSA-15s (acopy of the Russian SA-15) and a newadvanced self-propelled air defense artillerysystem, the PGZ-07. PLA ground forcerestructuring is highlighted by thedevelopment of brigades as a key operationalechelon for combat in diverse terrain andunder complex electromagnetic conditions.The ground force is a proponent of jointoperations since it requires transport fromother forces to operate beyond China’sborders. To assist with its power projectionneeds, PLA ground forces have practicedusing commercial transport assets such as roll-on/roll-off ships, to conduct maritimecrossing operations. However, broader jointoperations capability are still the primary goalfor the ground force, a goal that is now amandate for all the military services followingthe General Staff Department’s (GSD)December 2011 creation of the MilitaryTraining Department to oversee all PLAtraining, ensuring all military services realizethe “prominence of joint training.”Space Capabilities. In 2012, Chinaconducted 18 space launches. China alsoexpanded its space-based intelligence,surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation,meteorological, and communications satelliteconstellations. In parallel, China is developinga multi-dimensional program to improve itscapabilities to limit or prevent the use ofspace-based assets by adversaries during timesof crisis or conflict.During 2012, China launched six Beidounavigation satellites. These six satellitescompleted the regional network as well as thein-orbit validation phase for the globalnetwork, expected to be completed by 2020.China launched 11 new remote sensingsatellites in 2012, which can perform bothcivil and military applications. China alsolaunched three communications satellites, fiveexperimental small satellites, onemeteorological satellite, one relay satellite, anda manned space mission.China continues to develop the Long March 5(LM-5) rocket, which is intended to lift heavypayloads into space. LM-5 will more thandouble the size of the Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)payloads China is capable of placing intoorbit. To support these rockets, China beganconstructing the Wenchang Satellite LaunchCenter in 2008. Located on Hainan Island,this launch facility is expected to be completearound 2013, with the initial LM-5 launchscheduled for 2014.Military Information Operations. Chinesewritings have outlined the five key features atan operational level of a maturing Chineseinformation operations (IO) strategy. First,Chinese authors emphasize defense as the toppriority and indicate that Computer NetworkDefense (CND) must be the highest priorityin peacetime; Chinese doctrine suggests that“tactical counteroffensives” would only beconsidered if an adversary’s operations couldnot be countered. Second, IO is viewed as anunconventional warfare weapon, which mustbe established in the opening phase of theconflict and continue during all phases ofwar. Third, IO is characterized as apreemption weapon to be used under therubric of achieving information dominanceand controlling the electromagneticspectrum. Fourth, IO is seen as a tool topermit China to fight and win an informationcampaign, precluding the need forconventional military action. Fifth, potentialChinese adversaries, in particular the UnitedStates, are seen as “information dependent.”An IO campaign includes actions taken toseize and maintain campaign informationsuperiority, unify command campaigninformation operational forces, carry outinformation warfare-related reconnaissance,and offensive and defensive informationwarfare methods. According to a PLAmilitary manual, there are many types ofsupporting IO to campaigns including anisland-landing campaign IO, blockadecampaign IO, fire power attack campaign IO,border counterattack campaign IO, counter-landing campaign IO, and counter-airstrikecampaign IO. These IO campaigns can besub-divided into joint campaign IO andcombined arms campaign IO. Depending onthe military services involved in the campaign,IO can be further divided into army campaign,navy, air force, and strategic missile forcecampaign IO. Their primary tasks are toprotect the PLA’s campaign informationsystems, collect intelligence from enemyinformation systems, destroy enemyinformation systems, and weaken the enemy’sability to acquire, transmit, process, and useinformation during war.The PLA continues to conduct frequentmilitary exercises demonstrating advances ininformation technology and informationintegration of its military forces. China hasperformed integrated joint combat operationsexercises showcasing intelligence acquisition,joint command, joint strike, and supportoperations, increasingly incorporatedinformation technology and informationintegration into its annual trainingrequirement. A number of annual exercise
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China11series, including the Vanguard, Lianhe, and JointEducation series have increased requiredintegration and full reliance on informationtechnology for command of complexoperations. In 2012, according to PLAnewspapers, many military exercises bannedpaper maps and orders altogether. Also in2012, there was an increasing emphasis onPLA command academies participating injoint exercises using command informationtechnologies, which indicates proficiency onsuch platforms is now a requirement forgraduation to higher command positions.DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESEMILITARY DOCTRINE ANDTRAININGIn 2012, the PLA heavily emphasized trainingunder realistic, high-technology conditions.The Chinese aim to operate in “informatized”conditions by emphasizing system-of-systemsoperations, a concept similar to U.S. network-centric warfare. This requires linkinggeographically dispersed forces andcapabilities into an integrated system capableof unified action. These operational trainingreforms are a result of the Outline of MilitaryTraining and Evaluation (OMTE), which waslast published in mid-2008 and becamestandard across the PLA on January 1, 2009.Since that time, the PLA has pushed toachieve OMTE objectives by emphasizingrealistic training conditions, training incomplex electromagnetic and jointenvironments, and integrating new and hightechnologies into the force structure. A resultof these changes is a more flexible year-roundtraining cycle, which is a departure from theSoviet-style conscript-dependent trainingcycles that were prominent throughout thePLA over the previous decades.Additionally, the PLA is laying the foundationfor future changes in military doctrine. Todevelop a new cadre of officers, the PLA isreforming its academies to cultivate juniorofficers proficient with and capable ofleveraging technology in all warfightingfunctions for joint operations. The NationalUniversity of Defense Technology’s year-longjoint operations staff officer course is servingas a pilot for a future national-level program.The course allows junior officers to rotate tothe command elements of other PLA servicesto enhance their skills in joint operationsplanning and preparation.ADVANCED TECHNOLOGYACQUISITIONChina relies on foreign technology, acquisitionof key dual-use components, and focusedindigenous research and development (R&D)to advance military modernization. TheChinese utilize a large, well-organized networkto facilitate collection of sensitive informationand export-controlled technology from U.S.defense sources. Many of the organizationscomposing China’s military-industrialcomplex have both military and civilian
research and development functions. Thisnetwork of government-affiliated companiesand research institutes often enables the PLAto access sensitive and dual-use technologiesor knowledgeable experts under the guise ofcivilian research and development. Theenterprises and institutes accomplish thisthrough technology conferences and symposia,legitimate contracts and joint commercialventures, partnerships with foreign firms, andjoint development of specific technologies. Inthe case of key national security technologies,controlled equipment, and other materials notreadily obtainable through commercial meansor academia, China has utilized its intelligenceservices and employed other illicit approachesthat involve violations of U.S. laws and exportcontrols.A high-priority for China’s advancedtechnology acquisition strategy is its Civil-Military Integration policy to develop aninnovative dual-use technology and industrialbase that serve both military and civilianrequirements. China’s defense industry hasbenefited from integration with its expandingcivilian economy and science and technologysectors, particularly sectors with access toforeign technology. Examples of technologiesinclude: advanced aviation and aerospace (hotsection technologies, avionics and flightcontrols), source code, traveling wave tubes,night vision devices, monolithic microwaveintegrated circuits, and information and cybertechnologies.Differentiating between civil and military end-use is very challenging in China due to opaquecorporate structures, hidden asset ownership,and the connections of commercial personnelwith the central government. Somecommercial entities are affiliated with PLAresearch institutes, or have ties to and aresubject to the control of governmentorganizations such as the State-owned AssetsSupervision and Administration Commission.In March 2012, Hui Sheng Shen and HuanLing Chang, both from Taiwan, were chargedwith conspiracy to violate the U.S. ArmsExport Control Act after allegedly intendingto acquire and pass sensitive U.S. defensetechnology to China. The pair planned tophotograph the technology, delete the images,bring the memory cards back to China, andhave a Chinese contact recover the images.In June 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC),a subsidiary of U.S. aerospace firm anddefense contractor United TechnologiesCorporation (UTC), pleaded guilty to illegallyproviding military software used in thedevelopment of Chinas Z-10 military attackhelicopter.UTC and two subsidiaries agreed to pay $75million and were debarred from licenseprivileges as part of a settlement with the U.S.Department of Justice and State Department.PWC "knowingly and willfully" caused sixversions of military electronic engine controlsoftware to be "illegally exported" from
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China13Hamilton Sundstrand in the United States toPWC in Canada and then to China for the Z-10, and made false and belated disclosuresabout these illegal exports.In September 2012, Sixing Liu, aka “SteveLiu,” was convicted of violating the U.S.Arms Export Control Act and theInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations(ITAR) and possessing stolen trade secrets.Liu, a Chinese citizen, returned to China withelectronic files containing details on theperformance and design of guidance systemsfor missiles, rockets, target locators, andunmanned aerial vehicles. Liu developedcritical military technology for a U.S. defensecontractor and stole the documents toposition himself for employment in China.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China15NATIONAL-LEVEL PRIORITIESAND GOALSChina’s leaders characterize the first twodecades of the 21stcentury as a “strategicwindow of opportunity.” They assess thatduring this period, both domestic andinternational conditions will be conducive toexpanding China’s “comprehensive nationalpower,” a term that encapsulates all elementsof state power, including economic capacity,military might, and diplomacy. China’s leadersanticipate that a successful expansion ofcomprehensive national power will serveChina’s strategic objectives, which include:perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP)rule, sustaining economic growth anddevelopment, maintaining domestic politicalstability, defending national sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and securing China’s statusas a great power.China’s leaders routinely emphasize the goalof reaching critical economic and militarybenchmarks by 2020. These benchmarksinclude successfully restructuring theeconomy to maintain growth and increase thequality of living of China’s citizens to promotestability; making major progress in militarymodernization; and attaining the capability tofight and win potential regional conflicts,including those related to Taiwan, protectionof sea lines of communication (SLOCs),defense of territorial claims in the SouthChina Sea and East China Sea, and thedefense of western borders. Statements byChinese leaders indicate that, in their view, thedevelopment of a modern military is necessaryfor China to achieve greater power status.These statements also indicate that theChinese leadership views a modern military asa critical deterrent to prevent actions byoutside powers that could damage Chineseinterests, or to allow China to defend itselfagainst such actions should deterrence fail.Since China launched its “reform andopening” in late 1978, the essential elementsof China’s strategy to accomplish these goalshave remained relatively constant. Ratherthan challenge the existing global order, Chinahas adopted a pragmatic approach tointernational relations and economicdevelopment that seeks to strengthen theeconomy, modernize the military, and solidifythe CCP’s hold on power. China balances theimperative to reassure countries that its rise is“peaceful” with the imperative to strengthenits control over existing sovereignty andterritorial claims.China regards stable relations with itsneighbors and the United States as essential toits stability and development. Chinacontinues to see the United States as thedominant regional and global actor with thegreatest potential to both support and,potentially, disrupt China’s rise. In addition,China remains concerned that should regionalstates come to view China as a threat, theymight balance against China through unilateralmilitary modernization or through coalitions,
possibly with the United States. ManyChinese officials and the public see the U.S.rebalance to Asia as a reflection of “Cold Warthinking” and as a way to contain China’s rise.Despite its desire to project an image of adeveloping country engaged in a peacefuldevelopment strategy, China’s efforts todefend national sovereignty and territorialintegrity (underpinned by growing economicand military capabilities) have occasionallymanifested in assertive rhetoric and behaviorthat generate regional concerns about itsintentions. Prominent examples of thisinclude China’s response to Japan’s arrest of aPRC fishing trawler captain following acollision with Japanese coast guard vessels in2010, its use of punitive trade policies as aninstrument of coercion, its actions to shieldNorth Korea from the international responseto its sinking of the South Korean naval vessel,Cheonan, and its action to pressure Vietnamand the Philippines in the South China Seaand Japan in the East China Sea. Officialstatements and media during these situationsindicate that China sees itself as responding toperceived threats to its national interests orprovocations by outside actors. China’s lackof transparency surrounding its growingmilitary capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased concerns in theregion about China’s intentions. Absent amove towards greater transparency, theseconcerns will likely intensify as the PLAmodernization progresses.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China17Origin of the “New Historic Missions”In 2004, former President Hu Jintao articulated a mission statement for the armed forces titled,the “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” These “newhistoric missions” focus primarily on adjustments in the leadership’s assessment of theinternational security environment and the expanding definition of national security. Thesemissions were further codified in a 2007 amendment to the CCP Constitution. The missions, ascurrently defined, include:• Provide an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its rulingposition.• Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategicopportunity for national development.• Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests.• Play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting commondevelopment.According to official writings, the driving factors behind the articulation of these missions were:changes in China’s security situation, challenges and priorities regarding China’s nationaldevelopment, and a desire to realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’s objectives. Politburomember and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted “the historic missions embody thenew requirements imposed on the military by the Party’s historic tasks, accommodate newchanges in our national development strategy, and conform to the new trends in global militarydevelopment.” While these missions are not expected to replace the defense of China’ssovereignty in importance, implications for PLA modernization may be increased preparation forand participation in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, interaction withthe international community that allows the PLA more opportunities to learn from other militaries,and greater efforts to improve PLA logistics and transport capabilities.FACTORS SHAPING CHINA’SLEADERSHIP PERCEPTIONSChinese leaders continue to view themselvesas operating in a “window of opportunity” toadvance their priorities of economicdevelopment, territorial integrity, anddomestic stability. Although domesticstability is believed to be China’s top priority,official documents indicate that China sees itssecurity environment becoming more“complex” as a result of several factors:Economics. Continued economicdevelopment remains the bedrock of socialstability. A wide range of economic factorscould disrupt this trajectory, including afailure to shift away from its overreliance oninvestment and exports to drive growth.China’s leaders scaled back GDP targets for2011-2015 (from 8 percent to 7.5 percent) tomitigate risk of overheating and to manageexpectations. Other potential economic risksfor China include shifting global tradepatterns, domestic resource constraints, rising
wages driven by labor shortages, or attemptsto challenge China’s access to global resources,including energy.Nationalism. Communist Party leaders andmilitary officials continue to be affected by,and in some cases exploit, nationalism tobolster the legitimacy of the Party, deflectdomestic criticism, and justify their owninflexibility in dialogues with foreigninterlocutors. However, nationalist forcescould ultimately restrict the leadership’sdecision-making on key policy issues orpressure the CCP if these forces perceiveparty leaders as insufficiently satisfyingnationalist goals.Regional Challenges to China’s Interests.Tensions with Japan in the East China Seaand with South China Sea claimants challengeto China’s desire to maintain a stableperiphery. Combined with a greater U.S.presence in the region, these factors raiseChinese concerns that regional countries willstrengthen their military capabilities orincrease security cooperation with the UnitedStates to balance China.Domestic Unrest. The CCP continues toface long-term popular demands for limitingcorruption and improving governmentresponsiveness, transparency, andaccountability. If unmet, these factors likelyweaken the legitimacy of the CCP in the eyesof the Chinese people. The Arab Spring andfears of a Jasmine Revolution amplifyhistorical concerns about internal stability.Environment. China’s economicdevelopment has come at a highenvironmental cost. China’s leaders areincreasingly concerned that environmentaldegradation could undermine regimelegitimacy by threatening economicdevelopment, public health, social stability,and China’s international image.Demographics. China faces the dual threatof a rapidly aging population and a decliningbirth rate, one that now falls belowreplacement level. Longer life expectanciesmay force China to allocate more resources tosocial and health services, while the decliningbirth rate will continue to reduce China’ssupply of young and inexpensive labor, a keydriver of the country’s three decades ofeconomic growth. This dual phenomenoncould lead to economic stagnation that couldthreaten CCP legitimacy.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China19China’s Energy StrategyChina’s engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue to grow.China has constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries, spanning nearlyevery continent. This ambitious investment in energy assets is driven primarily by two factors. First,China is increasingly dependent upon imported energy to sustain its economy. A net oilexporter until 1993, China remains suspicious of international energy markets. Second, energyprojects present a viable option for investing China’s vast foreign currency holdings.In addition to ensuring reliable energy sources, Beijing hopes to diversify producers and transportoptions. Although energy independence is no longer realistic for China, given populationgrowth and increasing per capita energy consumption, Beijing still seeks to maintain a supplychain that is less susceptible to external disruption.In 2011, China imported approximately 58 percent of its oil; conservative estimates project thatChina will import almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and three-quarters by 2030. Beijing looksprimarily to the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Russia/Central Asia to satisfy its growing demand, withimported oil accounting for approximately 11 percent of China’s total energy consumption.A second goal of Beijing’s foreign energy strategy is to alleviate China’s heavy dependence onSLOCs, particularly the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. In 2011, approximately 85percent of China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.Separate crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China illustrate efforts to increaseoverland supply. A pipeline that would bypass the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oilfrom Kyuakpya, Burma to Kunming, China is currently under construction with an estimatedcompletion time of late 2013 or early 2014. The crude oil for this pipeline will be supplied bySaudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and African countries.Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will only slightly alleviate China’s maritimedependency on either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. Despite China’s efforts, thesheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas that is imported to China from the Middle East andAfrica will make strategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing.In 2011, China imported 14.3 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, or 46 percent of all of itsnatural gas imports, from Turkmenistan to China by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Thispipeline is designed to carry 40 bcm per year with plans to expand it to 60 bcm. Another naturalgas pipeline designed to deliver 12 bcm per year of Burmese-produced gas is underconstruction and estimated for completion in late 2013 or early 2014. This pipeline parallels thecrude oil pipeline across Burma. Beijing is negotiating with Moscow for two pipelines that couldsupply China with up to 69 bcm of gas per year; discussions have stalled over pricingdifferences.
Chinas Top Crude Suppliers 2011Country Volume (1,000 barrels per day) Percentage of Imported Crude OilSaudi Arabia 1010 20Angola 626 12Iran 557 11Russia 396 8Oman 365 7Iraq 277 5Sudan 261 5Venezuela 231 5Kazakhstan 225 4Kuwait 192 4Others 956 19Total 5096 100INTERNAL DEBATE OVERCHINA’S REGIONAL ANDGLOBAL ROLEChina’s leadership has supported formerparamount leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictumfrom the early 1990s that China should,“observe calmly; secure our position; copewith affairs calmly; hide our capabilities andbide our time; be good at maintaining a lowprofile; and never claim leadership.” Thisguidance reflected Deng’s belief that Chineseinterests are best served by focusing oninternal development and stability whilesteering clear of challenging or confrontingmajor powers. In December 2010, StateCouncilor Dai Bingguo specifically citedDeng’s guidance, insisting China adhered to a“path of peaceful development” and wouldnot seek expansion or hegemony. He assertedthat the “hide and bide” rhetoric was not a“smokescreen” employed while China buildsits strength, but rather an admonition to bepatient and not stand out.However, some Chinese scholars questionwhether Deng’s policy approach will continueto win support as China’s interests increaseabroad and its power expands. China’sperceived security interests have changedconsiderably since Deng’s era to include aheavy reliance on maritime commerce.China’s improving naval capabilities enableroles and missions that would have beenimpossible for the PLA to pursue just adecade ago. Proponents of a more active andassertive Chinese role on the world stage havesuggested that China would be better servedby a firm stance in the face of U.S. or otherregional pressure. These voices could increase
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China21as a result of renewed tensions with thePhilippines and Vietnam over the SouthChina Sea and with Japan over the Senkakus,further complicating this debate.“New Type of Relationship.” Top Chineseleaders have repeatedly advocated for a “newtype of relationship between great powers” inmeetings with U.S. officials. The “new typeof relationship” concept urges a cooperativeU.S.-China partnership based on equality,mutual respect, and mutual benefit. Theconcept also reflects China’s aspirations to beregarded as a great power, emphasizingconflict avoidance to maintain its “peacefulrise.”China’s Periphery. The Chinese leadershipfaces a policy dilemma in seeking to maintaina stable periphery in order to assure its“window of opportunity” for developmentremains open. China also perceives otherregional countries asserting their nationalinterests in China’s periphery and feelscompelled to respond to ensure continuedstability; however, too strong of a responsemay motivate regional actors tocounterbalance China’s rise through greatercooperation with each other and the UnitedStates. Therefore, China’s leaders are tryingto maintain a delicate balance betweendefending territorial integrity in the face ofperceived provocations by its neighbors whileconcurrently tamping down threat perceptionsacross the globe. China publicly states that itsrise is “peaceful” and that it harbors no“hegemonic” designs or aspirations forterritorial expansion. However, China’s lackof transparency surrounding these growingcapabilities has increased concerns in theregion about China’s intentions.China’s Territorial DisputesChina’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied throughout its history. Some disputes led towar, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contestedborder with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In morerecent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to itsneighbors. Since 1998, China has settled eleven land-based territorial disputes with six of itsneighbors. Several disputes continue over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and ownership ofpotentially rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits.The East China Sea contains approximately seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100billion barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved shouldseparate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant lineto the Okinawa Trench (which almost reaches Japan’s shore). In early 2009, Japan accusedChina of violating a June 2008 agreement providing for joint exploration of oil and natural gas
fields, and claimed that China unilaterally drilled beneath the demarcation line, extractingreserves from the Japanese side. China, Japan, and Taiwan continue to dispute possession ofthe nearby Senkaku Islands.The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast and Southeast Asian securityconsiderations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SouthChina Sea shipping lanes, including over 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups and other landformations within its “nine-dash line” claim - claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, thePhilippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the SpratlyIslands, makes the same claims as the PRC. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelfclaims in the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam; in its protest to the U.N.Commission, China included the ambiguous nine-dash line and reiterated that it has“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters andenjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoilthereof.”Despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India,tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh(which China asserts is part of Tibet, and therefore of China), and over the Aksai Chin region atthe western end of the Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to assert theirclaims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank,claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. Thisrepresented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution.The then-governor of Arunachal Pradesh announced that India would deploy more troops andfighter jets to the area. An Indian newspaper reported that the number of Chinese borderviolations had risen from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September 2012.Power Projection Capability. There hasalso been an active debate among military andcivilian theorists in China concerning futurecapabilities the PLA should develop toadvance China’s interests beyond traditionalrequirements. Some senior officers andcivilian theorists advocate an expansion of thePLA’s power projection capabilities tofacilitate missions well beyond Taiwan andregional disputes. Publicly, Chinese officialscontend that increasing the scope of China’smaritime capabilities is intended to buildcapacity for international peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, andprotection of sea lanes. The commissioningof the PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier in2012, in addition to serving as a symbol ofnational prestige, exemplifies theseaspirations.Indicators of Decision and Intent. Thereare several possible indicators of change in
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China23Chinese decision-making, depending on theissue. This intent could be reflected throughspeeches in regional and multi-nationalorganizations, commentary in official,domestic newspapers or prominent Chinesethink tanks, adjustments to China’s DefenseWhite Paper, changes in talking points withcivilian and military interlocutors, dispositionof forces, and changes in military diplomacy.PLA MILITARY ENGAGEMENTThe PLA’s level of engagement with foreignmilitaries continues to grow significantly. Atthe operational level, this engagementprovides the PLA with opportunities to sharedoctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques, andprocedures with other militaries - bothmodern and developing. At the strategic level,China uses military engagement as a platformfor demonstrating the PLA’s growingcapabilities, its status as a modern military,and its potential role as a responsible securitypartner.Senior-level visits and exchanges provideChina with opportunities to increase militaryofficers’ international exposure, communicateChina’s positions to foreign audiences, betterunderstand alternative world views, andadvance foreign relations throughinterpersonal contacts and military assistanceprograms. Expanded PLA travel abroadenables China’s military officers to observeand study foreign military commandstructures, unit formations, and operationaltraining.The PLA is participating in a growing numberof bilateral and multilateral military exercises.The PLA derives political benefit from theseexercises in terms of increased influence andenhanced ties with partner states andorganizations. These exercises also contributeto PLA modernization by providingopportunities to improve capabilities in areassuch as counterterrorism, mobility operations,and logistics. The PLA gains operationalinsight by observing tactics, commanddecision making, and equipment used by moreadvanced militaries.PLA participation or observer status inmilitary training exercises of nations inpossession of U.S. military equipment,systems, and weapons may, in certaincircumstances, have unintended consequencesthat could result in the unauthorizeddisclosure of defense articles, technical data,or defense services to China. Public Law 101-246 – the Tiananmen Sanctions – prohibitsthe transfer or disclosure of U.S.-origindefense articles, defense services, technicaldata, and/or technology to China.Additionally, Public Law 94-329 – the ArmsExport Control Act - and the InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations list China as anation for which U.S. policy denies thetransfer or export of defense articles(including technical data) and defense services.Beijing primarily conducts arms sales toenhance foreign relationships and to generaterevenue to support its domestic defenseindustry. China’s arms sales range from small
arms and ammunition to joint development ortransfer of advanced weapons systems.Chinese companies sell mostly to developingcountries where China’s low-cost weaponssales serve a strategic purpose. For example,China maintains strong and longstandingmilitary–technical cooperation with Pakistan,which includes arms sales and defenseindustrial cooperation. With other countriesof strategic importance to China, such asSudan, arms sales and other security assistancedeepen developing ties and balance China’senergy imports.As China’s regional and international interestsgrow more complex, the PLA’s internationalengagement will expand, especially in theareas of peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR), and joint exercises. In addition tofurthering PLA modernization, the focus ofthese engagements will likely remain onbuilding China’s political ties, assuaging fearsabout China’s rise, and building China’sexternal influence, particularly in Asia.China’s Military LeadershipThe PLA is the armed instrument of the CCP and, organizationally, is subordinate to the Partyapparatus. Career military officers are CCP members, and units at the company level andabove have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, andcounterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, also led by thepolitical officers and commanders.The PLA’s highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is technically adepartment of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers. The CMCChairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the CCP and President. Other membersinclude several vice chairmen, the commanders of the military services, and the directors of thefour general headquarters departments.China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) is not equivalent to the “defense ministry” in mostother nations, but rather is a small office coordinating military-related tasks where responsibilityoverlaps between the civilian government and the armed forces, including foreign militaryrelations, mobilization, recruitment, “national defense education,” and civil support to militaryoperations. The Minister of Defense is a uniformed military officer, a member of the State Council(the country’s chief administrative authority), and also a CMC member.Following the increasing professionalization of the PLA, the military now holds fewer formalpositions in key political bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the passing ofChina’s revolutionary generation, few national leaders have served in the military: the PolitburoStanding Committee has not had a uniformed member since 1997 and only 4 of the 25 currentPolitburo members have military experience. However, the PLA remains an influential player in
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China25China’s defense and foreign policy due to the CMC’s special bureaucratic status and the PLA’snear monopoly on military expertise. Even as the PLA remains subordinate to top Partyleadership direction as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, longstandingbureaucratic coordination issues and China’s increasingly active media landscape havesometimes led to PLA-associated actions or statements that appear to diverge from the positionsof China’s other key bureaucratic actors, especially on national sovereignty or territorial issues.Members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC)Chairman Xi Jinping’s appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC chairman, and hisexpected selection as state president in the spring, represent the first clean transfer of power inrecent decades. Prior to becoming China’s new commander-in-chief, Xi served as the CMC’sonly civilian vice chairman. Xi’s father was an important military figure during the Chinesecommunist revolution and a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as secretaryto a defense minister early in his career and would have had ample opportunities to interact withthe PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials Xi has emphasized increasingmutual trust between Beijing and Washington.Vice Chairman Fan Changlong is Beijing’s top uniformed officer. He formerly commanded theJinan Military Region (MR), a test bed for new operational concepts and technology that hasbeen at the forefront of the PLA’s joint training efforts in recent years. Fan was the longest servingof China’s seven MR commanders at the time of his promotion to the CMC. He also spent 35years in the Shenyang MR where he reportedly served in the same unit as outgoing CMC ViceChairman Xu Caihou, the PLA’s top political officer.Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang—the first career air force officer promoted to CMC vice chairman—previously served on the CMC as PLA Air Force commander where he oversaw rapid forcemodernization and expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He vocally advocated forincreasing the PLA Air Force’s role within the larger PLA including arguing in 2009 that the airforce should lead the development of offensive space capabilities. Xu may have crossed pathswith Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the firstPLA Air Force officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since theCultural Revolution period, and—at 54—the youngest in PLA history.Chang Wanquan was appointed Minister of National Defense at the National People’s Congressin March 2013. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA’s third most senior officer andmanages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Chang previouslyoversaw the PLA’s weapons development and space portfolio as head of the GeneralArmament Department. He is a veteran of China’s border skirmishes with Vietnam and held topposts across military regions.
Chief of the General Staff Department Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, andintelligence. He served as “commander-in-chief” of China’s 60th anniversary military parade in2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Fan is the first Beijing MilitaryRegion commander to move directly to Chief of the General Staff Department. He was theyoungest military region commander when he was promoted to lead the Beijing Military Regionin 2007.General Political Department Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLA’s political work to includepropaganda, discipline, and education. He previously served as Political Commissar of theGuangzhou Military Region, which borders Vietnam and the South China Sea. Zhang assumedthat position at a relatively young age and is unusual among the other newly appointed CMCmembers for spending his entire career in one military region. Zhang also participated in China’sborder conflict with Vietnam and supported disaster relief efforts following a January 2008snowstorm in southern China.General Logistics Department Director Zhao Keshi is responsible for overseeing PLA supportfunctions including finances, land, mining, and construction. Zhao spent his entire career in theNanjing MR responsible for a Taiwan contingency and most recently served as its Commander.He was also reportedly an exercise commander in the large military drills that induced the 1996Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhao has written on defense mobilization and reserve construction.General Armament Department Director Zhang Youxia is responsible for overseeing the military’sweapons development and space program. Nicknamed “General Patton,” he has rareexperience as a combat commander during China’s brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Zhangformerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea andRussia. Zhang is one of China’s military “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure inChina, served with Xi Jinping’s father in the 1940s.PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the navy since 2006 and on the CMCsince 2007—only the second PLA Navy Commander to do so in recent decades. Under Wu, thenavy has increased its out-of-area exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign naval exchanges,and initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first career navy officer to serve as aDeputy Chief of the General Staff, Wu held leadership positions in two of the PLA Navy’s threefleets, spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLA’s military engagementactivities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led the PLA side in key military-to-militaryexchanges with the United States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the StrategicSecurity Dialogue component of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ma hassignificant operational experience both as a pilot and staff officer in multiple military regions.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China27Second Artillery Commander Wei Fenghe oversees China’s strategic missile forces and bases.Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in theSecond Artillery headquarters before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff - the first officer from the Second Artillery to do so. In that role, Wei met frequentlywith foreign delegations, including senior U.S. officials, affording him greater internationalexposure than previous Second Artillery commanders.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China29OVERVIEWAlthough Taiwan continues to dominate thePLA’s force modernization agenda (seeChapter Five: Force Modernization for aTaiwan Contingency), Beijing is investing inmilitary programs and weapons designed toimprove extended-range power projection andoperations in emerging domains such as cyber,space, and electronic warfare. Current trendsin China’s weapons production will enable thePLA to conduct a range of military operationsin Asia well beyond Taiwan, in the SouthChina Sea, western Pacific, and Indian Ocean.Key systems that have been either deployedor are in development include ballistic missiles(including anti-ship variants), anti-ship andland attack cruise missiles, nuclear submarines,modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.The need to ensure trade, particularly oilsupplies from the Middle East, has promptedChina’s navy to conduct counter-piracyoperations in the Gulf of Aden. Disputeswith Japan over maritime claims in the EastChina Sea and with several Southeast Asianclaimants to all or parts of the Spratly andParacel Islands in the South China Sea haveled to renewed tensions in these areas.Instability on the Korean Peninsula could alsoproduce a regional crisis involving China’smilitary. The desire to protect energyinvestments in Central Asia, along withpotential security implications from cross-border support to ethnic separatists, couldalso provide an incentive for militaryinvestment or intervention in this region ifinstability surfaces.China’s political leaders have also charged thePLA with developing capabilities for missionssuch as peacekeeping, disaster relief, andcounterterrorism operations. Thesecapabilities will increase Beijing’s options formilitary influence to press its diplomaticagenda, advance regional and internationalinterests, and resolve disputes in its favor.China has become more involved in HA/DRoperations in response to the “New HistoricMissions.” China’s ANWEI-class militaryhospital ship (the Peace Ark) has deployedthroughout East Asia and to the Caribbean.China has conducted more than ten jointmilitary exercises with the SCO members, themost prominent being the PEACE MISSIONseries, with China and Russia as the mainparticipants.China continues its Gulf of Aden counter-piracy deployment that began in December2008. Outside of occasional goodwill cruises,this represents the PLA Navy’s only series ofoperational deployments beyond theimmediate western Pacific region.PLA FUTURE CAPABILITIESNuclear Weapons. China’s official policyon nuclear weapons continues to focus onmaintaining a nuclear force structure able to
survive an attack and respond with sufficientstrength to inflict unacceptable damage on anenemy. The new generation of mobilemissiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVsand penetration aids, are intended to ensurethe viability of China’s strategic deterrent inthe face of continued advances in U.S. and, toa lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),precision strike, and missile defensecapabilities. The PLA has deployed newcommand, control, and communicationscapabilities to its nuclear forces. Thesecapabilities improve the Second Artillery’sability to command and control multiple unitsin the field. Through the use of improvedcommunications links, the ICBM units nowhave better access to battlefield information,uninterrupted communications connecting allcommand echelons, and the unit commandersare able to issue orders to multiplesubordinates at once, instead of serially viavoice commands.China has consistently asserted that it adheresto a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating itwould use nuclear forces only in response to anuclear strike against China. China’s NFUpledge consists of two stated commitments:China will never use nuclear weapons firstagainst any nuclear-weapon state, and Chinawill never use or threaten to use nuclearweapons against any non-nuclear-weaponstate or nuclear-weapon-free zone. However,there is some ambiguity over the conditionsunder which China’s NFU policy would apply,including whether strikes on what Chinaconsiders its own territory, demonstrationstrikes, or high-altitude bursts wouldconstitute a first use. Moreover, some PLAofficers have written publicly of the need tospell out conditions under which China mightneed to use nuclear weapons first; for example,if an enemy’s conventional attack threatenedthe survival of China’s nuclear force or of theregime itself. However, there has been noindication that national leaders are willing toattach such nuances and caveats to China’sNFU doctrine.China will likely continue to investconsiderable resources to maintain a limited,but survivable, nuclear force (sometimesdescribed as “sufficient and effective”), toensure the PLA can deliver a damagingretaliatory nuclear strike.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China31PLA Underground FacilitiesChina maintains a technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting allaspects of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given China’s NFUnuclear policy, China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear blow while ensuringleadership and strategic assets survive.China determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid to late1980s. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S.and NATO air operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military capabilities during the1991 Gulf War. A new emphasis on “winning hi-tech battles” in the future precipitated researchinto advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convincedChina it needed to build more survivable, deeply-buried facilities, resulting in the widespreadUGF construction effort detected throughout China for the last decade.Land-Based Platforms. China’s nucleararsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4(DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and themore limited range CSS-3 (DF-4). This forceis complemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMsfor regional deterrence missions. By 2015,China’s nuclear forces will include additionalCSS-10 Mod 2 and enhanced CSS-4 ICBMs.Sea-Based Platforms. China continues toproduce the JIN-class SSBN, with threealready delivered and as many as two more invarious stages of construction. The JIN-classSSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2submarine-launched ballistic missile with anestimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-classand the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its firstlong-range, sea-based nuclear capability. Aftera round of successful testing in 2012, the JL-2appears ready to reach initial operationalcapability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based atHainan Island in the South China Sea wouldthen be able to conduct nuclear deterrencepatrols.Future Efforts. China is working on a rangeof technologies to attempt to counter U.S.and other countries’ ballistic missile defensesystems, including maneuverable reentryvehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff,jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons. China’s official media alsocite numerous Second Artillery trainingexercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, andlaunch operations under simulated combatconditions, which are intended to increasesurvivability. Together with the increasedmobility and survivability of the new
generation of missiles, these technologies andtraining enhancements strengthen China’snuclear force and enhance its strategic strikecapabilities. Further increases in the numberof mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBNdeterrence patrols will force the PLA toimplement more sophisticated command andcontrol systems and processes that safeguardthe integrity of nuclear release authority for alarger, more dispersed force.Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). Aspart of its planning for military contingencies,China continues to develop measures to deteror counter third-party intervention,particularly by the United States. China’sapproach to dealing with this challenge ismanifested in a sustained effort to develop thecapability to attack, at long ranges, militaryforces that might deploy or operate within thewestern Pacific, which the DoD characterizesas “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2/AD)capabilities. China is pursuing a variety of air,sea, undersea, space and counter-space, andinformation warfare systems and operationalconcepts to achieve this capability, movingtoward an array of overlapping, multilayeredoffensive capabilities extending from China’scoast into the western Pacific. China’s 2008Defense White Paper asserts, for example,that one of the priorities for the developmentof China’s armed forces is to “increase thecountry’s capabilities to maintain maritime,space, and electromagnetic space security.”An essential element, if not a fundamentalprerequisite, of China’s emerging A2/ADregime is the ability to control and dominatethe information spectrum in all dimensions ofthe modern battlespace. PLA authors oftencite the need in modern warfare to controlinformation, sometimes termed “informationblockade” or “information dominance,” andto seize the initiative and gain an informationadvantage in the early phases of a campaign toachieve air and sea superiority. China isimproving information and operationalsecurity to protect its own informationstructures, and is also developing electronicand information warfare capabilities, includingdenial and deception, to defeat those of itsadversaries. China’s “information blockade”likely envisions employment of military andnon-military instruments of state poweracross the battlespace, including in cyberspaceand outer space. China’s investments inadvanced electronic warfare systems, counter-space weapons, and computer networkoperations (CNO) — combined with moretraditional forms of control historicallyassociated with the PLA and CCP systems,such as propaganda and denial throughopacity, reflect the emphasis and priorityChina’s leaders place on building capability forinformation advantage.In more traditional domains, China’s A2/ADfocus appears oriented toward restricting orcontrolling access to China’s periphery,including the western Pacific. China’s currentand projected force structure improvements,for example, will provide the PLA withsystems that can engage adversary surfaceships up to 1,000 nm from China’s coast.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China33China is also developing weapons for itsentire military to project force further from itscoast.Current and projected missile systems willallow the PLA to strike regional air bases,logistical facilities, and other ground-basedinfrastructure. Chinese military analysts haveconcluded that logistics and power projectionare potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare,given the requirements for precision incoordinating transportation, communications,and logistics networks. China is fielding anarray of conventionally armed ballistic missiles,ground- and air-launched land-attack cruisemissiles, special operations forces, and cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at riskthroughout the region.Counter-Space. PLA strategists regard theability to utilize space and deny adversariesaccess to space as central to enabling modern,informatized warfare. Although PLA doctrinedoes not appear to address space operationsas a unique operational “campaign,” spaceoperations form an integral component ofother PLA campaigns and would serve a keyrole in enabling A2/AD operations. Publicly,China attempts to dispel any skepticism overits military intentions for space. In 2009, PLAAir Force Commander General Xu Qiliangpublically retracted his earlier assertion thatthe militarization of space was a “historicinevitability” after President Hu Jintao swiftlycontradicted him. General Xu Qiliang is nowa Vice Chairman of the Central MilitaryCommission and the second highest-rankingofficer in the PLA.The PLA is acquiring a range of technologiesto improve China’s space and counter-spacecapabilities. China demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic kill anti-satellite capability tolow Earth orbit when it destroyed the defunctChinese FY-1C weather satellite during a testin January 2007. Although Chinese defenseacademics often publish on counterspacethreat technologies, no additional anti-satelliteprograms have been publicly acknowledged.A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition militaryoperations reinforced the importance ofoperations in space to enable “informatized”warfare, claiming that “space is thecommanding point for the informationbattlefield.” PLA writings emphasize thenecessity of “destroying, damaging, andinterfering with the enemy’sreconnaissance...and communicationssatellites,” suggesting that such systems, aswell as navigation and early warning satellites,could be among the targets of attacksdesigned to “blind and deafen the enemy.”The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalitionmilitary operations also states that “destroyingor capturing satellites and other sensors…willdeprive an opponent of initiative on thebattlefield and [make it difficult] for them tobring their precision guided weapons into fullplay.”Information Operations. New technologiesallow the PLA to share intelligence, battlefieldinformation, logistics information, weather
reports, etc., instantaneously (over robust andredundant communications networks),resulting in improved situational awarenessfor commanders. In particular, by enablingthe sharing of near-real-time ISR data withcommanders in the field, decision-makingprocesses are facilitated, shortening commandtimelines and making operations moreefficient.These improvements have greatly enhancedthe PLA’s flexibility and responsiveness.“Informatized” operations no longer requiremeetings for command decision-making orlabor-intensive processes for execution.Commanders can now issue orders tomultiple units at the same time while on themove, and units can rapidly adjust theiractions through the use of digital databasesand command automation tools. This iscritical for joint operations needed to executeA2/AD. However, to fully implement“informatized” command and control, thePLA will need to overcome a shortage oftrained personnel and its culture of centralized,micro-managed command.The PLA GSD Fourth Department(Electronic Countermeasures and Radar)would likely use information operations (IO)tools, to include jamming/EW, CNO, anddeception to augment counter-space andother kinetic operations during a wartimescenario. “Simultaneous and parallel”operations would involve strikes against U.S.warships, aircraft, and associated supply craftand the use of IO to affect tactical andoperational communications and computernetworks. The PLA would likely rely on IOto disrupt the U.S. capability to usenavigational and targeting radar.Maritime. The PLA Navy is in the forefrontof China’s A2/AD developments, having thegreatest range and staying power within thePLA to interdict third-party forces. In a near-term conflict, PLA Navy operations wouldlikely begin in the offshore and coastal areaswith attacks by coastal defense cruise missiles,maritime strike aircraft, and smallercombatants, and extend as far as the secondisland chain and Strait of Malacca using largesurface ships and submarines. As the PLANavy gains experience and acquires largernumbers of more capable platforms, includingthose with long-range air defense, it willexpand the depth of these operations furtherinto the Western Pacific. It will also develop anew capability for ship-based land-attackusing cruise missiles. China views long-rangeanti-ship cruise missiles as a key weapon inthis type of operation and is developingmultiple advanced types and the platforms toemploy them for this purpose. Theseplatforms include conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines (KILO SS, SONGSS, YUAN SSP, SHANG SSN), surfacecombatants (LUYANG III DDG [Type052D], LUZHOU DDG [Type 051C],LUYANG I/II DDG [Type 052B/C],SOVREMENNY II-class DDG, JIANGKAIII FFG [Type 054A], JIANGDAO FFL [Type056]), and maritime strike aircraft (JH-7 andJH-7A, H-6G, and the SU-30 MK2).
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China35China would face several short-comings in anear-term A2/AD operation. First, it has notdeveloped a robust, deep water anti-submarine warfare capability, in contrast to itsstrong capabilities in the air and surfacedomains. Second, it is not clear whetherChina has the capability to collect accuratetargeting information and pass it to launchplatforms in time for successful strikes in seaareas beyond the first island chain. However,China is working to overcome theseshortcomings.Air and Air Defense. China’s future airforce A2/AD capabilities will be bolstered bythe development of a 5thgeneration fighterforce, which is not likely to be fielded before2018. Key characteristics of fifth generationfighters include high maneuverability, lack ofvisibility on radar due to very low observablestealth shaping, and an internal weapons bay.Other key features of these aircraft aremodern avionics and sensors that offer moretimely situational awareness for operations innetwork-centric combat environments, radarswith advanced targeting capabilities andprotection against enemy electroniccountermeasures, and integrated electronicwarfare systems with advancedcommunication and GPS navigation functions.These next generation aircraft will improveChina’s existing fleet of fourth generationaircraft (Russian built Su-27/Su-30 andindigenous J-10 and J-11B fighters) byutilizing low-observable platforms to supportregional air superiority and strike operations.Additionally, China’s continuing upgrades toits bomber fleet may provide the capability tocarry new, longer-range cruise missiles.Similarly, the acquisition and development oflonger-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),including the BZK-005, and unmannedcombat aerial vehicles (UCAV), will increaseChina’s ability to conduct long-rangereconnaissance and strike operations.China’s ground-based air defense A2/ADcapabilities will likely be focused oncountering long-range airborne strikeplatforms with increasing numbers ofadvanced, long-range SAMs. China’s currentair and air defense A2/AD componentsinclude a combination of advanced long-rangeSAMs – its indigenous HQ-9 and Russian SA-10 and SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, which have theadvertised capability to protect against bothaircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. Chinacontinues to pursue the acquisition of theRussian extremely long-range S-400 SAMsystem (400 km), and is also expected tocontinue research and development to extendthe range of the domestic HQ-9 SAM tobeyond 200km.Ballistic Missile Defense. China has madeefforts to go beyond defense from aircraft andcruise missiles to gain a ballistic missiledefense capability in order to provide furtherprotection of China’s mainland and strategicassets. China’s existing long-range SAMinventory offers limited capability againstballistic missiles. The SA-20 PMU2, the mostadvanced SAM Russia offers for export, hasthe advertised capability to engage ballistic
missiles with ranges of 1,000km and speeds of2,800m/s. China’s domestic CSA-9 long-range SAM system is expected to have alimited capability to provide point defenseagainst tactical ballistic missiles with ranges upto 500km. China is proceeding with theresearch and development of a missile defenseumbrella consisting of kinetic energy interceptat exo-atmospheric altitudes (>80km), as wellas intercepts of ballistic missiles and otheraerospace vehicles within the upperatmosphere. In January 2010, and again inJanuary 2013, China successfully intercepted aballistic missile at mid-course, using a ground-based missile.Cyber Activities Directed Against theDepartment of Defense. In 2012,numerous computer systems around theworld, including those owned by the U.S.government, continued to be targeted forintrusions, some of which appear to beattributable directly to the Chinesegovernment and military. These intrusionswere focused on exfiltratinginformation. China is using its computernetwork exploitation (CNE) capability tosupport intelligence collection against the U.S.diplomatic, economic, and defense industrialbase sectors that support U.S. nationaldefense programs. The information targetedcould potentially be used to benefit China’sdefense industry, high technology industries,policymaker interest in US leadership thinkingon key China issues, and military plannersbuilding a picture of U.S. network defensenetworks, logistics, and related militarycapabilities that could be exploited during acrisis. Although this alone is a seriousconcern, the accesses and skills required forthese intrusions are similar to those necessaryto conduct computer networkattacks. China’s 2010 Defense White Papernotes China’s own concern over foreigncyberwarfare efforts and highlighted theimportance of cyber-security in China’snational defense.Cyberwarfare in China’s Military.Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve Chinesemilitary operations in three key areas. Firstand foremost, they allow data collection forintelligence and computer network attackpurposes. Second, they can be employed toconstrain an adversary’s actions or slowresponse time by targeting network-basedlogistics, communications, and commercialactivities. Third, they can serve as a forcemultiplier when coupled with kinetic attacksduring times of crisis or conflict.Developing cyber capabilities for warfare isconsistent with authoritative PLA militarywritings. Two military doctrinal writings,Science of Strategy, and Science of Campaignsidentify information warfare (IW) as integralto achieving information superiority and aneffective means for countering a strongerfoe. Although neither document identifies thespecific criteria for employing computernetwork attack against an adversary, bothadvocate developing capabilities to competein this medium.