Role abandonment once was considered unlikely by research scientists; however emergency management officials have experienced catastrophic events that counter prior assumptions. Event types such as deluges and pandemics surface as scenarios supporting one set of examples. We explore a different angle, focusing on individual practitioners including: (1) fire, (2) police and (3) emergency medical services. Surveys were taken by the various practitioner group types. Results suggested that there may be role abandonment issues, differing from one practitioner type to another, each with unique reasons given the event type. Although communities and individual emergency officials may never encounter such situations, it’s imperative that this event type be taken into account during the design and implementation of disaster management systems. Systems developed should be designed to support and modify needs given the size and magnitude of the event, be it an routine emergency, a larger disaster or a 'once in a lifetime' catastrophic event. In this case, we focus on human resources. It is for this reason that we believe that algorithms be identified, developed and implemented so that such information be accessible to emergency officials, should this rare situation arise.

1. Emergency Management Information System Support
Rectifying 1st Responder Role Abandonment During
Extreme Events
Keith T. Noble, M.S
Email: knoble@hotmail.com
Connie White, PhD
College of Computer Science
University of Southern Mississippi, USA
Email: connie.m.white@gmail.com
Murray Turoff
Information Systems, NJIT
Email: murray.turoff@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Role abandonment once was considered unlikely by research scientists; however
emergency management officials have experienced catastrophic events that
counter prior assumptions. Event types such as deluges and pandemics surface as
scenarios supporting one set of examples. We explore a different angle, focusing
on individual practitioners including: (1) fire, (2) police and (3) emergency
medical services. Surveys were taken by the various practitioner group types.
Results suggested that there may be role abandonment issues, differing from one
practitioner type to another, each with unique reasons given the event type.
Although communities and individual emergency officials may never encounter
such situations, it’s imperative that this event type be taken into account during
the design and implementation of disaster management systems. Systems
developed should be designed to support and modify needs given the size and
magnitude of the event, be it an routine emergency, a larger disaster or a 'once in a
lifetime' catastrophic event. In this case, we focus on human resources. It is for
this reason that we believe that algorithms be identified, developed and
implemented so that such information be accessible to emergency officials,
should this rare situation arise.
INTRODUCTION
As simply pointed out by Quarantelli, “Disasters are different from catastrophies”
(2000). Extreme events pose extraordinary response efforts and decision support

2. requirements (Turoff, White and Plotnick, 2011). To what extent should
emergency planners consider role abandonment during an extreme event?
Hurricane Katrina was the first event in which there was large scale role
abandonment by a group of first responders. The New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD) had at least 200 Police Officers walk away from their posts or not
respond after Hurricane Katrina (Treaster, 2005). At the time of Hurricane
Katrina, approximately 1,450 to 1,700 Police Officers were employed by the
NOPD. Studies have explored many causes for this abandonment. Although
there are many different schools of thought on the subject, the majority stated
there were numerous problems within the department prior to Hurricane Katrina,
which at the very least contributed to the role abandonment during Katrina. There
were many issues in leadership, retention, and other areas prior to Hurricane
Katrina within the department. Hurricane Katrina magnified these problems. “In
the mid-90’s, the NOPD had a national reputation for both corruption and use of
force by its officers. Between 1995 and 1998, NOPD terminated an average of
slightly more than 18 officers per year and imposed an average of more than 100
suspensions per year” (Walker, Alpert, & Kenney, 2001). These numbers are
significant for any organization.
New Orleans Fire and EMS Departments reported no role abandonment
issues. The Journal of Emergency Medicine, reporting on a presentation given
after Hurricane Katrina stated, “Despite the difficulties and chaos of the Katrina
response, the speakers highlighted—to great fanfare from attendees—the fact that
all New Orleans EMS personnel showed up for work, a remarkable achievement
in light of the much-publicized defections in some other public safety agencies”
(Jems.com, 2006). According to news reports there were numerous reports of
New Orleans Police Officers abandoning their posts or not reporting for work. A
non-exhaustive review of the literature did not find documentation supporting the
same issue regarding the New Orleans Fire or EMS Departments.
There has been little research in comparing the three first responder
groups of Police, Fire, and EMS. The main research documenting role
abandonment has been on police departments, specifically, the NOPD during
Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was the most extreme event in regards to
role abandonment in U.S. history. However, what we aim to answer is, was
Hurricane Katrina an exception? If not, should such situations be further
identified given they are rare. Along with other indicators that support role
abandonment such as certain extreme events, be identifiable in emergency
management information systems such that officials who have never experienced
such situations, be privy to solutions and methods that aid in overcoming such
deficiencies?

3. Police, Fire, and EMS personnel respond to incidents on all levels, from a
simple vehicle accident to a terrorist attack like 9/11. They are defined as
“emergency response providers” which “includes Federal, State, and local
emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency
medical (including hospital emergency service), and related personnel, agencies,
and authorities” (Homeland Secuity Act of 2002, 2002). This study is a
preliminary examination of the research question: During extreme events, is there
a difference in the three first responder groups willingness to respond? If there is
a significant difference between the three agencies in willingness to respond, what
does that mean for the community?
First responders face the same dilemmas as the general public after a
disaster. New Orleans’ officials estimated that 70 percent of the city’s police
officers had their homes destroyed or damaged (Wroughton, 2005). Home
destruction, caring for family members, death, illness, and travel restrictions are
examples of issues first responder may face in addition to their normal work
duties. “The police, fire, and emergency medical services organizations were
engulfed themselves; becoming as much victims of the storm as were the citizens
they serve” (Rostker, Hix, & Wilson, 2007). First responders also must report for
work, when many citizens do not have that added responsibility.
Role abandonment is of interest to the research community whose findings
support that role abandonment is rare and that role abandonment during Hurricane
Katrina was the exception and not the norm (Kushma, 2007; Quarantelli, 2008).
New Orleans had been the only significant event in which there was large scale
abandonment according to Quarantelli. Large scale abandonment did not happen
during 9/11, Hurricane Hugo, or any other major event within the United States.
Although devastating, none of the aforementioned were of the size and scope of
Katrina, declared as the nation’s worst catastrophic even in history. “If role
abandonment was a problem for the police, why wasn’t it a problem for the other
first responders in New Orleans” (Kushma, 2007). There may have been social
reasons for this problem. One such reason was that the NOPD has a documented
history of corruption which also surfaced in Katrina’s aftermath. Problems
surrounding the NOPD continued during Katrina.
However, there are more recent studies that show that role abandonment
may be a reality under particular situations. “Results showed that only 68.7
percent and 53.2 percent of nurses were willing to report to work during a
disaster” (Fung & Loke, 2013). If role abandonment does happen it will have
serious complications for the general public and other emergency planners

4. (Kushma, 2007; Quarantelli, 2008). Given its rarity, even seasoned emergency
officials wouldn’t be experienced in significant role abandonment. Information
can be provided using present emergency management systems where algorithms
detect such possibilities.
How would a large American city plan for a disaster if they knew a certain
percentage of their first responders would not report for duty after or during a
disaster? Would pre-plans change if they knew a certain percentage of one
agency’s employees would be unwilling to report for duty? Are there disaster
types that need further evaluation due to a possible hazardous situation? This
situation would present a considerable issue for government officials. If a
significant percentage of EMS personnel would not be willing to respond during a
smallpox outbreak, what would that mean for the Police and Fire Departments
within a region? A study indicated that nurses would be hesitant to respond under
such situations (Fung & Loke, 2013). This exploratory study began to address
these questions in a limited manner. The three first responder types used for the
basis of this study include: police officers, fire fighters and emergency medical
services personal.
We provide background information on this and other related situations
where abandonment has occurred. Literature is presented both supporting and
rejecting role abandonment under a variety of situations. We then present our
methodology showing how we obtained our data from each practitioner type.
Results are provided also gaining insight into the reasoning for such abandonment
further identifying solutions to reduce and minimize such lack of personnel. We
conclude by presenting other international examples where role abandonment
occurred further disputing this as something that once was considered a myth, but
now surfaces as a reality where software solutions can aid in overcoming such
isolated events and the ensuing disasters that human resources can further
exacerbate.
BACKGROUND
An insufficient amount of research has been conducted on specific role
abandonment of first responders, comparing the three major first responder
groups. Research has been conducted on specific agencies including Police, Fire,
and Emergency Medical Support (EMS) due to the common task of being first
responders. Much of this research has been focused in role abandonment during
and after Hurricane Katrina. Research has primarily focused on the NOPD.
Many Officers abandoned their duties due to reasons beyond their control and
others could not report to work due to logistics, and because their homes were

5. destroyed (Rostker, Hix, & Wilson, 2007). Compounding the personal issues
further was that the police buildings, district headquarters and vehicles were also
under water in many cases.
No specific definition exists for first responder role abandonment. Most
would agree that first responders have a duty to act when requested thought the
proper channels. A duty to act is normally defined by state law and by
professional ethical standards. Role abandonment accrues when a first responder
fails to respond to lawful request for assistance whether from their department or
the general public. This may include failing to report for work, refusing to accept
certain duties with proper training, failing to respond to an incident, or avoiding
the incident altogether.
Although the perception is Police Officers did not report for duty, the
“overwhelming majority of Officers put their duty to the citizens of New Orleans
ahead of their responsibilities to their families, contrary to much that has been
written about Officers who abandoned their posts” (Rostker, Hix, & Wilson,
2007). However, a small amount of Officers abandoning their post can be adverse
for the response efforts. This creates a public relations and a public safety
nightmare.
Once situations are identified that show what sorts of catastrophic events
will trigger role abandonment, then algorithms can be developed to filter for such
information, identifying such situations aiding emergency management officials
in requesting a greater number of personnel under such situations. This would aid
in soliciting those responders in need for a more successful response or to
implement alternative solutions proven to minimize abandonment.
A study was conducted exploring first responders and their willingness to
actively participate in a variety of situations. The study found as the event
seriousness and the risk of exposure increased the percentage of personnel not
willing to respond increased. The percentage of willingness and ability to respond
to incidents varied greatly in regards to different incidents. 87.5% would be
willing to respond to a fire in a landfill, but only 64.8% would be willing to
respond to a smallpox outbreak within their community (DiMaggio, Markenson,
Loo, & Redlener, 2005). The authors found that personnel who had received
terrorism related training in last two years were more likely to respond to an
incident. This would be most likely because they have a better ability to respond
due to a better understanding of the event. This would be another avenue to
explore if there is a large percentage difference identified between the three major
first responder groups’ willingness to respond. Does one agency receive more or

6. better training than another? “While it is cause for concern that emergency
planners may at best expect no more than 65-75% of first responders to be willing
to report to work in the event of a terrorist incident, timely and appropriate
training, attention to interpersonal concerns, and instilling a sense of duty may
increase that response rate” (DiMaggio, Markenson, Loo, & Redlener, 2005). If a
difference is found between those agencies within this study, a possible solution is
located in the prior statement. Willingness to respond can also be influenced by
the level of training and available equipment. The following survey explored this
concept.
A study on Emergency Service Providers comfort level in responding to
weapons of mass destruction provides a link between the ability to respond and
the relationship to training and equipment. From this study, one influence
identified that without prior training and proper equipment Emergency Medical
Providers will be less willing to respond events (Reilly, Markenson, & DiMaggio,
2007). The literature on role abandonment supports a group of common
similarities. First responders must have the ability to respond before they have
the willingness to respond to events in many cases. This would include training
and equipment. Prior literature on the subject of role abandonment clearly
supports that abandonment during Hurricane Katrina was abnormal.
On one hand, throughout U.S. history there have been countless major
disasters, but no large scale role abandonment issues (Quarantelli E. l., 2008).
Numerous researchers, recently and throughout the last 30 years have found this
to be true (Quarantelli, 1978; Dynes, 1990). The theory of role abandonment has
also been studied in different countries, with different responders, and with
various types of disasters, and considered role abandonment to be a myth
(Scanlon, 2001). On the other hand, disasters differ in size scope and effect
differing social groups whether they are practitioners or the population in general.
We further deconstruct the problem by isolating the practitioner types to further
identify possible problem areas. The objective of this study is to determine if
there are any differences between first responder groups and each group’s
willingness to respond. The three first responder types used for this study
include: police officers, fire fighters and emergency medical services personal.
METHODOLOGY
This exploratory study examined first responders in the United States, in the state
of Texas and from the City of Austin. Police and EMS departments and select
internet-based bulletin boards were used to distribute a survey within each first
responder profession. The majority of data was obtained from City of Austin

7. public safety employees. The City of Austin has three separate public safety
departments: Police, Fire, and EMS. There are approximately 1,638 Police
personnel, 1079 Fire personnel, and 400 EMS personnel within the City of Austin
(information obtained from official department web sites). The survey was not
sent to City of Austin Fire personnel due to approval issues. The Fire personnel
sample was obtained from internet-based bulletin boards. There were three
surveys created, one for each profession, which asked the same questions.
Questions were generated by the author focusing on response to certain types of
incidents, ranging from everyday calls to lengthy disasters.
Survey requests were sent in two ways. First, mass emails were sent to all
field employees of the City of Austin Police and EMS departments. This email
requested subjects to follow a link to complete the survey. Second, a post with a
link was made on bulletin boards of the following internet web sites:
www.firehouse.com/forums and www.emtlife.com. Each request was made using
specific instructions on how to access the survey. Subjects were also asked that
only first responders employed with a Police, Fire, or EMS department complete
the survey.
A total of 426 subjects started the survey. Of that total, 373 completed the
survey providing an 88% completion rate overall. 207 Police personnel started
the survey with 86% completion rate. 147 EMS personnel started the survey with
a 90% completion rate and 72 Fire personnel started the survey with 88%
completion rate. The survey was open for a period of 5 days during the month of
April, 2010.
Surveys were used to gage first responders’ willingness to respond. They
covered different scenarios with different length incidents. The incidents ranged
from small common incidents to large scale, long lasting, events. The incidents
covered events in which Police, Fire, and EMS first responders may respond too.
RESULTS
This survey used an internet survey software product called QuestionPro which
allowed the survey sample to be directed only at first responders. The survey was
short, confidential, and completely voluntary. This was explained to the sample
subjects at the beginning of the survey.
Incidents ranged from simple everyday calls to a disaster response.
Willingness to response was much higher for low risk, short duration incidents. A
willingness to respond had a definition of duty to act if asked to respond to an

8. incident by lawful order.
Survey Statistics and Percent of Personnel Willing to Respond to Certain Incidents
Police -
Austin
Fire -
Internet
EMS - Austin /
Internet
Tot
al
Number that started the survey 207 72 147 426
Number Completing the Survey 178 63 132 373
Percent 86% 88% 90%
88
%
School bus accident 98% 100% 100%
99
%
Weather related event lasting 5-7
days 87% 93% 94%
91
%
Weather related event lasting 14
days 69% 83% 81%
78
%
MCI involving a dirty bomb 83% 80% 81%
81
%
Smallpox outbreak 60% 59% 76%
65
%
Hazardous material incident 63% 81% 63%
69
%
Figure 0 Survey Statistics and Percent of Personnel Willing to Respond to Certain Incidents
The first question involved responding to a multi casualty incident (MCI)
involving a school bus. There was an almost 100% willingness to respond
between all the professions. Only a total of 4 subjects stated they would not
respond to this type of incident. All 4 negative responses were reported by Police
personnel. Fire and EMS reported a 100% willingness to respond to this type of
incident.
Two scenarios asked subjects about their willingness to respond to a
weather related incident either lasting between 5-7 days or 14 days. Police
employees reported they would respond 87.2% of the time to a weather related
incident lasting between 5-7 days and 68.6% of the time for an incident lasting 14
days. Fire employees reported a 92.6% response rate to 5-7 days, and 82.6%
response rate to an incident lasting 14 days. EMS reported a response rate of
94.5% and 80.9% to the 5-7 incident and 14 day incident. Overall there was a
91.5% willingness to respond between all professions to weather related incident
lasting 5-7 days, 77.4% for a weather related incident lasting 14 days. Weather
related incidents do not necessarily involve Police, Fire, or EMS duties

9. exclusively. Weather related incidents typically require response by all three
groups of first responders.
Another event concerned a MCI involving a “dirty bomb”. Police
personnel reported an 82.9% willingness to respond to this type of incident. Fire
employees stated they would respond 79.7% of the time and EMS 80.9% of the
time. The percentage for all subjects that answered the survey was 81.2% for an
incident involving a “dirty bomb”.
One scenario involved subjects responding to a highly contiguous disease
outbreak such as smallpox. This question received the least amount of
willingness to respond. Police and Fire employees answered “yes” this question
60.1% and 58.8%, respectively. EMS subjects stated they would respond to a
small pox outbreak 75.5% of the time. This may be because small pox is thought
to be a medical issue, and not a Police or Fire matter. Overall there was a 64.8%
willingness to respond to a small pox incident.
The last scenario asked subjects to answer “yes” or “no” in regards to their
willingness to respond to a large scale hazardous materials incident involving a
possible lethal toxic agent. Police and EMS reported similar response rates of
62.4% and 63.3%. Fire personnel reported a response rate of 80.9% to the same
question. Just like the small pox incident was to EMS, hazardous materials are
thought to be a Fire Department issue in most communities. Police, Fire, and
EMS combined, reported a willingness to respond to a hazards materials incident
69.0% of the time.
The authors explored the reasons behind a practitioner’s unwillingness to
respond. Perhaps by discovering these reasons, better ways of supporting the
problem areas may decrease abandonment rates. Figure 6 shows the reasons that
were provided by the participants by first responder group type.
Figure 2 Reasons for Unwillingness to Respond
There were two primary themes present when first responders were asked
why they would not respond to extreme incidents. First responders are concerned
about their families and about their training during an extreme event. This
confirms the research that first responders may not be willing to respond to
certain event for a number of reasons. A total of 19.3% of all subjects that
answered “no” to any unwillingness to respond question, cited “duty to family” as
the reason for their negative response. This was almost double the next two
reasons given, which was “inadequate equipment” at 10.7%, and “inadequate

10. training” at 10.2%. It is clear that one of most important first responders’
concerns is the welfare of their family during a disaster. Emergency planners
need to address this issue within their departments. If first responders are
concerned about their families, some may be unwilling to respond to certain
events, as indicated by these survey findings. Research needs to be conducted in
how to better prepare responders in conjunction with their families for extreme
events. If first responders can be reassured that their family is safe during an
extreme event, it is possible willingness to respond will increase by a great deal.
Only 6.2% of all persons completing the survey and that answered “no” to
the at least one of the questions cited “risk to self” as the reason they would be
unwilling to respond. This may be surprising to some, as many articles cited for
this paper provided this as a reason for role abandonment during Hurricane
Katrina. 43.6% of all subjects, across all professions, would be willing to respond
to all scenarios asked. It is clear from this research that first responders are more
worried about others than themselves during a disaster.
When first responders were also asked, what their agency could provide to
them to make them more willing to respond to extreme incidents there was no
clear agreement (Figure 3). Almost all responses were consistent throughout the
sample. Better training was ranked #1, #2, or #3 by all professions, Fire and EMS
ranked it as #1. There has been a great deal more training since 9/11 and
Hurricane Katrina for first responders, but more training was ranked 3rd or lower
on all surveys as an average. More training does not equal better training.
Reasons responders may be more willing to respond
Order, from high (1) to low (5), for each profession Police Fire EM
S
Disaster Kit 2 5 2
Updates on family 4 3 3
Better training 3 1 1
More training 5 2 5
Better equipment 1 4 4
Figure 3 Reasons first Responders may be More Willing to Respond
Although family concerns were cited as a major reason subjects would not
respond to certain incidents, a disaster kit and updates on families ranked low on
in the areas in which a department could provide better services to their
employees. It is possible there are other services, training, or equipment, a

11. department could provide in regards to family concerns. This is an area that needs
to be further explored.
LIMITATIONS
Due to a lack of literature on the topic, this study was meant to explore if further
investigation should be focused on abandonment. Many limitations exist given
the exploratory nature of this study. First, the survey was based on the internet,
therefore only subjects with an internet connection could participate. Second,
there was a limited time frame.
Geographic constraints, of the survey sample, were also a significant
limitation. The City of Austin does not represent every American city. Locations
persons answering questions via the online bulletin board were unknown. They
may have been from rural, suburban, or urban departments. Again a longer
survey may have allowed more time to conduct the research on a boarder scale.
Significant role abandonment has only been reported once in the United
States. Hurricane Katrina was one of the most extreme events to happen in the
United States. Role abandonment is difficult to study since it is rare, this limits
the research both before and after an event. No one will know how a community
or first responders will react to a disaster until a disaster occurs.
DISCUSSION
This research supports that there is no major difference in the willingness to
respond to extreme events between the three major first responder groups: Police,
Fire, and EMS. Although there is a high percentage of personnel willing to
respond to all incidents asked, Police personnel reported a slightly lower rate of
willingness to respond overall. Police personnel reported a 5.9% less willingness
to respond to all incidents. As such, the research has suggested that emergency
planners should not anticipate one agency’s willingness to respond would be
greater or less than another agency’s willingness to respond. This would be used
for an all hazards type of pre-plan.
Although there was little difference between abandonment issues between
the responder groups, planners need to anticipate that a significant population of
first responders may not be willing to respond to certain extreme events. Extreme
events, such as Hurricane Katrina, brings to surface that there may be a natural
lack of response due to conditions outside the control of the responder. As prior
studies have shown, as the event seriousness and risk of exposure increases, so

12. does the unwillingness to respond. This type of role abandonment will can have
disastrous implications to emergency response during a large scale incident.
Excluding the questions involving a MCI with a school bus, first
responders reported they would be willing to respond, between a high of 94.5% to
a low of 58.8%, to certain extreme events. If an agency had 1000 employees that
were requested to respond to an extreme event, between 55 and 412 employees
would not be likely to respond to that event according to the data obtained. Role
abandonment rates may even be higher during an actual disaster. This is an area
all emergency planners, including Police, Fire, and EMS Chiefs, Emergency
Managers, on all levels need to plan for in advance. This is not the situation that a
planner needs to be realizing during an actual event.
The research did find that certain professions did have a difference in
willingness to respond. For example, there was a 16.7% difference between Fire
personnel’s willingness to respond to a small pox incident as compared to EMS,
whereas Fire personnel were less likely to be willing to respond. There was also a
difference, at 18% for Police and 17.5% for EMS, between Fire personnel and
Police and EMS personnel to respond to the hazards materials incident asked.
These differences are mostly likely based on the first responders’ comfort level
responding to those incidents.
One other area in which there was a large enough difference between the
professions was the willingness to respond to a weather related incident lasting 14
days. Police related they would respond to this type of incident 68.6% of the
time, compared to 82.6% for Fire (14% difference) and 80.9% for EMS (12.3%
difference). The reason for this difference is unclear. This type of incident would
involve all three major first responder groups. All three would be performing
their normal duties, but in a larger scale than normal.
With the difference in willingness to respond to 14 day weather related
incident and the slightly less willingness to respond overall, to all questions asked,
the question becomes: Will the Police response to the next major weather related
disaster be the same as it was during Hurricane Katrina? This may have more to
do with issues within a department prior to an event. 63.4% of Police personnel
cited better equipment as something their department could provide to them to
make them more willing to respond to extreme incidents. Better equipment was
an area not identified by prior research after Hurricane Katrina. Research needs
to be conducted in this area to see how to improve Police personnel’s willingness
to respond to a large scale, long lasting, weather related incident.

13. Emergency Managers in American cities need to plan for role
abandonment. Although rare, first responder role abandonment may happen for
certain events. Prepared plans for certain events should include the possibility of
some responders not willing or unable to respond. Small pox incidents and a long
lasting weather related events should be pre-planned to include a decrease in the
actual number of first responders available. Additional research needs to be
completed in all areas to increase the willingness to respond to extreme incidents,
for all professions.
OBSERVATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
More first responders need to be surveyed not only from the USA but also, from
other areas around the world. More questions should be presented and a more in
depth approach is needed to be used in order to gain better insight. Other studies
need to be conducted on the emergency managers to aid in future development of
decision support software development.
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is a well-established theory of human growth in
many different social areas. The theory can be, and has been, explored as it
relates to the work force. The needs in the theory can also be related to
employees. At the bottom of the list, or the most basic needs, are physiological
and safety. The first two needs need to be met before higher needs can be sought
according to Maslow.
First responders follow the same theory. Physiological and safety needs drive
first responders on a daily basis. Food, water, safety, family all play of part in the
response of first responders, whether to a normal incident or a disaster. In theory,
these needs would play a larger role when responding to a lengthy disaster
situation. First responders would be thinking about many different things like
when will they eat, the safety of their family, or will their home be there when
they return. These are just a few of the questions one might be wondering about
when responding to a disaster. Each disaster will be different, the more dangerous
the more basic needs will be questioned.
The body of the paper is focused on what is normally defined as the first
responder: Police Officers, Firefighters, Emergency Medical Personal. This is
typically what is thought of as first responders. It is also the categories for which
there has been data made available. However, there is really a much wider range
of first responders which includes:
 Public Works Professionals

14.  Utility Workers and Professionals of all types
 Transport Drivers
 Contractors with earth moving equipment and operators
 Hazardous materials experts
 Boat owners
 Civil and Environmental Engineers
 Volunteers of a lot of local organizations including the Red Cross
The above is an abbreviated list of the possible first responders that might
be needed in given specific and often unpredicted circumstances. Often it is the
nature the emergency plan where the lack of inclusion of many of these
professionals or which constrains the appropriate behavior of these professions
that have in the past led to severe problems.
In Katrina for example, the plan clearly stated that bus drivers who were
supposed to evacuate people without cars could not take their own families on the
buses. As a result, many bus drivers left with their families before the evacuation
was to be called. “During Katrina, identifying the lack of buses and devising a
solution was done a week after the storm” (Rainwater & Green, 2009). Boat
owners from outside the city who brought their boats into the flooded area were
turned away because they were not considered certified first responders.
There is also the lack of any attempt to ensure that gas stations and small
food sources on freeways will stay open when people are attempting to flee and
did not have a chance to fill their tanks or secure necessary food for the family.
Very little in many areas has not been done to integrate involvement of local
private sources of useful supplies for response and for public access. Because the
evacuation of New Orleans never occurred in time, the impact was that everyone
evacuated as soon as possible and all the roads turned into parking lots during
Hurricane Rita. The city planners called for the leaders to tell each local area of
the city when they could evacuate. This did not happen and everyone left at the
same time. Clearly, there was no trust of the leadership by the public.
There is a clear need for plans that will encourage the good behavior of all
types of professionals and skilled workers that could be crucial to an effective
response. In fact, plans should be made public so that public and private
organizations know what to expect and can more easily suggest improvements.
This will lead to better plans and better integration of possible useful resources,
capable people, citizen groups, and private organizations. If plans become public
documents, for emergencies common in a local area, it is far more likely that
mitigation efforts will receive greater recognition and actual implementation.

15. Plans need to be designed to have positive influences on the behavior of all the
people that are involved in the disaster response including the public.
CONCLUSION
Emergency management information systems can have algorithms that can
identify and detect when role abandonment situations are possible for occurring.
By further identifying social situations, event types and practitioner needs,
possible solutions for minimizing further disastrous human resource events can be
exposed to those who may experience such situations once in a lifetime, if at all.
It only takes one Katrina or Fukashima event to stun the world. Emergency
Managers owe it to those who put their lives in danger to question if response
efforts could be handled in a better way should the situation arise.
Having the ability to foresee such events may be difficult for humans but
will be easy for computers. Solutions and ‘what if’ scenarios can be provided to
help emergency officials manage the chaos that can ensue the aftermath or tragic
events as they unfold. Although events such as the Spanish Flu are rare, the Avian
Flu does pose real present threats and with the rise of terrorism on a global level
as of recent, these sorts of rarely occurring events may happen more often in the
near future. One can never be prepared enough and further system development
implanted in internationally developed and implemented systems such as the
Sahana Software system could aid in reducing such fatalities and managing such
events globally.
Emergency planners must at least consider that first responders may not
report for duty or respond to major events. The longer and higher risk the event
the more consideration must be made by planners. Although rare, if front line
personnel fail to respond to certain events it could mean another disaster after the
disaster.

16. REFERENCE LIST
DiMaggio, C., Markenson, D., Loo, G. T., & Redlener, I. (2005). The Willingness of U.S.
Emergency Medical Technicians to Respond to Terrorist Incidents. Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism , 3 (4).
Dynes, R. (1990). Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappopriate
Analogies.
Fung, O. W., & Loke, A. Y. (2013). Nurse's Willingness and Readiness to Report for Duty in
a Disaster. Journal of Emergency Management , 11 (1), 25-37.
Homeland Security Act of 2002. (2002, Nov 25). 6 USC Sec 101.
Jems.com. (2006). Katrina & the Future of Prehospital Care: Topics of Discussion at EMS
Today 2006. Retrieved March 12, 2006, from JEMS.com:
http://www.jems.com/news_and_articles/articles/Katrina_Future_Prehospital_Care_To
pics_EMS.html
Kushma, J. (2007). Role Abandonment in Disaster: Should We Leave this Myth Behind.
Natural Hazards Observer , 21 (5).
Quarantelli, E. (1978). Structural Factors in the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Re-examination
of the Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disasters.
Quarantelli, E. l. (2008). Conventional Beliefs and Counterintuitive Realities. Social
Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Sciences , 75 (3), pp. 873-904.
Quarantelli, E.I. (2000) Catastrophes are difference from Disasters: Some Implications for
Crisis Planning and Managing Drawn from Katrina. Retrieved March 27, 2014 http://173-
254-111-60.unifiedlayer.com/katrina/catastrophes_are_different_from_disasters.pdf
Rainwater, P., & Green, R. (2009, October). Leadership Lessons from Katrina . Fire
Rescue .
Reilly, M. J., Markenson, D., & DiMaggio, C. (2007). Comfort Level of Emergency Medical
Service Providers in Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Events: Impact of
Training and Equipment. Prehospital Disaster Medicine , July-August 2007.
Rostker, B. D., Hix, W. M., & Wilson, J. M. (2007). Recruitment and Retention: Lessions
for the New Orleans Police Department.

17. Scanlon, J. (2001). Lessons Learned or Lessons Forgotten: The Cadadian Disaster
Experience. Institute for Catasrophic Loss Reduction .
Treaster, J. B. (2005, Sept 4). At Least 200 Officers Walk Away. The New York Times .
U.S. Department of Justice. (2010). Six New Orleans Police Officers Indicted in Danziger
Bridge Case . New Orleans, LA: U.S. Department of Justice.
Walker, S., Alpert, G., & Kenney, D. (2001, July). Early Warning Systems: Responding to
the Problem Officer. National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief .

18. Wroughton, L. (2005). Katrina Takes its Toll on Police. Reuters.Appendix A
Hello: You are invited to participate in a survey. In this survey, approximately
3,000 City of Austin first responders will be asked to complete a survey that asks
questions about their willingness to respond to certain incidents within the
community. It will take approximately 2-3 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
This survey will hopefully help researchers better understand the willingness of
first responders to respond to high-risk incidents. The results will help emergency
planners better prepare for these incidents. Your participation in this study is
completely voluntary. There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project.
However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw
from the survey at any point. It is very important for us to learn your opinions.
Your survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will
be reported only in the aggregate. Your information will be coded and will remain
confidential. If you have questions at any time about the survey or the procedures,
you may contact Captain Keith Noble (Austin - Travis County EMS) by email at
keith.noble@ci.austin.tx.us. ***PLEASE READ*** All questions assume that
you have the ability to respond to the incident asked. This would include the
required minimum training within your department, minimum equipment
normally issued by your department, and ability to travel to work or respond
within a city vehicle while on duty, etc. Thank you very much for your time and
support. Please start with the survey now by clicking on the Continue button
below.
How many years have you been employed within your current field?
1. 1-5
2. 5-10
3. 10-15
4. 15-20
5. 20-25
6. 25+

19. Would you be willing to respond to large scale weather related incident in the
local area and the area in which you live, if you had to be away from home for 5-7
days?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you be willing to respond to large scale weather related incident in the
local area and the area in which you live, if you had to be away from home for 14
days?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you be willing to respond to a large scale multi casualty incident, 2,000-
3,000 injured, involving terrorists using a “dirty bomb”?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you be willing to respond to a large scale untreatable contiguous disease
outbreak such as smallpox?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you be willing to respond to a large scale haz-mat incident involving a
toxic agent?
1. Yes
2. No

20. If you answered no to any of the questions please select the main reason why you
would be unwilling to respond.
1. Duty to family (i.e. need to care for other family members)
2. Unsure if family would be safe or prepared
3. Inadequate training
4. Inadequate equipment
5. Risk to self
6. Risk to co-workers
7. I did not answer no to any questions
8. Other
______________________________________________________________
_______________________
What could your agency provide to you, to make you more willing to respond to a
high risk incident? Please rank in order from highest (1) to lowest (5).
 Disaster kit for family __________
 Updates on family during event __________
 Better training __________
 More frequent training __________
 Better equipment __________