The venetian economy_1400-1797 (2)


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The venetian economy_1400-1797 (2)

  1. 1. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797 Edited by Eric R. Dursteler LEIDEN •• BOSTON 2013
  2. 2. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 CONTENTS List of Maps and Figures  .............................................................................. ix Contributors  ..................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ xxi Introduction: A Brief Survey of Histories of Venice ............................. 1 Eric R. Dursteler Venice and Its Surroundings ....................................................................... 25 Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan Politics and Constitution .............................................................................. 47 Alfredo Viggiano The Terraferma State ..................................................................................... 85 Michael Knapton Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period  ..................... 125 Benjamin Arbel The Venetian Economy ................................................................................. 255 Luciano Pezzolo Industry and Production in the Venetian Terraferma (15th–18th Centuries)  ............................................................................... 291 Edoardo Demo Family and Society Anna Bellavitis ............................................................................................. 319 Society and the Sexes in the Venetian Republic ................................... 353 Anne Jacobson Schutte Religious Life Cecilia Cristellon and Silvana Seidel Menchi ....................................... 379
  3. 3. vi contents © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Charity and Confraternities ......................................................................... 421 David D’Andrea Venice and its Minorities  ............................................................................. 449 Benjamin Ravid The Anthropology of Venice  ....................................................................... 487 Edward Muir Liturgies of Violence: Social Control and Power Relationships in the Republic of Venice between the 16th and 18th Centuries ............................................................................................. 513 Claudio Povolo Wayfarers in Wonderland: The Sexual Worlds of Renaissance Venice Revisited ......................................................................................... 543 Guido Ruggiero The Venetian Intellectual World ................................................................ 571 Margaret L. King Venetian Literature and Publishing .......................................................... 615 Linda L. Carroll Book Publishing and the Circulation of Information .......................... 651 Mario Infelise Education in the Republic of Venice ........................................................ 675 Paul F. Grendler Science and Medicine in Early Modern Venice  .................................... 701 William Eamon Venetian Architecture ................................................................................... 743 Deborah Howard Art in Venice, 1400–1600 ............................................................................... 779 Wolfgang Wolters
  4. 4. contents vii © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Venetian Art, 1600–1797 ................................................................................ 811 Massimo Favilla, Ruggero Rugolo, and Dulcia Meijers Music in Venice: A Historigraphical Overview ...................................... 865 Jonathan Glixon Clothing, Fashion, Dress, and Costume in Venice (c.1450–1650) ..... 889 Margaret F. Rosenthal Venetian Language ......................................................................................... 929 Ronnie Ferguson Appendix One: Venetian Doges 1400–1797 ............................................. 959 Appendix Two: Patriarchs of Grado 1400–1451 and Patriarchs of Venice 1451–1800 ................................................................................... 960 Index ................................................................................................................... 961
  5. 5. © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 THE VENETIAN ECONOMY Luciano Pezzolo This essay presents the structures of Venice’s urban economy in the phases of success, resistance, and decline that characterized its history between the 15th and 18th centuries and looks at how a structure based on long-distance commerce changed into a system based on landed rev- enues and consumption. The examination of specific economic relations between the capital and its dominions is left to other contributions in this volume. Even a cursory glance at the studies of Venetian economic history brings us face to face with some of the great scholars of international historiogra- phy. Indeed, Venice was of great interest to many 20th-century scholars, both Italian and foreign, who examined the most important issues in eco- nomic history. Venetian historiography obviously reflects more general cultural tendencies. During the 19th century, the Republic of St Mark was studied above all with regard to political or cultural questions. The affir- mation of the national State as a principal historical actor led historians to an interest in the rise and fall of States in the context of international political competition. Thus the Serenissima was approached as a great Mediterranean power that had achieved a position of preeminence until the 16th century, and later followed a path of inevitable decline finally completed by the Napoleonic armies in 1797. Venice was a victim of the negative view that regarded the entire Mediterranean, according to which, after the rise of the Ottomans and the great discoveries culminating in Colombus’s enterprise in America, the whole region rapidly entered into a dramatic and irreversable crisis caused by the emergence of the Atlantic powers (Holland, France, and England). According to the German historian Wilhelm Heyd, the arrival of the Portuguese in India in 1498 and the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 were the two final events in a process that brought about the decline of the Mediterranean.1 In 1823, the Vene- tian intellectual Luigi Casarini argued that Venice, so distant from routes 1 Wilhelm Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1886), pp. 508–52.
  6. 6. 256 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 toward the East and the Americas, “was, after such a revolution, no longer capable of keeping for itself the monopoly on Oriental goods.”2 However, the First World War and the upheavals it provoked forced many to question what had previously been taken for granted, includ- ing, among other things, the preeminence of political history. Questions of economic history began to interest an ever larger group of scholars, particularly during the economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s. The move- ment of historiographical renewal culminated in the 1929 foundation of the French journal Annales proposed a decisive turn toward economic and social history. In Italy, one of the founding fathers of economic his- tory, Gino Luzzatto (1878–1964), was actually a scholar of Venetian history and was the first to do systematic research on the people and structures of the economic past. Beside Luzzatto, one must also mention the American historian Frederic C. Lane (1900–84), who began his illustrious career of Venetian scholarship with a study on the Arsenale and fleet published in 1934, followed in 1944 by a monograph on a 15th-century merchant and numerous works on the financial and commercial world of the city on the lagoon. It must also be noted that Fernand Braudel (1902–85), one of the principal protagonists of historiographical renewal in the 20th cen- tury, contributed to placing the Venetian economy in the broader con- text of Mediterranean history and strongly influenced an intrepid group of researchers in their studies on the Serenissima. The scholarly interest focused mainly on Venice’s golden centuries, the period extending from the 11th century to the 15th that witnessed the sailors, shipbuilders, and merchants of the Serenissima as protagonists of the great commercial traffic between East and West. In these stories of merchants and entrepreneurs, scholars sought the origins of the entre- preneurial spirit and, ultimately, the elements of the birth of capitalism and modernity. In the early Renaissance, Venice and Florence competed for the title of Birthplace of Capitalism and of the rationality, whether economic or political, of the Western Man. Commercial Success Venice was one of the largest metropolises of medieval Europe, drawing its vitality from long-distance commerce but, at the same time, functioning as a great center of production and consumption, as noted in Table 1. 2 Luigi Casarini, Sulla origine, ingrandimento e decadenza del commercio di Venezia e sui mezzi che nella presente di lei situazione praticare potrebbonsi per impedirne la minacciata rovina (Venice, 1823), pp. 30–31.
  7. 7. the venetian economy 257 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Table 1. Venice’s population and its ranking among the largest cities in Italy and Europe. Index: mean 1540–86=100. Inhabitants Index Ranking in Italy Ranking in Europe 1300* 110000 73 2 1363* 65228 44 1400* 85000 57 2 3 1509* 103500 69 2 3 1540 129971 87 1552 158069 105 1555 159467 106 1563 168627 113 1581 134871 90 1586 148097 99 1607*+ 188970 126 2 5 1624 141625 95 1633 102243 68 1642 120307 80 1655+ 158772 106 1696 137867 92 2 7 1740 147470 98 1761 148576 99 9 1766 140256 94 1771 138700 93 1780 140286 94 1784 139095 93 1790 137603 92 1795 137240 92 3 14 * Estimate + Data uncertain Sources: Benjamin Kedar, Merchants in Crisis. Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth Century Depression (New Haven, 1976), Appendix 7; Richard T. Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth-Century Venice (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 22; Daniele Beltrami, Storia della popolazione di Venezia dalla fine del secolo XVI alla caduta della Repubblica (Padua, 1954), p. 59; Andrea Zannini, “Un censimento inedito del primo Seicento e la crisi demografica ed economica di Venezia,” Studi veneziani 26 (1993), 108; Paolo Malanima, “Italian Cities 1300–1800. A Quantitative Approach,” Rivista di storia economica 14 (1998), Appendix; Jean Georgelin, Venise au siècle des lumières (Paris, 1978), p. 189. For comparison to other states in Europe, see Paul Bairoch, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre, La population des villes européenes de 800 à 1850 (Geneva, 1988), pp. 276–80. These data, which should be considered as indicative of a general trend, reflect the ambiguity of Venice’s economic history, an ambiguity which neither the rise and fall of a great power nor the overall stability of the population during the early modern period can explain. Certainly, the effects of the Black Death in the mid-14th century were significant, and it took several decades to recover from the demographic losses inflicted by such a catastrophe. Nevertheless, the long-term fluctuations are not
  8. 8. 258 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 significant, with the exception of the one caused by the plague of 1630. Venice’s stability is even more marked from the perspective of its rank- ing with respect to other Italian cities, behind only Naples (and Rome at the end of the 18th century). For the entire period under consideration, the city on the lagoon remained a fundamental pillar of the peninsula’s economic system and fully participated in its different phases. It is worth- while, though, to underline the importance of a comparison of Venice within the wider European context, which demonstrates that Venice, like the rest of the Mediterranean area, progressively lost ground in the early modern period. The changes that occurred on the continent placed the Serenissima in a peripheral position, despite its demographic consistency. Thus, we have resistance on one side and decline on the other. They are the two apparently opposing factors which, in the context of Venetian history, become complementary and ultimately provide the interpretative key for its economy. A long historiographical tradition has explained the late medieval eco- nomic success of Venice and, more generally, Italy as a result of its favor- able geographic position connecting European markets with the East, a particularly Italian entrepreneurial spirit, a superior technological skill in commercial management and navigation, and, consequently, in the higher productivity of its capital. The Italian comparative advantage also laid in the continuity of commercial relations with the more advanced Near East, which had been maintained even during the less dynamic peri- ods of the early Middle Ages. Constant relations had allowed for a flour- ishing exchange of technical know-how which ultimately gave Italians the edge. In fact, the western economic recovery after the 11th century further augmented the intermediary function of the peninsula’s ports. Growing European demand for spices, dying materials, silk, and cotton, and, on the part of the East, the continuous need for woolen cloths, slaves, and, above all, precious metals provided constant fuel for the Italian economy. However, it must be underlined that the achievement of a favorable posi- tion in the eastern Mediterranean was also a product of military force. The political and economic privileges enjoyed in Levantine ports by Venetian and Genovese merchants—traditionally the main competitors—reflected power relations which, at least until the arrival of the Ottomans, were maintained by their respective fleets and campaigns of piracy.3 Beyond connecting Levantine and European markets, Venetian and Genoese 3 Irene B. Katele, “Piracy in the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defence in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum 63 (1988), 865–89.
  9. 9. the venetian economy 259 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 vessels provided efficient services between the various Levantine cities, just as the English and Dutch were to do later. Tensions between the two greatest Italian naval powers led to numer- ous clashes and conflicts, culminating in the war of Chioggia (1378–81), which saw Genoa penetrate the Venetian lagoon and seriously threaten Venetian survival. However, the Serenissima was able to avoid total ruin and eventually reacquired military supremacy over its rival. It is plausible that the shifting of Genoese interests from the eastern Mediterranean towards western markets was in part caused by the constant pressure exerted by the Venetians, in addition to the recurrent Mongol and Otto- man threats. From the 13th century, unlike Genoa, Venice constructed an almost continuous chain of fortifications from the northern Adriatic to the Aegean in order to offer permanent protection to ships leaving the city of St Mark.4 Starting in the mid-14th century, the government orga- nized a system of convoys (the so-called mude) composed of armed ves- sels (the galee grosse) built in the Arsenale and thus property of the state, and then farmed them out to merchants. The most precious goods were transported on these convoys at rather high costs, but with very low insur- ance rates.5 Starting in the mid-15th century, Venetian merchants were able to achieve a preeminent position in the most important Levantine ports and thus dominate their other Italian competitors.6 Naturally, the advantages of a partial monopoly on the spice trade were considerable. It has been estimated that profits deriving from overseas trade reached 40 per cent and were at times even higher.7 That said, it is still plausible to argue that a merchant’s net profit was in the range of 10–20 per cent. If such ample profit margins attracted investors from different groups within the Venetian population, which might participate in these overseas enterprises even with small sums of money, for the gov- ernment, long-distance commerce constituted the principal source of fis- cal revenues. Customs dues and the taxation on trade and consumption contributed a huge part of government income and made Venice one of the great powers of medieval Europe. 4 John Dotson, “Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Four- teenth Centuries,” in John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds., War and Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 135. 5 Frederic C. Lane, Navires et constructeurs à Venise pendant la Renaissance (Paris, 1965), pp. 22–23. 6 Eliyahu Ashtor, “The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre- Colonialism?” Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974), 5–53. 7 Eliyahu Ashtor, “Profits from Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 37 (1975), 268.
  10. 10. 260 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 It is useful to consider the benefits Venice enjoyed in the eastern Medi- terranean compared to its competitors using the concept of transaction costs. These are the costs that regard a particular exchange, in this case of commercial nature. The actors must accept some burdens which, beyond those of production, concern the acquisition of information, eventual costs for enforcing contracts and rules, security, transport, and the like.8 The centuries-long presence of Venetian merchants in the trading centers of the Near East had allowed for an accumulation of knowledge and expertise, which over time was transformed into a consistent com- petitive advantage with respect to their competitors. Several observations of merchants from Lyon in the first half of the 16th century effectively summed up the question. The Italian merchants disposed of technical and commercial instruments, experience, a knowledge of Levantine markets, and an ability to manage money. If Frenchmen had borrowed from Vene- tians or Italians, they generally had to pay interests of 30–40 per cent at Aigues-Mortes. Moreover, the Italians residing in Levantine fondaci knew exactly when to purchase spices. Also, the voyage was of shorter duration between Venice and the East. The result was that spices coming from Ven- ice cost 20 per cent less than those imported directly by the merchants of Languedoc.9 The ability to take advantage of opportunities offered by the market, the control of or, at least, the skilled manipulation of inter- national financial networks, and the exploitation of efficient vessels were the tools that made the Venetians the protagonists of trade between the Near East and Europe. The position the merchants of the Serenissima achieved permitted a notable reduction in transaction costs and protection costs, forcing their competitors, in contrast, to sustain higher ones. Relying particularly on Venetian history, Frederic Lane underlined that the costs of protection must be considered in and of themselves when calculating total produc- tion costs: “Different enterprises competing in the same market often pay different costs of protection, perhaps as tariffs, or bribes, perhaps in some other form. The difference between the protection costs forms one element in the income of the enterprise enjoying the lower protection 8 Douglass C. North, “Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth,” Economic Inquiry 25 (1987), 383–99. 9 Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle. Lyon et ses marchands (environs de 1520—environs de 1580), 2 vols (Paris, 1971), 1:84.
  11. 11. the venetian economy 261 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 cost.”10 The component of defense represented a fundamental element in maritime trade. Thus, uncertainties about the pirates who infested Medi- terranean waters were added to those of the climate, though the former were far more worrying. Not by chance, at the beginning of the 14th cen- tury, the great Venetian galleys counted a minimum of 30 crossbowmen in a crew of 180 men; and in the 15th century a 250-ton vessel would carry 20 sailors, eight servants, and at least 4 crossbowmen.11 Though it is difficult to quantify the difference between the costs incurred by the Venetians compared to those of their competitors, it is plausible to argue that, at least until the 15th century, the former enjoyed lower costs, allowing them to benefit from a revenue of protection (that is to say, the differential between the different costs). The 20 per cent differ- ence in price between the spices the Venetians imported and those sold by French merchants may rightly be considered as a burden attributable to higher protection and transaction costs. Considering that insurance rates for galleys on the Venice–Alexandria route in times of peace did not exceed 2 per cent,12 and in the 1440s insurance rates on the Flanders route were in the range of 4 per cent, while Florentines paid 7 per cent for state ships and 10–12 per cent for private vessels,13 this difference represented a protection revenue all to the Venetians’ advantage. The benefits that were ensured to their operators were the result of a long and uncertain struggle that characterized the projection of Venetian power in the east- ern Mediterranean. The Venetian government was the first to maintain a permanent fleet (from the beginning of the 14th century) whose primary responsibility was patrolling the Adriatic Sea. Although it was not possible to fully secure these waters, due to the technological limitations of the era, it is nonethe- less significant that the Venetian rulers had decided to employ military 10 Frederic C. Lane, “National Wealth and Protection Costs,” in Lane, Venice and History (Baltimore, 1966), p. 374. 11  Bernard Doumerc, “La difesa dell’impero,” in Gino Benzoni and Antonio Menniti Ippolito, Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, 14 vols (Rome, 1992– 2002), vol. 3 (1997): La formazione dello stato patrizio, ed. Girolamo Arnaldi, Giorgio Cracco, and Alberto Tenenti, p. 240; Frederic C. Lane, “The Crossbow in the Nautical Revolution of the Middle Ages,” in Benjamin G. Kohl, and Reinhold C. Mueller, eds., Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History (London, 1987), p. 165. 12 Karin Nehlsen von Stryk, Die venetianische Seevericherung im 15. Jahrhundert (Ebel- sbach, 1986), Appendix. 13 Bernard Doumerc, “Le galere da mercato,” in Storia di Venezia, vol. 12 (1991): Il mare, ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci, p. 374.
  12. 12. 262 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 force on a regular basis in order to protect the economic interests of their merchants. Another response to the uncertainties of overseas commercial enter- prises came, as previously mentioned, in the form of state convoys, which were used from around the mid-14th century to the beginning of the 1500s. The most precious goods were transported on galee grosse (great galleys), capable both of defending themselves and protecting each other. A flotilla of three or four such galleys could provide the notable fighting force of 600–800 men, since, in addition to crossbowmen and, after 1486, archibus- iers, the rowers themselves could also fight.14 Such a convoy was certainly not easy prey for pirates. Moreover, the galley was the fastest of all the longships. A characteristic of this convoy system was its regularity: depar- tures and, if possible, arrivals were marked by a calendar that determined and made predictable the rhythms of supply and demand on the Venetian marketplace. As the galleys heading for the Levant absorbed currency and precious metals, making the city cash-poor, it was easily immaginable that the cost of money was destined to rise. At their arrival, then, the supply of liquidity brought about a corresponding fall in the cost of capital.15 Gal- ley service as a crossbowman also offered young patricians the chance to get accustomed to life at sea and begin the journey that would eventually lead them to become merchants themselves. Finally, the crews, composed of free men (as opposed to slaves), could provide a well-trained military force in wartime to serve in the fleet. Research on the regular state convoy system can boast a long tradition, thanks above all to the official documentation produced by the govern- ment. This has allowed us to track both the number of voyages made and the prices patricians—who enjoyed the right to rent merchant galleys— paid to use these ships.16 The sums collected at the auctions of galleys have been considered a good indicator of the economic fluctuations, since they reflected the investors’ profit expectations. It was possible that investors 14 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 21–22. 15 Reinhold C. Mueller, “ ‘Chome l’ucciello di passaggio’: la demande saisonnière des espèces et le marché des changes à Venise au Moyen Age,” in John Day, ed., Etudes d’his- toire monétaire (Lille, 1984), pp. 195–219. 16 Freddy Thiriet, “Quelques observations sur le trafic des galées vénitiennes d’apres les chiffres des incanti (XIVe–XVe siècles),” in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, vol. 3 (Milan, 1962), pp. 495–522; Doris Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto des galées du marché à Venise ( fin XIIIe–milieu XVe siècle) (Leiden, 1995); Claire Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner. Economie maritime et pouvoirs à Venise (XVe–XVIe siècles) (Leiden, 2008).
  13. 13. the venetian economy 263 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 might gather more than 20,000 ducats to rent a galley. As to the number of active ships, the peak was reached in the 15th century, with 180 galleys in circulation in the 1430s and 1440s. Successively, some routes were aban- doned (such as those for the Balkans), and other voyages occurred less frequently, though in some cases commercial exchange intensified in the late 15th century (the routes for Aigues Mortes, Valencia, and the Barbary states).17 But by the 16th century only a few galleys annually embarked for the traditional ports of Alexandria and Beirut. In 1569 the last state convoy was prepared for Beirut; from that moment, the system which had endured for centuries and represented one of the pillars of Venetian over- seas commerce, was abandoned. The advantages the galley system offered to Venetian merchants in the 1400s were destined to vanish in the next century. Despite government subsidies offered to contractors, management costs of the convoys ended up being quite burdensome, while roundships were able to transport goods at lower prices. Moreover, their vast employment of artillery made the roundships easy to defend, while the galleys displayed serious limits in their capacity to carry adequate weapons for the new forms of naval warfare. Moreover, it would be wrong to see the diminishing activity of the merchant galleys as a sign of crisis in Venetian maritime commerce. Silk, spices, and precious metals previously transported by the galleys now found a place in the capacious holds of the great sailing ships. In truth, in terms of tonnage, these vessels had always constituted a great majority of the mercantile fleet. It has been estimated that in the mid-15th century, the merchant galleys amounted to 3000–3500 tons, while there were 300 ships that exceeded 120 tons each. Roughly one century later, the fleet had 37 ships of more than 240 tons, 11 of which had a tonnage between 600 and 900 tons.18 However, the disappearance of the merchant galley did notably reduce the predictability of the market. Since the schedule of departures and arrivals in Venice determined the flow of supply and demand, the eclipse of the galleys meant that the arrival of even a single vessel was enough to provoke strong fluctuations in the marketplace. 17 Igual Luis, David, “Las galeras mercantiles venecianas y el puerto de Valencia (1391– 1534),” Anuario de estudios medievales 24 (1994), 179–99. 18 Gino Luzzatto, “Navigazione di linea e navigazione libera nelle grandi città marinare del Medio Evo,” in Luzzatto, Studi di storia economica veneziana (Padua, 1954), p. 55; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 228.
  14. 14. 264 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Trade between Growth and Change Despite the lack of quantitative data, most scholars claim that in the 15th and 16th centuries Venice maintained, and possibly reinforced, its pre- eminent role in commercial exchange between the West and the Levant. Between 1414 and 1431, the galleys heading for Beirut and Alexandria car- ried merchandise and precious metals of an annual value of 12 tons of silver, to which were added another five tons in the cocche (round trans- port ships) destined for Syria. The average annual investment in the gal- leys for Syria alone amounted to 17 tons in the two decades between 1449 and 1468. It could be argued, though based on information that are not always coherent, that towards the end of the 15th century the exchange value between Venice and the Levant was in the range of 25 tons of sil- ver (with a probable increase compared to the beginning of the century). In 1558–60, the Venetian representative in Constantinople claimed the overall value of this trade to be roughly 125 tons of silver. At the end of the century, Venetian commerce in Aleppo alone, one of the most impor- tant Levantine markets, amounted to more than 50 tons of silver, while the English and French took equal parts of a further 25 tons.19 The data, albeit rough, indicate that trade between the West and the Levant grew notably despite the demographic stagnation in 15th-century Europe. It is likely that continental demand was sustained by the rather elevated real incomes that allowed for an increase in demand for luxury goods. In the 16th century, though, despite the fall in real incomes, demand was sustained by a significant demographic growth together with the fall in the real prices of eastern spices. In any case, the expansion of the spice market developed through Venice’s intermediary role. Compared to the previous century, though, beginning in the 1570s Venice was joined in the 19 The data that I converted into silver for the 15th century are taken from Alan M. Stahl, “European Minting and the Balance of Payments with the Islamic World in the Later Middle Ages,” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, secc. XIII–XVIII, 2 vols (Florence, 2007), 2:895–96; Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), pp. 470–78; Francisco J. Apellániz, “Crise financière et rapports internationaux en Méditerranée: la faillité des corporations éuropéennes dans le sultanat mamelouk (1450–1517),” in Cavaciocchi, ed., Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, 2:621–22; and for the 16th century, see Bruno Simon, “Contribution à l’étude du commerce vénitien dans l’empire ottoman au milieu du XVIe siècle (1558–1560),” Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome 96 (1984), 978; and Michel Fontenay, “Le commerce des Occidentaux dans les echelles du Levant au XVIIe siècle,” in Cavaciocchi, ed., Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, 2:524.
  15. 15. the venetian economy 265 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Mediterranean by a group of fearsome competitors, primarily the French, Dutch, and English. The consistency and even the likely growth in Venetian long-distance trade was not weakened by the opening of the route around the Cape of Good Hope. True, after the arrival of Portuguese vessels full of eastern spices, the flow of trade via the Levant witnessed a dramatic interruption, but the crisis had more to do with the chaotic situation in the Arabian peninsula.20 After a short time, the Venetians resumed importing precious spices from eastern Mediterranean ports. News arriving from Alexandria in the early 1530s spoke of an abudance of spices.21 It is worth noting that from 1 October 1543 to 31 July 1544 in Lyon arrived 391 bundles of Venetian spices compared to only 66 from Antwerp, which constituted the distri- bution center for Portuguese spices destined for central Europe. Thus it seems that, at least from the vantage point of Lyon, Portuguese competi- tion did not provoke serious losses and was rather limited from the 1540s on.22 The emergence of a duopoly, in any case, had the effect of lowering the real price of spices and, in the last analysis, benefitting the European consumer.23 At least until the end of the 16th century, Levantine ports continued to provide encouraging signs for Venetian businessmen. In Aleppo as well as in Alexandria, trade volume remained quite high. Raw spices, silk, and cotton were exchanged for western products (wool fabrics, leather goods, metals, glass products, alum, silver, and gold). According to some esti- mates, in the early 1590s the Venetians invested several million ducats, and in 1596–99 they still controlled two-thirds of transit commerce. A decade later, this share would be cut in half, though it still constituted a relevant portion of the overall trade. Within a few years, the Venetian presence contracted to such a point that in the period 1612–15 its share of the trade volume had fallen to a mere 12 per cent; in Alexandria the situation was certainly no better.24 Leaving the analysis of the causes of 20 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “The Birth-Pangs of Portuguese Asia: Revisiting the Fateful ‘Long Decade’ 1498–1509,” Journal of Global History 2 (2007), 272–73. 21  Sanudo, Marin, I diarii di Marino Sanuto, ed. Rinaldo Fulin et al., 58 vols (Venice, 1879–1903), vol. 56, col. 569; and vol. 57, cols 262, 267, 463. 22 Gascon, Grand commerce, p. 89. 23 O’Rourke, Kevin H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Did Vasco da Gama Matter for Euro- pean Markets?” Economic History Review 62 (2009), 655–84. 24 Ugo Tucci, “Un ciclo di affari commerciali in Siria (1579–1581),” in Tucci, Mercanti, navi, monete nel Cinquecento veneziano (Bologna, 1981), pp. 95–143; Fontenay, “Le com- merce des Occidentaux,” p. 524; Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade 1585–1740 (Oxford, 1989), p. 55; Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies. The Structural
  16. 16. 266 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 decline for the following pages, let us for the moment simply stress that the structure of European imports from Aleppo changed significantly between the late 16th and the beginning of the 17th century. While spices had previously accounted for the majority of trade towards the west, the next century witnessed the disappearance of such products and the grow- ing importance of raw silk, mainly coming from Persia. In the space of a few decades, between 1560 and 1621, English imports rose from a little less than 12,000 to more than 117,000 pounds;25 but what is more important is that such a movement occurred without the participation of Venetian intermediaries, contrary to prior custom. In addition to the western manufactures the Venetians exported to the Levant, precious metals also occupied an important place in this trade. Gold and, above all, silver were constantly in demand from Persia, India, and especially China. The scarcity of silver ensured that its values in the East were quite favorable with respect to gold: whereas the gold-silver ratio tended to gravitate around 1:11 in 15th- and 16th-century Europe, in China it was roughly 1:7.26 That meant that precious metals served not only to balance the commercial deficit between West and East but also represented an enormous source of financial gain for European export- ers. Roughly up to the 1530s, that is, before the arrival of large quantities of American silver, Europeans supplied themselves with gold from Africa and silver from the mines of central Europe. A notable part of the produc- tion of the mines in southern Germany and Bohemia was destined for Antwerp and Venice, where German merchants purchased raw Syrian silk for their corduroy manufactures, in addition to traditional eastern prod- ucts. Technological innovations that had been developed in the second half of the 15th century allowed for a consistent increase in European sil- ver production, thus sustaining the increment of imports from the east- ern Mediterranean through Venice. It was certainly not by chance that in the 1490s precious metals transported by Venetian ships represented an average of 60 per cent of the value of their loads.27 Crisis in the European-Asian Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century (Copenhagen, 1972), pp. 175–85. 25 Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713 (Oxford, 2011), p. 68. 26 Luciano Pezzolo, “Stato, prezzi e moneta,” in Alessandro Barbero, ed., Storia d’Europa e del Mediterraneo, vol. 10: Ambiente, popolazione, società (Rome, 2009), pp. 290–91. 27 John H. Munro, “The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’: South German Sil- ver Mining, Merchant Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470–1540,” in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard Von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History,
  17. 17. the venetian economy 267 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 The 16th century witnessed a change in the social profile of the pro- tagonists of Venetian long-distance commerce. Until mid-century, people who embarked on the galleys, lived in the fondaci, and traded in the great marketplaces of southern Europe and the eastern Mediterreanean were largely patricians. The figure of Andrea Barbarigo can rightly be taken as representative of the 15th-century Venetian patrician, involved from his youth in the search for profit through commerce.28 In the space of only a few generations, however, most of the patricians would shed the aus- tere garb of the merchant and choose instead the comfortable life of the landed aristocracy. Throughout the 16th century, in fact, there was a huge wave of Venetian investments in the terraferma. The phenomenon had already manifested itself in the previous century, but in the 16th century it assumed more significant proportions. These investments first regarded areas closer to the lagoon (the regions of Padua, Treviso, and the south- western part of the Friuli) and eventually penetrated the regions around Vicenza and south of Verona.29 A long historiographical tradition has accused the Venetian patriciate of having betrayed its mercantile voca- tion in order to enjoy the easy revenues of a landed income, thus causing the decline of the great maritime republic. However, numerous elements justify and legitimize the patriciate’s choices. First, the 16th century was characterized by a marked increase in food prices, which consequently made agrarian production particularly profitable. Since the rates of return to agriculture were close to those to commerce, land acquisition was con- sidered an excellent investment.30 Second, the availability of land, facili- tated by the political control of the hinterland, represented a fundamental tool in ensuring the patrimonial transmission, which was becoming a par- ticular concern for 16th-century nobles. Third, in Renaissance Venice there 1470–1800 (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 1–34; John H. Munro, “South German Silver, European Textiles, and Venetian Trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire, c. 1370 to c. 1720: A Non-Mercantilistic Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem,” in Cavaciocchi, ed., Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, 2:905–60; Frederic C. Lane, “Exporta- tions vénitiennes d’or et d’argent de 1200 à 1450,” in Day, ed., Etudes d’histoire monétaire, pp. 29–48; Stahl, “European Minting,” pp. 889–904. 28 Frederic C. Lane, Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice, 1418–1449 (Baltimore, 1944). 29 Gian Maria Varanini, “Proprietà fondiaria e agricoltura,” in Storia di Venezia, vol. 5 (1985): Il Rinascimento. Società ed economia, ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci, pp. 807– 79; Daniele Beltrami, La penetrazione economica dei veneziani in terraferma. Forze di lavoro e proprietà fondiaria nella campagne venete dei secoli XVII e XVIII (Venice, 1961). 30 Richard T. Rapp, “Real Estate and Rational Investment in Early Modern Venice,” Journal of European Economic History 8 (1979), 269–90; Luciano Pezzolo, “Sistema di valori e attività economica a Venezia, 1530–1630,” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., L’impresa. Indu- stria, commercio, banca, secc. XIII–XVIII (Florence, 1991), pp. 981–88.
  18. 18. 268 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 was an increasing belief that agriculture could constitute an even nobler activity than commerce.31 That does not mean, however, that the Vene- tians abandoned commerce; it was only patrician merchant who became far rarer. Replacing the patricians were Venetians whom we might con- sider the “middle class,” but they were not the only ones. A myriad of more modest figures with origins in the terraferma and Jews from both Venice and its colonies conducted business under the flag of St Mark. It seems as though the norm that limited overseas commerce to the patriciate and other privileged citizens was overtaken by the contingencies of a more complex and composite reality.32 Thus, the Venetian mercantile world was transformed in its social components and, to a certain extent, in its cultural ones. The city embraced new commercial protagonists by giving them the possibility of freely conducting their business without any par- ticular limits or constraints. Unlike what occurred in Danzig and Lubeck,33 Venice represented a favorable environment for foreign merchants, whose property rights were fully guaranteed. It was likely this ability to attract foreigners that allowed Venice to maintain an important role in the net- work of information and relations that governed the international market, and consequently retain the city’s mercantile character. Commerce had in fact been transformed: growing difficulties in the international markets brought about a narrowing of the Venetian social groups participating in the sector, and the chances for financial gain now offered themselves only to the shrewdest operators and those who could call on a vast information network. The profits offered by long-distance commerce were still high, but they were now reserved to a far smaller group. Though a modest number of patricians continued to attend to commercial affairs, it was the ruling class as a whole whose economic foundations were truly transformed. The crucial question, then, regards the relations between economic change and the decisions of economic policy made by the patriciate. If it is true that the Senate was the “board of directors” of the mercantile Republic, one must accurately analyze the consequences of the spread of extensive landownership among the 31 Ugo Tucci, “The Psychology of the Venetian Merchant,” in John R. Hale, ed., Renais- sance Venice (London, 1973), pp. 346–78. 32 Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople. Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore, 2006), pp. 52–60. 33 Erik Lindberg, “Club Goods and Inefficient Institutions: Why Danzig and Lübeck Failed in the Early Modern Period,” Economic History Review 62 (2009), 604–28.
  19. 19. the venetian economy 269 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 patricians and the economic choices that were developed in the 17th and 18th centuries. Public Finance In order to sustain international trade, it was not enough to dispose of abundant merchandise and to have clever merchants; it was also neces- sary to support their activities with efficient crews and, above all, a system of protection. Such efforts, however, required great sums of money. The many wars Venice fought both at sea and on land exerted constant pres- sure on the city’s finances. Annual state spending in terms of silver was probably in the range of 45–50 tons in the 15th century and rose to 100 tons in the 17th, a sum that was never again equalled during the next cen- tury.34 The responses varied: increased taxation, recourse to extraordinary measures (sale of government offices and titles of nobility), and, above all, the public debt via both voluntary and forced loans. The Venetian state drew its financial resources first of all from indirect taxes, that is to say, from those regarding the transit of goods, consump- tion, and economic activities in general.35 The part of government rev- enues relative to its domain (property and land rentals, minting rights for coinage, etc.) was quite modest. In times of peace the budget covered ordinary expenses, such as the salaries of communal officials and over- seas administration, those of the soldiers and sailors of the fleet, and the cost of maintaining the arsenal, as well as the interest payments on its loans. Yet peace was a condition which Renaissance Venice experienced only rarely. Open conflicts and patrol operations, brief but intense cam- paigns against rebellious coastal centers, protection from raids, and the need to escort commercial shipping all contributed to a quasi-perennial state of emergency and military mobilization. Until the eve of the War of Chioggia, however, Venetian finances were able to meet their needs with relative efficiency. After that point, however, began an era of burdensome wars which put a serious strain on the state budget. 34 Luciano Pezzolo, Una finanza d’ancien régime. La Repubblica veneta tra XV e XVIII secolo (Naples, 2006), pp. 38–39. 35 This section is based on the fundamental work of Gino Luzzatto, “Introduzione” to Gino Luzzatto, ed., I prestiti pubblici della Repubblica di Venezia (sec. XIII–XV) (Padua, 1929); and especially Reinhold C. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market. Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200–1500 (Baltimore, 1997).
  20. 20. 270 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Renaissance Venice was one of the most developed financial markets in Europe, and even in the public sector it was unrivalled. Recourse to the public debt became an increasingly common choice in deficit spending. Yet it is necessary to underline the largely forced nature of these loans. Indeed, Venetians who were registered in the fiscal books were obliged to pay a sum in relation to their assessed wealth. In exchange, they received 5 per cent interest until the restitution of the loans. Moreover, those who held these state bonds were permitted to put them on the market. This possibility opened the door to the formation of a veritable market for shares in the state debt, subject to supply and demand and conducted with the presence of specialists and intermediaries. Naturally, the market offered attractive opportunities for speculation: a high demand for loans on the part of the government provoked an increase in the selling of these bonds among citizens, who were forced to find new liquidity with which to fund the new loans. A heightened supply contributed to lower market prices to the advantage of those who were able to purchase the devalued bonds. Then, when the negative period passed, prices of the securities rose again and could be sold with high profits. The growing state debt caused serious delays in interest payments, so that those claims came to be bought and sold. This mechanism of state credit had important consequences in both economic and socio-political terms. First, government debt was a potent instrument for the redistribution of resources: interest was generally paid through indirect taxation, which by definition weighed more heavily on the lower strata of the population than on the well-to-do, who possessed notable shares of the debt. Yet it must be noted that a share of the taxes destined to make these interest payments was, in fact, sustained by for- eign consumers who paid for products imported from Venice. A period of political expansion with its relative economic and financial benefits, then, permitted the government to bear the burden of debt without undue diffi- culties, as occurred until the end of the 14th century. Therefore, it is likely that the state debt enjoyed a wide social consensus, unlike what hap- pened in Florence. During the following century, the situation worsened as a consequence of sustained military activity. Interest payments came to accumulate enormous delays, and the price of securities collapsed. In 1482 the entire debt was consolidated in the Monte Vecchio and a new series of titles was offered in the so-called Monte Nuovo. The various phases of the Italian Wars caused further problems, so that the government launched other series (the Monte Nuovissimo, the Monte del sussidio) for the pur- pose of collecting mainly forced loans.
  21. 21. the venetian economy 271 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Because of these continuous financial difficulties, the need emerged to make regular recourse to direct taxation, traditionally considered viable only in extraordinary circumstances. In 1463 the government imposed the decima, a semi-regular direct tax without obligations of restitution that targeted mostly real estate holdings both in Venice and in the terraferma, and the tansa, which hit other forms of income (trade, manufactures). Pre- viously, various direct taxes had been decreed extraordinarily and largely had targeted those citizens not obliged to fund state loans, but beginning in the 1460s, this practice became ever more routine and institutionalized. The basis for collection remained the estimo (or catasto), a fiscal docu- ment that registered how much each individual might be taxed and which was supposed to be updated periodically so as to reflect fluctuations in wealth as they occurred. As for the decima, it was the taxpayer that declared his landed income, and only afterwards did the fiscal authority (the Dieci savi alle decime in Rialto) verify its accuracy. The amount of the tansa, in contrast, was determined with greater margins for personal judg- ment by a commission which considered the taxpayer’s total income and expenses. The system would have functioned well if the catasti had not been updated as infrequently as they were: despite the legislation order- ing a new evaluation every decade, the redecime (as they were defined in the administative language of the time) were carried out four times in the 16th century and only once in both the 17th and 18th centuries. In the final period of the Italian Wars, between 1520 and 1530, crucial innovations were introduced in the debt system.36 From this period, the government looked more and more frequently to the market of free capital and progressively abandoned the forced nature of loans. The new bonds, known as Depositi in zecca [Deposits in the mint], met with great success, thanks also to their attractive interest rates (14 per cent for life annuities and 6–7 per cent on long-term loans). The Depositi in zecca pro- vided the majority of the liquidity to fight the Turkish wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. The Venetian government’s excellent reputation was further strengthened with the great operation of debt payout which took place betwen 1577 and the early 17th century. Roughly 10 million ducats, equal to about four times the state’s annual income, were paid back to the state’s creditors. Thus a huge stream of money came to fill Venetian purses, from where it could be invested in the land or in private loans. The military conflicts of the 17th century, however, revived the financial needs 36 For what follows, see Pezzolo, Una finanza d’ancien régime.
  22. 22. 272 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 of the Republic. In addition to the Depositi in zecca, there were forced loans on guilds and ecclesiastical institutions, lotteries, the sale of offices and noble titles, and loans contracted abroad. During the 18th century, the evolution of debt reflected Venice’s economic and political situation. The general stability of state revenues and the lack of heavy financial burdens allowed the government to maintain the debt at an acceptable level. Though quantitative data are lacking, it is quite probable that the Vene- tian patriciate was the most important lender to the state, and thus to its own government institutions. The presence of significant shares of state securities is evident in numerous aristocratic patrimonies and dowry settlements. From the beginning of the 17th century, the patricians were joined more and more frequently by lay and ecclesiastical institutions and by other private citizens, particularly the Genoese. In 1787 Venetians held 79.7 per cent of the Venetian debt, foreigners had 19.5 per cent, and just 0.8 per cent was in the hands of subjects of the terraferma.37 This image can be interpreted in different ways: on the one hand the interna- tionalization of the debt might represent the high degree of trust in the Venetian debt; on the other, the phenomenon could be seen as a sign of difficulty for the Venetian patricians in satisfying the demands of the state. Third, the scarse participation of subjects from the dominion might show, yet again, the limits and nature of the Venetian territorial state: a state that was centered on Venice, unable to complete the process of forming a coherent and cohesive political entity with the rest of the ter- ritories under the flag of St Mark. However, the redistributive effects of revenues were significant: interest on the debt contributed to sustaining the 17th-century urban economy which was undergoing notable difficul- ties, and also provided resources to charitable institutions that sought to conserve social tranquility and the internal political equilibrium. Manufactures Though it was trade that characterized the Venetian Renaissance econ- omy, the contribution of the industrial sector must not be underesti- mated. The recent historiography has underlined how Venice in the 15th and even more in the 16th century was one of the greatest industrial centers in Europe.38 Wool and silk fabrics, glass beads and mirrors, leather 37 Georgelin, Venise au siècle des lumières, p. 554. 38 Salvatore, Ciriacono, “Industria e artigianato,” in Storia di Venezia, vol. 5: Il Rinasci- mento. Società ed economia, ed. Tenenti and Tucci, pp. 523–92; Ugo Tucci, “Venezia nel
  23. 23. the venetian economy 273 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 goods, the products of goldsmiths, books and prints, and, naturally, ships were the principal categories of urban production. Since for so long the production trend of woolen cloths has been considered indicative of Ven- ice’s economic health, it might be helpful to represent its evolution in Figure 5.1, and discuss its validity and limits. First, it must be noted that Figure 5.1 does not include the 15th-century data, which seem to be characterized by solid production levels. During the first half of the 15th century, 3000–5000 pieces were produced annu- ally, while at the end of the century estimates are in the range of 6000 wool pieces. That means that the first decades of the 16th century represent a period of continuity, if not modest decline with respect to the preceding years. The roots of the sector’s success, then, ought to be traced back to the 15th century. The workforce consisted in large part of immigrants from the Po Valley, and together with entrepreneurs of lower social extraction we find Venetian patricians and wealthy merchants.39 The 16th-century ascendancy of Venetian textiles, largely exported to Levantine markets, occurred at the expense of comparable Florentine products, which had Cinquecento: una città industriale?” in Vittore Branca and Carlo Ossola, eds., Crisi e rinno- vamento nell’autunno del rinascimento a Venezia (Florence, 1991), pp. 61–83. 39 Andrea Mozzato, “The Production of Woolens in Fifteenth and Sixteenth-Century Venice,” in Paola Lanaro, ed., At the Centre of the Old World. Trade and Manufacturing in Venice and the Venetian Mainland, 1400–1800 (Toronto, 2006), pp. 73–107. 0 5000 1516‒201526‒301536‒401546‒501556‒601566‒701576‒801586‒901596‒16001606‒101616‒201626‒301636‒401646‒501656‒601666‒701676‒801686‒901696‒17001706‒101706‒20 10000 15000 20000 25000 Cloths Source: Walter Panciera, L’ “arte matrice.” I lanifici della Repubblica di Venezia nei secoli XVII e XVIII (Venice/Treviso, 1996), pp. 42–43. Figure 5.1. Production of woolen cloths in Venice, 1516–1723 (quinquennial average).
  24. 24. 274 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 long been sold in those regions. The deterioration of relations between Florence and the Sublime Porte, internal political instability, and the reduction of imports of raw silk from Persia which counterbalanced the exports of woolen goods, significantly weakened the Florentine position in the Levant, though the Florentines continued to grow in the northern European market.40 At the same time, the recovery of the spice trade in the eastern Mediterranean offered the Venetians ample possibilities of trade in exchange for woolen cloths. This ensured that, from the mid- 16th century, the performance of the Venetian wool industry would be the exception to the general rule of the industry’s difficulties, both in the Venetian terraferma and in the principal centers of the peninsula. As for the raw materials used in the highest-quality production, the traditional supplies of famed English wool were now joined by Spanish merino wool, which by the end of the 16th century wholly replaced the former. It is certainly not by chance that merchants of Castilian wool left Florence for the lagoon at the beginning of the 17th century, attracted by the prospective of its lucrative trade. It must be said, however, that the supply channels were often heavily conditioned by the instability and tensions of international politics. In any case, it does not appear that the Venetian producers had to confront serious supply problems during the period of 16th-century expansion, as they were able to call on raw materi- als from both Spain and the Balkans. The quantitative data, however, hide an important structural change with regard to the quality of the fabrics. Richard Rapp has underlined that the numbers conceal a profound transformation in qualitative terms. From the third quarter of the 16th century, the traditional production of heavy fabrics made of high-quality wool came to be combined with a pro- duction of lighter, medium-quality fabrics, which better met the tastes of Levantine demand and which from the middle of the century constituted the majority of the cloths produced in Venetian workshops.41 Thus, the Venetian wool boom was characterized by significant qualitative changes that, as we shall see, force us to question the accusations made against the urban guild system as an impediment to innovation. Even an in-depth 40 Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 2009), pp. 274–75. 41  Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, p. 158. See also Walter Panciera, L’arte matrice. I lanifici della Repubblica di Venezia nei secoli XVII e XVIII (Treviso, 1996).
  25. 25. the venetian economy 275 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 analysis of the merely quantitative data, then, is insufficient in explaining the success and eventual decline of a productive sector. The great importance of wool in international commerce, from the Middle Ages onward, and the availability of important historical data sets have long relegated the silk industry to the margins. Although adequate quantitative data are not available, it is beyond doubt that silk fabrics con- tinued to conquer ever greater shares of the market. Owing particularly to the consistent presence of artisans from Lucca from the 14th century, Venice grew progressively as a center of silk manufacturing. It has been estimated that the number of looms rose from 800 in 1430 to 1000 in 1493 and by 1554 had reached 2400.42 Up to the mid-15th century, Venetian merchants got their raw silk sup- plies in the ports of the Black Sea. But after the fall of Constantinople, the provisioning areas shifted first to Damascus and then to Aleppo. Between the 15th and 16th centuries, the galleys imported an annual average of 75,000 pounds from Beirut, while between 1590 and 1604 the amount would climb to 362,500 pounds. It must be said, however, that a good portion of the imported silk was re-exported to other centers, mainly Ital- ian ones. As in the case of wool production, the imports of raw silk seem to follow the same trend, reaching their peak in the first years of the 17th century and then diminishing drastically afterwards.43 Still, Venice diver- sified its supply lines, from Spain to southern Italy, and in this case as well showed a capacity of adapting itself according to market changes. Silk cloths productions were diversified by not only targeting traditional products for the wealthy elite but also producing thinner fabrics for the growing demand of the middle classes.44 Nor did Venetian industry produce cloths alone. Its printing industry was by far the most important in early 16th-century Europe. By the middle of the century, the number of printed publications in the city was twice that of all the other great Italian centers put together.45 Yet, at the end of the 16th century, the Venetian press was struggling to maintain its suprem- acy and left plenty of room for its northern European competitors. 42 Luca Molà, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice (Baltimore, 2000), p. 17. 43 Domenico Sella, Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII (Venice, 1961), pp. 110– 11; Molà, The Silk industry, pp. 58–60. 44 Molà, The Silk industry, pp. 75–88. 45 Paul F. Grendler, The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press, 1540–1605 (Princeton, 1977), p. 229.
  26. 26. 276 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 The 15th and 16th centuries witnessed the growth of the Venetian manu- facturing sector, likely at a rather modest rate early on and at a higher speed over the course of the 16th century. Several factors favored this growth, and they depended both on the dynamics of international markets as well as on the emergence of local energies. Growing European demand for luxury products (spices, silk, porcelain, etc.) and more common ones (medium- and lower-quality cloths, food supplies, etc.), above all in urban areas and generated by demographic growth, became ever more constant toward the end of the 15th century and stimulated the Venetian commercial system. In addition, the availability of precious metals from Central Europe improved the capability of Europeans to purchase products from the East. Even at the beginning of the 17th century, Venice seemed to enjoy a luminous pros- perity, which nonetheless was destined to wane soon. The Restructuring of an Economic System In the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of the Venetian decline came to join, and even bypassed in importance, the analysis of its economic success. The pioneering study of Carlo M. Cipolla regarding the economic decline of Italy in the 17th century46 offered a point of reference for other scholars interested more in 17th-century shadows than in the bright lights of the Renaissance. In Cipolla’s view, the causes of the depression that struck the industrial and commercial apparatus of the Italian peninsula during the 17th century—and in particular the wool industry—had to be sought in an inability to keep up with foreign competitors, who were able to take over the place of Italian products in the markets of Europe and the Levant. The English “new draperies,” lighter and with more fashionable colors, better satisfied a changing demand; and, moreover, they could be sold at lower prices. Cipolla identified three fundamental causes in this decline: 1) the guild structure of Italian manufacturing centers hindered flexible production and the introduction of innovations, targeting instead on the safeguarding of traditional principles (high product quality, elimi- nation of competition between members of the same trade); this resulted in 2) the cost of labor in Italy being excessive in proportion to productiv- ity, unlike what was happening in competing countries, which reflected the rigidity of the labor market; and 3) the heavy hand of the fisc in the 46 Carlo M. Cipolla, “The Decline of Italy: The Case of a Fully Matured Economy,” Economic History Review 5 (1952), 178–87.
  27. 27. the venetian economy 277 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Italian states. To these reasons were added the aggressive mercantilist policy of the northern European powers that facilitated national exports by impeding imports; the dumping practiced in certain cases by compet- ing merchants; the growing difficulties which Italian manufactures faced in accessing supplies of raw materials (particularly Spanish wool); the greater efficiency of seagoing vessels with respect to the traditional prac- tices of Italian navigation; and, finally, the cost of money, which seems to have been lower beyond the Alps. Much of Cipolla’s diagnosis was confirmed in a fundamental study by DomenicoSellalookingatthe17th-centuryVenetianeconomy.Sellaargued for the contraction of Levantine demand owing to monetary fluctuations and the fall in purchasing power of more middling clientele; the growing inefficiency of Venetian maritime services (as shown by Tenenti)47 shaken by piracy and by Anglo-Dutch technological superiority; not to mention the competition not only from foreign merchants but also from the cloths of the terraferma. Moreover, the routines of traditional exchange had been thrown into crisis by “northern” merchants who arrived rich in silver cur- rency, which was in great demand in the eastern markets. Again in the Venetian case, the negative role of the guilds, high taxation, and the cost of labor are all called into account.48 The same Venetian authorities in the Levant proved incapable of perceiving the shifts underway in the political relations between the periphery and the capital of the Ottoman Empire.49 Sella’s book came out only a few years after an important conference held in Venice, whose objective was to place Venetian decline in a wider Euro- pean context.50 Eminent scholars had discussed and analyzed the 17th century through the Venetian prism and had made Venice a symbol for a century of crisis. Foreign competition, diminishing labor productivity due to the aging workforce, and the economic policies of the government were the causes indicated by Rapp as well, as he once more confronted the theme of Vene- tian decline, though with several clarifications. The American scholar rec- ognized that the Venetian economy had experienced a decline in relation to the international market in the 17th century, but he rejected the con- 47 Alberto Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes à Venise (1592–1609) (Paris, 1959); Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580–1615, trans. Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley, 1967). 48 Sella, Commerci e industrie. 49 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650 (Seattle, 1990), pp. 105–18. 50 Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII (Venice, 1961).
  28. 28. 278 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 cept of absolute decline since the city had not suffered a fall in revenues, which remained stable. Indeed, Venice had filled the fiscal voids provoked by the plague of 1630 rather quickly, thus demonstrating a notable capac- ity of recovery. Though Rapp lent excessive faith to certain sources, his view presented a more textured reality than the bleak depictions pro- posed in the past.51 At present, it is difficult to blame the guilds for production difficulties. First, one must explain why the guilds were able to sustain the strong growth of the Renaissance period on the one hand and, on the other, constituted a serious impediment to its future growth. Second, the guild system showed itself quite flexible, and capable, as in the case of the silk and glass industries, of adjusting qualitative standards and production processes to adapt to changes in international demand through the use of technological innovation. It should be noted, moreover, that the decisions made by the guilds depended on the productive capabilities of the city, as well as on the political and social relations among the guild leaders, guild members, and the government in the wider context of the market.52 As for the cost of labor, although we do not have comparable data for the manufacturing sector in the rest of Europe, the data series of con- struction workers’ salaries demonstrate that in England and Holland, real salaries were higher than in Italy (see Figure 5.2). That would reflect a greater labor productivity in northern Europe. In Venice, in particular, the trend does not differ from the more general one (a tendency for workers’ purchasing power to fall over the early modern period). The comparison with other European cities indicates that, in fact, unspecialized workers in Venice enjoyed a relatively good socio-economic position, which improved during the course of the 17th century compared to English salaried workers and which was more or less equivalent to their Dutchcolleagues.Itispossiblethatacomparisonintermsofthepurchasing power of grain alone could create a false picture, and yet another interest- ing problem emerges. How does one evaluate the discrepancies between the various levels of salaries? The 17th-century differential between Ven- ice and England would justify those who see high salaries as the cause of the crisis, but Holland also presents salaries which were just as high. 51 Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline; and the critical comments of John A. Marino, “La crisi di Venezia e la New Economic History,” Studi storici 19 (1978), 79–108. 52 Francesca Trivellato, “Guild, Technology, and Economic Change in Early Modern Venice,” in Stephan R. Epstein and Maarten Prak, eds., Guilds, Innovation, and the Euro- pean Economy, 1400–1800 (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 199–231.
  29. 29. the venetian economy 279 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 Yet, Venice itself could already boast higher real salaries than those in Florence in the later Middle Ages.53 It must be noted, however, that with grain being a rather costly cereal in England, popular consumption there tended to focus mainly on rye. English salaries expressed in grain, then, underestimate workers’ real purchasing power. Recent work has found, in fact, that a relatively high quality of life in the most developed areas was an element that distinguished them from areas with a lower rate of eco- nomic growth.54 Thus, the Venetian data might be explained not as much in the prerogatives of the guilds as in the high concentration of wealth which the city continued to enjoy, even in the 17th and 18th centuries, and in its ability to modify its own productive structure. Indeed, the salaries 53 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 656. 54 Robert C. Allen, “Real wages in Europe and Asia: A First Look at the Long-Term Pat- terns,” in Robert C. Allen, Tommy Bengtsson, and Martin Dribe, eds., Living Standards in the Past. New Perspectives on Well-Being in Asia and Europe (Oxford, 2005), pp. 111–30; Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta, “The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500–1800,” Economic History Review 59 (2006), 2–31. But see also Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Rise and Decline of Holland’s Econ- omy. Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market (Manchester, 1993), pp. 136–37. Source: Author’s dataset; and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Wages and the Standard of Living in Europe, 1500–1800,” European Review of Economic History 3 (1999), 181, 185. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 LitersofWheat1396‒1400 1461‒651471‒75 1498‒15001508‒101518‒201528‒301538‒401548‒501558‒601568‒701578‒801588‒90 1598‒16001608‒101618‒201628‒301658‒801671‒751711‒151738‒401771‒75 Venice England HollandParis Figure 5.2. Real wages of building laborers in comparison, 1396–1775.
  30. 30. 280 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 of common Venetian weavers were not at all superior to those of their colleagues in the terraferma.55 How, then, must we explain the grave difficulties Venice faced on the international market? First, it must be clarified that decline in the Levant was not immediate: in 1623 the Venetian presence was still significant, and the volume of its exports was estimated at 2 million ducats, a sum that was not far off late 16th-century levels.56 Even toward the end of the 18th century, Venetian ships continued to play an important role in trade between the Ottoman ports.57 Yet there is no doubt that Venetian long- distance commerce was hard hit by its “northern” competitors. It is likely that they were able to beat the Venetians on the very terrain in which the latter had founded their success in the later Middle Ages, particu- larly in the ability to lower transaction costs and force competitors to pay higher ones. While Venetian merchant ships were considered easy prey for pirates and corsairs, the Dutch and, above all, the English were able to ensure more effective protection for their ships. Consequently, insurance rates to be paid for Venetian goods were higher than those applied to the products transported on “northern” vessels. The favorable conditions that Venetian operators had enjoyed in the Levantine markets disappeared between the 16th and 17th centuries to the advantage of their more aggres- sive and crafty competitors.58 Difficulties in trade affected the manufac- turing sector, whose production was largely for export. In reality, the costs of commercialization contributed significantly to the crisis of Venetian trade. Since production costs were not easily reducible, it was in the costs of intermediation that the commercial game had to be won. An adequate comparison between countries’ economic policies ought to consider not only production costs but also (and I would say, most importantly) those of commercialization. Thus, from the mid-17th century, Venice revealed itself to be quite different with respect to the medieval city. Undoubtedly, long-distance international commerce, which had made the city’s fortune, was much 55 Marcello Della Valentina, Operai, mezzadi, mercanti. Tessitori e industria della seta a Venezia tra ’600 e ’700 (Padua, 2003), pp. 107–09. 56 Ugo Tucci, “Vita economica a Venezia nel primo Seicento,” in Galileo e la cultura veneziana (Venice, 1995), p. 131. 57 Daniel Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire During the Eighteenth Century,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992), 197–98. 58 Luciano Pezzolo, “Violenza, costi di protezione e declino commerciale nell’Italia del Seicento,” Rivista di storia economica 23 (2007), 111–24.
  31. 31. the venetian economy 281 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 reduced in scope, limited mainly to the Adriatic with an occasional foray into the Levant. Consequently, the size of the commercial fleet and, par- ticularly, its composition had changed. If in the second half of the 16th century there were numerous ships of great capacity, in the next century the trend is unclear because of the influence of the War of Candia. In the second half of the 18th century, however, a reduction clearly appears in the average tonnage of the vessels of St Mark. Its ships nonetheless con- tinued to operate intensely in the Adriatic, and the level of this activity would remain significant for the entire last century of the Republic.59 Some manufacturing sectors, however, had witnessed a consistent growth. The production of items in silk and silk-gold weaves developed throughout the 17th century, to the extent that they likely surpassed the production levels of the 15th century, considered the golden age of Venetian silk. The spread of the mulberry in the countryside of the ter- raferma during the last two centuries of the Republic witnesses the rise in demand of raw material for manufactures. Numerous merchants made their fortunes in the silk trade and were able to accumulate enormous patrimonies. It is significant that, of the 128 families that acquired a title of Venetian nobility between 1646 and 1718, 78 (57 per cent) of them came from the merchant class. Even the printing industry, which had experi- enced a significant decline between the 16th and 17th centuries, recovered in the following decades. Venice maintained its preeminent position in the Italian market, publishing one-third of all titles in the 17th century; and later, the sector displayed a notable ability to respond to changes in demand.60 Despite losing ground to foreign competition, the glassmakers of Murano were able to maintain an important role in specific sectors.61 The characteristics of 18th-century Venice were markedly different from those of the Renaissance city. Though its international activities had been reduced, there were still many merchants operating there, but now they were mainly Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. The service sector (grocers, hospitality) was now at least as important as the traditional cloth sector.62 59 Sella, Commerci e industrie, pp. 103–10; Massimo Costantini, Una Repubblica nata sul mare. Navigazione e commercio a Venezia (Venice, 2005), pp. 145–47. 60 Brendan Dooley, “Printing and Entrepreneurialism in Seventeenth-Century Italy,” Journal of European Economic History 25 (1996), 585; Mario Infelise, L’editoria veneziana nel ’700 (Milan, 1989). 61 Francesca Trivellato, Fondamenta dei vetrai. Lavoro, tecnologia e mercato a Venezia tra Sei e Settecento (Rome, 2000). 62 Beltrami, Storia della popolazione, pp. 206–12; Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, p. 97.
  32. 32. 282 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 The city represented a center of coordination in terms of an interregional economic area. Here there were financial, shipping, commercial, and manufacturing services; and it was here that the know-how, labor force, and entrepreneurs of the terraferma came together. At the same time, an analagous flow was directed towards various areas of the dominion. Behind the spread of industrial activities in the terraferma, one can see the capital of Venetian patricians: in the wool factory on Schio, in the northern hinterland of Vicenza, for silk spinning wheels in hills of Treviso, and for several paper factories.63 Similarly, nobles from the lagoon con- cerned themselves with improving land production by investing in new technologies.64 By now, the terraferma was assuming real importance, even for the well-being of the Venetians. In the regional division of labor, the capital demonstrated a marked vocation for the production of luxury goods, while the centers of the hinterland dedicated themselves to less prestigious industries.65 Can one thus speak of the formation of a regional economy? In the present state of research, it is premature to give a defini- tive answer. Undoubtedly a high degree of integration can be identified in some sectors (the grain and financial markets); and even in the fis- cal sector, the high barriers that had characterized the relations between Venice and its subject provinces in the Renaissance were lowered slowly over time. Yet the diaphragm that separated the city on the lagoon from the rest of its state never gave way: a diaphragm that was perhaps more cultural and ideological than economic but which, until recent times, also has heavily conditioned the relative historiography. Only recently, in fact, have we turned to consider the entire state (or better, the Italian terra- ferma) in order to better understand the economy of Venice. Bibliography Primary Works Naturally, the Archivio di Stato in Venice offers an enormous number of primary sources for any research project, particularly for topics of economic history. Since a large part of the documentation is subdivided according to the institutional structure of the government, 63 Ivo Mattozzi, “Intraprese produttive in Terraferma,” in Storia di Venezia, vol. 7 (1997): La Venezia barocca, ed. Gino Benzoni and Gaetano Cozzi, pp. 435–79. 64 Georgelin, Venise, pp. 349–92; Gullino, “Venezia e le campagne,” in Storia di Vene- zia, vol. 8 (1998): L’ultima fase della Serenissima, ed. Piero Del Negro and Paolo Preto, pp. 651–702. 65 Salvatore Ciriacono, “Venise et ses villes. Structuration et déstructuration d’un mar- ché régional, XVIe–XVIIIe siècle,” Revue historique 276 (1986), 287–307.
  33. 33. the venetian economy 283 © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 it is necessary to familiarize oneself with the responsibilities of the different magistracies. One must consider, however, that there were often tasks that overlapped between differ- ent organs of government. The key to enter into the labyrinth of the archive is provided by the Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali: Guida generale agli Archivi di Stato italiani (Rome, 1994) 4:858–1148 [the part concerning Venice]. The Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Biblioteca del Museo Civico Correr, and Biblioteca della Fondazione Querini Stampalia contain material that helps to complete that of the Archivio di Stato. One must not underestimate the riches of the archives and libraries of the terraferma, which can provide important data and information at the provincial level. In this case as well, the Guida can be of great assistance. Although printed primary sources are less numerous than those available to the medi- eval scholar, they are nonetheless of great importance. Particularly important are the Dia- rii of Marin Sanudo, ed. Rinaldo Fulin, Federico Stefani, Nicolò Barozzi, Guglielmo Berchet, and Marco Allegri, 58 vols (Venice, 1879–1903), which regard the dates of 1496–1533 and offer an enormous amount of information. The Diarii (1494–1512) of Girolamo Priuli, ed. Arturo Segre and Roberto Cessi, 3 vols (Città di Castello and Bologna, 1912–41) are less detailed and deal with a more limited chronological period. Also useful are the Annali veneti dall’anno 1457 al 1500 by Domenico Malipiero, ed. Agostino Sagredo, published in Archivio storico italiano 7 (1843–44), 5–720. Recently, Christiane Neerfeld, “Historia per forma di diaria,” La cronachistica veneziana contemporanea a cavallo tra il Quattro e il Cinquecento (Venice, 2006) has attributed this work to Pietro Dolfin. The website of the Archivio di Stato of Venice ( offers the chance to consult important documentary series up to 1500. Some documents have been published by Brian Pullan and David Chambers in Venice. A documentary his- tory, 1450–1630 (Oxford, 1992). See also Il libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer (Costantinopoli 1436–40), ed. Tommaso Bertelè (Rome, 1956); Lettere di commercio di Andrea Barbarigo, mercante veneziano del ’400, ed. Salvatore Sassi (Naples, 1951); Lettres d’un marchand véni- tien Andrea Berengo (1553–56), ed. Ugo Tucci (Paris, 1957); and Lettere di Vincenzo Priuli capitano delle galee di Fiandra al doge di Venezia, 1521–1523, ed. Francesca Ortalli (Ven- ice, 2005). For financial history, see I prestiti della Repubblica di Venezia, ed. Gino Luz- zatto, Documenti finanziari della Repubblica di Venezia editi dalla R. Accademia dei Lincei, ser. 3, vol. 1, part 1 (Padua, 1929); the Bilanci della Repubblica di Venezia, ed. Fabio Besta, 3 vols (Venice, 1903–12); vol. 4 is edited by Angelo Ventura (Padua, 1972). Regarding the Flemish community from 1568–1621, see the notarial acts summarized in Marchands fla- mands à Venise, eds. Winfried Brulez and Greta Devos, 2 vols (Bruxelles-Rome, 1965–86); for the German community, see Heinrich Simonsfeld, Der Fondaco dei Tedeschi in Venedig und die deutsch-venetianischen Handelsbeziehungen, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1887). Journals specializing in Venetian history include: Archivio veneto; Ateneo veneto; Atti dell’Istituto veneto di scienze lettere e arti; and Bollettino dell’Istituto di Storia della Società e dello Stato Veneziano (since 1976 Studi veneziani). Secondary Works Allen, Robert C., “Real wages in Europe and Asia: A First Look at the Long-Term Patterns,” in Robert C. Allen, Tommy Bengtsson, and Martin Dribe, eds., Living Standards in the Past. New Perspectives on Well-Being in Asia and Europe (Oxford, 2005). Apellániz, Francisco J., “Crise financière et rapports internationaux en Méditerranée: la faillité des corporations éuropéennes dans le sultanat mamelouk (1450–1517),” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, secc. XIII–XVIII, vol. 2 (Florence, 2007). Arbel, Benjamin, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediter- ranean (Leiden, 1995). Ashtor, Eliyahu, “The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre- Colonialism?” Journal of European Economic History 3 (1974).
  34. 34. 284 luciano pezzolo © 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25251-6 ——, “Profits from Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 37 (1975). ——, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983). Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII (Venice, 1961). Aymard, Maurice, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé pendant la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle (Paris, 1966). Bairoch, Paul, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre, La population des villes européenes de 800 à 1850 (Geneva, 1988). Beltrami, Daniele, Storia della popolazione di Venezia dalla fine del secolo XVI alla caduta della Repubblica (Padua, 1954). ——, La penetrazione economica dei veneziani in terraferma. Forze di lavoro e proprietà fondiaria nella campagne venete dei secoli XVII e XVIII (Venice, 1961). Benzoni, Gino, and Antonio Menniti Ippolito, Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, 14 vols (Rome, 1992–2002). Berengo, Marino, “Profilo di Gino Luzzatto,” Rivista storica italiana 36 (1964). Braudel, Fernand, “La vita economica di Venezia nel XVI secolo,” In Vittore Branca, ed., Storia della civiltà veneziana, 2 vols (Florence, 1979). Broadberry, Stephen, and Bishnupriya Gupta, “The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500–1800,” Economic History Review 59 (2006), 2–31. Bullard, Melissa M., Stephan R. Epstein, Benjamin G. Kohl, and Susan M. Stuard, “Where History and Theory Interact: Frederic C. Lane on the Emergence of Capitalism,” Specu- lum 79 (2004). Burke, Peter, Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Two Seventeenth Century Elites (London, 1974). Caizzi, Bruno, Industria e commercio della Repubblica di Venezia nel XVIII secolo (Milan, 1965). Cammarosano, Paolo, “Gino Luzzatto e la storia economica,” Quaderni Storici 28 (1993). Casarini, Luigi, Sulla origine, ingrandimento e decadenza del commercio di Venezia e sui mezzi che nella presente di lei situazione praticare potrebbonsi per impedirne la minac- ciata rovina (Venice, 1823). Cecchini, Isabella, Quadri e commercio a Venezia durante il Seicento. Uno studio sul mercato dell’arte (Venice, 2000). Chauvard, Jean-François, La circulation des biens à Venise. Stratégies patrimoniales et mar- ché immobilier (1600–1750) (Rome, 2005). Cipolla, Carlo M., “The Decline of Italy: The Case of a Fully Matured Economy,” Economic History Review 5 (1952), 178–87. ——, “Gino Luzzatto o dei rapporti tra teoria e storia economica,” Ricerche economiche 24 (1979). ——, “Tre maestri,” in Cipolla, Saggi di storia economica e sociale (Bologna, 1988). Ciriacono, Salvatore, “Venise et ses villes. Structuration et déstructuration d’un marché régional, XVIe–XVIIIe siècle,” Revue historique 276 (1986), 287–307. ——, “Industria e artigianato,” in Benzoni and Mennito Ippolito, Storia di Venezia, vol. 5 (1996): Il Rinascimento. Società ed economia, ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci, pp. 523–92. ——, Building on Water: Venice, Holland, and the Construction of the European Landscape in Early Modern Times, trans. Jeremy Scott (New York, 2006). Corazzol, Gigi, Livelli stipulati a Venezia nel 1591 (Pisa, 1986). Costantini, Massimo, L’albero della libertà economica. Il processo di scioglimento delle cor- porazioni veneziane (Venice, 1987). Costantini, Massimo, Una Repubblica nata sul mare. Navigazione e commercio a Venezia (Venice, 2005). Cowan, Alexander, The Urban Patriciate. Lübeck and Venice, 1580–1700 (Cologne, 1986). Cozzi, Gaetano, “Introduzione” to Venezia. Itinerari per la storia della città, ed. Stefano Gasparri, Giovanni Levi, and Pierandrea Moro (Bologna, 1997).
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