Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.
LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda<br />Ephraim Nkonya and Helen ...
Overview<br />Introduction: NR conflicts in Africa and their causes<br />Trends in conflict resolution in Africa<br />Conf...
NR embedded in production systems:	<br />Overlapping claims<br />External and internal pressures (environmental, demograph...
Increasing resource scarcity
Domestic and international trade flows
Complex PR systems
Political instability and mismanagement</li></ul>Natural resource conflicts in Africa<br />
<ul><li>Legal pluralism: multiple institutions outline rules of access
Two broad categories of conflict resolution mechanisms: traditional (informal) vs. statutory (formal)
Traditional institutions: crafted endogenously, based on social norms, enforced by traditional authorities, perceived more...
Formal institutions: written laws/regulations enacted by a legislative body (parliament, local government agencies)—third ...
Decentralization---more responsive to local needs; effectiveness depends on degree of decision-making power<br />“Hybrid” ...
Resource-related conflicts: mostly land related---boundary disputes, disagreements over grazing lands and small plot fragm...
Decentralization in Uganda<br />
Framework of determinants of NR conflicts and choice of institutions<br />Legitimacy and strength of existing institutions...
Community level data covering 123 LC1s (drawn from a sample of 972 rural LC1s sampled randomly in the 2002/03 Uganda Natio...
Descriptive Statistics<br />
Objective: to analyze the determinants of conflict occurrence and the choice of institutions used to resolve such conflict...
Results 1: Type of conflicts reported<br />
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda

1,992 views

Published on

Presented at the CAPRi International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management. June 28th to July 1st, 2010, Siem Reap, Cambodia.
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wks_0610.asp

  • Be the first to comment

LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda

  1. 1. LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda<br />Ephraim Nkonya and Helen Markelova (with Edward Kato)<br />
  2. 2. Overview<br />Introduction: NR conflicts in Africa and their causes<br />Trends in conflict resolution in Africa<br />Conflict in Uganda: brief overview<br />Theoretical framework<br />Results<br />Conclusions and policy implications<br />
  3. 3. NR embedded in production systems: <br />Overlapping claims<br />External and internal pressures (environmental, demographic, etc)<br /><ul><li>Types of conflict according to level: farm-level, community-level, inter-community, and supra-community</li></ul>Impacts:<br />Economic (Zimbabwe)<br />Human costs (Rwanda)<br />Resource depletion<br /><ul><li>Causes of NR conflicts:
  4. 4. Increasing resource scarcity
  5. 5. Domestic and international trade flows
  6. 6. Complex PR systems
  7. 7. Political instability and mismanagement</li></ul>Natural resource conflicts in Africa<br />
  8. 8. <ul><li>Legal pluralism: multiple institutions outline rules of access
  9. 9. Two broad categories of conflict resolution mechanisms: traditional (informal) vs. statutory (formal)
  10. 10. Traditional institutions: crafted endogenously, based on social norms, enforced by traditional authorities, perceived more trustworthy, but not always egalitarian. Capacity to deal with new trends?
  11. 11. Formal institutions: written laws/regulations enacted by a legislative body (parliament, local government agencies)—third party. Various perceptions, esp with decentralization</li></ul>Conflict resolution in Africa<br />
  12. 12. Decentralization---more responsive to local needs; effectiveness depends on degree of decision-making power<br />“Hybrid” systems (e.g. Rural Code of Niger)<br />Literature: preference toward formal institutions due to decline in customary institutions<br />Policy/practice: growing interest in community-based NRM<br />Trends in conflict resolution<br />
  13. 13. Resource-related conflicts: mostly land related---boundary disputes, disagreements over grazing lands and small plot fragmentation, encroachment on common lands<br />Tenure arrangements: <br />Customary in the North<br />Freehold in the South (agreement between the British and kingdoms in Western Uganda)<br />Mailo in central Uganda (previously awarded to absentee landlords during British rule in Buganda kingdom)<br />Leasehold (introduced by British as agreement between lessor and lessee---lessee has exclusive possession of the land for a certain period, can be private and statutory---mostly found in urban areas)<br />Land and natural resources in Uganda<br />
  14. 14. Decentralization in Uganda<br />
  15. 15. Framework of determinants of NR conflicts and choice of institutions<br />Legitimacy and strength of existing institutions<br />Community-level socio-economic characteristics<br />Characteristics of conflict<br />Cost of conflict resolution<br />Stock and condition of natural resources<br />External institutions and market conditions<br />
  16. 16. Community level data covering 123 LC1s (drawn from a sample of 972 rural LC1s sampled randomly in the 2002/03 Uganda National Household Survey)<br />Representative of 3 levels of poverty and NR endowments (proxied as agricultural potential---abstraction of many factors—including rainfall level and distribution, altitude, soil type and depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases, presence of irrigation, and others—that influence the absolute (as opposed to comparative) advantage of producing agricultural commodities in a particular place)<br />Data<br />
  17. 17. Descriptive Statistics<br />
  18. 18. Objective: to analyze the determinants of conflict occurrence and the choice of institutions used to resolve such conflicts.<br />Given that the type of conflict also determines the choice of institution for conflict resolution, use maximum likelihood bivariateprobit model, which is recursive and therefore addresses the endogeneity.<br />Empirical model<br />
  19. 19. Results 1: Type of conflicts reported<br />
  20. 20. Results 2: Conflict resolution institutions<br />
  21. 21. Determinants of occurrence of conflicts <br />
  22. 22. Discussion of results 1<br />Greater poverty  higher probability of conflict over private land boundaries, but lower probability of conflicts over access to water/other conflicts (effective customary water management institutions)<br />Low literacy rates higher likelihood of conflicts over commons (low capacity to access legal documents/implement bylaws)<br />Higher PMI  higher probability of private land conflicts (higher land values)<br />NR conditions:<br />Higher pasture/cropland degradation  more conflicts over commons, but fewer conflicts over private land and access to water (?) <br />
  23. 23. Determinants of conflict resolution institution<br />
  24. 24. Discussion of results 2<br />Type of conflict:<br />Communities with private land, water, and other conflicts formal institutions<br />Communities with commons conflicts customary institutions<br />Poverty: based on coefficients<br />Poor more likely to choose customary institutions for private land conflicts; formal for other conflicts<br />Higher population density with private land and water conflicts formal institutions <br />
  25. 25. In Uganda, formal institutions (local and central) government: resolved 85% of the reported conflicts---effective<br />Occurrence of conflict: poverty, population density, human capital, environmental conditions, remoteness<br />Choice of resolution institution: <br />Private land, water, others: formal institution (but other factors)<br />Commons: customary institutions (but also other factors)<br />Summary<br />
  26. 26. Support formal institutions in conflict resolution roles (fiscal powers, capacity building)<br />Customary institutions: weakening, esp with increasing socio-cultural diversity within community---but still important in customary tenure and for the poor. How can they be strengthened/integrated into conflict resolution?<br />Potential complementarity between formal and informal<br />Conclusions/recommendations<br />

×