Republic of the Philippines DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 10th floor, Francisco Good Condominium II Bldg. Esda cor. Mapagmahal St., Diliman, Quezon City MESSAGE It is an honor for me to congratulate the Philippine NationalPolice for it’s newly published “Compendium of Six OperationalMaster Plans”, that shall serve as a guiding tool of theorganization to achieve its vision, mission and goals. This compendium will surely help all PNP uniformedpersonnel to fully understand and effectively implement thevarious operational plans designed to address major threats tocriminality, safety and security. It’s timely publication is anindication of the PNP’s sincere effort to truly make our country asafe place to live, work and do business in. In behalf of the DILG family, I commend the Chief, PNP andhis staff most especially the Directorate for Operations for theefforts they exerted in making the publication of this compendiuma reality. JOSE D LINA JR Secretary
Republic of the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government NATIONAL POLICE COMISSION NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, PNP Camp Crame, Quezon City MESSAGE On behalf of the Philippine National Police, I am bothhonored and happy to welcome the publication of this“compendium of the Six Operational Master Plans”. I especiallywould like to commend Police Director Edgar Aglipay and his staffat the directorate for Operations for coming up with this handoutat a very opportune time. It gives me great pleasure to find in this handout an honestreflection of the faith, mission, and vision of the PhilippineNational Police. Our dreams of achieving organizationaldiscipline, moral integrity, and professional aptitude are aptlyreflected in this brief version of the PNP’s operational plans. As such, I encourage everyone to read this handout andtake it to heart. It is my fervent hope that every police officer, inall stations throughout the country be made to know and applythe principles and procedures contained in this handout. This is amust read for every police officer worth his uniform. Congratulations and Carry On! LEANDRO R MENDOZA Police Director General Chief, PNP
Republic of the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government NATIONAL POLICE COMISSION NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF PNP FOR OPERATIONS Camp Crame, Quezon City MESSAGE For the past few years, the Philippine National Police hasrelied on numerous operational plans for various kinds of policeactivities and to counter different types of crimes. Thus, thisdecision to compile and summarize our operational plans into this“Compendium of six Operational Master Plans” is a welcomemove, as it would help provide a concise and complete readingfacility to our police officers. I, therefore, encourage everyone, especially our policeofficers in the field to read this Compendium. Ignorance of itdoes not only excuse anyone, it also creates many dangerousthings not only to oneself but also to the entire Philippine NationalPolice. MABUHAY tayong lahat! EDGAR C GALVANTE Police Deputy Director General Deputy Chief PNP for Operations
Republic of the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government NATIONAL POLICE COMISSION NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR OPERATIONS Camp Crame, Quezon City MESSAGE Every navigator knows how hard it is to find an island in themiddle of the open sea without certain tools like a map or acompass. But with the aid of such tools success becomes agiven. The ‘Compendium of six Operational Master Plans” waspublished precisely to achieve such success in the field of lawenforcement. This is one of the tools of the trade necessary for apolice officer to accomplish his duties with a high level ofefficiency and proficiency. This publication – launched under my humble watch asDirector for Operations – provides a concise but complete versionof the PNP’s operational plans. It is my hope that this handoutbecomes an integral part of every policeman and his policestation’s “survival kit”. MABUHAY and God bless all of you! EDGAR B AGLIPAY Police Director Directorate for Operations
FOREWORD This compendium of the six (6) Master Plan forpolice Operations was prepared by the Directoratefor Operations to serve as a ready reference of allPNP units in the performance of their mandatedtasks. This compendium is a compilation of all LOIs,directives, policies, memoranda circulars and otherissuances, which were previously issued andpublished by the PNP. This will become a unitproperty and not a personal copy of the unitcommander and will remain on file at theunit/station and made available to all concerned,especially to those whose tasks/functions havedirect bearing on the conduct of police operationsof the unit. The users of this compendium are enjoined to read carefully and understand fully its contents be able to effectively and efficiently carryout the various tasks in accordance with the applicable laws.
PREFACE The Philippine National Police is a separateentity from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Itis mandated in the Philippines Constitution that thestate shall establish one national police, which iscivilian in character and national in scope. As anational police, it is primarily charged with theenforcement of law’s and maintenance of peaceand order in the country. It shall likewise ensurepublic safety and internal security. Section 24 ofRA 6975 defines the functions of the PhilippineNational Police to include its collateral functions.
TABLE OF CONTENTSTitle Page No.SANDIGAN 1 - 14(Master plan for Anti-Criminality Campaign)SANDUGO 15 -38(Counter Insurgency Master Plan)SANGYAMAN 39 - 58(Master Plan for the Protection ofthe Environment and Natural Resources)SANG-BANAT 59 - 78(Master Plan for the CampaignAgainst Illegal Drugs)SANG-INGAT 79 - 90(Master Plan for Security Coverage)SAKLOLO 91 - 98(PNP Master Plan for DisasterPreparedness & Management)UNIVERSAL DECLAMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 100 – 105POLICE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 106PNP IMPLAN TO E. O. # 62 107 – 111LIGTAS ACTION PLAN AGAINST KIDNAPPING 112 –122(Standard Operating Procedures Nr 5)EXECUTIVE ORDER # 115 123 - 126(Localization of Peace Efforts)EXECUTIVE ORDER # 3 127 - 129(Creating of National Anti-Crime Commission)JOINT IMPLEMENTATING GUIDELINES ON THEDILG/PNP; DND/AFP; DOJ/NBIMOA ON ANTI CRIME OPERATIONS 131 - 138MOA ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 139 - 146DETAILS ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE STUDYCOMMITTEE CHAIRED BY DCO 147 – 149EO # 3 DEFINING POLICY AND ADMINSTRATIVESTRUCTURE FOR GOVERNMENT’S COMPREHENSIVEPEACE EFFORTS 150 - 154PNP IMPLAN TO EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 61 155 - 161(Creation of NDLEPCC)
THE NATIONAL DRUG SITUATION 162 - 165PRESIDENTIAL LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 01-01 166 - 184(National Anti-Drug Program of Action)LOI 17/94 KALIKASAN 185 - 189LOI 28/96 NIYOG 190 - 19336/93 DUHAT 194 - 196LOI 46/93 CHESA 197 - 199THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHIL. 200 - 217(PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 705)THE PHILIPPINE FISHERIES CODE OF 1998 218 – 225(RA 8550)RA No. 7942 226 – 255RA No. 9003 256 - 294
DIRECTORATE FOR OPERATIONS MISSION To assist the Chief, PNP in the exercise of command,control, direction, coordination and supervision of all theactivities concerning operations, employment anddeployment of the PNP. FUNCTIONS 1. Plans, directs, controls, coordinates andssupervises PNP operations and integrates support activities; 2. Assesses, evaluates and prepares mobilization,demobilization, assignment and/or locationemployment/deployment of units in coordination with otherdirectorial Staffs; 3. Prepares, coordinates and issues operationalplan, orders and directives in accordance with Chief,PNPs policies and guidelines; 4. Maintains active liaisoning with the other OperatingUnits of the military and other law enforcement agencies; 5. Maintains close supervision, direction, control andcoordination of operational activities of all operating unitsand regional offices of the PNP; and 6. Performs such other duties as higher authoritiesmay direct.
LAW ENFORCER "Law enforcer" is one whose prime responsibility is toenforce the law and whose constitutional duty is to preservepeace, to defend and protect the people. There are several law enforcement officers appointed anddesignated by operation of law. Police officer is just one of them.Thus, there is indeed a clear delineation of duties andresponsibilities, and definition of jurisdiction in the application oftheir respective law enforcing authority. As distinguished from other law enforcers, a police officer isa general law enforcer who executes and enforces all existinggeneral, local, special and penal laws other than those specificallyand exclusively assigned to other law enforcement agencies ofthe government. HOW TO ENFORCE THE LAW: A law enforcer is presumed to know the law he has sworn toenforce, One must not be allowed to exercise and perform thedelicate duty as a law enforcer unless he knows how to enforceand execute the law, including its boundaries and limitationsotherwise, abuses, anarchy and lawlessness shall prevail.
Law enforcers must: 1. Know the ability to learn how they are interpreted by thecourts; 2. Have the ability to learn how they are interpreted by thecourts; 3. Know how to properly execute and enforce such laws; 4. Know how and when to properly effect the arrest ofoffenders; 5. Have the technical and legal know-how to protect anddefend the innocent from harassment, and prosecute offenderswho are probably guilty of a felony or a crime. Unless the foregoing mandatory requirements areaccomplished satisfactorily, a new graduate from the policeacademy and other law enforcement training centers mustnot be allowed to join or be appointed as a regular memberof the Philippine National Police or any law enforcementagency of the government. To do otherwise is by itself adeliberate violation of the constitution, a disservice to thepeople, and at their useless and unjustifiable expense andprejudice.
CARDINAL RULES RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS (Sec 11, Art 11, 1987 Philippine Constitution) HUMAN RIGHTS ARE THE GOD GIVEN RIGHTSINHERENT TO THE VERY EXISTENCE OF MAN. The right towear a piece of cloth to shield himself from shivering coldor melting heat; a right to have a bowl of rice to fill hisempty stomach for the day; the right to have a shelter tospend the night; the right of every working man to assurehimself and his family a life worthy of human dignity; and,the right to live with honor, dignity and respect of hisfellowmen living in a just and humane society under theblessing of democracy Entrusted with the constitutional mandate to serveand protect the people, law enforcers should be the veryfirst protectorate of human rights. Failing that task, thereis no Aristotelian reason for them to navigate the legalcomplexity and technical intricacy in the enforcement oflaws. Without recognizing and respecting the sanctity ofhuman rights as enshrined in the Constitution, they cannever induce public respect or command obedience toexisting laws. THEY CAN NEVER EFFECTIVELY ENFORCETHE LAW BY VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS!
SANDIGAN (ANTI-CRIMINALITY MASTERPLAN)I. INTRODUCTION A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE This Plan shall serve as the Master Plan in which all plans andprograms of the PNP shall conform with and supplement. It shall prescribe the grand strategy to be undertaken by PNPOffices and personnel on crime prevention, control and suppression, in thetotal fight against all forces of criminality. B. SITUATION The campaign against crime is a continuing concern. It is a warthat the police can not win alone, and can not in any real sense fight alone.Police can not change the “root drivers” of crime such as poverty,unemployment, poor housing, moral education, freedom, civil liberties,ambitions, dysfunctional families and other ills of socio-economicopportunities. Thus, all aspects of police work should be premised uponactive community consent, trust and participation. In so doing, developing effective crime prevention, control andsuppression strategies has presented the PNP with a fundamental dilemma.On one hand, crime will always be committed and, indeed, a continuingmandate. From this perspective, the police is viewed solely as a professionalcrime buster and often criticized if public expectations are not met. On theother hand, the community needs to believe that the police is or can becomeeffective crime buster. Thus, the PNP has been compelled to rethink and redesign itsentire approach to this main task through clearer prioritization of targetswith emphasis on prevention, control and suppression of crime and moreresources moved into proactive policing. C. ASSUMPTION The primary concern of the PNP for the next five years is curbingcriminality. D. MISSION The PNP shall implement a responsive and holistic anti-crimestrategy to effective prevent, control and suppress the occurrences of crimesto insure safety in our community. E. OBJECTIVES 1. To reduce index crime rate 2. To improve response time 3. To improve crime solution efficiency 4. To increase conviction rate 5. To operationalize COPS through the Police CommunityPrecincts, for the 24-hour community security coverage.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Please see appendix E)III. EXECUTION A. CPNP’S INTENT “Let us intensify our campaign against crime. Let us create anatmosphere of peace, in close collaboration with the community, localgovernment units, NGOs and international organizations, dedicating ourresources and enhancing our capabilities and skills to address national andtransnational threats to peace and order”. The efforts of the Police Regional Offices (PROs), Police ProvincialOffices (PPOs)/City Offices and Police Stations shall be to set-up andimplement a localized Anti-Crime Campaign Plan based on this plan. On theother hand, the National Support Units shall create their efforts inaccounting and neutralizing transnational and syndicated crime groups, andsupport the PROs in their localized Anti-Crime Campaign. B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1. Strategic Concept a. Improve the Police Security Service Package 1) Effective law enforcement and crimeprevention and suppression system. . Foremost among the means of effective lawenforcement is the wise utilization of all PNP available assets on the ground.One tested and tried instrument is the Police Security Containment RingSystem (PSCRS), composed of the following five (5) major components,deployment of which depends on their availability and the situation on theground: a) The Innermost Containment Ring, whichis composed of barangay tanods, CVOs, NGOs, radio groups,fire/disaster/calamity volunteer brigades that provide localized and neededpolice services to the barangays. b) The Inner Containment Ring, composedof the foot patrol elements are in uniform for police visibility while thedetective patrol component is in “civilian” attire for police presence. Even ifthere are no uniformed police around the people will still think that a policeeye is watching them because they will see police detectives in civiliancausing the arrest of crime perpetrators. c) The third component is the MiddleContainment Ring, which is composed of bicycle or motorcycle-mountedpatrols at control points who shall patrol the residential areas and make thetransport loading and unloading areas as their standby points. This willprevent mugging of commuters specially during nighttime. d) The Outer Containment Ring is composedof designated specialized units like the mobile patrols, which shall be
deployed at chokepoints. Their task is to prevent the escape of fleeingcriminal and react to call for police assistance. e) The fifth is the Outermost ContainmentRing, where the special police units (like the SWAT or anti-terrorist units)and the mobile groups shall serve as security elements at areas designatedas strong points, where they can immediately react to call for armed supportto beleaguered police personnel on the ground. 2) Adoption by police offices/stations of the Crimeand Information Management System, which will systematize the recording,retrieval and analysis of crime data. Another means of effective law enforcement isthe adoption by police offices/stations of Crime and InformationManagement System. In simple terms, the Regional, Provincial and City, andMunicipal Police Offices will indicate in their local maps the place and time acrime incident happened. The resulting inputs will constitute the basis for thedeployment or redeployment of police resources to maximize their use foranti crime efforts. 3) Deployment of dedicated Police Intelligenceand Investigation Teams for criminal gang/syndicates, terrorists, kidnappers,bank robbers, carnappers and specific crime prone areas. The deployment of dedicated intelligence,investigation and manhunt teams is another means of organizationaleffectiveness. Teams for specific activities involving InternalSecurity/Terrorist Groups, Kidnapping, Robbery, Hijacking and Carnappingare formed in all police units in varying scale depending on the threatanalysis and availability of personnel. These teams shall conduct legaloffensives against members of syndicated crime groups to force them out ofthe locality or, better still, to prevent them in the commission of crimes. 4) Aggressive Anti-Illegal Drugs Campaign Illegal Drug is the country’s’ number 1 enemy.A high percentage of our populace is affected by this menace and majority ofthe heinous crimes committed is drug- related. It is for this reason that wedo not only put to jail drug pushers but also rehabilitate drug users. Thesupply and demand reduction strategies should be coupled with aheightened drug education campaign. 5) Strengthening of the Programs for PublicSafety and Internal Security The government considers the crimes such askillings; kidnappings, extortion and etc, committed by the insurgent groupsas a criminal act not a political act. It is for this reason that crimescommitted by them should be investigated and appropriate cases filed sothat justice is afforded to the victims. People who feel that they are not safe in theirhouses, streets and place of work are predisposed to crime. The policetherefore has to lend support. 6) Pursuing the objectives for Gender AwarenessDevelopment
This concept will involve the strengthening ofGender and Development thrust of the PNP in collaboration with governmentorganizations, NGOs and women organizations in the country, as greatpercentage of crimes committed nowadays, involve women and children asvictims. b. Strengthen linkages with NGOs, local andinternational law enforcement organizations, the AFP, andPresidential Task Force and Centers as venues for interagency andinternational cooperation and support. These organizations and agencies are venues foreffective law enforcement coordination and support. The maintenance ofpeace and order is a multi-disciplinary responsibility and the active linkageswith these agencies and offices will redound to the efforts to eliminatetransnational and national crimes in the country, to include the criminalactivities of internal security threat groups and terrorists. In addition, this linkage would turn very relevant andbeneficial during the conduct of special events, like, the holding of honest,orderly and peaceful elections for both national and local officials of thegovernment. c. Enhance the community participation thru theCommunity-Oriented Policing System (COPS). Through COPS, there will be voluntary communitysupport and cooperation with law enforcement/crime prevention and controlactivities, thus there will be enhanced police effectiveness and efficiencygiven the same police resources. d. Operationalize the Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) In order to insure the success of linking up thecontribution of the community, the government and the police inguaranteeing the safety and security of the communities, the existingIntegrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan of provincial and municipalgovernment units shall complement this Anti-Crime Strategy. Closecoordination with respective Peace and Order Councils (POCs), LawEnforcement Coordinating Committees (LECCs), Regional DevelopmentCouncils (RDCs), Disaster Coordinating Councils (DCCs), Drug Watch andStreetwatch organizations, shall be maintained. e. Promote the objectives of an active CriminalJustice System Being in the frontline in the operationalization of theCriminal Justice System, the police serves as an effective catalyst inpromoting the concepts of justice for crime victims and of enhancingattainment of the objectives of the Anti-Crime Strategy. f. Devise an Effective Feedback Mechanism The continued feedback from all recipients of publicsafety services received from the citizens through the Project 117 of theDILG, the “Ugnayans” conducted by the PNP and other governmentagencies, and other sources of reports, complaints, needs, or rejoinders,
shall be the basis for improving the delivery of police services to thecitizenry. This feedback mechanism shall serve as the trigger to set off aseries of adjustments and if need be, a realignment of the foregoingstrategies to attain the purpose of maintaining a peaceful and prosperouscommunity. 2. Operational Concept The NHQ-PNP, through its directorial staff, shall superviseand support the Police Regional Offices in implementing the strategic agendaand operational concept of this anti-crime strategy. The PNP leadership,through the NALECC, the NDCC and the NPOC, shall coordinate andcooperate with other national government agencies in the realization of themission of this anti-crime strategy. The Police Regional Offices, through the policeprovincial/city offices and municipal/city police stations, shall implementtheir localized anti-crime plans based on this master plan. Their plans shallbe focused towards the implementation of localized activities to attain: (1)reduction of crime rate; (2) improvement of response time; (3)improvement of local crime solution efficiency; (4) increase in convictionrate for cases filed in court; and (5) the operationalization of community-oriented policing system (COPS) thru the Police Community Precincts, for the24-hour community security coverage. The national support units, through their specializedoperating units and various regional offices, shall concentrate their effortstowards supporting all the anti-crime efforts of the PROs, except in thepursuit of specific anti-crime tasks assigned to them. Schematic Diagram of the “SANDIGAN MASTERPLAN” refer to appendix C. TASKS In furtherance of the intent and purpose of this Plan thefollowing shall also be undertaken by offices/units concerned: 1. NHQ, PNP a. DCO – Command Group supervisor, responsible inthe successful implementation of this Master Plan. b. DPRM 1) Responsible in the conduct of moral recoveryprogram for PNP personnel in coordination with DHRDD. 2) Strictly implement COMPLAN PATNUBAY; 3) Monitor and supervise the moral and welfareprogram for the PNP personnel. 4) Strengthen policies and guidelines for theproper selection of personnel for designation to key positions, particularly atmunicipal station level; and
5) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. c. DI 1) Update and validate watch-lists on criminalsand furnish the same to tasked units; 2) Provide timely intelligence andcounterintelligence information or similar support, as needed, in theimplementation of this Plan; and 3) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. d. DO 1) OPR for this Master Plan; 2) Supervise and monitor the progress of theactivities of tasked units in the implementation of this Plan; 3) Supervise the implementation of the Strategicconcepts on law enforcement, prevention and suppression system, andIntegrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan. 4) Coordinate with the PAOCTF, PCTC andNDLEPCC for an effective integration of anti-crime efforts with local andinternational offices and organizations; and 5) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. e. DL 1) Provide equipment and logistical support to alltasked units; and 2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. f. DC 1) Provide necessary fund support needed in theimplementation of this Plan; and 2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. g. DIDM 1) Monitor the progress of cases beinginvestigated until their final disposition in court; 2) Conduct pre-charge investigation of personnelinvolved in violation of the ICU guidance of the CPNP; and 3) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. h. DPCR 1) Disseminate various thrusts of the PNP incontaining all forms of criminal activities throughout the country;
2) Supervise the implementation of theCommunity Oriented Policing System (COPS) in this Plan; 3) Come up with activities to catalyze the five (5)pillars of CJS to be an effective system for anti-crime efforts; 4) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. i. DHRDD 1) Design training programs/seminars for all PNPpersonnel to enhance their ability in the performance of their assigned dutiesrelative to this Plan’s operational concept; 2) Assist DPRM in the conduct of Moral RecoveryPrograms; and 3) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. 2. Police Regional Offices 1-13, ARMM, CAR and NCR a. The main implementors of this Master Plan, thus youare directed to perform activities but not limited to the following: 1) Pursue more meaningful interfacing with othergovernment agencies through the RLECC, RPOC and other regionalcoordinating bodies; prepare and update and operational IA/CPSP of everyprovince and municipality under your jurisdiction; 2) Coordinate with various government agenciesand NGOs concerned in development programs and the government’spoverty-alleviation projects; 3) Operationalize the strategic concept andoperational concept as contained in this Plan; 4) Support government agencies, particularly thepillars of the Criminal Justice System, and those concerned in the driveagainst lawless elements; and 5) Together with the Provincial Directors (PDs),constantly evaluate the performance and continuously assess the fitness,qualifications, and service reputation of local police chiefs. The ProvincialDirectors shall closely coordinate these evaluations with the concerned localgovernment executives. b. Provide other support/assistance to other operatingunits tasked with law enforcement functions. 3. National Support Units a. CIDG 1) Support/assist all PNP units in the conduct ofinvestigation and in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases, to insure theconviction of suspects; and
2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed; b. NARG 1). Launch sustained campaign against drug chainand syndicates and other related offenses; 2). Provide other support/assistance to all PNPunits pertaining to anti-illegal drugs operations; and 3) Perform other tasks, as requested/ directed. c. IG 1) Conduct intelligence and counter-intelligenceoperations in support of this Plan; and 2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. d. TMG 1) Assist all PNP units in the conduct ofinvestigation of crimes involving motor vehicles; and 2) Perform other tasks as directed/requested. e. SAF 1) Assist the PROs in specialized crimeoperations; and 2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. f. PCRG 1) Promote crime prevention awareness bytapping the support of the media and the community; 2) Formulate/distribute anti-crime slogans/ tips/posters/leaflets/pamphlets, etc; and, 3) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. g. CLS 1) Provide forensics technical support to PROs;and 2) Perform other tasks as requested/directed. 4. All Other NSUs a. Provide technical/administrative support to all PROs,NSUs and other PNP attached agencies; and, b. Perform other tasks as requested/directed.
D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS 1. Respect for human rights shall be paramount, and strictadherence with the PNP Operational Procedures (Revised Rules ofEngagement) shall always be emphasized in all police operations. 2. All PNP units shall re-assess respective resources andcapabilities. All IMPLANs and SOPs, shall be updated to conform with thismaster plan. 3. Tasked units shall operate on the existing logistical andfinancial allocations. NHQ-PNP shall provide additional logistical andfinancial support on a case-to-case basis. 4. Maximum coordination with national government agencies,local government units, non-government organizations and all sectors of thecommunity, for the success of the anti-crime strategy, is authorized andhighly encouraged. 5. In order to insure uniformity in adopting/implementing theCOPS and IA/CPSP concepts, all chiefs of police/police supervisorsimplementing them must always be guided by the “Community-OrientedPolicing System (COPS) Manual for the PNP” issued thru NAPOLCOMResolution Nr 2000-157 dated October 31, 2000 and IA/CPSP guidelines andrequirements. 6. This Master Plan shall supersede PNP LOI 10/93SANDIGAN (PNP Anti-Crime Strategy). However, all applicable issuances,MOUs/MOAs not in conflict with this Master Plan are still in effect. 7. All RDs, PROs and Dirs, NSUs shall submit IMPLANs to thisPlan and periodic reports on its implementation. 8. This Master Plan shall take effect upon approval.IV. APPENDICESA. To improve the Police Security Service Package, the following standardoperating procedures and guidelines shall be implemented: 1. SOP #01 - POLICE BEAT PATROL PROCEDURES This SOP prescribes the basic procedures to be observed by all PNPUnits and mobile patrol elements in the conduct of visibility patrols. 2. SOP #02 - BANTAY KALYE This SOP prescribes the deployment of 85% of the PNP in the fieldto increase police visibility and intensify anti-crime campaign nationwide. 3. SOP #03 – SIYASAT This SOP prescribes the guidelines in the conduct of inspectionsto ensure police visibility. 4. SOP #04 - REACT 166
REACT 166 was launched in 1992 as the people’s direct link tothe police to receive public calls for assistance and complaints for promptaction by police authorities. This SOP prescribes the procedures in the detailof Duty Officers, Telephone Operators and Radio Operators for REACT 166;their term of duty and responsibilities. 5. SOP #05 – LIGTAS (ANTI-KIDNAPPING) With the creation of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime TaskForce (PAOCTF), the PNP is now in the support role in the campaign againstkidnapping in terms of personnel requirements. SOP #6 sets forth the PNP’sguidelines in its fight against kidnapping activities. 6. SOP #06 - ANTI-CARNAPPING This SOP prescribes the conduct of an all-out and sustained Anti-Carnapping campaign to stop/minimize carnapping activities, neutralizesyndicated carnapping groups, identify/prosecute government personnelinvolved in carnapping activities, and to effectively address other criminalactivities related to carnapping. 7. SOP #07 - ANTI-TERRORISM This prescribes the operational guidelines in the conduct ofoperations against terrorists and other lawless elements involved interroristic activities. 8. SOP #08 – JOINT ANTI-BANK ROBBERY ACTION COMMITTEE(ANTI-BANK ROBBERY) This SOP provides overall planning, integration,orchestration/coordination and monitoring of all efforts to ensure thesuccessful implementation. 9. SOP #09 - ANTI-HIJACKING/HIGHWAY ROBBERY This SOP sets forth the guidelines and concepts of operations tobe observed in the conduct of anti-hiway robbery/hold-up/hijackingoperations. 10. SOP #10 - PAGLALANSAG/PAGAAYOS-HOPE This SOP sets forth the concept of operations and tasks of allconcerned units in the campaign against Partisan Armed Groups and loosefirearms. 11. SOP #11 – MANHUNT BRAVO (NEUTRALIZATION OF WANTEDPERSONS) This SOP sets forth the objectives and concept of operations andtasks of all concerned units in the neutralization of wanted persons. 12. SOP #12 - ANTI-ILLEGAL GAMBLING This SOP sets forth the operational thrusts to beundertaken by the PNP that will spearhead the fight against all forms ofillegal gambling nationwide. 13. SOP #13 - ANTI-SQUATTING
This SOP sets forth the concept of operations in the campaignagainst professional squatters and squatting syndicates. 14. SOP #14 – JERICHO This SOP prescribes the operational guidelines to be undertakenby the NHQ, PNP in the establishment of a quick reaction group that can bedetailed with the office of the SILG (OSILG), with personnel and equipmentrequirements of that reaction group supported by the PNP. 15. SOP #15 – NENA (ANTI-PROSTITUTION/VAGRANCY) This SOP sets forth the operational thrusts to be undertaken bythe PNP that will spearhead the fight against prostitution and vagrancy. 16. SOP #16 – ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY This prescribes the guidelines to be followed by tasked PNPUnits/Offices in enforcing the ban on pornographic pictures, videos andmagazines. 17. SOP #17 - GUIDELINES IN THE CONDUCT OF ARREST, SEARCH,AND SEIZURE This SOP prescribes the procedure and manner of conducting anarrest, raid, search and/or search of person, search of any premises and theseizure of properties pursuant to the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Rules ofCourt, as amended and updated decision of the Supreme Court. 18. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF SANDIGAN MASTER PLAN 19. ANTI-ILLEGAL LOGGING (Please refer to SANGYAMAN MasterPlan) 20. ANTI-ILLEGAL FISHING (Please refer to SANGYAMAN MasterPlan) 21. ANTI-ILLEGAL DRUGS (Please refer to BANAT Master Plan)B. To strengthen linkages with other government and NGOs, local andinternational law enforcement organizations, the AFP, and Presidential TaskForce and Centers as venues for interagency and international cooperationand support, the following shall be implemented. 1) RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING EO 829 AS AMENDEDBY EOs 41 AND 41-A (LECC) 2) PNP IMPLEMENTING PLAN TO EO 61. 3) PNP IMPLEMENTING PLAN TO EO 62.C. To enhance community participation thru the Community-OrientedPolicing System (COPS) and uniform implementation of COPS, theCOMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING SYSTEM (COPS) MANUAL shall beimplemented.
D. To operationalize the Integrated Area/ Community Public Safety Plan(IA/CPSP), IA/CPSP GUIDELINES shall be implemented.E. Definition of TermsV. REFERENCES A. Republic Act 6975, as amended by Republic Act 8551 B. Pertinent NAPOLCOM Resolutions C. NHQ-PNP LOI 10/93 SANDIGAN (PNP Anti-Crime Strategy) D. The PNP Program Thrusts for CY 2001 E. “Pulis ng Bayan, Lingkod ng Mamamayan” by PDDG LEANDRO RMENDOZA F. The Operational PPAs and PER.
SANDUGO (THE PNP ISO MASTER PLAN)I. INTRODUCTION The insurgency problem, whether of the communist or the secessionisttype, has social, economic, political and security dimensions. The securitypart, as manifested by armed guerilla activities, is the most visible sign orsymptom of the problem. The security acts only because of the politicalorganization that provides the leadership and the direction. On the otherhand, the dissatisfaction and grievances of the people resulting from thesocio-economic and political conditions in the area provide the insurgencymovement the reason for its being. Thus, insurgency may not be solved bypolice/military solution alone (although police/military action is vital and animportant part), but by a package of government policies and programs thatcan effectively and simultaneously address the socio-economic, the politicaland the military aspects of the situation. Accordingly, the whole governmentmachinery and instrumentalities must strongly and coordinately be made tobear on the problem. A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE This serves as the long-range and holistic master plan of the PNP inwaging an internal security support operations nationwide. Premised on theestimate of the national situation and other considerations, it prescribes thecounterinsurgency support strategy, operational concept, scheme ofimplementation, service support, and coordinating instructions in order toaccomplish the PNP”s internal security support mission. All subsequent and supplemental Programs of Action, LOIs, andother related issuances to be prescribed and executed by PNP units andpersonnel at all levels which would have a bearing on internal security, musttherefore conform with the intent/spirit and strategic and operationalguidelines embodied herein. This is to ensure the continuity, unity,consistency and synergy of all internal security efforts at all times. B. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS (See Annex 1) C. NATIONAL SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS: 1. General The Government, through the AFP and the PNP, hadlaunched various campaigns and pacification drives in the past decades toresolve the continuing communist insurgency threat. As a result, thecommunist insurgent movement experienced a downtrend in its partybuilding, army building and alliance work. This downtrend was attributedamong others to the vigorous implementation of the series of the PNPsSandugo COIN campaign plans and the AFP Campaign Plan Lambat-Bitag. These developments, however, did not lead to the downfallof the Communist Movement. The CPP/NPA, instead, staged a strategicwithdrawal to avoid decisive defeat by the government forces.
Subsequently, the CPP/NPA launched a rectification campaign to regaincontrol of LCM lost areas and restore its influence in the rural areas.Additionally, the CPP, having experienced a regression in the Yearly sub-stages of the Strategic Defensive Stage focused its activities on ideological,political and organizational (IPO) work to rebuild the party, its army andmass organizations. During the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated NationalPolice (PC/INP) era, internal and external security were tasks relegated tothe Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC/INP then, as one of thefour major services of the AFP had played an indispensable role in counter-insurgency until its deactivation in 1991, with the passage of RA 6975,which resulted in the birth of the PNP. RA 6975 further placed the PNP as thelead agency in the maintenance of internal security although it took until1995, for the PNP to fully assume its primary role in internal security.However, when RA 8551 was passed into law in 1998, internal security wasonce again given to the aegis of the AFP. Moreover, Executive Order No.110 issued on June 15, 1999 mandated the PNP to support the AFP in ISOfor the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to nationalsecurity. The military and police counter-insurgencycampaigns and other complementing efforts by concerned civil governmentagencies LGUs and NGOS, may be classified into three major operations oractivities, namely: (1) Internal Security Operations (ISO) by the AFP and thePNP to provide security to the people and the government; (2) NationalDevelopment operations by the civil government agencies to address the rootcauses of insurgency; and (3) Peace Process by the Office of the PresidentialAssistant on the Peace Process (OPAPP) to complement the overall governmenteffort to attract rebels back to the mainstream of society, in the spirit ofequality, peace, reconciliation and unification. Essentially, these three mutuallycomplementing efforts are the government’s three-pronged strategy inaddressing the country’s insurgency problem. In line with the government’s three-pronged strategy inaddressing the insurgency problem, the PNP and the AFP have expanded theirroles and actively participated in the civil government’s development activitiesthat strike at the root causes of insurgency. As one recognized weakness of thisundertaking is the lack of coordination and unity of efforts among themilitary/police and civil government agencies, thus the National Peace andDevelopment Plan (NPDP) was formulated. Amidst these changes in the operationalenvironment, coupled with the recent political events in our country, the PNPhas to formulate and adopt a comprehensive plan that would define the generalguidelines/concepts of operations and tasks to be observed and followed by allPNP units/offices in supporting the AFP in the suppression of insurgency andother serious threats to national security in conjunction with the NPDP andExecutive Order No. 110. 2. Strategic Guidance a. The National Peace and Development Plan This Plan sets forth the government’s overall plan for addressinginsurgency. It recognizes insurgency as a multi-dimensional problem requiring aholistic and collaborative response and involvement of all sectors of governmentand of the citizenry. It prescribes the Clear – Hold – Consolidate – Develop(CHCD) operational methodology and envisions to launch a concerted,
integrated and collaborative campaign to address insurgency and its root causesthrough the “left – hand” and the “right – hand” responses. The “left – hand”response involves the conduct of political and socio-economic reforms toaddress the root causes of insurgency and win the hearts and minds of thepeople, while the “right –hand” response involves the conduct of offensiveoperations that directly contribute to the decisive defeat of the insurgents andthe dismantling of their politico-military infrastructures. These offensiveoperations include diplomatic, political, intelligence, psychological and militaryoffensive. b. Strategy of "Total-Approach" The National Peace and Development Plan has adopted the Strategyof "Total Approach". Its holistic approach to effectively address armed conflictsin the country consists of a security component, a political component and asocio-economic component. The security component directly addresses violentconflicts, the political component seeks to tap the full cooperation of localgovernment units and civil society to promote good governance and local peaceinitiatives, while the socio-economic component focuses on ways and means toeradicate/alleviate poverty. c. AFP ISO Campaign Plan “BALANGAI”: This is the implementation of the National Peace and DevelopmentPlan and consistent with the National Strategy of “Total Approach” and theClear – Hold – Consolidate and Develop Methodology prescribed in the nationalplan. It envisions the clearing of barangays one after the other bysimultaneously and decisively defeating CPP/NPA armed groups, dismantlingLCM politico – military infrastructures and more importantly Winning the Heartsand Minds of the People. The SOT concept is applied in dismantling the politico– military structure of the enemy and employs the TRIAD of intelligence,combat and psychological operations as separate weapons system to decisivelydefeat its armed groups.II COUNTER - INSURGENCY STRATEGY A. C, PNP’s INTENT I intend to have all the PNP Offices and units consistently andvigorously perform our tasks as mandated by RA 8551 and further providedin EO 110. The Police Regional Police Offices and other tasked PNP Unitsshall be employed accordingly to help support the AFP neutralize the LCMnationwide. This way, the armed components, the infrastructures, and thepolitical machinery of the CPP/NPA/NDF will be dismantled by thegovernment. I likewise intend to have the organization help LocalGovernment Units (LGUs) re-establish or strengthen government authorityand control over insurgency-affected barangays, and have linkages withother security and development agencies and organizations to help attainthe aims of the National Peace and Development Plan of the government. Inso doing the PNP would be able to effectively implement and succeed in thiscampaign plan as the PNP will be greatly involved in harnessing allgovernment resources in the fight against insurgency and its root causes. B. OBJECTIVES 1. Broad Objective
The PNP, in strengthening its participation and involvement in thegovernment’s peace and development machinery, and concurrent with itsstatutory functions and mandate through Executive Order 110, shall support theAFP in ISO for the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats tonational security and to perform its tasks in the National Peace andDevelopment Plan. 2. Specific Objectives a. To develop the capability of field units to fullyoperationalize this ISO support plan for the government and the AFP inparticular. b. To support the AFP in the isolation of the undergroundinfrastructure and front organizations of the insurgents in the towns andcities from the general population c. To enhance intelligence activities against threatgroups d. To enhance the conduct of legal offensive against theinsurgents. e. To support the governments’ National Peace andDevelopment Plan to include the Peace and Reconciliation plan. C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 1. Strategic Concept a. The PNP shall basically support the AFP’s ISOCampaign Plan “Balangai” through the conduct of limited internal securityoperations, sustained law enforcement and PCR activities, intensiveinformation gathering and the conduct of investigation and prosecution ofISO related cases. b. The PNP campaign plan shall also follow the Clear-Hold-Support operational methodology as herein indicated in support to theintegration efforts of the military and other civilian agencies of thegovernment as envisioned in the NPDP and the strategy of “Total Approach”. The CLEAR Stage shall involve the conduct ofcombat, Intelligence and Psychological operations as separate weaponssystems to directly lead to the destruction of the insurgent armed groups.The end state of this phase is dismantled LCM politico-military infrastructurein the affected barangays and the decisive defeat of the main enemy armedgroups in the targeted guerilla fronts. The PNP will support the AFP who isprimarily responsible for the Clear Stage. The HOLD Stage shall involve the utilization of theterritorial defense forces to limit the freedom of action and movement of theCPP/NPA, limit its access to resources and reduce mass base support to theCPP/NPA/NDF. This phase shall have the following end state. IntegratedArea/Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is organized and established, inorder to protect the people, defend communities and secure vital assets andinstallations. The PNP will be primarily responsible for the Hold Stage in areaswhich are turned over to the PNP or where there are no AFP units assigned.
However, other areas especially in those areas where AFP units are present orwhere AFP supervises CAFGU then the IA/CPSP is responsible. The SUPPORT Stage is a “work in progress:. Itshall involve police support to consolidation and development activities ofother agencies of government. The PNP within its capability shall play asupportive role in these activities, including but not limited to the conduct ofmedical and dental civic action, adult literacy programs and providingsecurity in support and in coordination with AFP to civil government agenciesin their delivery of basic services in far-flung and strife-torn area. The Consolidation Stage aims to strengthengovernment control and authority in contested barangays and develop thecapability of local officials to effectively govern their barangays. This stagehas the following end-state; 1) Government authority and control in contestedareas reestablished or strengthened, 2) Government services delivered, 3) Counter-organizations further expanded andconsolidated, and 4) Mass support for the government is enhanced. The Development Stage has the following for itsend state: 1) Root causes of insurgency effectivelyaddressed, and 2) Political and socio-economic reforms plannedat the beginning of the campaign are sustained. c. The overlapping and interrelated phases of thismethodology may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially depending onthe prevailing situation in the targeted area. The efforts of the PNP shallfocus in supporting the AFP on the Clearing and Holding phases, and withinthe local unit capability they shall provide appropriate support to localgovernment units and other concerned agencies in the Consolidation andDevelopment Phase. d. The principle of integration of efforts shall be appliedto accomplish an ISO-related mission. This principal thrust requires the PNP,military and the civil government agencies to work cohesively, and to unifyefforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressinginsurgency. The role of the police aside from supporting the AFP inneutralizing the insurgent politico-military infrastructure is to help create aphysically and psychologically secured environment conducive for socio-economic development. 2. Operational Concept a. The NHQ-PNP, through its directorial staff, shallsupervise and support the Police Regional Offices in implementing thestrategic agenda and operational concept of this counter-insurgencystrategy. The PNP leadership, through the NALEC, the NDCC and the NPOC,
shall coordinate and cooperate with other national government agencies inthe realization of the intent of this counter-insurgency strategy. b. The Police Regional Offices, through the policeprovincial/city offices and municipal/city police stations, RMGs and PMGsshall implement their localized counter-insurgency plans based on thismaster plan. Their plan shall be focused towards the implementation oflocalized activities to attain: (1) development of the capabilities of fieldsunits to support the AFP in the resolution of ISO problem; (2) isolation of theunderground infrastructure and front organizations of insurgents in townsand cities from the general population; (3) enhancement of intelligenceactivities against threat group; and (4) enhancement of legal offensiveagainst the insurgents. c. The Special Action Force is designated as the reservemobile/strike unit of NHQ, PNP. It shall be deployed/committed to supportthe police Regional offices as situation warrants and/or upon request. d. The PNP National Support Units, through theirspecialized operating units and various regional offices, shall assist/support thelocal police units in the conduct of ISO related activities in accordance with theirmandated mission and functions. e. Role of PNP and AFP on Enemy Affected Barangaysparticularly in areas with guerilla frontsInfluenced Infiltrated Threatened As shown in the above schematic diagram, the AFPtakes the primary responsibility in responding to affected areas, particularlyin areas with very active and active guerilla fronts. In these areas, the AFPwill seek to dismantle/neutralize the insurgent political and armedcomponents by mobile battalions of a tasked unit applying the SpecialOperations Team (SOT) concept and the TRIAD concept of Intelligence. Inbuilt - up areas not affected by insurgency, including cities and urban center,the PNP takes the lead role. It shall continue its normal police functions,such as the enhancement of law enforcement activities, maintenance ofpeace and order to ensure public safety intensified intelligence, policecommunity relation activities and other related police operations. f. In areas where the AFP due to its limited resources,cannot physically occupy or adequately secure an area, and where PNP unitsare present or available, the PNP within its capability shall initially providesecurity in the area until AFP reinforcements shall have arrived. However, inareas where there is preponderance of AFP forces or where it is declared byMOA/policy that they are the OPR, the PNP shall, through the conduct oflimited combat support operations assist the AFP mainly because the policepersonnel to be committed on this aspect are the same personnel that areperforming law enforcement functions. On the ground, the Regional Directors, PDsand Chiefs of Police are enjoined to enter into memorandum of understanding
with their AFP counterparts purposely to delineate and define their respectiveresponsibilities/tasks and command relationship based on their capabilities,limitations and the prevailing threat situation and within the limits of the MOAset by DILG/PNP and DND/AFP. g. The PNP through the PROs, PPOs/CPOs and MPSshall undertake the following specific activities during the Clearing andHolding Phases of the operational Methodology: 1) Operations – This shall focus on thefollowing: 1.1) Conduct of population and resourcecontrol/denial measures depending upon the prevailing situation and legalconsideration, such as but not limited to the establishment of checkpoints, androadblock; employment of overt and covert population surveillance; screeningand controlling of displaced persons in the affected areas. 1.2) Deployment of police visibility patrols inrear areas to prevent the entry/incursion of the enemy in threatened/conflictareas. 1.3) Conduct of limited police operations suchas ambush, raid, clearing and other similar operations depending upon thecapability and limitation of forces and threat situation on the ground. 1.4) Implementation of the crime preventionand suppression programs provided for in LOI Sandigan – Milenyo. 1.5) Intensification of the preventive and pro-active measures and guidelines set forth in LOI AGAP dated October 16, 2000. 1.6) Provision of appropriate security measuresto government vital installations/facilities, defense of communities andprotection of the people from insurgent terroristic actions. 1.7) Conduct holding operations in areascleared by the AFP forces to protect the community from possible enemydepredations and terroristic activities, with the support of CAFGUs, CVOs, andthe local government units upon request of, or in coordination with local AFP. 1.8) Operationalization of the IntegratedArea /Community Public Safety Plan (IA/SPSP) through close coordination withthe Local Government Units, Local Peace and Order Councils, Law Enforcementand Disaster Coordinating Councils, in order that it shall appropriate serve asthe unified and integrated direction of the local public safety programs andcreate an active shield against the problems associated with internal security. 1.9) Strengthen the various programs forpublic safety and internal security 2) Intelligence Operations: This shall focus on the following: 2.1) Conduct intensive and sustainedintelligence gathering to identify threat groups and monitor their movements,plans/activities etc. 2.2) Conduct of special projects and caseoperations to neutralize or negate insurgent leadership, logistics fund support,plans and terroristic activities, safe houses and other support facilities.
2.3) Intensify counter intelligence operations todetect and neutralize enemy infiltration, sabotage and subversion, incoordination with the intelligence units of the AFP and other law enforcementagencies. 2.4) Enhance the mobilization and utilization ofthe Barangay Information Nets (BINs) 3) Police Community Relations This shall focus on the following: 3.1) Conduct public information campaign thatwould reduce the influence of the insurgent on the populace through the tri-media. 3.2) Implement measures to gain, preserve andstrengthen civilian support for the programs of the government in counter-insurgency. 3.3) Support the comprehensive, integratedand holistic peace process of the Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 3issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on February 28, 2001 (See Annex-- ) 3.4) Maintain a databank of issues against theinsurgents and develop positive issues for the PNP and AFP for mediaexploitation. 3.5) Conduct civic action, information drives,dialogues, livelihood projects, civil assistance and development, and other alliedPCR activities designed to win back the enemy mass base. 4) Legal Offensive Activities: This shall involve the following: 4.1) Provide efficient and well-coordinatedinvestigation documentation and prosecution of all ISO related cases, incoordination with the DND/AFP, DOJ and the Commission on Human Rights. 4.2) Sustain the filing of ISO related cases andfollow-up the prosecution of cases in court against the insurgents. h. In the Consolidation and Development Phases, theactivities are as follows: 1) Assist the Local Government Units (LGUs) andconcerned civil government agencies in the strengthening and consolidatingcontrol and authority over targeted barangays/areas pursuant to the strategicconcept laid down in the NPDP. 2) Provide/extend appropriate security coverage tocivil government agencies, local government units NGAs, NGOs and GO’s in thedelivery of basic services and development projects to the community duringthe consolidation and development phases. 3) Participate in, and support the Local ChiefExecutives (LCEs) in the selection process of the Civilian VolunteerOrganizations (Bantay Bayan/Kababayan).
4) Intensify intelligence gathering: 5) Ensure that the Integrated Area/CommunityPublic Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) is fully operationalize in coordination with thelocal government units. i. Counter-organization effort against insurgents/secessionists above ground organizations. Counter - organization such as the CVOs/BantayBayan/Kababayan and CAFGUs are organized in barangays that have beende-influenced or cleared from enemy control. The CAFGUs and CVOs/Bantay Bayan/Kababayanshall, during the holding phase, augment the PNP for territorial defense inorder to free the AFP maneuver forces to go on all offensive. The CVOs shallhelp mobilize the people to support the government, the police and themilitary against the insurgents. Another important element of counter organization isthe setting-up of peoples organizations and cooperatives in the clearedbarangays for various livelihood projects and community - basedreforestation (when appropriate). The peoples organizations (POs) andCooperatives can also serve as the nuclei for rural economic developmentand environmental protection to be orchestrated by concerned governmentagencies under the baton of the governor or Mayor. j. Organization of CVOs for ISO Support The CVO is an overt but unarmed component of theLocal Defense Organization. They are directly under the control andsupervision of the local chief executives who shall be assisted by the localpolice and/or military elements in the community. The PCR elements of PNP units/offices incollaboration with the local officials, recruit volunteers to become membersof the CVOs from all sectors of society such as peasants, workers, students,professionals, businessman, religious sectors, out of school youth andothers. The CVOs shall among others perform the followingtasks in support of the police and the military in the area: 1) Collect intelligence reports; 2) Conduct ronda and similar neighborhood watchactivities; 3) Assist in the dissemination of publicinformation; 4) Assist in providing safety and security servicesin cases of emergency; 5) Support and assist in the identification andimplementation of community development projects; and 6) Perform other related tasks. k. Conduct of regular meetings of Coordinating Councilsto plan, monitor, supervise and revitalize ISO government efforts
Government fora such as the peace and ordercouncils, development councils and the disaster coordinating centers andarea coordinating centers are excellent venues or facilities through whichvarious government programs are discussed and facilitated. Concerned PNP units are therefore directed toactively participate in the activities of these bodies for the attainment of arevitalized internal security support operations to the AFP and thegovernment as a whole. l. The operationalization of the DILG/PNPand DND/AFP Joint IRR to EO 110 The core objective of the Joint IRR is to delineate theroles and responsibilities of the PNP and AFP in the implementation of theprovisions of EO 110 in the areas of Operations, Intelligence, PoliceCommunity Relations and Investigation of ISO related cases and otherrelated activities. Likewise, it set forth the concept in Internal SecurityOperations to be conducted jointly by the AFP with the PNP in the supportrole in order to preserve the internal security of the State against insurgentsand other serious threats to national security. Relatedly, the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Developoperational methodology shall be applied to carry out the integrated andfocused effort of the military, police, the entire government machinery andthe NGOs, GOs, POs in addressing insurgency as outlined in the NationalPeace and Development Plan and the Strategy of Total Approach. (SeeAnnex- ): Schematic Diagram of the Operational Methodology) D. TASKS: In furtherance of the intent and purpose of this Plan thefollowing shall also be undertaken by offices/units concerned: 1. NHQ PNP Directorial Staff a. Directorate for Operations 1) Monitor the progress and development of thiscampaign plan; 2) Coordinate/work closely with the Joint AFP-PNPSecretariat on Internal Security Coordinating System (ISCS) for thecontinuous evaluation and assessment of internal security condition of thecountry; 3) Prioritize the deployment of SAF operatingunits to critical areas, especially when there are more critical areas than theavailable operating units; 4) Monitor the operationalization of the IntegratedArea/Community Public Safety Plan; 5) Generate and maintain additional reserveelements from available personnel at NHQ-PNP; and 6) Perform other tasks as directed.
b. Directorate for Police-Community Relations 1) Plan, develop and supervise the PCR activitiesof tasked units; 2) Assist the PROs in the establishment ofeffective inter-agency linkages with concerned government units and NGOs. 3) Develop and pursue PCR activity design to gainthe support and cooperation of the populace on the government; and 4) Perform other tasks as directed/requested. c. Directorate for Personnel and Records Management 1) Fill-up personnel strength of all mobile forcesin accordance with the staffing pattern; 2) Recommend the replacement and/or reshuffleof field commanders when necessary; 3) Prioritize the distribution of recruitment quota toareas where the AFP is not present. 4) Come-up with policies and guidelines onthe proper selection of key positions in insurgency affected areas; and 5) Perform other tasks as directed. d. Directorate for Intelligence 1) Provide policy direction to PROs in theirintelligence efforts; 2) Intensify the conduct of intelligence and CIoperations in support of the AFP; 3) Provide timely and relevant intelligenceand estimates of the situation to all tasked units; 4) Assess continuously the intelligence priorityrequirements; and 5) Perform other tasks as directed. e. Directorate for Investigation and DetectiveManagement 1) Supervise the PROs in their investigation effortsand in the service of warrants of arrest against DT personalities; 2) Monitor and follow-up the cases filed against theinsurgents in the proper court and/or at the Commission on Human Rights; 3) Supervise the PROs and other tasked PNPunits/offices in the implementation of the legal offensive; and 4) Perform other tasks as directed/requested. f. Directorate for Logistics
1) Allocate and re-allocate vehicles, firearms andcommunication facilities based on criticality of the area and threat situation; 2) Plan for and support the additional logisticalrequirement of tasked units; and 3) Perform other tasks as directed/requested. g. Directorate for Plans 1) Responsible in the re-organization of theRegional and Provincial Mobile Groups in accordance with the staffing pattern;and 2) Perform other tasks as directed. h. Directorate for Comptrollership Provide additional fund requirements of tasked units. i. Directorate for Human Resource and DoctrineDevelopment 1) Supervise and monitor the training activities of tasked units; 2) Supervise the SCOUT Training of all mobile forces; and 3) Direct and supervise the training to improvepolice investigative techniques. j. Directorate for Research and Development 1) Conduct continuous research on organizationaland individual equipment that may be appropriate for use in ISO; and 2) Conduct continuous evaluation on the existingorganizational and individual equipment for usefulness, serviceability andapplicability in ISO. 2. NSUsa. PNP Special Action Group 1) Act as the primary mobile force of PNP; 2) Sustain training and retraining of personnel forISO to maintain the highest level of tactical proficiency; and 3) Perform other tasks on orders. b. Aviation Security Group 1) Maintain and enhance the serviceability ofprimary air assets;
2) Prioritize the allocation of flights for an efficientdelivery of air support to ISO; 3) Establish, maintain and improve air-to-groundcommunications system; and 4) Conduct a sustained training on the operationand deployment of air assets as a measure to maintain the highest level ofair tactical proficiency in support to ISO.c. Maritime Group 1) Maintain and enhance the serviceability ofprimary maritime assets; 2) Prioritize the allocation of materials for anefficient delivery of Maritime support to ISO; 3) Maintain and improve ship-to-groundcommunications system; 4) Conduct a sustained training on the operationand deployment of watercrafts; and 5) Perform other tasks on orders.d. Police Community Relations Group 1) Assist PROs in the conduct of PCR and otherPCR operations in support to ISO; 2) Conduct civic action, information drives,dialogues and counter propaganda using the print and broadcast media todiscredit and isolate the threat group politico-military hierarchy; 3) Conduct series of coordination with othergovernment agencies and NGOs for possible support in conjunction with theimplementation of this plan; 4) Assist PROs in the processing of the threatgroup’s members who will avail of the amnesty and balik-baril programs;and 5) Perform other tasks on orders.e. Intelligence Group 1) Intensify information gathering and intelligenceoperations against CPP/NPA/NDF top leadership; 2) Provide timely intelligence information totasked units; 3) Perform other tasks on orders.
f. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group 1) Assist PRO’s in the case build-up and otherdocumentation against CPP/NPA/NDF personalities; 2) Provide investigation teams to other taskedunits; and 3) Perform other tasks on orders. g. Police Security Protection Office 1) Sustain and enhance the security ofembassies, vital installation, and VIPs from atrocities; and 2) Perform other tasks on orders. h. Communications and Electronics Group Provide additional communication requirements totasked units. 3. PROs 1-12, NCRPO, CAR, ARMM and CARAGA The main implementors of this master plan , thus directedto perform the following subject to the MOA with the AFP, PNP priority forAnti-crime, available PNP resources, threat level and other localconsiderations: a. Conduct limited internal security operations,gathering of information and PCR activities in support to the AFP. b. Re-deploy forces, firearms, vehicles andcommunication equipment to address the enemy threat; c. Determine own “force mix” in the deployment offorces for ISO and law enforcement, giving more emphasis to the identifiedprimary thrust or local areas; d. Coordinate closely with the AFP Area Commandswithin respective AORs in the conduct of internal security operations; e. Continue to conduct SCOUT Training until allpersonnel of the mobile forces are trained; f. See to it that all your lower offices have IA/CPSP’sand COPS Plans and are fully implemented; g. Strengthen the organization of COOPs and/ororganize new ones in cleared areas in respective AORs to bolster the existingIA/CPSP; h. Prepare to conduct ISO in areas where no AFP arepresent.
i. Coordinate closely with Peace and OrderCouncil/Development Coordinating Council (POCs/DCC) on other activitiesthat require the active participation of civilian agencies and the privatesector; j. Render quarterly report on the Internal SecurityCondition (ISC) of provinces/municipalities within their respectivejurisdiction; and k. Perform other tasks on orders. 4. Other NSUs a. Assist and support the ISO of PROs in conformitywith their respective area of interest or field of expertise; and b. Continue to perform their respective missions. E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS 1. Respect for human rights shall be paramount, and strictadherence with the PNP Operational Procedure (Revised Rules of Engagement)shall always be emphasized in all police operations. 2. All PNP units shall re-assess respective resources andcapabilities. All IMPLANS AND SOPs, shall be updated to conform with thismaster plan. 3. Tasked units shall operate on the existing logistical andfinancial allocations. NHQ-PNP shall provide additional logistical and financialsupport on a case-to-case basis. 4. Maximum coordination with national government units, non-government organizations and all sectors of the community, for the success ofthis strategy, is authorized and highly encouraged. 5. In order to insure uniformity in adopting/implementing theCOPS and IA/CPSP concepts, all chiefs of police/police supervisors implementingthem must always be guided by the "Community-Oriented Policing System(COPS) Manual for the PNP" issued thru NAPOLCOM Resolution Nr 2000-157dated October 31, 200 and IA/CPSP guidelines and requirements. 6. This Master Plan shall supersede PNP LOI 41/96 CAMPAIGNPLAN SANDUGO III (PNP Counter Insurgency Strategy). However, all applicableissuances, MOUs/MOAs not in conflict with this Master Plan are still in effect. 7. All RDs, PROs and Dirs, NSUs shall submit IMPLANs to thisPlan and periodic reports on its implementation. 8. This Master Plan shall take effect upon approval. LEANDRO R MENDOZA Police Director General Chief, PNP
ATTACHMENTS: A. APPENDICES (OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES) 1. Strengthen the Advance Security Control Point (ASCP)established at the respective area of responsibility in order to prevent policestations/precincts from the attack of the Local Communist Terrorists (LCTs). SOP # 1 – MEMO DIRECTIVE ON ADVANCE SECURITY CONTROLPOINT dated November 5, 1999. 2. Intensify legal offensive campaign particularly in thedocumentation and filing of criminal charges against the DTs, including theservice of pending warrants of arrest. SOP # 2 - MEMO DIRECTIVE RE NOTICE OF TERMINATION OFJASIG DTD JUNE 7, 1999. 3. Enhance the coordination and cooperation between the AFPand PNP in the conduct of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations onmatters involving suppression of insurgency and other serious threats tonational security. SOP # 3 - MOA BY THE AFP AND PNP ON THE CONDUCT OFINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DTD FEBRUARY 19,2001. 4. Strengthen linkages with NGOs, local and international lawenforcement organizations, the AFP, and Presidential Task Force and Centers asvenues for interagency and international cooperation and support. SOP # 17 OF SANDIGAN - IMPLEMENTATION OF EO 829 ASAMENDED BY EOs 41 AND 41-A (LECC) SOP # 18 OF SANDIGAN - CAMPAIGN AGAINSTTRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL SYNDICATES (PNP IMPLEMENTING PLAN TO EO 62) 5. Enhance community participation thru the Community-Oriented Policing System (COPS) SOP # 19 OF SANDIGAN - COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICINGSYSTEM (COPS) MANUAL 6. Operationalize the Integrated Area/Community Public SafetyPlan (IA/CPSP) SOP # 20 OF SANDIGAN - IA/CPSP GUIDELINES B: Definition of Terms Armed Conflict - refers to any conflict betweengovernment forces and organized groups which involves the actual use ofarmed force and which disrupts normal social, economic, political andcultural activities in a specific geographical area. Centers of Gravity - Are the “source of strength andbalance”; that characteristic, capability or locality from wherein the enemyderives its freedom of action, physical strength or the will to fight. It is the“hub of all power and movement”. Its attack should be the focus of alloperations. Centers of gravity can change. A major shift in operational
direction, the replacement of a key enemy commander, the fielding of newunits or weaponry can significantly shift centers of gravity. Combat Operations - These shall mean offensive anddefensive operations such as attack, counter attack, bombing, artillerybarrage and other tactical actions involving the use of bigger, tactical forces,bigger caliber weapons, better armored vehicles and both air and navalweapons systems. Community-Oriented Policing System (COPS) - anintegrated approach to the community’s public safety concern which is basedon the notion that the police can provide better services to the communitythrough the development of an effective partnership between and amongthem. Such partnership must be based on trust and goodwill in order tofacilitate voluntary community support and cooperation to lawenforcement/crime prevention and control activities, thus enhance policeeffectiveness and efficiency, given the same police resource. Counter Insurgency - These are the economic, socio-cultural, political reforms and development including the military and policeactions undertaken by the Government in order to defeat insurgency. Counter Intelligence - An aspect of intelligence devotedto offensive actions to destroy or neutralize the effectiveness of adverseintelligence activities and to undertake defensive actions to protectinformation against espionage, individuals against subversion andinstallations or material against sabotage. Government Forces - refers to the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, the Philippine National Police and other armed groupssupporting the government forces. Information - Refers to unevaluated material of everydescription including those derived from observations, communications,reports, rumors, imagery and other sources from which intelligence isproduced. Information Gathering - It is an activity aimed atidentifying the composition, organization and leadership, disposition, training,strategy and tactics, logistics, combat effectiveness, plans and other relatedinformation about the insurgents and other threat groups. It also includes theacquisition of other related information/data that indirectly or directly relate toinsurgency and other serious threats to national security such as: data oncriminal elements/groups that can be exploited by or can sympathize withinsurgents; results of security survey and personnel security investigation; casebuild-up as part of legal offensive; analysis/assessment of recovered subversivedocuments; and, data about the terrain, weather and the people in certainareas. Insurgency - a condition of subversive political activity,civil rebellion, revolt or insurrection against a duly constituted governmentor occupying power, where irregular forces are formed and engaged inactions, which may include guerilla warfare, that are designed to defy,weaken and/or overthrow the government and occupying power. Integrated Area / Community Public Safety Plan(IA/CPSP) – is the blue print for the protection of lives and properties in agiven locality. It is focused on total mobilization of all available resourcesand the simultaneous conduct of complementary programs involving the
civilian, police and military components of the society. It has ten (10) areasof concern namely: crime prevention, law-enforcement, prosecution,corrections, fire prevention and suppression, counter-insurgency,environmental protection, health and sanitation, civil defense andcommunity development. Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS) - Is astrategy of integrating the efforts of mobile, forces, territorial forces (AFPdesignated territorial forces, CAA companies, PNP and local defenseorganization); local government; local sectoral organizations (NGOs, POs)and the local populace into an effective defense and security system that willsecure and insulate the locality from enemy influence incursion or re-entry. Intelligence - A meaningful statement or a productderived from information which has been selected, recorded, evaluated,analyzed, integrated and interpreted so that its immediate mandate orpotential significance to the development and execution of plans, policiesand operation is made clear. Internal Security - refers to the wide range of measurestaken by the government to free and protect its society from subversion,lawlessness and insurgency. It is established and maintained primarily tocreate an atmosphere of relative peace and order under which nationaldevelopment could be achieved. Internal Security Operations – activities designed topreserve internal security against insurgents, secessionists and terrorists.Among others, it includes territorial defense operations, intelligence, combat,military and police civil relations and psychological operations. Investigation - The process whereby the facts of thecommission of an offense, identity of the person/s responsible and the placeof commission of the offense, are known through examination of the crimescene, interview, or questioning of the witnesses, the complainants orsuspects, and other pieces of evidence presented. National Development – refers to those actions taken bythe government to foster and strengthen its responsiveness and capabilitiesto meet the needs of the society, and to promote the growth of a viablepolitical, economic and social institution that will insure freedom fromconditions bearing potentials for internal conflict. National Security - refers to the state or conditionwherein the people’s way of life and attitudes, their institutions, territorialintegrity and sovereignty, including their well-being, are protected, andenhanced. It is synonymous with the protection of the political, economic,psycho-social, military, geo-ecological and techno-scientific environment ofthe nation. Operational Control (OPCON) – Those functions ofcommand involving composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks,the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operational control should be exercised by the use ofthe assigned normal organizational units through their respective commandersor through the commanders of subordinate forces established by thecommander exercising operational control. It does not include such matters asadministration, discipline, internal organization and unit training except when asubordinate commander requests assistance.
Order of Battle - is a document which reflects enemycomposition, disposition, strength, tactics, logistics, training, combateffectiveness, miscellaneous data and personalities. Police Functions – These are the regular, customary ornormal duties and activities of the police in the performance of its mandate, asenumerated in Section 24 of RA 6975 (DILG/PNP Law of 1990), as amended byRA 8551. Primary/Lead Role - As used herein, shall mean providingthe principal planning, direction, control and resources for internal securityoperations. This shall also include the responsibility for preparing internalsecurity assessment and other related documents and reports unless specifiedby law or directed by competent authority, as well as the establishment andadministration of an appropriate Rewards System. Support for Combat Operations – Assisting the leadagency in internal security operations with personnel and material resourceswithin the capability of the PNP. Threats to National Security - these are dangers tothe components of National Security that could come from within or fromwithout the nation state. They may be political, economic, military, psycho-social, techno-scientific and geo-ecological in nature including but not limitedto organized/syndicated crimes, terrorism, rebellion, coup d’etat andinsurgency.
Annex - 2 OPERATIONAL METHODOLOGY CLEAR HOLD CONSOLIDATE DEVELOP Activities • Clearing of the • Re-establishment of • Strengthening • Full blast to political Government control & of Govt control economic infrastructure thru authority in recovered and authority development gradual areas • Sanctioning of & construction • Organization of CVOs & pro-dissident environmental (TRIAD Way) CAFGUs local officials protection • Formation of Peoples • Expansion of • Field Officers Organization (PO)/Coops POs/Coops (or of NGAs conversion of work together CAFGUS/CVOs under the as such) baton of the LCE Orchestration of development efforts through COC, ROC, etc. RolesDND/AFP- lead agency DILG/PNP - as lead agency DILG/PNP - prosecute DILG/PNP- as leadw/support of DILG/PNP with support of DOJ & AFP dissident local officials agency CDA/NAPC -DOJ – legal offensive CAFGUs/CVOs - augment PNP livelihood projects NAPC - implement field forces Social Reform Agenda DENR - reforestationPIA - media offensive CVOs - mobilize popular projects Others - provide support to Govt and AFP support & Others - support to cooperation per SRA CDA/NAPC - organize livelihood convergence plan Pos/Coops LCEs - orchestration LCE - convergence AFP - support agency of development efforts Leader AFP - support agency AFP – support role REFERENCES a) Section 12 of Republic Act (RA) # 6975 as amended by Section 3 of RA # 8551 b) EO No. 309 concerning the Re-organization of the Peace and Order Councils; c) EO No. 319 concerning the Re-organization of the Local Development Councils; d) EO No. 113 concerning the National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP); e) EO No. 1012 concerning the Local Integrated Security Defense Plan;
f) Joint AFP-PNP SOPs relating the Counter-insurgency; g) “Pro-Democracy PEOPLE’S WAR” Book, 1991; and h) Executive Order (EO) # 110 i) AFP Campaign Plan 01/99 “BALANGAI” j) EO 115, series ’99, - Localization of Peace Efforts; k) National Peace and Development Plan dtd Jan 2000. l) PNP COIN Master Plan (MP-01 SANDUGO) m) MOA on Intelligence & Counter-Intelligence Opns dtd 19February 2001 n) 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures o) MOA on JSOP on ISO dtd 07 Jan 1999 p) MOA on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Operationsdtd 19 February 2001 q) EO No. 3 dtd 28 February 2001