Advertisement
Secure Voting
Report
Ben AdidaFollow
Research Faculty at Harvard UniversityFeb. 14, 2009•0 likes•1,695 views
1 likes
Be the first to like this
Show More
views
Total views
0
On Slideshare
0
From embeds
0
Number of embeds
0
Check these out next
Secure Voting
Feb. 14, 2009•0 likes•1,695 views
1 likes
Be the first to like this
Show More
views
Total views
0
On Slideshare
0
From embeds
0
Number of embeds
0
Download to read offline
Report
Technology
A short and sweet version of my voting talk for the Harvard College Fund meeting. The talk started with Stuart Shieber and ended with Greg Morrisett. I haven't included their slides here, as I'm not sure what license they'd like to use.
Ben AdidaFollow
Research Faculty at Harvard UniversityAdvertisement
Secure Voting
- Voters, Computers, and Trust: Designing Verifiable Elections Stuart M. Shieber Ben Adida Greg Morrisett Center for Research on Computation and Society October 18, 2008 School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University
- Secure Voting
- • Voting is particularly challenging: requires secrecy and public auditability. • Computer science enables qualitatively novel solutions. • Cryptography can reconcile seemingly contradictory requirements.
- quot;That's for me and a button to know.quot; Joe, the plumber.
- 6
- 6
- 6
- 6
- 6
- 6
- 6
- 7
- 7
- “When I finally saw the results of our tests, I thought I was going to throw up.” Sec. of State, Ohio, last week.
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
- Fashionable Voting 10
- Voting is a fundamentally difficult problem. 11
- 14 12
- 14 12 1 person, 1 vote
- Enforced Privacy to ensure each voter votes in his/her own interest 13
- http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ 14
- 1892 - Australian Ballot http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ 15
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Obama Obama Obama McCain McCain McCain Alice the Voter 16
- The Ballot Handoff McCain Obama Obama Obama McCain McCain McCain Alice the Voter Black Box 16
- Chain of Custody 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Voting */ 2 Machine if (... Vendor 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 5 Ballot Box Collection 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice Results 5 6 ..... Ballot Box Collection 19
- Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice Results 5 6 ..... Ballot Box Collection Black Box 19
- Computers have only obscured the process. 20
- Computers have only obscured the process. What about computer science? 20
- Cryptography solving problems that initially appear to have conflicting requirements. 21
- Public-Key Encryption Customer 22
- Public-Key Encryption public key Customer 22
- Public-Key Encryption public key enc(cc number) Customer 22
- Public Ballots Bulletin Board Bob: McCain Carol: Obama 23
- Public Ballots Bulletin Board Bob: McCain Carol: Obama Alice 23
- Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Obama McCain Carol: Obama Alice 23
- Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Obama McCain Carol: Obama Tally Obama....2 McCain....1 Alice 23
- Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: Rice Tally Obama....2 McCain....1 Alice 24
- Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: Ali Rice ce ver Tally ifies he rv Obama....2 ote McCain....1 Alice 24
- Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: lly Ali ta Rice ce e thTally ver es rifi ifies e ve he n ryo rv ve Obama....2 E ote McCain....1 Alice 24
- How can we verify operations on encrypted data? Mathematical Proofs. 25
- Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama 26
- Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama 26
- Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama This last envelope likely contains “Obama” 26
- Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse Vote For: Vote For: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse McCain Paul Obama Open envelopes don’t prove anything after the fact. 27
Advertisement