Controller's Perspective Ifatca


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Controller's Perspective Ifatca

  1. 1. Anthony Smoker IFATCA ASAS-TN2 Second Workshop Roma, 3rd-5th April 2006 Controller's Perspective INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
  2. 2. <ul><li>Introduction </li></ul><ul><li>Some laws about “Cognitive Work” in Human-Machine systems </li></ul><ul><li>Controllers’ Perspectives - the view from Taiwan </li></ul><ul><li>ASAS and the controller - a cornucopia of thoughts </li></ul><ul><li>Conclusions </li></ul>INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
  3. 3. Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 1 <ul><li>“ Every system is stretched to operate at its capacity. As soon as there is some improvement, some new technology, we exploit it to achieve new intensity and tempo of activity” </li></ul><ul><li>Ahhhh - controller workload </li></ul><ul><ul><li>reduced - per flight but increased overall? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>What is the balance of TOTAL controller workload going to be? </li></ul></ul><ul><li>What will be the effect of ASAS? </li></ul>
  4. 4. Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 2 <ul><li>“ All systems are balancing distant plans with local adaptations to cope with the potential surprise” </li></ul><ul><li>We are changing system dynamics and interactions </li></ul><ul><li>Introducing tighter coupling and brittleness? </li></ul><ul><li>Do we want “local” adaptations? </li></ul>
  5. 5. A Systemic View <ul><li>Iterations of future system development to be deployed, are dependent on increasing use of technology, and increasing the actors in the ATM system </li></ul><ul><li>System attributes will change: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Tighter coupling </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>More complex interactions </li></ul></ul>INTERACTIONS Coupling Linear Complex Loose Tight SOURCE: Perrow (1984) Normal Accidents <ul><li>How does this affect: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Our understanding of system safety? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Behaviours of human actors in the system and how to support them? </li></ul></ul>
  6. 6. Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 3 <ul><li>“ Multiple, but potentially conflicting goals, apply to all systems” </li></ul><ul><li>Are we creating, and embedding these, in ASAS operations? </li></ul><ul><li>Are some of the philosophies being espoused currently inducing conflicting goals? </li></ul><ul><li>Do we understand the compound effect of ASAS on operations? </li></ul>
  7. 7. Woods 1st Law(s) of “Co-operation” <ul><li>“ It’s not co-operation if either you do it all, or I do it all” </li></ul><ul><li>“ Co-operative problem solving occurs when the agents co-ordinate activity in the process of problem solving” </li></ul><ul><li>Can we afford to have hybrid solutions that create stressors on the system (stressing safety and capacity)? </li></ul><ul><li>What is the system cost of co-ordination activity? </li></ul>
  8. 8. Woods 2nd Law(s) of “Co-operation <ul><li>“ Co-operating agents have access to partial, overlapping information and knowledge relevant to the problem at hand” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>What does ASAS provide? - because this raises concerns for controllers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ you can’t co-operate with another agent if you assume they are incompetent or… </li></ul></ul>
  9. 9. Mr Weasley’s Rule <ul><li>“ Never trust anything that can think for itself if you can’t see where it keeps its brain” </li></ul><ul><li>Harry Potter and The Chamber of Secrets (pg 329) </li></ul>
  10. 11. The View from Taiwan <ul><li>IFATCA Conference last week debated ASAS and ADS-B applications </li></ul><ul><li>Controllers find the term ASAS misleading </li></ul><ul><li>The transposition of “ADS-B” and ASAS is confusing </li></ul><ul><li>IFATCA views: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ADS-B as surveillance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Surveillance = ground based or airborne applications </li></ul></ul>
  11. 12. The View from Taiwan <ul><li>Airborne surveillance applications grouped into three classes </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Information </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Instructions (Clearances) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Separation (Flight deck based) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>All three can have an affect and influence upon clearances and instructions , and as a consequence separation </li></ul><ul><li>All three can have an impact on separation anyway </li></ul>
  12. 13. The View from Taiwan Surveillance Applications Ground Air Information Separation Instructions
  13. 14. The View from Taiwan <ul><li>Surveillance - Airborne - Information </li></ul><ul><li>This will increase the situational awareness for the flight crew. It will affect ATC in two main ways </li></ul><ul><li>Firstly, information provided to pilots today will not have to be passed at all, or when passed may need to be passed in a different manner </li></ul><ul><li>Secondly, controller and pilot behaviour will change because of this increased “situational awareness” </li></ul>
  14. 15. The View from Taiwan <ul><li>Surveillance – Airborne - Instruction </li></ul><ul><li>This is the use of surveillance information by the flight crew in order to comply with an ATC instruction </li></ul><ul><li>Compare this with an instruction to fly a particular (radar) heading. The pilot uses information on-board the aircraft in order to comply with the instruction </li></ul><ul><li>Importantly, instructions do not change the airways clearance (except to the extent required to comply with the instruction) and separation still remains the responsibility of the controller . </li></ul>
  15. 16. The View from Taiwan <ul><li>Surveillance – Airborne – Separation </li></ul><ul><li>This is the use of surveillance information by the flight crew to separate themselves from one or more aircraft (or hazards) </li></ul><ul><li>This may be delegation of separation from the controller or a situation where the flight crew is already responsible for separation </li></ul>
  16. 17. The View from Taiwan - Headlines from the debate <ul><li>What do we, as controllers want the future profession to look like? </li></ul><ul><li>How are pilots reacting to this, and what do they want? </li></ul><ul><li>How can ASAS be useful in approach control? </li></ul><ul><li>Need to develop conditions when to use ASAS - when it is useful to controllers </li></ul>
  17. 18. In Conclusion <ul><li>The IFATCA view is that ASAS is a variant of Airborne Surveillance </li></ul><ul><li>The provision of “Information” to the flight deck will have an affect upon the control process for controllers and pilots </li></ul><ul><li>In some respects, ASAS is just a different way from doing what we do today </li></ul><ul><li>In other respects it is not as above, and this is a major shift in operations </li></ul>
  18. 19. In Conclusion <ul><li>Responsibility for separation must be unambiguous </li></ul><ul><li>There is confusion as to what is “Separation” and what is “spacing” </li></ul><ul><li>Do not Underestimate the amount of training that will be required - and do not forget recurrent training </li></ul><ul><li>Thank you for listening </li></ul>