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A New US Crisis Response Force for Africa


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Colonel Scott Benedict reviews the new Marine Crisis Response Force at an event at the Atlantic Council.

Published in: News & Politics
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A New US Crisis Response Force for Africa

  1. 1. SPMAGTF-CR Information Brief Colonel S.F. Benedict, USMC 1 The overall classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
  2. 2. UNCLASSIFIED SPMAGTF-CR is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Each MAGTF has four Basic Elements Command Element (CE) Ground Combat Element Aviation Combat Element Logistics Combat Element (GCE) (ACE) (LCE) Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response & Non-Standard Missions (MEU) ~2,500 Forward Presence & Crisis Response With Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) ~15K Swiftly Defeat the Enemy Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) ~30-90K Decisively Defeat MAGTFs are scalable and/or tailored combined-arms Task Forces for any contingency 2
  3. 3. UNCLASSIFIED Mission is Crisis Response SPMAGTF-CR is one of the forwarddeployed crisis response options the U.S. Marine Corps offers AFRICOM/EUCOM AOR. • Along with the ARG/MEU, FAST, BSRF, SPMAGTF-AF and other episodic rotational forces, as well as MSAU To differentiate between similar capabilities of forward deployed USMC CR forces it is useful to think in the following terms:  Permissive to Uncertain and NO vertical lift required: MSAU, FAST, SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU  Permissive to Uncertain and vertical lift required: SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU  Hostile: ARG/MEU, MEB • • Trained and certified to a range of capabilities including: Embassy reinforcement, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Also capable of being the lead element to a larger fly-in echelon (MEU/ MEB/ JTF) 3
  4. 4. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO SPMAGTF-CR Uniqueness SPMAGTF-CR provides a self command and controlled, self deployable, and highly mobile maritime force that helps mitigate the gap in the Mediterranean or Gulf of Guinea left by the absence of the MEU due to a lack of amphibious shipping. It is considered a Rapid Response Force by CCDRs. CR does not replace an ARG/MEU and lacks the combat power, medical, and logistical sustainment an ARG/MEU provides. However, it complements ARG/MEU capabilities at the lower end of the ROMO. SPMAGTF-CR’s marriage of the V-22 and KC-130J organic airlift and small task organized ground combat elements combine to create an extremely agile force SPMAGTF-CR fills a critical deterrent / force of choice role due to its high mobility, self deploy capability, ability to self sustain, and vertical lift capability – unique among crisis response forces in theaters where no ARG/MEU is available 4
  5. 5. UNCLASSIFIED Operating Area Time / Space Problem Framing •It is approximately the same flight time from Moron to Gulf of Guinea as a TRANSLANT from Camp Lejeune NC to Moron Spain. •It is approximately the same flight time from Moron Spain to Camp Lemmonier Djibouti as a flight from Anchorage to Miami. Entebbe is 800 NM further. MORON NASSIG CLNC Niamey •It is approximately the same flight time from Moron to NASSIG as a flight from New York to New Orleans. •The continent of Africa can fit 3.7 times the contiguous land mass of the United States within its shores 5
  6. 6. UNCLASSIFIED Operations Execution Directed to forward stage in NASSIG three times ISO North African unrest  May-July  September  October Conducted Multiple Bi-lateral Training Events and Exercises in Spain and France Souda Bay Moron Dakar, Senegal Conducted Marine Integration Exercises and Rehearsals Sigonella Niamey CLDJ Accra, Ghana Flew 1570 NM to Senegal ISO TSC event and Engagement Conducted multiple Key Leader Engagements with Partner Nations, High Risk Embassies, and Cooperative Security Location Country Teams Deployed 3400 NM to Djibouti Djibouti and additional to and additional 800 NM 800 NM to Uganda ISO South Uganda ISO South Sudan Sudan unrest and US unrest and partial partial US Embassy withdrawal  December-Present 6
  7. 7. UNCLASSIFIED New Normal New Normal Implementation  Whole of government strategy  DoS commitment to early identification of security requirements –  Increased DoD commitment as a stakeholder in USG facility and personnel security abroad –  Implementation of Trip Wires and security coordination Prevent, Deter, Defeat by offering an array of security augmentation AFRICOM TTX Aug13 New Normal Is…. New Normal Is Not…. • Embassy Reinforcement • Focus on Deterrence • Host Nation Training • Scalable / Tailor-able Support • Chief of Mission Influences • • • • • A Forcible Entry NEO Unilaterally DOD CT Operations Only a Kinetic Reaction Lessons Learned from South Sudan EMB JUBA During NN crisis, need to determine what the US government’s endstate is, and then:    How is the endstate reached? Who will determine when endstate is being met? How much risk are we willing to take to reach the endstate?  Who determines the limits of risk (DoD, DoS) we are willing to take to reach the endstate?  What are the limits of the resources (DoD, DoS, IC, etc.) we are willing to use to reach that endstate and or to mitigate risk?  Who will determine those resource limits? Within NN construct, as conditions normalize, we must be as aggressive reconstituting rapid response 7 forces as we were deploying them or we will end up with our highest capabilities tied down indefinitely